From cfc3c3301cda228a9c102be3f4010d36687144ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Thomson Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2025 15:26:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 01/58] ci: Create script for installing custom kernel Creating a script to build and install a modified kernel with patches applied. Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson --- .../hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh | 170 ++++++++++++++++++ resources/hiding_ci/kernel_commit_hash | 1 + resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides | 6 + resources/hiding_ci/kernel_url | 1 + resources/hiding_ci/patches/0001.lore | 1 + 5 files changed, 179 insertions(+) create mode 100755 resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/kernel_commit_hash create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/kernel_url create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/patches/0001.lore diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000000..c898a581384 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# Copyright 2025 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + +# fail if we encounter an error, uninitialized variable or a pipe breaks +set -eu -o pipefail + +check_root() { + # We need sudo privileges to install the kernel + if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then + echo "To install, this script must be run as root or with sudo privileges" + exit 1 + fi +} + +check_ubuntu() { + # Currently this script only works on Ubuntu instances + if ! grep -qi 'ubuntu' /etc/os-release; then + echo "This script currently only works on Ubuntu." + exit 1 + fi +} + +tidy_up() { + # Some cleanup after we are done + echo "Cleaning up.." + popd + rm -rf $TMP_BUILD_DIR +} + +confirm() { + if [[ "$*" == *"--no-install"* ]]; then + echo "Not installing new kernel." + + if [[ "$*" == *"--tidy"* ]]; then + tidy_up + fi + + exit 0 + fi + + if [[ "$*" == *"--install"* ]]; then + return 0 + fi + + while true; do + read -p "Do you want to install the new kernel? (y/n) " yn + case $yn in + [Yy]*) return 0 ;; + [Nn]*) + echo "Exiting..." + exit 1 + ;; + *) echo "Please answer yes or no." ;; + esac + done +} + +apply_patch_file() { + git apply $1 +} + +apply_series_mbox() { + git am $1 --empty=drop +} + +apply_series_link() { + patch_url=$(cat $1) + echo "Fetching mbox from:" $patch_url + curl --output lore.mbox.gz "$patch_url/t.mbox.gz" + gunzip lore.mbox + apply_series_mbox lore.mbox + rm lore.mbox +} + +apply_patch_or_series() { + case "$1" in + *.patch) apply_patch_file $1 ;; + *.mbox) apply_series_mbox $1 ;; + *.lore) apply_series_link $1 ;; + *) + echo "Uknown patch file: "$1 + exit 1 + ;; + esac +} + +check_override_presence() { + while IFS= read -r line; do + if ! grep -Fq "$line" .config; then + echo "Missing config: $line" + exit 1 + fi + done <"$KERNEL_CONFIG_OVERRIDES" + + echo "All overrides correctly applied.." +} + +KERNEL_URL=$(cat kernel_url) +KERNEL_COMMIT_HASH=$(cat kernel_commit_hash) +KERNEL_PATCHES_DIR=$(pwd)/patches +KERNEL_CONFIG_OVERRIDES=$(pwd)/kernel_config_overrides + +TMP_BUILD_DIR=$(mktemp -d -t kernel-build-XXXX) + +pushd . +cd $TMP_BUILD_DIR + +echo "Cloning kernel repository into" $TMP_BUILD_DIR + +# We checkout the repository that way to make it as +# small and fast as possible +git init +git remote add origin $KERNEL_URL +git fetch --depth 1 origin $KERNEL_COMMIT_HASH +git checkout FETCH_HEAD + +# Apply our patches on top +for PATCH in $KERNEL_PATCHES_DIR/*.*; do + echo "Applying patch:" $(basename $PATCH) + apply_patch_or_series $PATCH +done + +echo "Making kernel config ready for build" +# We use olddefconfig to automatically pull in the +# config from the AMI and update to the newest +# defaults +make olddefconfig + +# Disable the ubuntu keys +scripts/config --disable SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS +scripts/config --disable SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS + +# We run this again to default options now changed by +# the disabling of the ubuntu keys +make olddefconfig + +# Apply our config overrides on top of the config +scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -m .config $KERNEL_CONFIG_OVERRIDES + +check_override_presence + +echo "Building kernel this may take a while" +make -s -j $(nproc) +echo "Building kernel modules" +make modules -s -j $(nproc) +echo "Kernel build complete!" + +KERNEL_VERSION=$(KERNELVERSION=$(make -s kernelversion) ./scripts/setlocalversion) + +echo "New kernel version:" $KERNEL_VERSION + +# Make sure a user really wants to install this kernel +confirm "$@" + +check_root +check_ubuntu + +echo "Installing kernel modules..." +make INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 modules_install +echo "Installing kernel..." +make INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 install +echo "Update initramfs" +update-initramfs -c -k $KERNEL_VERSION +echo "Updating GRUB..." +update-grub + +echo "Kernel built and installed successfully!" + +tidy_up diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_commit_hash b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_commit_hash new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..39d6afaaf51 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_commit_hash @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +4701f33a10702d5fc577c32434eb62adde0a1ae1 diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e42464abb89 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +CONFIG_EXPERT=y +CONFIG_KVM=y +CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM=y +CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM=y +CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_url b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_url new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ce6e1a3e6a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_url @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm.git diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/patches/0001.lore b/resources/hiding_ci/patches/0001.lore new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7663841026d --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/patches/0001.lore @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250318161823.4005529-1-tabba@google.com From b23626e508f4040687141c24ef843678871242a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Thomson Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 15:56:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 02/58] test: Add test for kernel build Adding a new integration test to assert that the kernel build script will succeed. Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson --- .buildkite/pipeline_pr.py | 9 ++++++ tests/README.md | 2 ++ .../build/test_hiding_kernel.py | 29 +++++++++++++++++++ tests/pytest.ini | 3 +- 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tests/integration_tests/build/test_hiding_kernel.py diff --git a/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py b/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py index 8744a0dcb6a..1f7b2d3f653 100755 --- a/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py +++ b/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py @@ -70,6 +70,15 @@ for step in kani_grp["steps"]: step["label"] = "🔍 Kani" +if any(x.parent.name == "hiding_ci" for x in changed_files): + pipeline.build_group_per_arch( + "🕵️ Build Secret Hiding Kernel", + pipeline.devtool_test( + pytest_opts="-m secret_hiding integration_tests/build/test_hiding_kernel.py", + ), + depends_on_build=False, + ) + if run_all_tests(changed_files): pipeline.build_group( "📦 Build", diff --git a/tests/README.md b/tests/README.md index e8ad62d0792..803b4e8ec62 100644 --- a/tests/README.md +++ b/tests/README.md @@ -340,6 +340,8 @@ which tests are run in which context: in separate pipelines according to various cron schedules. - Tests marked as `no_block_pr` are run in the "optional" PR CI pipeline. This pipeline is not required to pass for merging a PR. +- Tests marked as `secret_hiding` are secret hiding specifc tests. They don't + run by default. All tests without markers are run for every pull request, and are required to pass for the PR to be merged. diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/build/test_hiding_kernel.py b/tests/integration_tests/build/test_hiding_kernel.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a85a73143cb --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/integration_tests/build/test_hiding_kernel.py @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# Copyright 2025 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +"""A test which checks that the secret hiding enable kernel builds successfully.""" + +import pytest + +from framework import utils + + +@pytest.mark.timeout(600) +@pytest.mark.secret_hiding +def test_build_hiding_kernel(): + """ + In the test we will run our kernel build script to check it succeeds and builds the hidden kernel + """ + + # We have some extra deps for building the kernel that are not in the dev contaner + utils.check_output( + "apt install -y build-essential libncurses-dev bison flex libssl-dev libelf-dev bc dwarves libncurses5-dev kmod fakeroot" + ) + + # We have to configure git otherwise patch application fails + # the git log still credits the original author + utils.check_output('git config --global user.name "Firecracker CI"') + utils.check_output('git config --global user.email "ci@email.com"') + + utils.check_output( + "cd ../resources/hiding_ci; ./build_and_install_kernel.sh --no-install --tidy" + ) diff --git a/tests/pytest.ini b/tests/pytest.ini index 5656c8eee4d..930c4891814 100644 --- a/tests/pytest.ini +++ b/tests/pytest.ini @@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ addopts = -vv --durations=10 --showlocals - -m 'not nonci and not no_block_pr' + -m 'not nonci and not no_block_pr and not secret_hiding' --json-report --json-report-file=../test_results/test-report.json markers = no_block_pr: tests whose failure does not block PR merging. nonci: mark test as nonci. + secret_hiding: tests related to secret hiding. ; Overwrite the default norecursedirs, which includes 'build'. norecursedirs = .* From 827fb4b40f26464ac7f87a57815fdf063afefd38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Thomson Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2025 13:15:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 03/58] ci: Add secret hiding kernel to defaults buildkite Adding the secret hiding kernel as a default for the buildkite pipeline, this will mean that PR's made against the branch will now be run with the new secret hiding enabled amis. Some tests have been marked to skip as they are kernel dependent so while we are compiling our kernel in CI these could change again. Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson --- .buildkite/common.py | 1 + .../functional/test_cpu_features_host_vs_guest.py | 6 ++++++ .../functional/test_shut_down.py | 6 ++++++ .../performance/test_huge_pages.py | 15 +++++++++++++++ .../integration_tests/performance/test_initrd.py | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+) diff --git a/.buildkite/common.py b/.buildkite/common.py index 57a46f945d0..1f468a94e99 100644 --- a/.buildkite/common.py +++ b/.buildkite/common.py @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ DEFAULT_PLATFORMS = [ ("al2", "linux_5.10"), ("al2023", "linux_6.1"), + ("ubuntu24", "secret_hiding"), ] diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_cpu_features_host_vs_guest.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_cpu_features_host_vs_guest.py index 78ea0380f1b..63705d6f161 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_cpu_features_host_vs_guest.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_cpu_features_host_vs_guest.py @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ import os +import pytest + from framework import utils from framework.properties import global_props from framework.utils_cpuid import CPU_FEATURES_CMD, CpuModel @@ -152,6 +154,10 @@ } +@pytest.mark.skipif( + global_props.host_linux_version_tpl > (6, 1), + reason="We don't currently track features for host kernels above 6.1.", +) def test_host_vs_guest_cpu_features(uvm_plain_any): """Check CPU features host vs guest""" diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_shut_down.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_shut_down.py index 4b21aa3d2d5..16220730518 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_shut_down.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_shut_down.py @@ -4,11 +4,17 @@ import platform +import pytest from packaging import version from framework import utils +from framework.properties import global_props +@pytest.mark.skipif( + global_props.host_linux_version_tpl > (6, 1), + reason="The number of threads associated to firecracker changes in newer kernels", +) def test_reboot(uvm_plain_any): """ Test reboot from guest. diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py index 1c5a14873d1..9515abe7942 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py @@ -54,6 +54,11 @@ def check_hugetlbfs_in_use(pid: int, allocation_name: str): assert kernel_page_size_kib > 4 +@pytest.mark.skipif( + global_props.host_linux_version_tpl > (6, 1) + and global_props.cpu_architecture == "aarch64", + reason="Huge page tests with secret hidden kernels on ARM currently fail", +) def test_hugetlbfs_boot(uvm_plain): """Tests booting a microvm with guest memory backed by 2MB hugetlbfs pages""" @@ -102,6 +107,11 @@ def test_hugetlbfs_snapshot(microvm_factory, uvm_plain, snapshot_type): check_hugetlbfs_in_use(vm.firecracker_pid, "/anon_hugepage") +@pytest.mark.skipif( + global_props.host_linux_version_tpl > (6, 1) + and global_props.cpu_architecture == "aarch64", + reason="Huge page tests with secret hidden kernels on ARM currently fail", + ) @pytest.mark.parametrize("huge_pages", HugePagesConfig) def test_ept_violation_count( microvm_factory, @@ -177,6 +187,11 @@ def test_ept_violation_count( metrics.put_metric(metric, int(metric_value), "Count") +@pytest.mark.skipif( + global_props.host_linux_version_tpl > (6, 1) + and global_props.cpu_architecture == "aarch64", + reason="Huge page tests with secret hidden kernels on ARM currently fail", +) def test_negative_huge_pages_plus_balloon(uvm_plain): """Tests that huge pages and memory ballooning cannot be used together""" uvm_plain.memory_monitor = None diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_initrd.py b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_initrd.py index 7b92644efa6..e13c9692318 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_initrd.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_initrd.py @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import pytest from framework.microvm import HugePagesConfig, Serial +from framework.properties import global_props INITRD_FILESYSTEM = "rootfs" @@ -22,6 +23,11 @@ def uvm_with_initrd( yield uvm +@pytest.mark.skipif( + global_props.host_linux_version_tpl > (6, 1) + and global_props.cpu_architecture == "aarch64", + reason="Huge page tests with secret hidden kernels on ARM currently fail", +) @pytest.mark.parametrize("huge_pages", HugePagesConfig) def test_microvm_initrd_with_serial(uvm_with_initrd, huge_pages): """ From 8bf8133f768ed8a04e10b0258d7999bd3604b984 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Thomson Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2025 14:43:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 04/58] tests: Mark kernels newer than 6.12 as next To make it easier to track the upstream kernels which may change as we rebase, let's mark kernels newer than 6.12 as next for now to make dashboarding easier. Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson --- tests/conftest.py | 6 +++--- tests/framework/microvm.py | 2 +- tests/framework/properties.py | 7 +++++++ tests/host_tools/fcmetrics.py | 2 +- 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/conftest.py b/tests/conftest.py index 96ee285d192..ea06d09cac8 100644 --- a/tests/conftest.py +++ b/tests/conftest.py @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ def pytest_runtest_logreport(report): "test": report.nodeid, "instance": global_props.instance, "cpu_model": global_props.cpu_model, - "host_kernel": "linux-" + global_props.host_linux_version, + "host_kernel": "linux-" + global_props.host_linux_version_metrics, "phase": report.when, }, # per test @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ def pytest_runtest_logreport(report): "test": report.nodeid, "instance": global_props.instance, "cpu_model": global_props.cpu_model, - "host_kernel": "linux-" + global_props.host_linux_version, + "host_kernel": "linux-" + global_props.host_linux_version_metrics, }, # per coarse-grained test name, dropping parameters and other dimensions to reduce metric count for dashboard # Note: noideid is formatted as below @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ def pytest_runtest_logreport(report): # per phase {"phase": report.when}, # per host kernel - {"host_kernel": "linux-" + global_props.host_linux_version}, + {"host_kernel": "linux-" + global_props.host_linux_version_metrics}, # per CPU {"cpu_model": global_props.cpu_model}, # and global diff --git a/tests/framework/microvm.py b/tests/framework/microvm.py index 3c672e82e23..a3c6734f80a 100644 --- a/tests/framework/microvm.py +++ b/tests/framework/microvm.py @@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ def dimensions(self): return { "instance": global_props.instance, "cpu_model": global_props.cpu_model, - "host_kernel": f"linux-{global_props.host_linux_version}", + "host_kernel": f"linux-{global_props.host_linux_version_metrics}", "guest_kernel": self.kernel_file.stem[2:], "rootfs": self.rootfs_file.name, "vcpus": str(self.vcpus_count), diff --git a/tests/framework/properties.py b/tests/framework/properties.py index 29041ab6e64..bd6fe955274 100644 --- a/tests/framework/properties.py +++ b/tests/framework/properties.py @@ -104,6 +104,13 @@ def host_linux_version_tpl(self): """Host Linux version major.minor, as a tuple for easy comparison""" return tuple(int(x) for x in self.host_linux_version.split(".")) + @property + def host_linux_version_metrics(self): + """Host Linux version to be reported in metrics""" + return ( + "next" if self.host_linux_version_tpl > (6, 12) else self.host_linux_version + ) + @property def is_ec2(self): """Are we running on an EC2 instance?""" diff --git a/tests/host_tools/fcmetrics.py b/tests/host_tools/fcmetrics.py index 1b3cdcb96b1..4b993810360 100644 --- a/tests/host_tools/fcmetrics.py +++ b/tests/host_tools/fcmetrics.py @@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ def __init__(self, vm, timer=60): self.metrics_logger.set_dimensions( { "instance": global_props.instance, - "host_kernel": "linux-" + global_props.host_linux_version, + "host_kernel": "linux-" + global_props.host_linux_version_metrics, "guest_kernel": vm.kernel_file.stem[2:], } ) From 86647973e72cb1f429bf75a91e53609d702623b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Thomson Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2025 13:56:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 05/58] ci: Move away from using dir stacks Addressing a comment to move away from dir stacks in our install scripts. We now store the start directly before we move the build directory and cd back to that explicitly. Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson --- resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh index c898a581384..7d27f3a3f86 100755 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ check_ubuntu() { tidy_up() { # Some cleanup after we are done echo "Cleaning up.." - popd + cd $START_DIR rm -rf $TMP_BUILD_DIR } @@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ KERNEL_CONFIG_OVERRIDES=$(pwd)/kernel_config_overrides TMP_BUILD_DIR=$(mktemp -d -t kernel-build-XXXX) -pushd . +START_DIR=$(pwd) + cd $TMP_BUILD_DIR echo "Cloning kernel repository into" $TMP_BUILD_DIR From ab60b200061d647e482dc4b4069052e23a94cb55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Thomson Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2025 09:31:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 06/58] tests(bk): Run the kernel build in our nightly PR Run the kernel build as part of our nightly tests so we can monitor it's success. Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson --- .buildkite/pipeline_pr.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py b/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py index 1f7b2d3f653..e7b7b3790ed 100755 --- a/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py +++ b/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ for step in kani_grp["steps"]: step["label"] = "🔍 Kani" -if any(x.parent.name == "hiding_ci" for x in changed_files): +if not changed_files or (any(x.parent.name == "hiding_ci" for x in changed_files)): pipeline.build_group_per_arch( "🕵️ Build Secret Hiding Kernel", pipeline.devtool_test( From e580df88d9b684489024b74f7af37422058ba603 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2025 10:16:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 07/58] ci: Add linux patches for secret hiding Add all required linux host kernel patches required for secret hiding. These are: - v17 of guest_memfd direct map support [1] - Direct map removal patches - make kvm_clock work with direct map removed guest_memfd - v2 of KVM_USERFAULT patches [2] - support for UFFDIO_CONTINUE in guest_memfd VMAs - support for write(2) syscall for guest_memfd [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/diqztt2tjo2s.fsf@ackerleytng-ctop.c.googlers.com/T/#m729a1f14fbbccdd66ed5fe434ff3a9d46b055dec [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250109204929.1106563-1-jthoughton@google.com/ emoval series to apply on top of v17. Rebase all the other series. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- .../hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh | 42 +- resources/hiding_ci/kernel_commit_hash | 2 +- resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides | 1 + ...G_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM-to-CONFIG_KVM_GUES.patch | 187 +++++++++ ...-vendor-neutral-sub-configs-depend-o.patch | 109 ++++++ ...VM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM-directly-from.patch | 42 ++ ...DX-s-KVM_GENERIC_xxx-dependencies-if.patch | 43 +++ ...G_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM-to-CONFIG_.patch | 144 +++++++ ...lot_can_be_private-to-kvm_slot_has_g.patch | 108 ++++++ ...ix-comments-that-refer-to-slots_lock.patch | 50 +++ ...-that-refers-to-kvm-uapi-header-path.patch | 37 ++ ...VM_GUEST_MEMFD-for-all-64-bit-builds.patch | 144 +++++++ ...Add-plumbing-to-host-to-map-guest_me.patch | 185 +++++++++ ...Track-guest_memfd-mmap-support-in-me.patch | 76 ++++ ...me-.private_max_mapping_level-to-.gm.patch | 171 +++++++++ ...t-guest_memfd-max-level-order-helper.patch | 113 ++++++ ...rce-guest_memfd-s-max-order-when-rec.patch | 196 ++++++++++ ...nd-guest_memfd-s-max-mapping-level-t.patch | 163 ++++++++ ...le-guest-page-faults-for-guest_memfd.patch | 60 +++ ...17-KVM-arm64-Refactor-user_mem_abort.patch | 230 +++++++++++ ...-guest_memfd-backed-guest-page-fault.patch | 140 +++++++ ...dle-VNCR_EL2-triggered-faults-backed.patch | 112 ++++++ ...-support-for-guest_memfd-backed-memo.patch | 61 +++ ...vertise-support-for-host-mmap-on-gue.patch | 112 ++++++ ...-not-use-hardcoded-page-sizes-in-gue.patch | 77 ++++ ...est_memfd-mmap-test-when-mmap-is-sup.patch | 274 +++++++++++++ ...d-guest_memfd-testcase-to-fault-in-o.patch | 115 ++++++ ...-address_space-mapping-to-free_folio.patch | 214 +++++++++++ ...direct_map_valid_noflush-to-KVM-modu.patch | 85 +++++ .../0027-mm-introduce-AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP.patch | 208 ++++++++++ ...d-Add-flag-to-remove-from-direct-map.patch | 241 ++++++++++++ ...n-describe-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIREC.patch | 30 ++ ...selftests-load-elf-via-bounce-buffer.patch | 105 +++++ ...t-KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD-in-vm_mem_add-.patch | 71 ++++ ...d-guest_memfd-based-vm_mem_backing_s.patch | 190 +++++++++ ...uff-vm_mem_backing_src_type-into-vm_.patch | 98 +++++ ...ver-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP-i.patch | 49 +++ ...ver-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP-i.patch | 27 ++ ...st-guest-execution-from-direct-map-r.patch | 88 +++++ ...-for-kvm-clock-if-kvm_gpc_refresh-fa.patch | 103 +++++ ...EM_USERFAULT-memslot-flag-and-bitmap.patch | 158 ++++++++ ...M-Add-KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_USERFAULT.patch | 28 ++ ...etting-of-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT-on-guest.patch | 58 +++ ...mu-Add-support-for-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT.patch | 209 ++++++++++ ...M_CAP_USERFAULT-in-KVM_CHECK_EXTENSI.patch | 45 +++ ...64-Add-support-for-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT.patch | 100 +++++ ...mfd-add-generic-population-via-write.patch | 118 ++++++ ...d-generic-continue-for-non-hugetlbfs.patch | 153 ++++++++ ...-provide-can_userfault-vma-operation.patch | 95 +++++ ...ltfd-use-can_userfault-vma-operation.patch | 79 ++++ ...fd-add-support-for-userfaultfd-minor.patch | 41 ++ ...d-add-UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_GUEST_MEMFD.patch | 61 +++ .../0050-fixup-for-guest_memfd-uffd-v3.patch | 71 ++++ resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/GPL-2.0 | 359 ++++++++++++++++++ resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/README.md | 8 + resources/hiding_ci/patches/0001.lore | 1 - 56 files changed, 6079 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0001-KVM-Rename-CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM-to-CONFIG_KVM_GUES.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0002-KVM-x86-Have-all-vendor-neutral-sub-configs-depend-o.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0003-KVM-x86-Select-KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM-directly-from.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0004-KVM-x86-Select-TDX-s-KVM_GENERIC_xxx-dependencies-if.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0005-KVM-Rename-CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM-to-CONFIG_.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0006-KVM-Rename-kvm_slot_can_be_private-to-kvm_slot_has_g.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0007-KVM-Fix-comments-that-refer-to-slots_lock.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0008-KVM-Fix-comment-that-refers-to-kvm-uapi-header-path.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0009-KVM-x86-Enable-KVM_GUEST_MEMFD-for-all-64-bit-builds.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0010-KVM-guest_memfd-Add-plumbing-to-host-to-map-guest_me.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0011-KVM-guest_memfd-Track-guest_memfd-mmap-support-in-me.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0012-KVM-x86-mmu-Rename-.private_max_mapping_level-to-.gm.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0013-KVM-x86-mmu-Hoist-guest_memfd-max-level-order-helper.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0014-KVM-x86-mmu-Enforce-guest_memfd-s-max-order-when-rec.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0015-KVM-x86-mmu-Extend-guest_memfd-s-max-mapping-level-t.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0016-KVM-x86-mmu-Handle-guest-page-faults-for-guest_memfd.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0017-KVM-arm64-Refactor-user_mem_abort.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0018-KVM-arm64-Handle-guest_memfd-backed-guest-page-fault.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0019-KVM-arm64-nv-Handle-VNCR_EL2-triggered-faults-backed.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0020-KVM-arm64-Enable-support-for-guest_memfd-backed-memo.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0021-KVM-Allow-and-advertise-support-for-host-mmap-on-gue.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0022-KVM-selftests-Do-not-use-hardcoded-page-sizes-in-gue.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0023-KVM-selftests-guest_memfd-mmap-test-when-mmap-is-sup.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0024-KVM-selftests-Add-guest_memfd-testcase-to-fault-in-o.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0025-filemap-Pass-address_space-mapping-to-free_folio.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0026-arch-export-set_direct_map_valid_noflush-to-KVM-modu.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0027-mm-introduce-AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0028-KVM-guest_memfd-Add-flag-to-remove-from-direct-map.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0029-KVM-Documentation-describe-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIREC.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0030-KVM-selftests-load-elf-via-bounce-buffer.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0031-KVM-selftests-set-KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD-in-vm_mem_add-.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0032-KVM-selftests-Add-guest_memfd-based-vm_mem_backing_s.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0033-KVM-selftests-stuff-vm_mem_backing_src_type-into-vm_.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0034-KVM-selftests-cover-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP-i.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0035-KVM-selftests-cover-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP-i.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0036-KVM-selftests-Test-guest-execution-from-direct-map-r.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/11-kvm-clock/0037-KVM-x86-use-uhva-for-kvm-clock-if-kvm_gpc_refresh-fa.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0038-KVM-Add-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT-memslot-flag-and-bitmap.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0039-KVM-Add-KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_USERFAULT.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0040-KVM-Allow-late-setting-of-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT-on-guest.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0041-KVM-x86-mmu-Add-support-for-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0042-KVM-Advertise-KVM_CAP_USERFAULT-in-KVM_CHECK_EXTENSI.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0043-KVM-arm64-Add-support-for-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/20-gmem-write/0044-KVM-guest_memfd-add-generic-population-via-write.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0045-mm-userfaultfd-generic-continue-for-non-hugetlbfs.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0046-mm-provide-can_userfault-vma-operation.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0047-mm-userfaultfd-use-can_userfault-vma-operation.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0048-KVM-guest_memfd-add-support-for-userfaultfd-minor.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0049-mm-userfaultfd-add-UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_GUEST_MEMFD.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0050-fixup-for-guest_memfd-uffd-v3.patch create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/GPL-2.0 create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/README.md delete mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/patches/0001.lore diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh index 7d27f3a3f86..fec1dfc75a5 100755 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh @@ -21,6 +21,18 @@ check_ubuntu() { fi } +install_build_deps() { + case $USERSPACE in + "UBUNTU") + apt-get update && apt-get install -y make bsdmainutils flex yacc bison bc xz-utils libelf-dev elfutils libssl-dev + ;; + "AL2023") + yum groupinstall "Development Tools" + yum install make openssl-devel dkms + ;; + esac +} + tidy_up() { # Some cleanup after we are done echo "Cleaning up.." @@ -57,6 +69,8 @@ confirm() { } apply_patch_file() { + echo "Applying patch:" $(basename $1) + git apply $1 } @@ -85,6 +99,23 @@ apply_patch_or_series() { esac } +apply_all_patches() { + if [ ! -d "$1" ]; then + echo "Not a directory: $1" + return + fi + + echo "Applying all patches in $1" + + for f in $1/*; do + if [ -d $f ]; then + apply_all_patches $f + else + apply_patch_or_series $f + fi + done +} + check_override_presence() { while IFS= read -r line; do if ! grep -Fq "$line" .config; then @@ -96,9 +127,12 @@ check_override_presence() { echo "All overrides correctly applied.." } +check_ubuntu +install_build_deps + KERNEL_URL=$(cat kernel_url) KERNEL_COMMIT_HASH=$(cat kernel_commit_hash) -KERNEL_PATCHES_DIR=$(pwd)/patches +KERNEL_PATCHES_DIR=$(pwd)/linux_patches KERNEL_CONFIG_OVERRIDES=$(pwd)/kernel_config_overrides TMP_BUILD_DIR=$(mktemp -d -t kernel-build-XXXX) @@ -117,10 +151,7 @@ git fetch --depth 1 origin $KERNEL_COMMIT_HASH git checkout FETCH_HEAD # Apply our patches on top -for PATCH in $KERNEL_PATCHES_DIR/*.*; do - echo "Applying patch:" $(basename $PATCH) - apply_patch_or_series $PATCH -done +apply_all_patches $KERNEL_PATCHES_DIR echo "Making kernel config ready for build" # We use olddefconfig to automatically pull in the @@ -155,7 +186,6 @@ echo "New kernel version:" $KERNEL_VERSION confirm "$@" check_root -check_ubuntu echo "Installing kernel modules..." make INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 modules_install diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_commit_hash b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_commit_hash index 39d6afaaf51..0e03de1fe6f 100644 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_commit_hash +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_commit_hash @@ -1 +1 @@ -4701f33a10702d5fc577c32434eb62adde0a1ae1 +beafd7ecf2255e8b62a42dc04f54843033db3d24 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides index e42464abb89..86c7504526f 100644 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides @@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM=y CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM=y CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y +CONFIG_KVM_XEN=n diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0001-KVM-Rename-CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM-to-CONFIG_KVM_GUES.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0001-KVM-Rename-CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM-to-CONFIG_KVM_GUES.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..086f055a3d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0001-KVM-Rename-CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM-to-CONFIG_KVM_GUES.patch @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +From 83ed02c1c583b5b831e7827453845fe4fd7b4c80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:32 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 01/49] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM to + CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + +Rename the Kconfig option CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM to +CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD. The original name implied that the feature only +supported "private" memory. However, CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM enables +guest_memfd in general, which is not exclusively for private memory. +Subsequent patches in this series will add guest_memfd support for +non-CoCo VMs, whose memory is not private. + +Renaming the Kconfig option to CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD more accurately +reflects its broader scope as the main Kconfig option for all +guest_memfd-backed memory. This provides clearer semantics for the +option and avoids confusion as new features are introduced. + +Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg +Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 14 +++++++------- + virt/kvm/Kconfig | 8 ++++---- + virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 2 +- + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 4 ++-- + virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h | 4 ++-- + 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +index f19a76d3ca0e..7b0f2b3e492d 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +@@ -2276,7 +2276,7 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level, + int tdp_max_root_level, int tdp_huge_page_level); + + +-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem) + #else + #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) false +diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +index 15656b7fba6c..8cdc0b3cc1b1 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h ++++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot { + short id; + u16 as_id; + +-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + struct { + /* + * Writes protected by kvm->slots_lock. Acquiring a +@@ -720,10 +720,10 @@ static inline int kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + #endif + + /* +- * Arch code must define kvm_arch_has_private_mem if support for private memory +- * is enabled. ++ * Arch code must define kvm_arch_has_private_mem if support for guest_memfd is ++ * enabled. + */ +-#if !defined(kvm_arch_has_private_mem) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM) ++#if !defined(kvm_arch_has_private_mem) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD) + static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm) + { + return false; +@@ -2505,7 +2505,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, + + static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) + { +- return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM) && ++ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD) && + kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn) & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE; + } + #else +@@ -2515,7 +2515,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) + } + #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */ + +-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, + gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t *pfn, struct page **page, + int *max_order); +@@ -2528,7 +2528,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, + KVM_BUG_ON(1, kvm); + return -EIO; + } +-#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM */ ++#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD */ + + #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE + int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_order); +diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig +index 727b542074e7..e4b400feff94 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig ++++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig +@@ -112,19 +112,19 @@ config KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + depends on KVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIER + bool + +-config KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ++config KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + select XARRAY_MULTI + bool + + config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES +- select KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ++ select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + bool + + config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE + bool +- depends on KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ++ depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + + config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE + bool +- depends on KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ++ depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +diff --git a/virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm b/virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm +index 724c89af78af..d047d4cf58c9 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm ++++ b/virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm +@@ -12,4 +12,4 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_ASYNC_PF) += $(KVM)/async_pf.o + kvm-$(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQ_ROUTING) += $(KVM)/irqchip.o + kvm-$(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING) += $(KVM)/dirty_ring.o + kvm-$(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_PFNCACHE) += $(KVM)/pfncache.o +-kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM) += $(KVM)/guest_memfd.o ++kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD) += $(KVM)/guest_memfd.o +diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +index 6c07dd423458..25a94eed75fd 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +@@ -4915,7 +4915,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg) + case KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES: + return kvm_supported_mem_attributes(kvm); + #endif +-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD: + return !kvm || kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm); + #endif +@@ -5352,7 +5352,7 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, + case KVM_GET_STATS_FD: + r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_stats_fd(kvm); + break; +-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + case KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD: { + struct kvm_create_guest_memfd guest_memfd; + +diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h b/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h +index acef3f5c582a..31defb08ccba 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h ++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h +@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static inline void gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start(struct kvm *kvm, + } + #endif /* HAVE_KVM_PFNCACHE */ + +-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + void kvm_gmem_init(struct module *module); + int kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd *args); + int kvm_gmem_bind(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, +@@ -91,6 +91,6 @@ static inline void kvm_gmem_unbind(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) + { + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + } +-#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM */ ++#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD */ + + #endif /* __KVM_MM_H__ */ +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0002-KVM-x86-Have-all-vendor-neutral-sub-configs-depend-o.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0002-KVM-x86-Have-all-vendor-neutral-sub-configs-depend-o.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..fe70a496b4c --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0002-KVM-x86-Have-all-vendor-neutral-sub-configs-depend-o.patch @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +From 8800d0a0bd2be12a870e65a739a7e97441579441 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sean Christopherson +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:33 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 02/49] KVM: x86: Have all vendor neutral sub-configs depend on + KVM_X86, not just KVM + +Make all vendor neutral KVM x86 configs depend on KVM_X86, not just KVM, +i.e. gate them on at least one vendor module being enabled and thus on +kvm.ko actually being built. Depending on just KVM allows the user to +select the configs even though they won't actually take effect, and more +importantly, makes it all too easy to create unmet dependencies. E.g. +KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM can't be selected by KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM, because +the KVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIER dependency is select by KVM_X86. + +Hiding all sub-configs when neither KVM_AMD nor KVM_INTEL is selected also +helps communicate to the user that nothing "interesting" is going on, e.g. + + --- Virtualization + Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support + < > KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support + < > KVM for AMD processors support + +Fixes: ea4290d77bda ("KVM: x86: leave kvm.ko out of the build if no vendor module is requested") +Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +index 2c86673155c9..9895fc3cd901 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ config KVM_WERROR + # FRAME_WARN, i.e. KVM_WERROR=y with KASAN=y requires special tuning. + # Building KVM with -Werror and KASAN is still doable via enabling + # the kernel-wide WERROR=y. +- depends on KVM && ((EXPERT && !KASAN) || WERROR) ++ depends on KVM_X86 && ((EXPERT && !KASAN) || WERROR) + help + Add -Werror to the build flags for KVM. + +@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ config KVM_WERROR + config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM + bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" + depends on EXPERT +- depends on KVM && X86_64 ++ depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 + help + Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- + protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for +@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV + config KVM_IOAPIC + bool "I/O APIC, PIC, and PIT emulation" + default y +- depends on KVM ++ depends on KVM_X86 + help + Provides support for KVM to emulate an I/O APIC, PIC, and PIT, i.e. + for full in-kernel APIC emulation. +@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ config KVM_IOAPIC + config KVM_SMM + bool "System Management Mode emulation" + default y +- depends on KVM ++ depends on KVM_X86 + help + Provides support for KVM to emulate System Management Mode (SMM) + in virtual machines. This can be used by the virtual machine +@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ config KVM_SMM + + config KVM_HYPERV + bool "Support for Microsoft Hyper-V emulation" +- depends on KVM ++ depends on KVM_X86 + default y + help + Provides KVM support for emulating Microsoft Hyper-V. This allows KVM +@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ config KVM_HYPERV + + config KVM_XEN + bool "Support for Xen hypercall interface" +- depends on KVM ++ depends on KVM_X86 + help + Provides KVM support for the hosting Xen HVM guests and + passing Xen hypercalls to userspace. +@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ config KVM_XEN + config KVM_PROVE_MMU + bool "Prove KVM MMU correctness" + depends on DEBUG_KERNEL +- depends on KVM ++ depends on KVM_X86 + depends on EXPERT + help + Enables runtime assertions in KVM's MMU that are too costly to enable +@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ config KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING + + config KVM_MAX_NR_VCPUS + int "Maximum number of vCPUs per KVM guest" +- depends on KVM ++ depends on KVM_X86 + range 1024 4096 + default 4096 if MAXSMP + default 1024 +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0003-KVM-x86-Select-KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM-directly-from.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0003-KVM-x86-Select-KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM-directly-from.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b5e09c6a178 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0003-KVM-x86-Select-KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM-directly-from.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 77d38342c84fd5a10a01fe3180aecc3acdac45dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sean Christopherson +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:34 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 03/49] KVM: x86: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM directly from + KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM + +Now that KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM doesn't have a hidden dependency on KVM_X86, +select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM from within KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM instead of +conditionally selecting it from KVM_X86. + +No functional change intended. + +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +index 9895fc3cd901..402ba00fdf45 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ config KVM_X86 + select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM + select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING + select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY +- select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM + select KVM_WERROR if WERROR + + config KVM +@@ -84,6 +83,7 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM + bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" + depends on EXPERT + depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 ++ select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM + help + Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- + protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0004-KVM-x86-Select-TDX-s-KVM_GENERIC_xxx-dependencies-if.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0004-KVM-x86-Select-TDX-s-KVM_GENERIC_xxx-dependencies-if.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1d33e531e57 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0004-KVM-x86-Select-TDX-s-KVM_GENERIC_xxx-dependencies-if.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 746288ca13800a1aeec74f2a4527d6db2306db59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sean Christopherson +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:35 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 04/49] KVM: x86: Select TDX's KVM_GENERIC_xxx dependencies iff + CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=y + +Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM and KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES directly +from KVM_INTEL_TDX, i.e. if and only if TDX support is fully enabled in +KVM. There is no need to enable KVM's private memory support just because +the core kernel's INTEL_TDX_HOST is enabled. + +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +index 402ba00fdf45..13ab7265b505 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +@@ -95,8 +95,6 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM + config KVM_INTEL + tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support" + depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL +- select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST +- select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if INTEL_TDX_HOST + help + Provides support for KVM on processors equipped with Intel's VT + extensions, a.k.a. Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX). +@@ -135,6 +133,8 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX + bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support" + default y + depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST ++ select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM ++ select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + help + Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) + confidential VMs on Intel processors. +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0005-KVM-Rename-CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM-to-CONFIG_.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0005-KVM-Rename-CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM-to-CONFIG_.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6c73c02f499 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0005-KVM-Rename-CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM-to-CONFIG_.patch @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +From 0f72f7fe353052120eb0853c9fee863c373c7eb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:36 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 05/49] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to + CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE + +The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig +option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate() function, +which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data. + +The new name, HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE, describes the purpose of the +option: to enable arch-specific guest_memfd population mechanisms. It +also follows the same pattern as the other HAVE_KVM_ARCH_* configuration +options. + +This improves clarity for developers and ensures the name accurately +reflects the functionality it controls, especially as guest_memfd +support expands beyond purely "private" memory scenarios. + +Temporarily keep KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM as an x86-only config so as to +minimize churn, and to hopefully make it easier to see what features +require HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE. On that note, omit GMEM_POPULATE +for KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, as regular ol' memset() suffices for +software-protected VMs. + +As for KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM, a future change will select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +for all 64-bit KVM builds, at which point the intermediate config will +become obsolete and can/will be dropped. + +Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg +Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka +Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++---- + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- + virt/kvm/Kconfig | 9 ++++----- + virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 2 +- + 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +index 13ab7265b505..c763446d9b9f 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +@@ -79,11 +79,16 @@ config KVM_WERROR + + If in doubt, say "N". + ++config KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM ++ select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ++ select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ++ bool ++ + config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM + bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" + depends on EXPERT + depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 +- select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM ++ select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + help + Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- + protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for +@@ -133,8 +138,8 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX + bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support" + default y + depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST +- select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM +- select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ++ select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM ++ select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE + help + Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) + confidential VMs on Intel processors. +@@ -157,9 +162,10 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV + depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64 + depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m) + select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM +- select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM ++ select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE + select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE ++ select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE + help + Provides support for launching encrypted VMs which use Secure + Encrypted Virtualization (SEV), Secure Encrypted Virtualization with +diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +index 8cdc0b3cc1b1..ddfb6cfe20a6 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h ++++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +@@ -2534,7 +2534,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, + int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_order); + #endif + +-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM ++#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE + /** + * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data + * +diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig +index e4b400feff94..1b7d5be0b6c4 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig ++++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig +@@ -116,11 +116,6 @@ config KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + select XARRAY_MULTI + bool + +-config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM +- select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES +- select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +- bool +- + config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE + bool + depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +@@ -128,3 +123,7 @@ config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE + config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE + bool + depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ++ ++config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE ++ bool ++ depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +index 7d85cc33c0bb..b2b50560e80e 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn); + +-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM ++#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE + long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user *src, long npages, + kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque) + { +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0006-KVM-Rename-kvm_slot_can_be_private-to-kvm_slot_has_g.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0006-KVM-Rename-kvm_slot_can_be_private-to-kvm_slot_has_g.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..55e9e4b53a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0006-KVM-Rename-kvm_slot_can_be_private-to-kvm_slot_has_g.patch @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +From 31e60b5c346e1bf2ccce5cb32d2379cb8f7dea30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:37 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 06/49] KVM: Rename kvm_slot_can_be_private() to + kvm_slot_has_gmem() + +Rename kvm_slot_can_be_private() to kvm_slot_has_gmem() to improve +clarity and accurately reflect its purpose. + +The function kvm_slot_can_be_private() was previously used to check if a +given kvm_memory_slot is backed by guest_memfd. However, its name +implied that the memory in such a slot was exclusively "private". + +As guest_memfd support expands to include non-private memory (e.g., +shared host mappings), it's important to remove this association. The +new name, kvm_slot_has_gmem(), states that the slot is backed by +guest_memfd without making assumptions about the memory's privacy +attributes. + +Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg +Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 4 ++-- + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 ++-- + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- + virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 2 +- + 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +index 6e838cb6c9e1..fdc2824755ee 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +@@ -3312,7 +3312,7 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, + int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, + const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn) + { +- bool is_private = kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot) && ++ bool is_private = kvm_slot_has_gmem(slot) && + kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn); + + return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, gfn, PG_LEVEL_NUM, is_private); +@@ -4551,7 +4551,7 @@ static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + { + int max_order, r; + +- if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(fault->slot)) { ++ if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(fault->slot)) { + kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault); + return -EFAULT; + } +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +index 2fbdebf79fbb..7744c210f947 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +@@ -2365,7 +2365,7 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) + mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock); + + memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, params.gfn_start); +- if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(memslot)) { ++ if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(memslot)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } +@@ -4719,7 +4719,7 @@ void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code) + } + + slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn); +- if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot)) { ++ if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(slot)) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("SEV: Unexpected RMP fault, non-private slot for GPA 0x%llx\n", + gpa); + return; +diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +index ddfb6cfe20a6..4c5e0a898652 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h ++++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot { + #endif + }; + +-static inline bool kvm_slot_can_be_private(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) ++static inline bool kvm_slot_has_gmem(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) + { + return slot && (slot->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD); + } +diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +index b2b50560e80e..a99e11b8b77f 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user *src, long + return -EINVAL; + + slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, start_gfn); +- if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot)) ++ if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(slot)) + return -EINVAL; + + file = kvm_gmem_get_file(slot); +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0007-KVM-Fix-comments-that-refer-to-slots_lock.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0007-KVM-Fix-comments-that-refer-to-slots_lock.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b1ac9d7c402 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0007-KVM-Fix-comments-that-refer-to-slots_lock.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From a26ec49cecb4ab11cba6e770904ee5f79b29d2b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:38 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 07/49] KVM: Fix comments that refer to slots_lock + +Fix comments so that they refer to slots_lock instead of slots_locks +(remove trailing s). + +Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand +Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg +Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +index 4c5e0a898652..5c25b03d3d50 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h ++++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ struct kvm { + struct notifier_block pm_notifier; + #endif + #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES +- /* Protected by slots_locks (for writes) and RCU (for reads) */ ++ /* Protected by slots_lock (for writes) and RCU (for reads) */ + struct xarray mem_attr_array; + #endif + char stats_id[KVM_STATS_NAME_SIZE]; +diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +index 25a94eed75fd..aa86dfd757db 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, + * All current use cases for flushing the TLBs for a specific memslot + * are related to dirty logging, and many do the TLB flush out of + * mmu_lock. The interaction between the various operations on memslot +- * must be serialized by slots_locks to ensure the TLB flush from one ++ * must be serialized by slots_lock to ensure the TLB flush from one + * operation is observed by any other operation on the same memslot. + */ + lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock); +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0008-KVM-Fix-comment-that-refers-to-kvm-uapi-header-path.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0008-KVM-Fix-comment-that-refers-to-kvm-uapi-header-path.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e0c94d5fd0a --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0008-KVM-Fix-comment-that-refers-to-kvm-uapi-header-path.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From a2fbf5ba7d74d4039918211c6fc95e40ae28f1d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:39 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 08/49] KVM: Fix comment that refers to kvm uapi header path + +The comment that points to the path where the user-visible memslot flags +are refers to an outdated path and has a typo. + +Update the comment to refer to the correct path. + +Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg +Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +index 5c25b03d3d50..56ea8c862cfd 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h ++++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ + /* + * The bit 16 ~ bit 31 of kvm_userspace_memory_region::flags are internally + * used in kvm, other bits are visible for userspace which are defined in +- * include/linux/kvm_h. ++ * include/uapi/linux/kvm.h. + */ + #define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID (1UL << 16) + +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0009-KVM-x86-Enable-KVM_GUEST_MEMFD-for-all-64-bit-builds.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0009-KVM-x86-Enable-KVM_GUEST_MEMFD-for-all-64-bit-builds.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..46490d4b69c --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0009-KVM-x86-Enable-KVM_GUEST_MEMFD-for-all-64-bit-builds.patch @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +From 7b55de369a61bad54d1a110b743c446e2d350c47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:40 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 09/49] KVM: x86: Enable KVM_GUEST_MEMFD for all 64-bit builds + +Enable KVM_GUEST_MEMFD for all KVM x86 64-bit builds, i.e. for "default" +VM types when running on 64-bit KVM. This will allow using guest_memfd +to back non-private memory for all VM shapes, by supporting mmap() on +guest_memfd. + +Opportunistically clean up various conditionals that become tautologies +once x86 selects KVM_GUEST_MEMFD more broadly. Specifically, because +SW protected VMs, SEV, and TDX are all 64-bit only, private memory no +longer needs to take explicit dependencies on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD, because +it is effectively a prerequisite. + +Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +--- + arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 12 ++++-------- + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 9 ++------- + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 4 ++-- + 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +index 7b0f2b3e492d..50366a1ca192 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +@@ -2276,10 +2276,8 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level, + int tdp_max_root_level, int tdp_huge_page_level); + + +-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem) +-#else +-#define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) false + #endif + + #define kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(kvm) (!(kvm)->arch.has_protected_state) +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +index c763446d9b9f..4e43923656d0 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ config KVM_X86 + select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING + select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY + select KVM_WERROR if WERROR ++ select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD if X86_64 + + config KVM + tristate "Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support" +@@ -79,16 +80,11 @@ config KVM_WERROR + + If in doubt, say "N". + +-config KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM +- select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES +- select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +- bool +- + config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM + bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" + depends on EXPERT + depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 +- select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM ++ select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + help + Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- + protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for +@@ -138,7 +134,7 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX + bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support" + default y + depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST +- select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM ++ select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE + help + Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) +@@ -162,7 +158,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV + depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64 + depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m) + select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM +- select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM ++ select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE + select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE + select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE +diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +index 56ea8c862cfd..4d1c44622056 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h ++++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +@@ -719,11 +719,7 @@ static inline int kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + } + #endif + +-/* +- * Arch code must define kvm_arch_has_private_mem if support for guest_memfd is +- * enabled. +- */ +-#if !defined(kvm_arch_has_private_mem) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD) ++#ifndef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm) + { + return false; +@@ -2505,8 +2501,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, + + static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) + { +- return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD) && +- kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn) & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE; ++ return kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn) & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE; + } + #else + static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) +diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +index aa86dfd757db..4f57cb92e109 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +@@ -1588,7 +1588,7 @@ static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm *kvm, + { + u32 valid_flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES; + +- if (kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm)) ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD)) + valid_flags |= KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD; + + /* Dirty logging private memory is not currently supported. */ +@@ -4917,7 +4917,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg) + #endif + #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD: +- return !kvm || kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm); ++ return 1; + #endif + default: + break; +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0010-KVM-guest_memfd-Add-plumbing-to-host-to-map-guest_me.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0010-KVM-guest_memfd-Add-plumbing-to-host-to-map-guest_me.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..141e1915f7d --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0010-KVM-guest_memfd-Add-plumbing-to-host-to-map-guest_me.patch @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +From b280399f5bc244bc6f443a0a67375c400f1a44b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:41 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 10/49] KVM: guest_memfd: Add plumbing to host to map + guest_memfd pages + +Introduce the core infrastructure to enable host userspace to mmap() +guest_memfd-backed memory. This is needed for several evolving KVM use +cases: + +* Non-CoCo VM backing: Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests + entirely backed by guest_memfd, even for non-CoCo VMs [1]. This + provides a unified memory management model and simplifies guest memory + handling. + +* Direct map removal for enhanced security: This is an important step + for direct map removal of guest memory [2]. By allowing host userspace + to fault in guest_memfd pages directly, we can avoid maintaining host + kernel direct maps of guest memory. This provides additional hardening + against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by removing a + potential attack surface within the kernel. + +* Future guest_memfd features: This also lays the groundwork for future + enhancements to guest_memfd, such as supporting huge pages and + enabling in-place sharing of guest memory with the host for CoCo + platforms that permit it [3]. + +Enable the basic mmap and fault handling logic within guest_memfd, but +hold off on allow userspace to actually do mmap() until the architecture +support is also in place. + +[1] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding +[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/cc1bb8e9bc3e1ab637700a4d3defeec95b55060a.camel@amazon.com +[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/c1c9591d-218a-495c-957b-ba356c8f8e09@redhat.com/T/#u + +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg +Acked-by: David Hildenbrand +Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng +Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 +++++++ + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 4 +++ + virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +index a1c49bc681c4..e5cd54ba1eaa 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +@@ -13518,6 +13518,16 @@ bool kvm_arch_no_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_no_poll); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ++/* ++ * KVM doesn't yet support mmap() on guest_memfd for VMs with private memory ++ * (the private vs. shared tracking needs to be moved into guest_memfd). ++ */ ++bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(struct kvm *kvm) ++{ ++ return !kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm); ++} ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE + int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_order) + { +@@ -13531,6 +13541,7 @@ void kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) + kvm_x86_call(gmem_invalidate)(start, end); + } + #endif ++#endif + + int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value) + { +diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +index 4d1c44622056..26bad600f9fa 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h ++++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +@@ -726,6 +726,10 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm) + } + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ++bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(struct kvm *kvm); ++#endif ++ + #ifndef kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem + static inline bool kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(struct kvm *kvm) + { +diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +index a99e11b8b77f..67e7cd7210ef 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +@@ -312,7 +312,72 @@ static pgoff_t kvm_gmem_get_index(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn) + return gfn - slot->base_gfn + slot->gmem.pgoff; + } + ++static bool kvm_gmem_supports_mmap(struct inode *inode) ++{ ++ return false; ++} ++ ++static vm_fault_t kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping(struct vm_fault *vmf) ++{ ++ struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file); ++ struct folio *folio; ++ vm_fault_t ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED; ++ ++ if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode)) ++ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; ++ ++ folio = kvm_gmem_get_folio(inode, vmf->pgoff); ++ if (IS_ERR(folio)) { ++ int err = PTR_ERR(folio); ++ ++ if (err == -EAGAIN) ++ return VM_FAULT_RETRY; ++ ++ return vmf_error(err); ++ } ++ ++ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(folio_test_large(folio))) { ++ ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; ++ goto out_folio; ++ } ++ ++ if (!folio_test_uptodate(folio)) { ++ clear_highpage(folio_page(folio, 0)); ++ kvm_gmem_mark_prepared(folio); ++ } ++ ++ vmf->page = folio_file_page(folio, vmf->pgoff); ++ ++out_folio: ++ if (ret != VM_FAULT_LOCKED) { ++ folio_unlock(folio); ++ folio_put(folio); ++ } ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static const struct vm_operations_struct kvm_gmem_vm_ops = { ++ .fault = kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping, ++}; ++ ++static int kvm_gmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) ++{ ++ if (!kvm_gmem_supports_mmap(file_inode(file))) ++ return -ENODEV; ++ ++ if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) != ++ (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) { ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } ++ ++ vma->vm_ops = &kvm_gmem_vm_ops; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + static struct file_operations kvm_gmem_fops = { ++ .mmap = kvm_gmem_mmap, + .open = generic_file_open, + .release = kvm_gmem_release, + .fallocate = kvm_gmem_fallocate, +@@ -391,6 +456,11 @@ static const struct inode_operations kvm_gmem_iops = { + .setattr = kvm_gmem_setattr, + }; + ++bool __weak kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(struct kvm *kvm) ++{ ++ return true; ++} ++ + static int __kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, loff_t size, u64 flags) + { + const char *anon_name = "[kvm-gmem]"; +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0011-KVM-guest_memfd-Track-guest_memfd-mmap-support-in-me.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0011-KVM-guest_memfd-Track-guest_memfd-mmap-support-in-me.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a2de409fa9e --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0011-KVM-guest_memfd-Track-guest_memfd-mmap-support-in-me.patch @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +From a5d0015d5701f7c76c975dcba6ed4bdc8863ced1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:42 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 11/49] KVM: guest_memfd: Track guest_memfd mmap support in + memslot + +Add a new internal flag, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, to the top half of +memslot->flags (which makes it strictly for KVM's internal use). This +flag tracks when a guest_memfd-backed memory slot supports host +userspace mmap operations, which implies that all memory, not just +private memory for CoCo VMs, is consumed through guest_memfd: "gmem +only". + +This optimization avoids repeatedly checking the underlying guest_memfd +file for mmap support, which would otherwise require taking and +releasing a reference on the file for each check. By caching this +information directly in the memslot, we reduce overhead and simplify the +logic involved in handling guest_memfd-backed pages for host mappings. + +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Acked-by: David Hildenbrand +Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 11 ++++++++++- + virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +index 26bad600f9fa..8b47891adca1 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h ++++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ + * used in kvm, other bits are visible for userspace which are defined in + * include/uapi/linux/kvm.h. + */ +-#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID (1UL << 16) ++#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID (1UL << 16) ++#define KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY (1UL << 17) + + /* + * Bit 63 of the memslot generation number is an "update in-progress flag", +@@ -2490,6 +2491,14 @@ static inline void kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + vcpu->run->memory_fault.flags |= KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE; + } + ++static inline bool kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) ++{ ++ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD)) ++ return false; ++ ++ return slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY; ++} ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + static inline unsigned long kvm_get_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) + { +diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +index 67e7cd7210ef..d5b445548af4 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +@@ -578,6 +578,8 @@ int kvm_gmem_bind(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, + */ + WRITE_ONCE(slot->gmem.file, file); + slot->gmem.pgoff = start; ++ if (kvm_gmem_supports_mmap(inode)) ++ slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY; + + xa_store_range(&gmem->bindings, start, end - 1, slot, GFP_KERNEL); + filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping); +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0012-KVM-x86-mmu-Rename-.private_max_mapping_level-to-.gm.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0012-KVM-x86-mmu-Rename-.private_max_mapping_level-to-.gm.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3076af329c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0012-KVM-x86-mmu-Rename-.private_max_mapping_level-to-.gm.patch @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +From 6773a2fb6642b80d20737c3efd86540d9af4bc0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ackerley Tng +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:43 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 12/49] KVM: x86/mmu: Rename .private_max_mapping_level() to + .gmem_max_mapping_level() + +Rename kvm_x86_ops.private_max_mapping_level() to .gmem_max_mapping_level() +in anticipation of extending guest_memfd support to non-private memory. + +No functional change intended. + +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Acked-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 +- + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 2 +- + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 +- + arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- + arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 4 ++-- + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 6 +++--- + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 2 +- + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 +- + 9 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +index 18a5c3119e1a..62c3e4de3303 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons); + KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(get_untagged_addr) + KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(alloc_apic_backing_page) + KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(gmem_prepare) +-KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(private_max_mapping_level) ++KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(gmem_max_mapping_level) + KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(gmem_invalidate) + + #undef KVM_X86_OP +diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +index 50366a1ca192..c0a739bf3829 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +@@ -1922,7 +1922,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { + void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + int (*gmem_prepare)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order); + void (*gmem_invalidate)(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end); +- int (*private_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn); ++ int (*gmem_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn); + }; + + struct kvm_x86_nested_ops { +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +index fdc2824755ee..b735611e8fcd 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +@@ -4532,7 +4532,7 @@ static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, + if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) + return PG_LEVEL_4K; + +- req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(private_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); ++ req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); + if (req_max_level) + max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level); + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +index 7744c210f947..be1c80d79331 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +@@ -4947,7 +4947,7 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) + } + } + +-int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) ++int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) + { + int level, rc; + bool assigned; +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +index d9931c6c4bc6..8a66e2e985a4 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +@@ -5180,7 +5180,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { + + .gmem_prepare = sev_gmem_prepare, + .gmem_invalidate = sev_gmem_invalidate, +- .private_max_mapping_level = sev_private_max_mapping_level, ++ .gmem_max_mapping_level = sev_gmem_max_mapping_level, + }; + + /* +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +index 58b9d168e0c8..d84a83ae18a1 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code); + void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order); + void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end); +-int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn); ++int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn); + struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa); + #else +@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static inline int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, in + return 0; + } + static inline void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) {} +-static inline int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) ++static inline int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) + { + return 0; + } +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +index dbab1c15b0cd..dd7687ef7e2d 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +@@ -831,10 +831,10 @@ static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) + return tdx_vcpu_ioctl(vcpu, argp); + } + +-static int vt_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) ++static int vt_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) + { + if (is_td(kvm)) +- return tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(kvm, pfn); ++ return tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(kvm, pfn); + + return 0; + } +@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { + .mem_enc_ioctl = vt_op_tdx_only(mem_enc_ioctl), + .vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl = vt_op_tdx_only(vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl), + +- .private_max_mapping_level = vt_op_tdx_only(gmem_private_max_mapping_level) ++ .gmem_max_mapping_level = vt_op_tdx_only(gmem_max_mapping_level) + }; + + struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = { +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +index 66744f5768c8..b444714e8e8a 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +@@ -3318,7 +3318,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) + return ret; + } + +-int tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) ++int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) + { + return PG_LEVEL_4K; + } +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +index 2b3424f638db..6037d1708485 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp); + void tdx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + void tdx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level); +-int tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn); ++int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn); + #endif + + #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */ +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0013-KVM-x86-mmu-Hoist-guest_memfd-max-level-order-helper.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0013-KVM-x86-mmu-Hoist-guest_memfd-max-level-order-helper.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5a4a0dc950c --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0013-KVM-x86-mmu-Hoist-guest_memfd-max-level-order-helper.patch @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +From 01be6db3effd560947df13a0471ba58587477192 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sean Christopherson +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:44 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 13/49] KVM: x86/mmu: Hoist guest_memfd max level/order helpers + "up" in mmu.c + +Move kvm_max_level_for_order() and kvm_max_private_mapping_level() up in +mmu.c so that they can be used by __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(). + +Opportunistically drop the "inline" from kvm_max_level_for_order(). + +No functional change intended. + +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Reviewed-by: Ackerley Tng +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +index b735611e8fcd..20dd9f64156e 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +@@ -3285,6 +3285,42 @@ static int host_pfn_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, + return level; + } + ++static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) ++{ ++ BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL > PG_LEVEL_1G); ++ ++ KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G) && ++ order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M) && ++ order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_4K)); ++ ++ if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G)) ++ return PG_LEVEL_1G; ++ ++ if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M)) ++ return PG_LEVEL_2M; ++ ++ return PG_LEVEL_4K; ++} ++ ++static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, ++ u8 max_level, int gmem_order) ++{ ++ u8 req_max_level; ++ ++ if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) ++ return PG_LEVEL_4K; ++ ++ max_level = min(kvm_max_level_for_order(gmem_order), max_level); ++ if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) ++ return PG_LEVEL_4K; ++ ++ req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); ++ if (req_max_level) ++ max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level); ++ ++ return max_level; ++} ++ + static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, + const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, + gfn_t gfn, int max_level, bool is_private) +@@ -4503,42 +4539,6 @@ void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_async_pf *work) + vcpu->stat.pf_fixed++; + } + +-static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) +-{ +- BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL > PG_LEVEL_1G); +- +- KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G) && +- order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M) && +- order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_4K)); +- +- if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G)) +- return PG_LEVEL_1G; +- +- if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M)) +- return PG_LEVEL_2M; +- +- return PG_LEVEL_4K; +-} +- +-static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, +- u8 max_level, int gmem_order) +-{ +- u8 req_max_level; +- +- if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) +- return PG_LEVEL_4K; +- +- max_level = min(kvm_max_level_for_order(gmem_order), max_level); +- if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) +- return PG_LEVEL_4K; +- +- req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); +- if (req_max_level) +- max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level); +- +- return max_level; +-} +- + static void kvm_mmu_finish_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct kvm_page_fault *fault, int r) + { +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0014-KVM-x86-mmu-Enforce-guest_memfd-s-max-order-when-rec.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0014-KVM-x86-mmu-Enforce-guest_memfd-s-max-order-when-rec.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8b14fc2ecac --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0014-KVM-x86-mmu-Enforce-guest_memfd-s-max-order-when-rec.patch @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +From 58e824be4a291883a4b1f3955825605f0f3cfbe5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sean Christopherson +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:45 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 14/49] KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when + recovering hugepages + +Rework kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() to provide the plumbing to consult +guest_memfd (and relevant vendor code) when recovering hugepages, e.g. +after disabling live migration. The flaw has existed since guest_memfd was +originally added, but has gone unnoticed due to lack of guest_memfd support +for hugepages or dirty logging. + +Don't actually call into guest_memfd at this time, as it's unclear as to +what the API should be. Ideally, KVM would simply use kvm_gmem_get_pfn(), +but invoking kvm_gmem_get_pfn() would lead to sleeping in atomic context +if guest_memfd needed to allocate memory (mmu_lock is held). Luckily, +the path isn't actually reachable, so just add a TODO and WARN to ensure +the functionality is added alongisde guest_memfd hugepage support, and +punt the guest_memfd API design question to the future. + +Note, calling kvm_mem_is_private() in the non-fault path is safe, so long +as mmu_lock is held, as hugepage recovery operates on shadow-present SPTEs, +i.e. calling kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() with @fault=NULL is mutually +exclusive with kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes() changing the PRIVATE attribute +of the gfn. + +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +- + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 2 +- + 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +index 20dd9f64156e..61eb9f723675 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +@@ -3302,31 +3302,54 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) + return PG_LEVEL_4K; + } + +-static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, +- u8 max_level, int gmem_order) ++static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, ++ const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn) + { +- u8 req_max_level; ++ u8 max_level, coco_level; ++ kvm_pfn_t pfn; + +- if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) +- return PG_LEVEL_4K; ++ /* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ ++ if (fault) { ++ pfn = fault->pfn; ++ max_level = fault->max_level; ++ } else { ++ /* TODO: Call into guest_memfd once hugepages are supported. */ ++ WARN_ONCE(1, "Get pfn+order from guest_memfd"); ++ pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT; ++ max_level = PG_LEVEL_4K; ++ } + +- max_level = min(kvm_max_level_for_order(gmem_order), max_level); + if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) +- return PG_LEVEL_4K; ++ return max_level; + +- req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); +- if (req_max_level) +- max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level); ++ /* ++ * CoCo may influence the max mapping level, e.g. due to RMP or S-EPT ++ * restrictions. A return of '0' means "no additional restrictions", to ++ * allow for using an optional "ret0" static call. ++ */ ++ coco_level = kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); ++ if (coco_level) ++ max_level = min(max_level, coco_level); + + return max_level; + } + +-static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, +- const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, +- gfn_t gfn, int max_level, bool is_private) ++int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, ++ const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn) + { + struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo; +- int host_level; ++ int host_level, max_level; ++ bool is_private; ++ ++ lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->mmu_lock); ++ ++ if (fault) { ++ max_level = fault->max_level; ++ is_private = fault->is_private; ++ } else { ++ max_level = PG_LEVEL_NUM; ++ is_private = kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn); ++ } + + max_level = min(max_level, max_huge_page_level); + for ( ; max_level > PG_LEVEL_4K; max_level--) { +@@ -3335,25 +3358,16 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, + break; + } + +- if (is_private) +- return max_level; +- + if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) + return PG_LEVEL_4K; + +- host_level = host_pfn_mapping_level(kvm, gfn, slot); ++ if (is_private) ++ host_level = kvm_max_private_mapping_level(kvm, fault, slot, gfn); ++ else ++ host_level = host_pfn_mapping_level(kvm, gfn, slot); + return min(host_level, max_level); + } + +-int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, +- const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn) +-{ +- bool is_private = kvm_slot_has_gmem(slot) && +- kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn); +- +- return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, gfn, PG_LEVEL_NUM, is_private); +-} +- + void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault) + { + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot; +@@ -3374,9 +3388,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault + * Enforce the iTLB multihit workaround after capturing the requested + * level, which will be used to do precise, accurate accounting. + */ +- fault->req_level = __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, slot, +- fault->gfn, fault->max_level, +- fault->is_private); ++ fault->req_level = kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, fault, ++ fault->slot, fault->gfn); + if (fault->req_level == PG_LEVEL_4K || fault->huge_page_disallowed) + return; + +@@ -4564,8 +4577,7 @@ static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + } + + fault->map_writable = !(fault->slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY); +- fault->max_level = kvm_max_private_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, fault->pfn, +- fault->max_level, max_order); ++ fault->max_level = kvm_max_level_for_order(max_order); + + return RET_PF_CONTINUE; + } +@@ -7165,7 +7177,7 @@ static bool kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte(struct kvm *kvm, + * mapping if the indirect sp has level = 1. + */ + if (sp->role.direct && +- sp->role.level < kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, sp->gfn)) { ++ sp->role.level < kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, NULL, slot, sp->gfn)) { + kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte(kvm, rmap_head, sptep); + + if (kvm_available_flush_remote_tlbs_range()) +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +index 65f3c89d7c5d..b776be783a2f 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, + return r; + } + +-int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, ++int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, + const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn); + void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault); + void disallowed_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_page_fault *fault, u64 spte, int cur_level); +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +index 7f3d7229b2c1..740cb06accdb 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ static void recover_huge_pages_range(struct kvm *kvm, + if (iter.gfn < start || iter.gfn >= end) + continue; + +- max_mapping_level = kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, iter.gfn); ++ max_mapping_level = kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, NULL, slot, iter.gfn); + if (max_mapping_level < iter.level) + continue; + +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0015-KVM-x86-mmu-Extend-guest_memfd-s-max-mapping-level-t.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0015-KVM-x86-mmu-Extend-guest_memfd-s-max-mapping-level-t.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bb9133af62f --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0015-KVM-x86-mmu-Extend-guest_memfd-s-max-mapping-level-t.patch @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +From 66352c48c15b6e80e07f2e79c55d2d6d238573dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sean Christopherson +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:46 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 15/49] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to + shared mappings + +Rework kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() to consult guest_memfd for all mappings, +not just private mappings, so that hugepage support plays nice with the +upcoming support for backing non-private memory with guest_memfd. + +In addition to getting the max order from guest_memfd for gmem-only +memslots, update TDX's hook to effectively ignore shared mappings, as TDX's +restrictions on page size only apply to Secure EPT mappings. Do nothing +for SNP, as RMP restrictions apply to both private and shared memory. + +Suggested-by: Ackerley Tng +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 12 +++++++----- + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 +- + arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 4 ++-- + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 5 +++-- + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 5 ++++- + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 +- + 7 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +index c0a739bf3829..c56cc54d682a 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +@@ -1922,7 +1922,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { + void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + int (*gmem_prepare)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order); + void (*gmem_invalidate)(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end); +- int (*gmem_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn); ++ int (*gmem_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private); + }; + + struct kvm_x86_nested_ops { +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +index 61eb9f723675..e83d666f32ad 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +@@ -3302,8 +3302,9 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) + return PG_LEVEL_4K; + } + +-static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, +- const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn) ++static u8 kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, ++ const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn, ++ bool is_private) + { + u8 max_level, coco_level; + kvm_pfn_t pfn; +@@ -3327,7 +3328,7 @@ static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault * + * restrictions. A return of '0' means "no additional restrictions", to + * allow for using an optional "ret0" static call. + */ +- coco_level = kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); ++ coco_level = kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn, is_private); + if (coco_level) + max_level = min(max_level, coco_level); + +@@ -3361,8 +3362,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, + if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) + return PG_LEVEL_4K; + +- if (is_private) +- host_level = kvm_max_private_mapping_level(kvm, fault, slot, gfn); ++ if (is_private || kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(slot)) ++ host_level = kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(kvm, fault, slot, gfn, ++ is_private); + else + host_level = host_pfn_mapping_level(kvm, gfn, slot); + return min(host_level, max_level); +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +index be1c80d79331..807d4b70327a 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +@@ -4947,7 +4947,7 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) + } + } + +-int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) ++int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private) + { + int level, rc; + bool assigned; +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +index d84a83ae18a1..70df7c6413cf 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code); + void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order); + void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end); +-int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn); ++int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private); + struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa); + #else +@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static inline int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, in + return 0; + } + static inline void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) {} +-static inline int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) ++static inline int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private) + { + return 0; + } +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +index dd7687ef7e2d..bb5f182f6788 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +@@ -831,10 +831,11 @@ static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) + return tdx_vcpu_ioctl(vcpu, argp); + } + +-static int vt_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) ++static int vt_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, ++ bool is_private) + { + if (is_td(kvm)) +- return tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(kvm, pfn); ++ return tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(kvm, pfn, is_private); + + return 0; + } +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +index b444714e8e8a..ca9c8ec7dd01 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +@@ -3318,8 +3318,11 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) + return ret; + } + +-int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) ++int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private) + { ++ if (!is_private) ++ return 0; ++ + return PG_LEVEL_4K; + } + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +index 6037d1708485..4c70f56c57c8 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp); + void tdx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + void tdx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level); +-int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn); ++int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private); + #endif + + #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */ +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0016-KVM-x86-mmu-Handle-guest-page-faults-for-guest_memfd.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0016-KVM-x86-mmu-Handle-guest-page-faults-for-guest_memfd.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..272234e5d0a --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0016-KVM-x86-mmu-Handle-guest-page-faults-for-guest_memfd.patch @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From 0bd3fa88d45b2f38ff12ec419e3b7e6fb8cd64fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ackerley Tng +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:47 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 16/49] KVM: x86/mmu: Handle guest page faults for guest_memfd + with shared memory + +Update the KVM MMU fault handler to service guest page faults +for memory slots backed by guest_memfd with mmap support. For such +slots, the MMU must always fault in pages directly from guest_memfd, +bypassing the host's userspace_addr. + +This ensures that guest_memfd-backed memory is always handled through +the guest_memfd specific faulting path, regardless of whether it's for +private or non-private (shared) use cases. + +Additionally, rename kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private() to +kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_gmem(), as this function is now used to fault in +pages from guest_memfd for both private and non-private memory, +accommodating the new use cases. + +Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng +Co-developed-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +[sean: drop the helper] +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +index e83d666f32ad..56c80588efa0 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +@@ -4561,8 +4561,8 @@ static void kvm_mmu_finish_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + r == RET_PF_RETRY, fault->map_writable); + } + +-static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, +- struct kvm_page_fault *fault) ++static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_gmem(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ++ struct kvm_page_fault *fault) + { + int max_order, r; + +@@ -4589,8 +4589,8 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + { + unsigned int foll = fault->write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0; + +- if (fault->is_private) +- return kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(vcpu, fault); ++ if (fault->is_private || kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(fault->slot)) ++ return kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_gmem(vcpu, fault); + + foll |= FOLL_NOWAIT; + fault->pfn = __kvm_faultin_pfn(fault->slot, fault->gfn, foll, +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0017-KVM-arm64-Refactor-user_mem_abort.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0017-KVM-arm64-Refactor-user_mem_abort.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..fd17a3bb22f --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0017-KVM-arm64-Refactor-user_mem_abort.patch @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +From 3f974a030013f8eac6486d1731b97be765cab5d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:48 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 17/49] KVM: arm64: Refactor user_mem_abort() + +Refactor user_mem_abort() to improve code clarity and simplify +assumptions within the function. + +Key changes include: + +* Immediately set force_pte to true at the beginning of the function if + logging_active is true. This simplifies the flow and makes the + condition for forcing a PTE more explicit. + +* Remove the misleading comment stating that logging_active is + guaranteed to never be true for VM_PFNMAP memslots, as this assertion + is not entirely correct. + +* Extract reusable code blocks into new helper functions: + * prepare_mmu_memcache(): Encapsulates the logic for preparing and + topping up the MMU page cache. + * adjust_nested_fault_perms(): Isolates the adjustments to shadow S2 + permissions and the encoding of nested translation levels. + +* Update min(a, (long)b) to min_t(long, a, b) for better type safety and + consistency. + +* Perform other minor tidying up of the code. + +These changes primarily aim to simplify user_mem_abort() and make its +logic easier to understand and maintain, setting the stage for future +modifications. + +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier +Reviewed-by: Tao Chan +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- + 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +index 2942ec92c5a4..b3eacb400fab 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +@@ -1470,13 +1470,56 @@ static bool kvm_vma_mte_allowed(struct vm_area_struct *vma) + return vma->vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED; + } + ++static int prepare_mmu_memcache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool topup_memcache, ++ void **memcache) ++{ ++ int min_pages; ++ ++ if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled()) ++ *memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache; ++ else ++ *memcache = &vcpu->arch.pkvm_memcache; ++ ++ if (!topup_memcache) ++ return 0; ++ ++ min_pages = kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu); ++ ++ if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled()) ++ return kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(*memcache, min_pages); ++ ++ return topup_hyp_memcache(*memcache, min_pages); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Potentially reduce shadow S2 permissions to match the guest's own S2. For ++ * exec faults, we'd only reach this point if the guest actually allowed it (see ++ * kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault). ++ * ++ * Also encode the level of the original translation in the SW bits of the leaf ++ * entry as a proxy for the span of that translation. This will be retrieved on ++ * TLB invalidation from the guest and used to limit the invalidation scope if a ++ * TTL hint or a range isn't provided. ++ */ ++static void adjust_nested_fault_perms(struct kvm_s2_trans *nested, ++ enum kvm_pgtable_prot *prot, ++ bool *writable) ++{ ++ *writable &= kvm_s2_trans_writable(nested); ++ if (!kvm_s2_trans_readable(nested)) ++ *prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R; ++ ++ *prot |= kvm_encode_nested_level(nested); ++} ++ + static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + struct kvm_s2_trans *nested, + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, unsigned long hva, + bool fault_is_perm) + { + int ret = 0; +- bool write_fault, writable, force_pte = false; ++ bool topup_memcache; ++ bool write_fault, writable; + bool exec_fault, mte_allowed; + bool device = false, vfio_allow_any_uc = false; + unsigned long mmu_seq; +@@ -1488,6 +1531,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + gfn_t gfn; + kvm_pfn_t pfn; + bool logging_active = memslot_is_logging(memslot); ++ bool force_pte = logging_active; + long vma_pagesize, fault_granule; + enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R; + struct kvm_pgtable *pgt; +@@ -1498,17 +1542,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + fault_granule = kvm_vcpu_trap_get_perm_fault_granule(vcpu); + write_fault = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu); + exec_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu); +- VM_BUG_ON(write_fault && exec_fault); +- +- if (fault_is_perm && !write_fault && !exec_fault) { +- kvm_err("Unexpected L2 read permission error\n"); +- return -EFAULT; +- } +- +- if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled()) +- memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache; +- else +- memcache = &vcpu->arch.pkvm_memcache; ++ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(write_fault && exec_fault); + + /* + * Permission faults just need to update the existing leaf entry, +@@ -1516,17 +1550,10 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + * only exception to this is when dirty logging is enabled at runtime + * and a write fault needs to collapse a block entry into a table. + */ +- if (!fault_is_perm || (logging_active && write_fault)) { +- int min_pages = kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu); +- +- if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled()) +- ret = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(memcache, min_pages); +- else +- ret = topup_hyp_memcache(memcache, min_pages); +- +- if (ret) +- return ret; +- } ++ topup_memcache = !fault_is_perm || (logging_active && write_fault); ++ ret = prepare_mmu_memcache(vcpu, topup_memcache, &memcache); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; + + /* + * Let's check if we will get back a huge page backed by hugetlbfs, or +@@ -1540,16 +1567,10 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + return -EFAULT; + } + +- /* +- * logging_active is guaranteed to never be true for VM_PFNMAP +- * memslots. +- */ +- if (logging_active) { +- force_pte = true; ++ if (force_pte) + vma_shift = PAGE_SHIFT; +- } else { ++ else + vma_shift = get_vma_page_shift(vma, hva); +- } + + switch (vma_shift) { + #ifndef __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED +@@ -1601,7 +1622,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + max_map_size = PAGE_SIZE; + + force_pte = (max_map_size == PAGE_SIZE); +- vma_pagesize = min(vma_pagesize, (long)max_map_size); ++ vma_pagesize = min_t(long, vma_pagesize, max_map_size); + } + + /* +@@ -1630,7 +1651,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + * Rely on mmap_read_unlock() for an implicit smp_rmb(), which pairs + * with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(). + */ +- mmu_seq = vcpu->kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq; ++ mmu_seq = kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq; + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); + + pfn = __kvm_faultin_pfn(memslot, gfn, write_fault ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, +@@ -1665,24 +1686,8 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + if (exec_fault && device) + return -ENOEXEC; + +- /* +- * Potentially reduce shadow S2 permissions to match the guest's own +- * S2. For exec faults, we'd only reach this point if the guest +- * actually allowed it (see kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault). +- * +- * Also encode the level of the original translation in the SW bits +- * of the leaf entry as a proxy for the span of that translation. +- * This will be retrieved on TLB invalidation from the guest and +- * used to limit the invalidation scope if a TTL hint or a range +- * isn't provided. +- */ +- if (nested) { +- writable &= kvm_s2_trans_writable(nested); +- if (!kvm_s2_trans_readable(nested)) +- prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R; +- +- prot |= kvm_encode_nested_level(nested); +- } ++ if (nested) ++ adjust_nested_fault_perms(nested, &prot, &writable); + + kvm_fault_lock(kvm); + pgt = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->pgt; +@@ -1953,6 +1958,9 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + goto out_unlock; + } + ++ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_vcpu_trap_is_permission_fault(vcpu) && ++ !write_fault && !kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu)); ++ + ret = user_mem_abort(vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, hva, + esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr)); + if (ret == 0) +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0018-KVM-arm64-Handle-guest_memfd-backed-guest-page-fault.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0018-KVM-arm64-Handle-guest_memfd-backed-guest-page-fault.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5ded77e7cee --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0018-KVM-arm64-Handle-guest_memfd-backed-guest-page-fault.patch @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +From 49e7ea04e12c7b460fd8f1bbb7af396ed015e359 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:49 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 18/49] KVM: arm64: Handle guest_memfd-backed guest page faults + +Add arm64 architecture support for handling guest page faults on memory +slots backed by guest_memfd. + +This change introduces a new function, gmem_abort(), which encapsulates +the fault handling logic specific to guest_memfd-backed memory. The +kvm_handle_guest_abort() entry point is updated to dispatch to +gmem_abort() when a fault occurs on a guest_memfd-backed memory slot (as +determined by kvm_slot_has_gmem()). + +Until guest_memfd gains support for huge pages, the fault granule for +these memory regions is restricted to PAGE_SIZE. + +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Reviewed-by: James Houghton +Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +index b3eacb400fab..8c82df80a835 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +@@ -1512,6 +1512,82 @@ static void adjust_nested_fault_perms(struct kvm_s2_trans *nested, + *prot |= kvm_encode_nested_level(nested); + } + ++#define KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_MEMABORT_FLAGS (KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_HANDLE_FAULT | KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_SHARED) ++ ++static int gmem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, ++ struct kvm_s2_trans *nested, ++ struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, bool is_perm) ++{ ++ bool write_fault, exec_fault, writable; ++ enum kvm_pgtable_walk_flags flags = KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_MEMABORT_FLAGS; ++ enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R; ++ struct kvm_pgtable *pgt = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->pgt; ++ unsigned long mmu_seq; ++ struct page *page; ++ struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm; ++ void *memcache; ++ kvm_pfn_t pfn; ++ gfn_t gfn; ++ int ret; ++ ++ ret = prepare_mmu_memcache(vcpu, true, &memcache); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++ ++ if (nested) ++ gfn = kvm_s2_trans_output(nested) >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ else ++ gfn = fault_ipa >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ ++ write_fault = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu); ++ exec_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu); ++ ++ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(write_fault && exec_fault); ++ ++ mmu_seq = kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq; ++ /* Pairs with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(). */ ++ smp_rmb(); ++ ++ ret = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(kvm, memslot, gfn, &pfn, &page, NULL); ++ if (ret) { ++ kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault_ipa, PAGE_SIZE, ++ write_fault, exec_fault, false); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ ++ writable = !(memslot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY); ++ ++ if (nested) ++ adjust_nested_fault_perms(nested, &prot, &writable); ++ ++ if (writable) ++ prot |= KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_W; ++ ++ if (exec_fault || ++ (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC) && ++ (!nested || kvm_s2_trans_executable(nested)))) ++ prot |= KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_X; ++ ++ kvm_fault_lock(kvm); ++ if (mmu_invalidate_retry(kvm, mmu_seq)) { ++ ret = -EAGAIN; ++ goto out_unlock; ++ } ++ ++ ret = KVM_PGT_FN(kvm_pgtable_stage2_map)(pgt, fault_ipa, PAGE_SIZE, ++ __pfn_to_phys(pfn), prot, ++ memcache, flags); ++ ++out_unlock: ++ kvm_release_faultin_page(kvm, page, !!ret, writable); ++ kvm_fault_unlock(kvm); ++ ++ if (writable && !ret) ++ mark_page_dirty_in_slot(kvm, memslot, gfn); ++ ++ return ret != -EAGAIN ? ret : 0; ++} ++ + static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + struct kvm_s2_trans *nested, + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, unsigned long hva, +@@ -1536,7 +1612,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R; + struct kvm_pgtable *pgt; + struct page *page; +- enum kvm_pgtable_walk_flags flags = KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_HANDLE_FAULT | KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_SHARED; ++ enum kvm_pgtable_walk_flags flags = KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_MEMABORT_FLAGS; + + if (fault_is_perm) + fault_granule = kvm_vcpu_trap_get_perm_fault_granule(vcpu); +@@ -1961,8 +2037,12 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_vcpu_trap_is_permission_fault(vcpu) && + !write_fault && !kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu)); + +- ret = user_mem_abort(vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, hva, +- esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr)); ++ if (kvm_slot_has_gmem(memslot)) ++ ret = gmem_abort(vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, ++ esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr)); ++ else ++ ret = user_mem_abort(vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, hva, ++ esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr)); + if (ret == 0) + ret = 1; + out: +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0019-KVM-arm64-nv-Handle-VNCR_EL2-triggered-faults-backed.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0019-KVM-arm64-nv-Handle-VNCR_EL2-triggered-faults-backed.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4c9f81f4410 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0019-KVM-arm64-nv-Handle-VNCR_EL2-triggered-faults-backed.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From e51d1a89f7620263328422b3b12a2d29f80e19d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:50 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 19/49] KVM: arm64: nv: Handle VNCR_EL2-triggered faults backed + by guest_memfd + +Handle faults for memslots backed by guest_memfd in arm64 nested +virtualization triggered by VNCR_EL2. + +* Introduce is_gmem output parameter to kvm_translate_vncr(), indicating + whether the faulted memory slot is backed by guest_memfd. + +* Dispatch faults backed by guest_memfd to kvm_gmem_get_pfn(). + +* Update kvm_handle_vncr_abort() to handle potential guest_memfd errors. + Some of the guest_memfd errors need to be handled by userspace instead + of attempting to (implicitly) retry by returning to the guest. + +Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier +Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c +index dc1d26559bfa..b3edd7f7c8cd 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c +@@ -1172,8 +1172,9 @@ static u64 read_vncr_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + return (u64)sign_extend64(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, VNCR_EL2), 48); + } + +-static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) ++static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool *is_gmem) + { ++ struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot; + bool write_fault, writable; + unsigned long mmu_seq; + struct vncr_tlb *vt; +@@ -1216,10 +1217,25 @@ static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + smp_rmb(); + + gfn = vt->wr.pa >> PAGE_SHIFT; +- pfn = kvm_faultin_pfn(vcpu, gfn, write_fault, &writable, &page); +- if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn) || (write_fault && !writable)) ++ memslot = gfn_to_memslot(vcpu->kvm, gfn); ++ if (!memslot) + return -EFAULT; + ++ *is_gmem = kvm_slot_has_gmem(memslot); ++ if (!*is_gmem) { ++ pfn = __kvm_faultin_pfn(memslot, gfn, write_fault ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, ++ &writable, &page); ++ if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn) || (write_fault && !writable)) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ } else { ++ ret = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(vcpu->kvm, memslot, gfn, &pfn, &page, NULL); ++ if (ret) { ++ kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, vt->wr.pa, PAGE_SIZE, ++ write_fault, false, false); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ } ++ + scoped_guard(write_lock, &vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock) { + if (mmu_invalidate_retry(vcpu->kvm, mmu_seq)) + return -EAGAIN; +@@ -1292,23 +1308,36 @@ int kvm_handle_vncr_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + if (esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr)) { + inject_vncr_perm(vcpu); + } else if (esr_fsc_is_translation_fault(esr)) { +- bool valid; ++ bool valid, is_gmem = false; + int ret; + + scoped_guard(read_lock, &vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock) + valid = kvm_vncr_tlb_lookup(vcpu); + + if (!valid) +- ret = kvm_translate_vncr(vcpu); ++ ret = kvm_translate_vncr(vcpu, &is_gmem); + else + ret = -EPERM; + + switch (ret) { + case -EAGAIN: +- case -ENOMEM: + /* Let's try again... */ + break; ++ case -ENOMEM: ++ /* ++ * For guest_memfd, this indicates that it failed to ++ * create a folio to back the memory. Inform userspace. ++ */ ++ if (is_gmem) ++ return 0; ++ /* Otherwise, let's try again... */ ++ break; + case -EFAULT: ++ case -EIO: ++ case -EHWPOISON: ++ if (is_gmem) ++ return 0; ++ fallthrough; + case -EINVAL: + case -ENOENT: + case -EACCES: +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0020-KVM-arm64-Enable-support-for-guest_memfd-backed-memo.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0020-KVM-arm64-Enable-support-for-guest_memfd-backed-memo.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9b15868d043 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0020-KVM-arm64-Enable-support-for-guest_memfd-backed-memo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From 0a292815117d6ce72fe76168aa51686e052deb9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:51 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 20/49] KVM: arm64: Enable support for guest_memfd backed + memory + +Now that the infrastructure is in place, enable guest_memfd for arm64. + +* Select CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD in KVM/arm64 Kconfig. + +* Enforce KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY for guest_memfd on arm64: Ensure that + guest_memfd-backed memory slots on arm64 are only supported if they + are intended for shared memory use cases (i.e., + kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only() is true). This design reflects the current + arm64 KVM ecosystem where guest_memfd is primarily being introduced + for VMs that support shared memory. + +Reviewed-by: James Houghton +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier +Acked-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 1 + + arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 7 +++++++ + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig +index 713248f240e0..bff62e75d681 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig +@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ menuconfig KVM + select HAVE_KVM_VCPU_RUN_PID_CHANGE + select SCHED_INFO + select GUEST_PERF_EVENTS if PERF_EVENTS ++ select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + help + Support hosting virtualized guest machines. + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +index 8c82df80a835..85559b8a0845 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +@@ -2276,6 +2276,13 @@ int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, + if ((new->base_gfn + new->npages) > (kvm_phys_size(&kvm->arch.mmu) >> PAGE_SHIFT)) + return -EFAULT; + ++ /* ++ * Only support guest_memfd backed memslots with mappable memory, since ++ * there aren't any CoCo VMs that support only private memory on arm64. ++ */ ++ if (kvm_slot_has_gmem(new) && !kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(new)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ + hva = new->userspace_addr; + reg_end = hva + (new->npages << PAGE_SHIFT); + +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0021-KVM-Allow-and-advertise-support-for-host-mmap-on-gue.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0021-KVM-Allow-and-advertise-support-for-host-mmap-on-gue.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0e112477933 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0021-KVM-Allow-and-advertise-support-for-host-mmap-on-gue.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From 61dcc8ae40093daad33c80b115228cf06b35ebc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:52 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 21/49] KVM: Allow and advertise support for host mmap() on + guest_memfd files + +Now that all the x86 and arm64 plumbing for mmap() on guest_memfd is in +place, allow userspace to set GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP and advertise support +via a new capability, KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP. + +The availability of this capability is determined per architecture, and +its enablement for a specific guest_memfd instance is controlled by the +GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP flag at creation time. + +Update the KVM API documentation to detail the KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP +capability, the associated GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP, and provide essential +information regarding support for mmap in guest_memfd. + +Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg +Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 9 +++++++++ + include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 ++ + virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 7 ++++++- + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 ++ + 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +index fcb783735dd1..1e0c4a68876d 100644 +--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst ++++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +@@ -6414,6 +6414,15 @@ most one mapping per page, i.e. binding multiple memory regions to a single + guest_memfd range is not allowed (any number of memory regions can be bound to + a single guest_memfd file, but the bound ranges must not overlap). + ++When the capability KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP is supported, the 'flags' field ++supports GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP. Setting this flag on guest_memfd creation ++enables mmap() and faulting of guest_memfd memory to host userspace. ++ ++When the KVM MMU performs a PFN lookup to service a guest fault and the backing ++guest_memfd has the GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP set, then the fault will always be ++consumed from guest_memfd, regardless of whether it is a shared or a private ++fault. ++ + See KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 for additional details. + + 4.143 KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY +diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +index aeb2ca10b190..0d96d2ae6e5d 100644 +--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +@@ -961,6 +961,7 @@ struct kvm_enable_cap { + #define KVM_CAP_ARM_EL2 240 + #define KVM_CAP_ARM_EL2_E2H0 241 + #define KVM_CAP_RISCV_MP_STATE_RESET 242 ++#define KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP 243 + + struct kvm_irq_routing_irqchip { + __u32 irqchip; +@@ -1597,6 +1598,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_attributes { + #define KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE (1ULL << 3) + + #define KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xd4, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd) ++#define GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP (1ULL << 0) + + struct kvm_create_guest_memfd { + __u64 size; +diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +index d5b445548af4..08a6bc7d25b6 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +@@ -314,7 +314,9 @@ static pgoff_t kvm_gmem_get_index(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn) + + static bool kvm_gmem_supports_mmap(struct inode *inode) + { +- return false; ++ const u64 flags = (u64)inode->i_private; ++ ++ return flags & GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP; + } + + static vm_fault_t kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping(struct vm_fault *vmf) +@@ -522,6 +524,9 @@ int kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd *args) + u64 flags = args->flags; + u64 valid_flags = 0; + ++ if (kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(kvm)) ++ valid_flags |= GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP; ++ + if (flags & ~valid_flags) + return -EINVAL; + +diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +index 4f57cb92e109..18f29ef93543 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +@@ -4918,6 +4918,8 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg) + #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD: + return 1; ++ case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP: ++ return !kvm || kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(kvm); + #endif + default: + break; +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0022-KVM-selftests-Do-not-use-hardcoded-page-sizes-in-gue.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0022-KVM-selftests-Do-not-use-hardcoded-page-sizes-in-gue.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7a835dc0ce5 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0022-KVM-selftests-Do-not-use-hardcoded-page-sizes-in-gue.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From de2729aec6884d52d796ae7be26c648499694d47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:53 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 22/49] KVM: selftests: Do not use hardcoded page sizes in + guest_memfd test + +Update the guest_memfd_test selftest to use getpagesize() instead of +hardcoded 4KB page size values. + +Using hardcoded page sizes can cause test failures on architectures or +systems configured with larger page sizes, such as arm64 with 64KB +pages. By dynamically querying the system's page size, the test becomes +more portable and robust across different environments. + +Additionally, build the guest_memfd_test selftest for arm64. + +Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand +Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg +Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan +Suggested-by: Gavin Shan +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 1 + + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 11 ++++++----- + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm +index 40920445bfbe..963687892bcb 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm +@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += arch_timer + TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += coalesced_io_test + TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += dirty_log_perf_test + TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += get-reg-list ++TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += guest_memfd_test + TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += memslot_modification_stress_test + TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += memslot_perf_test + TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += mmu_stress_test +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +index ce687f8d248f..341ba616cf55 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +@@ -146,24 +146,25 @@ static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(struct kvm_vm *vm) + { + int fd1, fd2, ret; + struct stat st1, st2; ++ size_t page_size = getpagesize(); + +- fd1 = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, 4096, 0); ++ fd1 = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, page_size, 0); + TEST_ASSERT(fd1 != -1, "memfd creation should succeed"); + + ret = fstat(fd1, &st1); + TEST_ASSERT(ret != -1, "memfd fstat should succeed"); +- TEST_ASSERT(st1.st_size == 4096, "memfd st_size should match requested size"); ++ TEST_ASSERT(st1.st_size == page_size, "memfd st_size should match requested size"); + +- fd2 = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, 8192, 0); ++ fd2 = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, page_size * 2, 0); + TEST_ASSERT(fd2 != -1, "memfd creation should succeed"); + + ret = fstat(fd2, &st2); + TEST_ASSERT(ret != -1, "memfd fstat should succeed"); +- TEST_ASSERT(st2.st_size == 8192, "second memfd st_size should match requested size"); ++ TEST_ASSERT(st2.st_size == page_size * 2, "second memfd st_size should match requested size"); + + ret = fstat(fd1, &st1); + TEST_ASSERT(ret != -1, "memfd fstat should succeed"); +- TEST_ASSERT(st1.st_size == 4096, "first memfd st_size should still match requested size"); ++ TEST_ASSERT(st1.st_size == page_size, "first memfd st_size should still match requested size"); + TEST_ASSERT(st1.st_ino != st2.st_ino, "different memfd should have different inode numbers"); + + close(fd2); +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0023-KVM-selftests-guest_memfd-mmap-test-when-mmap-is-sup.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0023-KVM-selftests-guest_memfd-mmap-test-when-mmap-is-sup.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a9201e5cf4e --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0023-KVM-selftests-guest_memfd-mmap-test-when-mmap-is-sup.patch @@ -0,0 +1,274 @@ +From 90618af0f76687d57f422b4a9c292507e38d8591 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fuad Tabba +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:54 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 23/49] KVM: selftests: guest_memfd mmap() test when mmap is + supported + +Expand the guest_memfd selftests to comprehensively test host userspace +mmap functionality for guest_memfd-backed memory when supported by the +VM type. + +Introduce new test cases to verify the following: + +* Successful mmap operations: Ensure that MAP_SHARED mappings succeed + when guest_memfd mmap is enabled. + +* Data integrity: Validate that data written to the mmap'd region is + correctly persistent and readable. + +* fallocate interaction: Test that fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) + correctly zeros out mapped pages. + +* Out-of-bounds access: Verify that accessing memory beyond the + guest_memfd's size correctly triggers a SIGBUS signal. + +* Unsupported mmap: Confirm that mmap attempts fail as expected when + guest_memfd mmap support is not enabled for the specific guest_memfd + instance or VM type. + +* Flag validity: Introduce test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity() to + systematically test that only allowed guest_memfd creation flags are + accepted for different VM types (e.g., GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP for + default VMs, no flags for CoCo VMs). + +The existing tests for guest_memfd creation (multiple instances, invalid +sizes), file read/write, file size, and invalid punch hole operations +are integrated into the new test_with_type() framework to allow testing +across different VM types. + +Cc: James Houghton +Cc: Gavin Shan +Cc: Shivank Garg +Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng +Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng +Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba +Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 161 +++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 139 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +index 341ba616cf55..088053d5f0f5 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -34,12 +36,83 @@ static void test_file_read_write(int fd) + "pwrite on a guest_mem fd should fail"); + } + +-static void test_mmap(int fd, size_t page_size) ++static void test_mmap_supported(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size) ++{ ++ const char val = 0xaa; ++ char *mem; ++ size_t i; ++ int ret; ++ ++ mem = mmap(NULL, total_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); ++ TEST_ASSERT(mem == MAP_FAILED, "Copy-on-write not allowed by guest_memfd."); ++ ++ mem = mmap(NULL, total_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); ++ TEST_ASSERT(mem != MAP_FAILED, "mmap() for guest_memfd should succeed."); ++ ++ memset(mem, val, total_size); ++ for (i = 0; i < total_size; i++) ++ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(READ_ONCE(mem[i]), val); ++ ++ ret = fallocate(fd, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 0, ++ page_size); ++ TEST_ASSERT(!ret, "fallocate the first page should succeed."); ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < page_size; i++) ++ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(READ_ONCE(mem[i]), 0x00); ++ for (; i < total_size; i++) ++ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(READ_ONCE(mem[i]), val); ++ ++ memset(mem, val, page_size); ++ for (i = 0; i < total_size; i++) ++ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(READ_ONCE(mem[i]), val); ++ ++ ret = munmap(mem, total_size); ++ TEST_ASSERT(!ret, "munmap() should succeed."); ++} ++ ++static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf; ++void fault_sigbus_handler(int signum) ++{ ++ siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1); ++} ++ ++static void test_fault_overflow(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size) ++{ ++ struct sigaction sa_old, sa_new = { ++ .sa_handler = fault_sigbus_handler, ++ }; ++ size_t map_size = total_size * 4; ++ const char val = 0xaa; ++ char *mem; ++ size_t i; ++ int ret; ++ ++ mem = mmap(NULL, map_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); ++ TEST_ASSERT(mem != MAP_FAILED, "mmap() for guest_memfd should succeed."); ++ ++ sigaction(SIGBUS, &sa_new, &sa_old); ++ if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) { ++ memset(mem, 0xaa, map_size); ++ TEST_ASSERT(false, "memset() should have triggered SIGBUS."); ++ } ++ sigaction(SIGBUS, &sa_old, NULL); ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < total_size; i++) ++ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(READ_ONCE(mem[i]), val); ++ ++ ret = munmap(mem, map_size); ++ TEST_ASSERT(!ret, "munmap() should succeed."); ++} ++ ++static void test_mmap_not_supported(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size) + { + char *mem; + + mem = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); + TEST_ASSERT_EQ(mem, MAP_FAILED); ++ ++ mem = mmap(NULL, total_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); ++ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(mem, MAP_FAILED); + } + + static void test_file_size(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size) +@@ -120,26 +193,19 @@ static void test_invalid_punch_hole(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size) + } + } + +-static void test_create_guest_memfd_invalid(struct kvm_vm *vm) ++static void test_create_guest_memfd_invalid_sizes(struct kvm_vm *vm, ++ uint64_t guest_memfd_flags, ++ size_t page_size) + { +- size_t page_size = getpagesize(); +- uint64_t flag; + size_t size; + int fd; + + for (size = 1; size < page_size; size++) { +- fd = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, size, 0); +- TEST_ASSERT(fd == -1 && errno == EINVAL, ++ fd = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, size, guest_memfd_flags); ++ TEST_ASSERT(fd < 0 && errno == EINVAL, + "guest_memfd() with non-page-aligned page size '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL", + size); + } +- +- for (flag = BIT(0); flag; flag <<= 1) { +- fd = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, page_size, flag); +- TEST_ASSERT(fd == -1 && errno == EINVAL, +- "guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL", +- flag); +- } + } + + static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(struct kvm_vm *vm) +@@ -171,30 +237,81 @@ static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(struct kvm_vm *vm) + close(fd1); + } + +-int main(int argc, char *argv[]) ++static void test_guest_memfd_flags(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t valid_flags) + { +- size_t page_size; +- size_t total_size; ++ size_t page_size = getpagesize(); ++ uint64_t flag; + int fd; +- struct kvm_vm *vm; + +- TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD)); ++ for (flag = BIT(0); flag; flag <<= 1) { ++ fd = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, page_size, flag); ++ if (flag & valid_flags) { ++ TEST_ASSERT(fd >= 0, ++ "guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should succeed", ++ flag); ++ close(fd); ++ } else { ++ TEST_ASSERT(fd < 0 && errno == EINVAL, ++ "guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL", ++ flag); ++ } ++ } ++} ++ ++static void test_guest_memfd(unsigned long vm_type) ++{ ++ uint64_t flags = 0; ++ struct kvm_vm *vm; ++ size_t total_size; ++ size_t page_size; ++ int fd; + + page_size = getpagesize(); + total_size = page_size * 4; + +- vm = vm_create_barebones(); ++ vm = vm_create_barebones_type(vm_type); ++ ++ if (vm_check_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP)) ++ flags |= GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP; + +- test_create_guest_memfd_invalid(vm); + test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(vm); ++ test_create_guest_memfd_invalid_sizes(vm, flags, page_size); + +- fd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, total_size, 0); ++ fd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, total_size, flags); + + test_file_read_write(fd); +- test_mmap(fd, page_size); ++ ++ if (flags & GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP) { ++ test_mmap_supported(fd, page_size, total_size); ++ test_fault_overflow(fd, page_size, total_size); ++ } else { ++ test_mmap_not_supported(fd, page_size, total_size); ++ } ++ + test_file_size(fd, page_size, total_size); + test_fallocate(fd, page_size, total_size); + test_invalid_punch_hole(fd, page_size, total_size); + ++ test_guest_memfd_flags(vm, flags); ++ + close(fd); ++ kvm_vm_free(vm); ++} ++ ++int main(int argc, char *argv[]) ++{ ++ unsigned long vm_types, vm_type; ++ ++ TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD)); ++ ++ /* ++ * Not all architectures support KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES. However, those that ++ * support guest_memfd have that support for the default VM type. ++ */ ++ vm_types = kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES); ++ if (!vm_types) ++ vm_types = VM_TYPE_DEFAULT; ++ ++ for_each_set_bit(vm_type, &vm_types, BITS_PER_TYPE(vm_types)) ++ test_guest_memfd(vm_type); + } +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0024-KVM-selftests-Add-guest_memfd-testcase-to-fault-in-o.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0024-KVM-selftests-Add-guest_memfd-testcase-to-fault-in-o.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7c457a22f16 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/05-mmap-support/0024-KVM-selftests-Add-guest_memfd-testcase-to-fault-in-o.patch @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +From 11629592f6f88f2b7bd33efb2c15dbf241628faa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sean Christopherson +Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2025 15:54:55 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 24/49] KVM: selftests: Add guest_memfd testcase to fault-in on + !mmap()'d memory + +Add a guest_memfd testcase to verify that a vCPU can fault-in guest_memfd +memory that supports mmap(), but that is not currently mapped into host +userspace and/or has a userspace address (in the memslot) that points at +something other than the target guest_memfd range. Mapping guest_memfd +memory into the guest is supposed to operate completely independently from +any userspace mappings. + +Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson +--- + .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +index 088053d5f0f5..b86bf89a71e0 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ + + #include "kvm_util.h" + #include "test_util.h" ++#include "ucall_common.h" + + static void test_file_read_write(int fd) + { +@@ -298,6 +300,66 @@ static void test_guest_memfd(unsigned long vm_type) + kvm_vm_free(vm); + } + ++static void guest_code(uint8_t *mem, uint64_t size) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) ++ __GUEST_ASSERT(mem[i] == 0xaa, ++ "Guest expected 0xaa at offset %lu, got 0x%x", i, mem[i]); ++ ++ memset(mem, 0xff, size); ++ GUEST_DONE(); ++} ++ ++static void test_guest_memfd_guest(void) ++{ ++ /* ++ * Skip the first 4gb and slot0. slot0 maps <1gb and is used to back ++ * the guest's code, stack, and page tables, and low memory contains ++ * the PCI hole and other MMIO regions that need to be avoided. ++ */ ++ const uint64_t gpa = SZ_4G; ++ const int slot = 1; ++ ++ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; ++ struct kvm_vm *vm; ++ uint8_t *mem; ++ size_t size; ++ int fd, i; ++ ++ if (!kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP)) ++ return; ++ ++ vm = __vm_create_shape_with_one_vcpu(VM_SHAPE_DEFAULT, &vcpu, 1, guest_code); ++ ++ TEST_ASSERT(vm_check_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP), ++ "Default VM type should always support guest_memfd mmap()"); ++ ++ size = vm->page_size; ++ fd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, size, GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP); ++ vm_set_user_memory_region2(vm, slot, KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD, gpa, size, NULL, fd, 0); ++ ++ mem = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); ++ TEST_ASSERT(mem != MAP_FAILED, "mmap() on guest_memfd failed"); ++ memset(mem, 0xaa, size); ++ munmap(mem, size); ++ ++ virt_pg_map(vm, gpa, gpa); ++ vcpu_args_set(vcpu, 2, gpa, size); ++ vcpu_run(vcpu); ++ ++ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(get_ucall(vcpu, NULL), UCALL_DONE); ++ ++ mem = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); ++ TEST_ASSERT(mem != MAP_FAILED, "mmap() on guest_memfd failed"); ++ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) ++ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(mem[i], 0xff); ++ ++ close(fd); ++ kvm_vm_free(vm); ++} ++ + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + { + unsigned long vm_types, vm_type; +@@ -314,4 +376,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + + for_each_set_bit(vm_type, &vm_types, BITS_PER_TYPE(vm_types)) + test_guest_memfd(vm_type); ++ ++ test_guest_memfd_guest(); + } +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0025-filemap-Pass-address_space-mapping-to-free_folio.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0025-filemap-Pass-address_space-mapping-to-free_folio.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..771499abac9 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0025-filemap-Pass-address_space-mapping-to-free_folio.patch @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +From c448db399473016d02b6c6374d749133b1c63f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Elliot Berman +Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 09:29:38 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 25/49] filemap: Pass address_space mapping to ->free_folio() + +When guest_memfd removes memory from the host kernel's direct map, +direct map entries must be restored before the memory is freed again. To +do so, ->free_folio() needs to know whether a gmem folio was direct map +removed in the first place though. While possible to keep track of this +information on each individual folio (e.g. via page flags), direct map +removal is an all-or-nothing property of the entire guest_memfd, so it +is less error prone to just check the flag stored in the gmem inode's +private data. However, by the time ->free_folio() is called, +folio->mapping might be cleared. To still allow access to the address +space from which the folio was just removed, pass it in as an additional +argument to ->free_folio, as the mapping is well-known to all callers. + +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/15f665b4-2d33-41ca-ac50-fafe24ade32f@redhat.com/ +Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand +Acked-by: David Hildenbrand +Signed-off-by: Elliot Berman +[patrick: rewrite shortlog for new usecase] +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + Documentation/filesystems/locking.rst | 2 +- + fs/nfs/dir.c | 11 ++++++----- + fs/orangefs/inode.c | 3 ++- + include/linux/fs.h | 2 +- + mm/filemap.c | 9 +++++---- + mm/secretmem.c | 3 ++- + mm/vmscan.c | 4 ++-- + virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 3 ++- + 8 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/locking.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/locking.rst +index 2e567e341c3b..21373864e6c2 100644 +--- a/Documentation/filesystems/locking.rst ++++ b/Documentation/filesystems/locking.rst +@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ prototypes:: + sector_t (*bmap)(struct address_space *, sector_t); + void (*invalidate_folio) (struct folio *, size_t start, size_t len); + bool (*release_folio)(struct folio *, gfp_t); +- void (*free_folio)(struct folio *); ++ void (*free_folio)(struct address_space *, struct folio *); + int (*direct_IO)(struct kiocb *, struct iov_iter *iter); + int (*migrate_folio)(struct address_space *, struct folio *dst, + struct folio *src, enum migrate_mode); +diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c +index d0e0b435a843..5cb338f0d3a2 100644 +--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c ++++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c +@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int nfs_closedir(struct inode *, struct file *); + static int nfs_readdir(struct file *, struct dir_context *); + static int nfs_fsync_dir(struct file *, loff_t, loff_t, int); + static loff_t nfs_llseek_dir(struct file *, loff_t, int); +-static void nfs_readdir_clear_array(struct folio *); ++static void nfs_readdir_clear_array(struct address_space *, struct folio *); + static int nfs_do_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode, int open_flags); + +@@ -218,7 +218,8 @@ static void nfs_readdir_folio_init_array(struct folio *folio, u64 last_cookie, + /* + * we are freeing strings created by nfs_add_to_readdir_array() + */ +-static void nfs_readdir_clear_array(struct folio *folio) ++static void nfs_readdir_clear_array(struct address_space *mapping, ++ struct folio *folio) + { + struct nfs_cache_array *array; + unsigned int i; +@@ -233,7 +234,7 @@ static void nfs_readdir_clear_array(struct folio *folio) + static void nfs_readdir_folio_reinit_array(struct folio *folio, u64 last_cookie, + u64 change_attr) + { +- nfs_readdir_clear_array(folio); ++ nfs_readdir_clear_array(folio->mapping, folio); + nfs_readdir_folio_init_array(folio, last_cookie, change_attr); + } + +@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ nfs_readdir_folio_array_alloc(u64 last_cookie, gfp_t gfp_flags) + static void nfs_readdir_folio_array_free(struct folio *folio) + { + if (folio) { +- nfs_readdir_clear_array(folio); ++ nfs_readdir_clear_array(folio->mapping, folio); + folio_put(folio); + } + } +@@ -391,7 +392,7 @@ static void nfs_readdir_folio_init_and_validate(struct folio *folio, u64 cookie, + if (folio_test_uptodate(folio)) { + if (nfs_readdir_folio_validate(folio, cookie, change_attr)) + return; +- nfs_readdir_clear_array(folio); ++ nfs_readdir_clear_array(folio->mapping, folio); + } + nfs_readdir_folio_init_array(folio, cookie, change_attr); + folio_mark_uptodate(folio); +diff --git a/fs/orangefs/inode.c b/fs/orangefs/inode.c +index 08a6f372a352..14ac9ffc4431 100644 +--- a/fs/orangefs/inode.c ++++ b/fs/orangefs/inode.c +@@ -450,7 +450,8 @@ static bool orangefs_release_folio(struct folio *folio, gfp_t foo) + return !folio_test_private(folio); + } + +-static void orangefs_free_folio(struct folio *folio) ++static void orangefs_free_folio(struct address_space *mapping, ++ struct folio *folio) + { + kfree(folio_detach_private(folio)); + } +diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h +index 040c0036320f..9d7ff57794fa 100644 +--- a/include/linux/fs.h ++++ b/include/linux/fs.h +@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ struct address_space_operations { + sector_t (*bmap)(struct address_space *, sector_t); + void (*invalidate_folio) (struct folio *, size_t offset, size_t len); + bool (*release_folio)(struct folio *, gfp_t); +- void (*free_folio)(struct folio *folio); ++ void (*free_folio)(struct address_space *, struct folio *folio); + ssize_t (*direct_IO)(struct kiocb *, struct iov_iter *iter); + /* + * migrate the contents of a folio to the specified target. If +diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c +index bada249b9fb7..6af53c5096fc 100644 +--- a/mm/filemap.c ++++ b/mm/filemap.c +@@ -226,11 +226,11 @@ void __filemap_remove_folio(struct folio *folio, void *shadow) + + void filemap_free_folio(struct address_space *mapping, struct folio *folio) + { +- void (*free_folio)(struct folio *); ++ void (*free_folio)(struct address_space *, struct folio *); + + free_folio = mapping->a_ops->free_folio; + if (free_folio) +- free_folio(folio); ++ free_folio(mapping, folio); + + folio_put_refs(folio, folio_nr_pages(folio)); + } +@@ -820,7 +820,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_write_and_wait_range); + void replace_page_cache_folio(struct folio *old, struct folio *new) + { + struct address_space *mapping = old->mapping; +- void (*free_folio)(struct folio *) = mapping->a_ops->free_folio; ++ void (*free_folio)(struct address_space *, struct folio *) = ++ mapping->a_ops->free_folio; + pgoff_t offset = old->index; + XA_STATE(xas, &mapping->i_pages, offset); + +@@ -849,7 +850,7 @@ void replace_page_cache_folio(struct folio *old, struct folio *new) + __lruvec_stat_add_folio(new, NR_SHMEM); + xas_unlock_irq(&xas); + if (free_folio) +- free_folio(old); ++ free_folio(mapping, old); + folio_put(old); + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(replace_page_cache_folio); +diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c +index e042a4a0bc0c..96bcb79a1aa7 100644 +--- a/mm/secretmem.c ++++ b/mm/secretmem.c +@@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ static int secretmem_migrate_folio(struct address_space *mapping, + return -EBUSY; + } + +-static void secretmem_free_folio(struct folio *folio) ++static void secretmem_free_folio(struct address_space *mapping, ++ struct folio *folio) + { + set_direct_map_default_noflush(&folio->page); + folio_zero_segment(folio, 0, folio_size(folio)); +diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c +index 424412680cfc..edeb8b903a49 100644 +--- a/mm/vmscan.c ++++ b/mm/vmscan.c +@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ static int __remove_mapping(struct address_space *mapping, struct folio *folio, + xa_unlock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); + put_swap_folio(folio, swap); + } else { +- void (*free_folio)(struct folio *); ++ void (*free_folio)(struct address_space *, struct folio *); + + free_folio = mapping->a_ops->free_folio; + /* +@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static int __remove_mapping(struct address_space *mapping, struct folio *folio, + spin_unlock(&mapping->host->i_lock); + + if (free_folio) +- free_folio(folio); ++ free_folio(mapping, folio); + } + + return 1; +diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +index 08a6bc7d25b6..9ec4c45e3cf2 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +@@ -430,7 +430,8 @@ static int kvm_gmem_error_folio(struct address_space *mapping, struct folio *fol + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE +-static void kvm_gmem_free_folio(struct folio *folio) ++static void kvm_gmem_free_folio(struct address_space *mapping, ++ struct folio *folio) + { + struct page *page = folio_page(folio, 0); + kvm_pfn_t pfn = page_to_pfn(page); +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0026-arch-export-set_direct_map_valid_noflush-to-KVM-modu.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0026-arch-export-set_direct_map_valid_noflush-to-KVM-modu.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2d50e8cc2b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0026-arch-export-set_direct_map_valid_noflush-to-KVM-modu.patch @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +From 2d29a6cc2acd7f6c15cad81fcde5bd3d6cbe78a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2025 12:06:10 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 26/49] arch: export set_direct_map_valid_noflush to KVM module + +Use the new per-module export functionality to allow KVM (and only KVM) +access to set_direct_map_valid_noflush(). This allows guest_memfd to +remove its memory from the direct map, even if KVM is built as a module. + +Direct map removal gives guest_memfd the same protection that +memfd_secret enjoys, such as hardening against Spectre-like attacks +through in-kernel gadgets. + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 1 + + arch/loongarch/mm/pageattr.c | 1 + + arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 1 + + arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c | 1 + + arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 1 + + 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +index 04d4a8f676db..ff454bc6e9a2 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ int set_direct_map_valid_noflush(struct page *page, unsigned nr, bool valid) + + return set_memory_valid(addr, nr, valid); + } ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES(set_direct_map_valid_noflush, "kvm"); + + #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC + /* +diff --git a/arch/loongarch/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/loongarch/mm/pageattr.c +index 99165903908a..43c1a873a469 100644 +--- a/arch/loongarch/mm/pageattr.c ++++ b/arch/loongarch/mm/pageattr.c +@@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) + + return __set_memory(addr, 1, __pgprot(0), __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID)); + } ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES(set_direct_map_valid_noflush, "kvm"); + + int set_direct_map_valid_noflush(struct page *page, unsigned nr, bool valid) + { +diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c +index d815448758a1..3a1627e0eeb4 100644 +--- a/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c ++++ b/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c +@@ -400,6 +400,7 @@ int set_direct_map_valid_noflush(struct page *page, unsigned nr, bool valid) + + return __set_memory((unsigned long)page_address(page), nr, set, clear); + } ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES(set_direct_map_valid_noflush, "kvm"); + + #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC + static int debug_pagealloc_set_page(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr, void *data) +diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c +index 348e759840e7..392ce9194f86 100644 +--- a/arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c ++++ b/arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c +@@ -413,6 +413,7 @@ int set_direct_map_valid_noflush(struct page *page, unsigned nr, bool valid) + + return __set_memory((unsigned long)page_to_virt(page), nr, flags); + } ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES(set_direct_map_valid_noflush, "kvm"); + + bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page) + { +diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +index 8834c76f91c9..ab469de18c4d 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c ++++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +@@ -2661,6 +2661,7 @@ int set_direct_map_valid_noflush(struct page *page, unsigned nr, bool valid) + + return __set_pages_np(page, nr); + } ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES(set_direct_map_valid_noflush, "kvm"); + + #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC + void __kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable) +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0027-mm-introduce-AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0027-mm-introduce-AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..04c392fb0bc --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0027-mm-introduce-AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP.patch @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +From 9d0f7fe52db2352cddeca91f8da03b50665a4047 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2025 11:16:06 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 27/49] mm: introduce AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP + +Add AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP for mappings where direct map entries of folios are +set to not present . Currently, mappings that match this description are +secretmem mappings (memfd_secret()). Later, some guest_memfd +configurations will also fall into this category. + +Reject this new type of mappings in all locations that currently reject +secretmem mappings, on the assumption that if secretmem mappings are +rejected somewhere, it is precisely because of an inability to deal with +folios without direct map entries, and then make memfd_secret() use +AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP on its address_space to drop its special +vma_is_secretmem()/secretmem_mapping() checks. + +This drops a optimization in gup_fast_folio_allowed() where +secretmem_mapping() was only called if CONFIG_SECRETMEM=y. secretmem is +enabled by default since commit b758fe6df50d ("mm/secretmem: make it on +by default"), so the secretmem check did not actually end up elided in +most cases anymore anyway. + +Use a new flag instead of overloading AS_INACCESSIBLE (which is already +set by guest_memfd) because not all guest_memfd mappings will end up +being direct map removed (e.g. in pKVM setups, parts of guest_memfd that +can be mapped to userspace should also be GUP-able, and generally not +have restrictions on who can access it). + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + include/linux/pagemap.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ + include/linux/secretmem.h | 18 ------------------ + lib/buildid.c | 4 ++-- + mm/gup.c | 14 +++----------- + mm/mlock.c | 2 +- + mm/secretmem.c | 6 +----- + 6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/linux/pagemap.h b/include/linux/pagemap.h +index e63fbfbd5b0f..d7407dde2b61 100644 +--- a/include/linux/pagemap.h ++++ b/include/linux/pagemap.h +@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ enum mapping_flags { + folio contents */ + AS_INACCESSIBLE = 8, /* Do not attempt direct R/W access to the mapping */ + AS_WRITEBACK_MAY_DEADLOCK_ON_RECLAIM = 9, ++ AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP = 10, /* Folios in the mapping are not in the direct map */ + /* Bits 16-25 are used for FOLIO_ORDER */ + AS_FOLIO_ORDER_BITS = 5, + AS_FOLIO_ORDER_MIN = 16, +@@ -346,6 +347,21 @@ static inline bool mapping_writeback_may_deadlock_on_reclaim(struct address_spac + return test_bit(AS_WRITEBACK_MAY_DEADLOCK_ON_RECLAIM, &mapping->flags); + } + ++static inline void mapping_set_no_direct_map(struct address_space *mapping) ++{ ++ set_bit(AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP, &mapping->flags); ++} ++ ++static inline bool mapping_no_direct_map(struct address_space *mapping) ++{ ++ return test_bit(AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP, &mapping->flags); ++} ++ ++static inline bool vma_is_no_direct_map(const struct vm_area_struct *vma) ++{ ++ return vma->vm_file && mapping_no_direct_map(vma->vm_file->f_mapping); ++} ++ + static inline gfp_t mapping_gfp_mask(struct address_space * mapping) + { + return mapping->gfp_mask; +diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h +index e918f96881f5..0ae1fb057b3d 100644 +--- a/include/linux/secretmem.h ++++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h +@@ -4,28 +4,10 @@ + + #ifdef CONFIG_SECRETMEM + +-extern const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops; +- +-static inline bool secretmem_mapping(struct address_space *mapping) +-{ +- return mapping->a_ops == &secretmem_aops; +-} +- +-bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma); + bool secretmem_active(void); + + #else + +-static inline bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +-{ +- return false; +-} +- +-static inline bool secretmem_mapping(struct address_space *mapping) +-{ +- return false; +-} +- + static inline bool secretmem_active(void) + { + return false; +diff --git a/lib/buildid.c b/lib/buildid.c +index c4b0f376fb34..33f173a607ad 100644 +--- a/lib/buildid.c ++++ b/lib/buildid.c +@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ static int freader_get_folio(struct freader *r, loff_t file_off) + + freader_put_folio(r); + +- /* reject secretmem folios created with memfd_secret() */ +- if (secretmem_mapping(r->file->f_mapping)) ++ /* reject secretmem folios created with memfd_secret() or guest_memfd() */ ++ if (mapping_no_direct_map(r->file->f_mapping)) + return -EFAULT; + + r->folio = filemap_get_folio(r->file->f_mapping, file_off >> PAGE_SHIFT); +diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c +index 3c39cbbeebef..b8e2d868cb60 100644 +--- a/mm/gup.c ++++ b/mm/gup.c +@@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags) + if ((gup_flags & FOLL_SPLIT_PMD) && is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + +- if (vma_is_secretmem(vma)) ++ if (vma_is_no_direct_map(vma)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (write) { +@@ -2775,7 +2775,6 @@ static bool gup_fast_folio_allowed(struct folio *folio, unsigned int flags) + { + bool reject_file_backed = false; + struct address_space *mapping; +- bool check_secretmem = false; + unsigned long mapping_flags; + + /* +@@ -2787,14 +2786,6 @@ static bool gup_fast_folio_allowed(struct folio *folio, unsigned int flags) + reject_file_backed = true; + + /* We hold a folio reference, so we can safely access folio fields. */ +- +- /* secretmem folios are always order-0 folios. */ +- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) && !folio_test_large(folio)) +- check_secretmem = true; +- +- if (!reject_file_backed && !check_secretmem) +- return true; +- + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(folio_test_slab(folio))) + return false; + +@@ -2836,8 +2827,9 @@ static bool gup_fast_folio_allowed(struct folio *folio, unsigned int flags) + * At this point, we know the mapping is non-null and points to an + * address_space object. + */ +- if (check_secretmem && secretmem_mapping(mapping)) ++ if (mapping_no_direct_map(mapping)) + return false; ++ + /* The only remaining allowed file system is shmem. */ + return !reject_file_backed || shmem_mapping(mapping); + } +diff --git a/mm/mlock.c b/mm/mlock.c +index 3cb72b579ffd..6cde2a5073f0 100644 +--- a/mm/mlock.c ++++ b/mm/mlock.c +@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct vm_area_struct *vma, + + if (newflags == oldflags || (oldflags & VM_SPECIAL) || + is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) || vma == get_gate_vma(current->mm) || +- vma_is_dax(vma) || vma_is_secretmem(vma) || (oldflags & VM_DROPPABLE)) ++ vma_is_dax(vma) || vma_is_no_direct_map(vma) || (oldflags & VM_DROPPABLE)) + /* don't set VM_LOCKED or VM_LOCKONFAULT and don't count */ + goto out; + +diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c +index 96bcb79a1aa7..40798ac5e178 100644 +--- a/mm/secretmem.c ++++ b/mm/secretmem.c +@@ -136,11 +136,6 @@ static int secretmem_mmap_prepare(struct vm_area_desc *desc) + return 0; + } + +-bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +-{ +- return vma->vm_ops == &secretmem_vm_ops; +-} +- + static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .release = secretmem_release, + .mmap_prepare = secretmem_mmap_prepare, +@@ -208,6 +203,7 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags) + + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER); + mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping); ++ mapping_set_no_direct_map(inode->i_mapping); + + inode->i_op = &secretmem_iops; + inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops; +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0028-KVM-guest_memfd-Add-flag-to-remove-from-direct-map.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0028-KVM-guest_memfd-Add-flag-to-remove-from-direct-map.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..26585771c4c --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0028-KVM-guest_memfd-Add-flag-to-remove-from-direct-map.patch @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +From 75cd1653b7aa0fbef44835b183110f25d0bf584e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2025 14:33:01 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 28/49] KVM: guest_memfd: Add flag to remove from direct map + +Add GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP flag for KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD() +ioctl. When set, guest_memfd folios will be removed from the direct map +after preparation, with direct map entries only restored when the folios +are freed. + +To ensure these folios do not end up in places where the kernel cannot +deal with them, set AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP on the guest_memfd's struct +address_space if GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP is requested. + +Add KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP to let userspace discover whether +guest_memfd supports GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP. Support depends on +guest_memfd itself being supported, but also on whether KVM can +manipulate the direct map at page granularity at all (possible most of +the time, just arm64 is a notable outlier where its impossible if the +direct map has been setup using hugepages, as arm64 cannot break these +apart due to break-before-make semantics). + +Note that this flag causes removal of direct map entries for all +guest_memfd folios independent of whether they are "shared" or "private" +(although current guest_memfd only supports either all folios in the +"shared" state, or all folios in the "private" state if +GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP is not set). The usecase for removing direct map +entries of also the shared parts of guest_memfd are a special type of +non-CoCo VM where, host userspace is trusted to have access to all of +guest memory, but where Spectre-style transient execution attacks +through the host kernel's direct map should still be mitigated. In this +setup, KVM retains access to guest memory via userspace mappings of +guest_memfd, which are reflected back into KVM's memslots via +userspace_addr. This is needed for things like MMIO emulation on x86_64 +to work. + +Do not perform TLB flushes after direct map manipulations. This is +because TLB flushes resulted in a up to 40x elongation of page faults in +guest_memfd (scaling with the number of CPU cores), or a 5x elongation +of memory population. TLB flushes are not needed for functional +correctness (the virt->phys mapping technically stays "correct", the +kernel should simply to not it for a while). On the other hand, it means +that the desired protection from Spectre-style attacks is not perfect, +as an attacker could try to prevent a stale TLB entry from getting +evicted, keeping it alive until the page it refers to is used by the +guest for some sensitive data, and then targeting it using a +spectre-gadget. + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 11 +++++++++++ + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 +++++++ + include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 ++ + virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 5 +++++ + 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +index 3e41a880b062..f3e000daa876 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -1674,5 +1675,15 @@ void compute_fgu(struct kvm *kvm, enum fgt_group_id fgt); + void get_reg_fixed_bits(struct kvm *kvm, enum vcpu_sysreg reg, u64 *res0, u64 *res1); + void check_feature_map(void); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ++static inline bool kvm_arch_gmem_supports_no_direct_map(void) { ++ /* ++ * Without FWB, direct map access is needed in kvm_pgtable_stage2_map(), ++ * as it calls dcache_clean_inval_poc(). ++ */ ++ return can_set_direct_map() && cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_STAGE2_FWB); ++} ++#define kvm_arch_gmem_supports_no_direct_map kvm_arch_gmem_supports_no_direct_map ++#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD */ + + #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_HOST_H__ */ +diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +index 8b47891adca1..37553848e078 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h ++++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #include + #include +@@ -731,6 +732,12 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm) + bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(struct kvm *kvm); + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ++#ifndef kvm_arch_gmem_supports_no_direct_map ++#define kvm_arch_gmem_supports_no_direct_map can_set_direct_map ++#endif ++#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD */ ++ + #ifndef kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem + static inline bool kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(struct kvm *kvm) + { +diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +index 0d96d2ae6e5d..7688ea92b25c 100644 +--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +@@ -962,6 +962,7 @@ struct kvm_enable_cap { + #define KVM_CAP_ARM_EL2_E2H0 241 + #define KVM_CAP_RISCV_MP_STATE_RESET 242 + #define KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP 243 ++#define KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP 244 + + struct kvm_irq_routing_irqchip { + __u32 irqchip; +@@ -1599,6 +1600,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_attributes { + + #define KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xd4, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd) + #define GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP (1ULL << 0) ++#define GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP (1ULL << 1) + + struct kvm_create_guest_memfd { + __u64 size; +diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +index 9ec4c45e3cf2..e3696880405c 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #include "kvm_mm.h" + +@@ -42,8 +43,18 @@ static int __kvm_gmem_prepare_folio(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slo + return 0; + } + ++static bool kvm_gmem_test_no_direct_map(struct inode *inode) ++{ ++ return ((unsigned long) inode->i_private) & GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP; ++} ++ + static inline void kvm_gmem_mark_prepared(struct folio *folio) + { ++ struct inode *inode = folio_inode(folio); ++ ++ if (kvm_gmem_test_no_direct_map(inode)) ++ set_direct_map_valid_noflush(folio_page(folio, 0), folio_nr_pages(folio), false); ++ + folio_mark_uptodate(folio); + } + +@@ -429,25 +440,29 @@ static int kvm_gmem_error_folio(struct address_space *mapping, struct folio *fol + return MF_DELAYED; + } + +-#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE + static void kvm_gmem_free_folio(struct address_space *mapping, + struct folio *folio) + { + struct page *page = folio_page(folio, 0); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE + kvm_pfn_t pfn = page_to_pfn(page); + int order = folio_order(folio); ++#endif + ++ if (kvm_gmem_test_no_direct_map(mapping->host)) ++ WARN_ON_ONCE(set_direct_map_valid_noflush(page, folio_nr_pages(folio), true)); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE + kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate(pfn, pfn + (1ul << order)); +-} + #endif ++} + + static const struct address_space_operations kvm_gmem_aops = { + .dirty_folio = noop_dirty_folio, + .migrate_folio = kvm_gmem_migrate_folio, + .error_remove_folio = kvm_gmem_error_folio, +-#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE + .free_folio = kvm_gmem_free_folio, +-#endif + }; + + static int kvm_gmem_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, +@@ -504,6 +519,9 @@ static int __kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, loff_t size, u64 flags) + /* Unmovable mappings are supposed to be marked unevictable as well. */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(!mapping_unevictable(inode->i_mapping)); + ++ if (flags & GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP) ++ mapping_set_no_direct_map(inode->i_mapping); ++ + kvm_get_kvm(kvm); + gmem->kvm = kvm; + xa_init(&gmem->bindings); +@@ -528,6 +546,9 @@ int kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd *args) + if (kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(kvm)) + valid_flags |= GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP; + ++ if (kvm_arch_gmem_supports_no_direct_map()) ++ valid_flags |= GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP; ++ + if (flags & ~valid_flags) + return -EINVAL; + +diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +index 18f29ef93543..0dbfd17e1191 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + + + /* Worst case buffer size needed for holding an integer. */ +@@ -4916,6 +4917,10 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg) + return kvm_supported_mem_attributes(kvm); + #endif + #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ++ case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP: ++ if (!can_set_direct_map()) ++ return false; ++ fallthrough; + case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD: + return 1; + case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP: +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0029-KVM-Documentation-describe-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIREC.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0029-KVM-Documentation-describe-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIREC.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2ae8f2bb09f --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0029-KVM-Documentation-describe-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIREC.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 690b035df72fd4058f96af080d3d769035090544 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2025 15:21:10 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 29/49] KVM: Documentation: describe + GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +index 1e0c4a68876d..4a94bac95dca 100644 +--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst ++++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +@@ -6418,6 +6418,11 @@ When the capability KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP is supported, the 'flags' field + supports GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP. Setting this flag on guest_memfd creation + enables mmap() and faulting of guest_memfd memory to host userspace. + ++When the capability KVM_CAP_GMEM_NO_DIRECT_MAP is supported, the 'flags' field ++supports GUEST_MEMFG_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP. Setting this flag makes the guest_memfd ++instance behave similarly to memfd_secret, and unmaps the memory backing it from ++the kernel's address space after allocation. ++ + When the KVM MMU performs a PFN lookup to service a guest fault and the backing + guest_memfd has the GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP set, then the fault will always be + consumed from guest_memfd, regardless of whether it is a shared or a private +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0030-KVM-selftests-load-elf-via-bounce-buffer.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0030-KVM-selftests-load-elf-via-bounce-buffer.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f99a8330716 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0030-KVM-selftests-load-elf-via-bounce-buffer.patch @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +From b2a5123fafdbdd7637f3398f7168da24dc84b137 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 09:00:45 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 30/49] KVM: selftests: load elf via bounce buffer + +If guest memory is backed using a VMA that does not allow GUP (e.g. a +userspace mapping of guest_memfd when the fd was allocated using +KVM_GMEM_NO_DIRECT_MAP), then directly loading the test ELF binary into +it via read(2) potentially does not work. To nevertheless support +loading binaries in this cases, do the read(2) syscall using a bounce +buffer, and then memcpy from the bounce buffer into guest memory. + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h | 1 + + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/elf.c | 8 +++---- + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/io.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h +index c6ef895fbd9a..0409b7b96c94 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h +@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ do { \ + + ssize_t test_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count); + ssize_t test_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count); ++ssize_t test_read_bounce(int fd, void *buf, size_t count); + int test_seq_read(const char *path, char **bufp, size_t *sizep); + + void __printf(5, 6) test_assert(bool exp, const char *exp_str, +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/elf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/elf.c +index f34d926d9735..e829fbe0a11e 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/elf.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/elf.c +@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static void elfhdr_get(const char *filename, Elf64_Ehdr *hdrp) + * the real size of the ELF header. + */ + unsigned char ident[EI_NIDENT]; +- test_read(fd, ident, sizeof(ident)); ++ test_read_bounce(fd, ident, sizeof(ident)); + TEST_ASSERT((ident[EI_MAG0] == ELFMAG0) && (ident[EI_MAG1] == ELFMAG1) + && (ident[EI_MAG2] == ELFMAG2) && (ident[EI_MAG3] == ELFMAG3), + "ELF MAGIC Mismatch,\n" +@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static void elfhdr_get(const char *filename, Elf64_Ehdr *hdrp) + offset_rv = lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET); + TEST_ASSERT(offset_rv == 0, "Seek to ELF header failed,\n" + " rv: %zi expected: %i", offset_rv, 0); +- test_read(fd, hdrp, sizeof(*hdrp)); ++ test_read_bounce(fd, hdrp, sizeof(*hdrp)); + TEST_ASSERT(hdrp->e_phentsize == sizeof(Elf64_Phdr), + "Unexpected physical header size,\n" + " hdrp->e_phentsize: %x\n" +@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ void kvm_vm_elf_load(struct kvm_vm *vm, const char *filename) + + /* Read in the program header. */ + Elf64_Phdr phdr; +- test_read(fd, &phdr, sizeof(phdr)); ++ test_read_bounce(fd, &phdr, sizeof(phdr)); + + /* Skip if this header doesn't describe a loadable segment. */ + if (phdr.p_type != PT_LOAD) +@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ void kvm_vm_elf_load(struct kvm_vm *vm, const char *filename) + " expected: 0x%jx", + n1, errno, (intmax_t) offset_rv, + (intmax_t) phdr.p_offset); +- test_read(fd, addr_gva2hva(vm, phdr.p_vaddr), ++ test_read_bounce(fd, addr_gva2hva(vm, phdr.p_vaddr), + phdr.p_filesz); + } + } +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/io.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/io.c +index fedb2a741f0b..74419becc8bc 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/io.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/io.c +@@ -155,3 +155,26 @@ ssize_t test_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count) + + return num_read; + } ++ ++/* Test read via intermediary buffer ++ * ++ * Same as test_read, except read(2)s happen into a bounce buffer that is memcpy'd ++ * to buf. For use with buffers that cannot be GUP'd (e.g. guest_memfd VMAs if ++ * guest_memfd was created with GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP). ++ */ ++ssize_t test_read_bounce(int fd, void *buf, size_t count) ++{ ++ void *bounce_buffer; ++ ssize_t num_read; ++ ++ TEST_ASSERT(count >= 0, "Unexpected count, count: %li", count); ++ ++ bounce_buffer = malloc(count); ++ TEST_ASSERT(bounce_buffer != NULL, "Failed to allocate bounce buffer"); ++ ++ num_read = test_read(fd, bounce_buffer, count); ++ memcpy(buf, bounce_buffer, num_read); ++ free(bounce_buffer); ++ ++ return num_read; ++} +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0031-KVM-selftests-set-KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD-in-vm_mem_add-.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0031-KVM-selftests-set-KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD-in-vm_mem_add-.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0a0cc6057c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0031-KVM-selftests-set-KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD-in-vm_mem_add-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From 606298b9b943481badabfce93a65e054a069b628 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2025 14:56:20 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 31/49] KVM: selftests: set KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD in vm_mem_add() + if guest_memfd != -1 + +Have vm_mem_add() always set KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD in the memslot flags if +a guest_memfd is passed in as an argument. This eliminates the +possibility where a guest_memfd instance is passed to vm_mem_add(), but +it ends up being ignored because the flags argument does not specify +KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD at the same time. + +This makes it easy to support more scenarios in which no vm_mem_add() is +not passed a guest_memfd instance, but is expected to allocate one. +Currently, this only happens if guest_memfd == -1 but flags & +KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD != 0, but later vm_mem_add() will gain support for +loading the test code itself into guest_memfd (via +GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP) if requested via a special +vm_mem_backing_src_type, at which point having to make sure the src_type +and flags are in-sync becomes cumbersome. + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 26 +++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c +index c3f5142b0a54..cc67dfecbf65 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c +@@ -1107,22 +1107,26 @@ void vm_mem_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, enum vm_mem_backing_src_type src_type, + + region->backing_src_type = src_type; + +- if (flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD) { +- if (guest_memfd < 0) { ++ if (guest_memfd < 0) { ++ if (flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD) { + uint32_t guest_memfd_flags = 0; + TEST_ASSERT(!guest_memfd_offset, + "Offset must be zero when creating new guest_memfd"); + guest_memfd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, mem_size, guest_memfd_flags); +- } else { +- /* +- * Install a unique fd for each memslot so that the fd +- * can be closed when the region is deleted without +- * needing to track if the fd is owned by the framework +- * or by the caller. +- */ +- guest_memfd = dup(guest_memfd); +- TEST_ASSERT(guest_memfd >= 0, __KVM_SYSCALL_ERROR("dup()", guest_memfd)); + } ++ } else { ++ /* ++ * Install a unique fd for each memslot so that the fd ++ * can be closed when the region is deleted without ++ * needing to track if the fd is owned by the framework ++ * or by the caller. ++ */ ++ guest_memfd = dup(guest_memfd); ++ TEST_ASSERT(guest_memfd >= 0, __KVM_SYSCALL_ERROR("dup()", guest_memfd)); ++ } ++ ++ if (guest_memfd > 0) { ++ flags |= KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD; + + region->region.guest_memfd = guest_memfd; + region->region.guest_memfd_offset = guest_memfd_offset; +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0032-KVM-selftests-Add-guest_memfd-based-vm_mem_backing_s.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0032-KVM-selftests-Add-guest_memfd-based-vm_mem_backing_s.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..56006bd4cc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0032-KVM-selftests-Add-guest_memfd-based-vm_mem_backing_s.patch @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +From 9658e71c08d2e2cfe9f49938706f812e5ac0ebc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2025 11:08:22 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 32/49] KVM: selftests: Add guest_memfd based + vm_mem_backing_src_types + +Allow selftests to configure their memslots such that userspace_addr is +set to a MAP_SHARED mapping of the guest_memfd that's associated with +the memslot. This setup is the configuration for non-CoCo VMs, where all +guest memory is backed by a guest_memfd whose folios are all marked +shared, but KVM is still able to access guest memory to provide +functionality such as MMIO emulation on x86. + +Add backing types for normal guest_memfd, as well as direct map removed +guest_memfd. + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h | 18 ++++++ + .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h | 7 +++ + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 63 ++++++++++--------- + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/test_util.c | 8 +++ + 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h +index 23a506d7eca3..5204a0a18a7f 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h +@@ -635,6 +635,24 @@ static inline bool is_smt_on(void) + + void vm_create_irqchip(struct kvm_vm *vm); + ++static inline uint32_t backing_src_guest_memfd_flags(enum vm_mem_backing_src_type t) ++{ ++ uint32_t flags = 0; ++ ++ switch (t) { ++ case VM_MEM_SRC_GUEST_MEMFD: ++ flags |= GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP; ++ fallthrough; ++ case VM_MEM_SRC_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP: ++ flags |= GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP; ++ break; ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ return flags; ++} ++ + static inline int __vm_create_guest_memfd(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t size, + uint64_t flags) + { +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h +index 0409b7b96c94..a56e53fc7b39 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h +@@ -133,6 +133,8 @@ enum vm_mem_backing_src_type { + VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS_HUGETLB_16GB, + VM_MEM_SRC_SHMEM, + VM_MEM_SRC_SHARED_HUGETLB, ++ VM_MEM_SRC_GUEST_MEMFD, ++ VM_MEM_SRC_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP, + NUM_SRC_TYPES, + }; + +@@ -165,6 +167,11 @@ static inline bool backing_src_is_shared(enum vm_mem_backing_src_type t) + return vm_mem_backing_src_alias(t)->flag & MAP_SHARED; + } + ++static inline bool backing_src_is_guest_memfd(enum vm_mem_backing_src_type t) ++{ ++ return t == VM_MEM_SRC_GUEST_MEMFD || t == VM_MEM_SRC_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP; ++} ++ + static inline bool backing_src_can_be_huge(enum vm_mem_backing_src_type t) + { + return t != VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS && t != VM_MEM_SRC_SHMEM; +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c +index cc67dfecbf65..a81089f7c83f 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c +@@ -1060,6 +1060,34 @@ void vm_mem_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, enum vm_mem_backing_src_type src_type, + alignment = 1; + #endif + ++ if (guest_memfd < 0) { ++ if ((flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD) || backing_src_is_guest_memfd(src_type)) { ++ uint32_t guest_memfd_flags = backing_src_guest_memfd_flags(src_type); ++ ++ TEST_ASSERT(!guest_memfd_offset, ++ "Offset must be zero when creating new guest_memfd"); ++ guest_memfd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, mem_size, guest_memfd_flags); ++ } ++ } else { ++ /* ++ * Install a unique fd for each memslot so that the fd ++ * can be closed when the region is deleted without ++ * needing to track if the fd is owned by the framework ++ * or by the caller. ++ */ ++ guest_memfd = dup(guest_memfd); ++ TEST_ASSERT(guest_memfd >= 0, __KVM_SYSCALL_ERROR("dup()", guest_memfd)); ++ } ++ ++ if (guest_memfd > 0) { ++ flags |= KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD; ++ ++ region->region.guest_memfd = guest_memfd; ++ region->region.guest_memfd_offset = guest_memfd_offset; ++ } else { ++ region->region.guest_memfd = -1; ++ } ++ + /* + * When using THP mmap is not guaranteed to returned a hugepage aligned + * address so we have to pad the mmap. Padding is not needed for HugeTLB +@@ -1075,10 +1103,13 @@ void vm_mem_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, enum vm_mem_backing_src_type src_type, + if (alignment > 1) + region->mmap_size += alignment; + +- region->fd = -1; +- if (backing_src_is_shared(src_type)) ++ if (backing_src_is_guest_memfd(src_type)) ++ region->fd = guest_memfd; ++ else if (backing_src_is_shared(src_type)) + region->fd = kvm_memfd_alloc(region->mmap_size, + src_type == VM_MEM_SRC_SHARED_HUGETLB); ++ else ++ region->fd = -1; + + region->mmap_start = mmap(NULL, region->mmap_size, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, +@@ -1106,34 +1137,6 @@ void vm_mem_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, enum vm_mem_backing_src_type src_type, + } + + region->backing_src_type = src_type; +- +- if (guest_memfd < 0) { +- if (flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD) { +- uint32_t guest_memfd_flags = 0; +- TEST_ASSERT(!guest_memfd_offset, +- "Offset must be zero when creating new guest_memfd"); +- guest_memfd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, mem_size, guest_memfd_flags); +- } +- } else { +- /* +- * Install a unique fd for each memslot so that the fd +- * can be closed when the region is deleted without +- * needing to track if the fd is owned by the framework +- * or by the caller. +- */ +- guest_memfd = dup(guest_memfd); +- TEST_ASSERT(guest_memfd >= 0, __KVM_SYSCALL_ERROR("dup()", guest_memfd)); +- } +- +- if (guest_memfd > 0) { +- flags |= KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD; +- +- region->region.guest_memfd = guest_memfd; +- region->region.guest_memfd_offset = guest_memfd_offset; +- } else { +- region->region.guest_memfd = -1; +- } +- + region->unused_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc(); + if (vm_arch_has_protected_memory(vm)) + region->protected_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc(); +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/test_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/test_util.c +index 03eb99af9b8d..b2baee680083 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/test_util.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/test_util.c +@@ -299,6 +299,14 @@ const struct vm_mem_backing_src_alias *vm_mem_backing_src_alias(uint32_t i) + */ + .flag = MAP_SHARED, + }, ++ [VM_MEM_SRC_GUEST_MEMFD] = { ++ .name = "guest_memfd", ++ .flag = MAP_SHARED, ++ }, ++ [VM_MEM_SRC_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP] = { ++ .name = "guest_memfd_no_direct_map", ++ .flag = MAP_SHARED, ++ } + }; + _Static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(aliases) == NUM_SRC_TYPES, + "Missing new backing src types?"); +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0033-KVM-selftests-stuff-vm_mem_backing_src_type-into-vm_.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0033-KVM-selftests-stuff-vm_mem_backing_src_type-into-vm_.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..416ded372d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0033-KVM-selftests-stuff-vm_mem_backing_src_type-into-vm_.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 2356665bc3949fa79c497246e2aa261c3f5184cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2025 13:46:01 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 33/49] KVM: selftests: stuff vm_mem_backing_src_type into + vm_shape + +Use one of the padding fields in struct vm_shape to carry an enum +vm_mem_backing_src_type value, to give the option to overwrite the +default of VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS in __vm_create(). + +Overwriting this default will allow tests to create VMs where the test +code is backed by mmap'd guest_memfd instead of anonymous memory. + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h | 19 ++++++++++--------- + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 2 +- + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c | 1 + + .../selftests/kvm/pre_fault_memory_test.c | 1 + + 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h +index 5204a0a18a7f..8baa0bbacd09 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h +@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ enum vm_guest_mode { + struct vm_shape { + uint32_t type; + uint8_t mode; +- uint8_t pad0; ++ uint8_t src_type; + uint16_t pad1; + }; + +@@ -196,14 +196,15 @@ kvm_static_assert(sizeof(struct vm_shape) == sizeof(uint64_t)); + + #define VM_TYPE_DEFAULT 0 + +-#define VM_SHAPE(__mode) \ +-({ \ +- struct vm_shape shape = { \ +- .mode = (__mode), \ +- .type = VM_TYPE_DEFAULT \ +- }; \ +- \ +- shape; \ ++#define VM_SHAPE(__mode) \ ++({ \ ++ struct vm_shape shape = { \ ++ .mode = (__mode), \ ++ .type = VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, \ ++ .src_type = VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS \ ++ }; \ ++ \ ++ shape; \ + }) + + #if defined(__aarch64__) +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c +index a81089f7c83f..3a22794bd959 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c +@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ struct kvm_vm *__vm_create(struct vm_shape shape, uint32_t nr_runnable_vcpus, + if (is_guest_memfd_required(shape)) + flags |= KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD; + +- vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0, nr_pages, flags); ++ vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, shape.src_type, 0, 0, nr_pages, flags); + for (i = 0; i < NR_MEM_REGIONS; i++) + vm->memslots[i] = 0; + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c +index c3a9838f4806..d920880e4fc0 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c +@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code, + struct vm_shape shape = { + .mode = VM_MODE_DEFAULT, + .type = type, ++ .src_type = VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, + }; + struct kvm_vm *vm; + struct kvm_vcpu *cpus[1]; +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/pre_fault_memory_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/pre_fault_memory_test.c +index 0350a8896a2f..d403f8d2f26f 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/pre_fault_memory_test.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/pre_fault_memory_test.c +@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static void __test_pre_fault_memory(unsigned long vm_type, bool private) + const struct vm_shape shape = { + .mode = VM_MODE_DEFAULT, + .type = vm_type, ++ .src_type = VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, + }; + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; + struct kvm_run *run; +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0034-KVM-selftests-cover-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP-i.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0034-KVM-selftests-cover-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP-i.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..74a5489fac4 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0034-KVM-selftests-cover-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP-i.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 18f619c94a1cb0737639d6f8fc1178e0c41d9d36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2024 07:18:57 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 34/49] KVM: selftests: cover GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP in + mem conversion tests + +Cover the scenario that the guest can fault in and write gmem-backed +guest memory even if its direct map removed. + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + .../selftests/kvm/x86/private_mem_conversions_test.c | 7 ++++--- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/private_mem_conversions_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/private_mem_conversions_test.c +index 82a8d88b5338..8427d9fbdb23 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/private_mem_conversions_test.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/private_mem_conversions_test.c +@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ static void *__test_mem_conversions(void *__vcpu) + } + + static void test_mem_conversions(enum vm_mem_backing_src_type src_type, uint32_t nr_vcpus, +- uint32_t nr_memslots) ++ uint32_t nr_memslots, uint64_t gmem_flags) + { + /* + * Allocate enough memory so that each vCPU's chunk of memory can be +@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ static void test_mem_conversions(enum vm_mem_backing_src_type src_type, uint32_t + + vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL, (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE)); + +- memfd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, memfd_size, 0); ++ memfd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, memfd_size, gmem_flags); + + for (i = 0; i < nr_memslots; i++) + vm_mem_add(vm, src_type, BASE_DATA_GPA + slot_size * i, +@@ -477,7 +477,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + } + } + +- test_mem_conversions(src_type, nr_vcpus, nr_memslots); ++ test_mem_conversions(src_type, nr_vcpus, nr_memslots, 0); ++ test_mem_conversions(src_type, nr_vcpus, nr_memslots, GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP); + + return 0; + } +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0035-KVM-selftests-cover-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP-i.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0035-KVM-selftests-cover-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP-i.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..31f1394e17b --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0035-KVM-selftests-cover-GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP-i.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From 1c1fdb1be73ab38b5d7377dcf68cc6781521ea56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2025 15:30:39 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 35/49] KVM: selftests: cover GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP in + guest_memfd_test.c + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +index b86bf89a71e0..2ca82bd58322 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +@@ -275,6 +275,8 @@ static void test_guest_memfd(unsigned long vm_type) + + if (vm_check_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP)) + flags |= GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP; ++ if (vm_check_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP)) ++ flags |= GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP; + + test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(vm); + test_create_guest_memfd_invalid_sizes(vm, flags, page_size); +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0036-KVM-selftests-Test-guest-execution-from-direct-map-r.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0036-KVM-selftests-Test-guest-execution-from-direct-map-r.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e2f7313824b --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/10-direct-map-removal/0036-KVM-selftests-Test-guest-execution-from-direct-map-r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +From 6b47a2e73562b32e250c1395aae6e54ebc3a5aa8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 08:18:24 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 36/49] KVM: selftests: Test guest execution from direct map + removed gmem + +Add a selftest that loads itself into guest_memfd (via +GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP) and triggers an MMIO exit when executed. This +exercises x86 MMIO emulation code inside KVM for guest_memfd-backed +memslots where the guest_memfd folios are direct map removed. +Particularly, it validates that x86 MMIO emulation code (guest page +table walks + instruction fetch) correctly accesses gmem through the VMA +that's been reflected into the memslot's userspace_addr field (instead +of trying to do direct map accesses). + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + .../selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c +index ce3ac0fd6dfb..ab18c0083780 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c +@@ -603,6 +603,41 @@ static void test_mmio_during_vectoring(void) + + kvm_vm_free(vm); + } ++ ++static void guest_code_trigger_mmio(void) ++{ ++ /* ++ * Read some GPA that is not backed by a memslot. KVM consider this ++ * as MMIO and tell userspace to emulate the read. ++ */ ++ READ_ONCE(*((uint64_t *)MEM_REGION_GPA)); ++ ++ GUEST_DONE(); ++} ++ ++static void test_guest_memfd_mmio(void) ++{ ++ struct kvm_vm *vm; ++ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; ++ struct vm_shape shape = { ++ .mode = VM_MODE_DEFAULT, ++ .src_type = VM_MEM_SRC_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP, ++ }; ++ pthread_t vcpu_thread; ++ ++ pr_info("Testing MMIO emulation for instructions in gmem\n"); ++ ++ vm = __vm_create_shape_with_one_vcpu(shape, &vcpu, 0, guest_code_trigger_mmio); ++ ++ virt_map(vm, MEM_REGION_GPA, MEM_REGION_GPA, 1); ++ ++ pthread_create(&vcpu_thread, NULL, vcpu_worker, vcpu); ++ ++ /* If the MMIO read was successfully emulated, the vcpu thread will exit */ ++ pthread_join(vcpu_thread, NULL); ++ ++ kvm_vm_free(vm); ++} + #endif + + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +@@ -626,10 +661,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + test_add_max_memory_regions(); + + #ifdef __x86_64__ +- if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD) && +- (kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM))) { ++ if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD)) { ++ if (kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM)) { + test_add_private_memory_region(); + test_add_overlapping_private_memory_regions(); ++ } ++ ++ if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP) && kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP)) ++ test_guest_memfd_mmio(); ++ else ++ pr_info("Skipping tests requiring KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP | KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP"); + } else { + pr_info("Skipping tests for KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD memory regions\n"); + } +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/11-kvm-clock/0037-KVM-x86-use-uhva-for-kvm-clock-if-kvm_gpc_refresh-fa.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/11-kvm-clock/0037-KVM-x86-use-uhva-for-kvm-clock-if-kvm_gpc_refresh-fa.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..59c0bc72622 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/11-kvm-clock/0037-KVM-x86-use-uhva-for-kvm-clock-if-kvm_gpc_refresh-fa.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From 71bcbd4705fda07a87b0274f86eee7f1742ab863 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Roy +Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2025 15:59:39 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 37/49] KVM: x86: use uhva for kvm-clock if kvm_gpc_refresh() + fails + +kvm-clock uses a gfn_to_pfn_cache to avoid repeated gpa->pfn +computations, relying on mmu notifiers to determine when the translation +needs to be redone. + +If the guest places the kvm-clock for some vcpu into memory that is +backed by a KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY memslot, and the guest_memfd instance +has GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP set, this does not work: +gfn_to_pfn_cache internally uses GUP to resolve uhva->pfn, which +returned -EFAULT for direct map removed memory. But even if this pfn +computation were to work, the subsequent attempts to access guest memory +through the direct map would obviously fail. + +For this scenario, all other parts of kvm fall back to instead accessing +guest memory through userspace mapping of guest_memfd, which is stored +in the memslots userspace_addr. Have kvm-clock do the same by handling +failures in kvm_gpc_refresh() with a fallback to a pvclock update +routine that operates on userspace mappings. This looses the +optimization of gfn_to_pfn_cache for these VMs, but on modern hardawre +kvm-clock update requests should be rare enough for this to not matter +(and guest_memfd is not support for Xen VMs, where speed of pvclock +accesses is more relevant). + +Alternatively, it would be possible to team gfn_to_pfn_cache about +(direct map removed) guest_memfd, however the combination of on-demand +direct map reinsertion (and its induced ref-counting) and hooking +gfn_to_pfn_caches up to gmem invalidations has proven significantly more +complex [1], and hence simply falling back to userspace mappings was +suggested by Sean at one of the guest_memfd upstream calls. + +[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240910163038.1298452-9-roypat@amazon.co.uk/ + https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240910163038.1298452-10-roypat@amazon.co.uk/ + +Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy +--- + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +index e5cd54ba1eaa..197428567239 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +@@ -3149,6 +3149,40 @@ u64 get_kvmclock_ns(struct kvm *kvm) + return data.clock; + } + ++static void kvm_setup_guest_pvclock_slow(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *ref_hv_clock, ++ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ++ gpa_t gpa) ++{ ++ struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info guest_hv_clock; ++ struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info hv_clock; ++ ++ memcpy(&hv_clock, ref_hv_clock, sizeof(hv_clock)); ++ ++ kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, gpa, &guest_hv_clock, sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info)); ++ ++ /* ++ * This VCPU is paused, but it's legal for a guest to read another ++ * VCPU's kvmclock, so we really have to follow the specification where ++ * it says that version is odd if data is being modified, and even after ++ * it is consistent. ++ */ ++ ++ guest_hv_clock.version = hv_clock.version = (guest_hv_clock.version + 1) | 1; ++ smp_wmb(); ++ ++ /* retain PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED if set in guest copy */ ++ hv_clock.flags |= (guest_hv_clock.flags & PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED); ++ ++ kvm_write_guest(vcpu->kvm, gpa, &hv_clock, sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info)); ++ ++ smp_wmb(); ++ ++ ++hv_clock.version; ++ kvm_write_guest(vcpu->kvm, gpa + offsetof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info, version), &hv_clock.version, sizeof(hv_clock.version)); ++ ++ trace_kvm_pvclock_update(vcpu->vcpu_id, &hv_clock); ++} ++ + static void kvm_setup_guest_pvclock(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *ref_hv_clock, + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, +@@ -3164,8 +3198,10 @@ static void kvm_setup_guest_pvclock(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *ref_hv_clock, + while (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, offset + sizeof(*guest_hv_clock))) { + read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags); + +- if (kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, offset + sizeof(*guest_hv_clock))) ++ if (kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, offset + sizeof(*guest_hv_clock))) { ++ kvm_setup_guest_pvclock_slow(ref_hv_clock, vcpu, gpc->gpa + offset); + return; ++ } + + read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags); + } +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0038-KVM-Add-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT-memslot-flag-and-bitmap.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0038-KVM-Add-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT-memslot-flag-and-bitmap.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c1b0e940739 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0038-KVM-Add-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT-memslot-flag-and-bitmap.patch @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +From 1e250b57d6044939dae8f9e5068a0a8325d33652 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: James Houghton +Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2025 20:49:17 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 38/49] KVM: Add KVM_MEM_USERFAULT memslot flag and bitmap + +Use one of the 14 reserved u64s in struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2 +for the user to provide `userfault_bitmap`. + +The memslot flag indicates if KVM should be reading from the +`userfault_bitmap` field from the memslot. The user is permitted to +provide a bogus pointer. If the pointer cannot be read from, we will +return -EFAULT (with no other information) back to the user. + +Signed-off-by: James Houghton +--- + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ + include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 4 +++- + virt/kvm/Kconfig | 3 +++ + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +index 37553848e078..716f958e852c 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h ++++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +@@ -600,6 +600,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot { + unsigned long *dirty_bitmap; + struct kvm_arch_memory_slot arch; + unsigned long userspace_addr; ++ unsigned long __user *userfault_bitmap; + u32 flags; + short id; + u16 as_id; +@@ -745,6 +746,11 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(struct kvm *kvm) + } + #endif + ++static inline bool kvm_has_userfault(struct kvm *kvm) ++{ ++ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_USERFAULT); ++} ++ + struct kvm_memslots { + u64 generation; + atomic_long_t last_used_slot; +@@ -2595,4 +2601,12 @@ static inline int kvm_enable_virtualization(void) { return 0; } + static inline void kvm_disable_virtualization(void) { } + #endif + ++int kvm_gfn_userfault(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, ++ gfn_t gfn); ++ ++static inline bool kvm_memslot_userfault(struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot) ++{ ++ return memslot->flags & KVM_MEM_USERFAULT; ++} ++ + #endif +diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +index 7688ea92b25c..d834eb428318 100644 +--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2 { + __u64 guest_memfd_offset; + __u32 guest_memfd; + __u32 pad1; +- __u64 pad2[14]; ++ __u64 userfault_bitmap; ++ __u64 pad2[13]; + }; + + /* +@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2 { + #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0) + #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1) + #define KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD (1UL << 2) ++#define KVM_MEM_USERFAULT (1UL << 3) + + /* for KVM_IRQ_LINE */ + struct kvm_irq_level { +diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig +index 1b7d5be0b6c4..1ba90f2af313 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig ++++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig +@@ -127,3 +127,6 @@ config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE + config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE + bool + depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ++ ++config HAVE_KVM_USERFAULT ++ bool +diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +index 0dbfd17e1191..41c8ac9fe514 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +@@ -1605,6 +1605,9 @@ static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm *kvm, + !(mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD)) + valid_flags |= KVM_MEM_READONLY; + ++ if (kvm_has_userfault(kvm)) ++ valid_flags |= KVM_MEM_USERFAULT; ++ + if (mem->flags & ~valid_flags) + return -EINVAL; + +@@ -2040,6 +2043,12 @@ static int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, + if (id < KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS && + (mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES) + return -EINVAL; ++ if (mem->flags & KVM_MEM_USERFAULT && ++ ((mem->userfault_bitmap != untagged_addr(mem->userfault_bitmap)) || ++ !access_ok((void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userfault_bitmap, ++ DIV_ROUND_UP(mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT, BITS_PER_LONG) ++ * sizeof(long)))) ++ return -EINVAL; + + slots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, as_id); + +@@ -2108,6 +2117,9 @@ static int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, + if (r) + goto out; + } ++ if (mem->flags & KVM_MEM_USERFAULT) ++ new->userfault_bitmap = ++ (unsigned long __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userfault_bitmap; + + r = kvm_set_memslot(kvm, old, new, change); + if (r) +@@ -6551,3 +6563,26 @@ void kvm_exit(void) + kvm_irqfd_exit(); + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit); ++ ++int kvm_gfn_userfault(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, ++ gfn_t gfn) ++{ ++ unsigned long bitmap_chunk = 0; ++ off_t offset; ++ ++ if (!kvm_memslot_userfault(memslot)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!memslot->userfault_bitmap)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ offset = gfn - memslot->base_gfn; ++ ++ if (copy_from_user(&bitmap_chunk, ++ memslot->userfault_bitmap + offset / BITS_PER_LONG, ++ sizeof(bitmap_chunk))) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ ++ /* Set in the bitmap means that the gfn is userfault */ ++ return !!(bitmap_chunk & (1ul << (offset % BITS_PER_LONG))); ++} +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0039-KVM-Add-KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_USERFAULT.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0039-KVM-Add-KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_USERFAULT.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bdf185775d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0039-KVM-Add-KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_USERFAULT.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 56d26e4a6d9e3dd57edc166fdd5ea49e6d982e5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: James Houghton +Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2025 20:49:18 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 39/49] KVM: Add KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_USERFAULT + +This flag is used for vCPU memory faults caused by KVM Userfault; i.e., +the bit in `userfault_bitmap` corresponding to the faulting gfn was set. + +Signed-off-by: James Houghton +--- + include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +index d834eb428318..9d08e36ea93b 100644 +--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +@@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ struct kvm_run { + /* KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT */ + struct { + #define KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE (1ULL << 3) ++#define KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_USERFAULT (1ULL << 4) + __u64 flags; + __u64 gpa; + __u64 size; +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0040-KVM-Allow-late-setting-of-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT-on-guest.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0040-KVM-Allow-late-setting-of-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT-on-guest.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bc562d8f8c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0040-KVM-Allow-late-setting-of-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT-on-guest.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From 5f5c0d38adade0abfb63f9473a26638dd9fc0a84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: James Houghton +Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2025 20:49:19 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 40/49] KVM: Allow late setting of KVM_MEM_USERFAULT on + guest_memfd memslot + +Currently guest_memfd memslots can only be deleted. Slightly change the +logic to allow KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY changes when the only flag being +changed is KVM_MEM_USERFAULT. + +Signed-off-by: James Houghton +--- + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 15 +++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +index 41c8ac9fe514..ff2d40636a7a 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +@@ -2081,9 +2081,6 @@ static int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, + if ((kvm->nr_memslot_pages + npages) < kvm->nr_memslot_pages) + return -EINVAL; + } else { /* Modify an existing slot. */ +- /* Private memslots are immutable, they can only be deleted. */ +- if (mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD) +- return -EINVAL; + if ((mem->userspace_addr != old->userspace_addr) || + (npages != old->npages) || + ((mem->flags ^ old->flags) & KVM_MEM_READONLY)) +@@ -2097,6 +2094,16 @@ static int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, + return 0; + } + ++ /* ++ * Except for being able to set KVM_MEM_USERFAULT, private memslots are ++ * immutable, they can only be deleted. ++ */ ++ if (mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD && ++ !(change == KVM_MR_CREATE || ++ (change == KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY && ++ (mem->flags ^ old->flags) == KVM_MEM_USERFAULT))) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ + if ((change == KVM_MR_CREATE || change == KVM_MR_MOVE) && + kvm_check_memslot_overlap(slots, id, base_gfn, base_gfn + npages)) + return -EEXIST; +@@ -2112,7 +2119,7 @@ static int kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, + new->npages = npages; + new->flags = mem->flags; + new->userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr; +- if (mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD) { ++ if (mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD && change == KVM_MR_CREATE) { + r = kvm_gmem_bind(kvm, new, mem->guest_memfd, mem->guest_memfd_offset); + if (r) + goto out; +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0041-KVM-x86-mmu-Add-support-for-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0041-KVM-x86-mmu-Add-support-for-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..56a128197f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0041-KVM-x86-mmu-Add-support-for-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT.patch @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +From a8936a9daf5ed24a1dafe514da65b92df92b79e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: James Houghton +Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2025 20:49:21 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 41/49] KVM: x86/mmu: Add support for KVM_MEM_USERFAULT + +Adhering to the requirements of KVM Userfault: + +1. Zap all sptes for the memslot when KVM_MEM_USERFAULT is toggled on + with kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(). +2. Only all PAGE_SIZE sptes when KVM_MEM_USERFAULT is enabled (for both + normal/GUP memory and guest_memfd memory). +3. Reconstruct huge mappings when KVM_MEM_USERFAULT is toggled off with + kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages(). This is the behavior when dirty logging + is disabled; remain consistent with it. + +With the new logic in kvm_mmu_slot_apply_flags(), I've simplified the +two dirty-logging-toggle checks into one, and I have dropped the +WARN_ON() that was there. + +Signed-off-by: James Houghton +--- + arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 2 +- + arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 2 +- + arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 1 + + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 12 +++++++++++ + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 20 +++++++++++++++--- + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 5 ++++- + 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +index 85559b8a0845..f0fc1f59cd6d 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +@@ -1551,7 +1551,7 @@ static int gmem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + ret = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(kvm, memslot, gfn, &pfn, &page, NULL); + if (ret) { + kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault_ipa, PAGE_SIZE, +- write_fault, exec_fault, false); ++ write_fault, exec_fault, false, false); + return ret; + } + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c +index b3edd7f7c8cd..2e2d03e578b5 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c +@@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool *is_gmem) + ret = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(vcpu->kvm, memslot, gfn, &pfn, &page, NULL); + if (ret) { + kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, vt->wr.pa, PAGE_SIZE, +- write_fault, false, false); ++ write_fault, false, false, false); + return ret; + } + } +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +index 4e43923656d0..1390ba799d4f 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ config KVM_X86 + select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY + select KVM_WERROR if WERROR + select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD if X86_64 ++ select HAVE_KVM_USERFAULT + + config KVM + tristate "Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support" +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +index 56c80588efa0..ae0f244357a5 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +@@ -4588,6 +4588,18 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct kvm_page_fault *fault) + { + unsigned int foll = fault->write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0; ++ int userfault; ++ ++ userfault = kvm_gfn_userfault(vcpu->kvm, fault->slot, fault->gfn); ++ if (userfault < 0) ++ return userfault; ++ if (userfault) { ++ kvm_mmu_prepare_userfault_exit(vcpu, fault); ++ return -EFAULT; ++ } ++ ++ if (kvm_memslot_userfault(fault->slot)) ++ fault->max_level = PG_LEVEL_4K; + + if (fault->is_private || kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(fault->slot)) + return kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_gmem(vcpu, fault); +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +index b776be783a2f..120ce9d340b4 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +@@ -339,12 +339,26 @@ enum { + */ + static_assert(RET_PF_CONTINUE == 0); + +-static inline void kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, +- struct kvm_page_fault *fault) ++static inline void __kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ++ struct kvm_page_fault *fault, ++ bool is_userfault) + { + kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault->gfn << PAGE_SHIFT, + PAGE_SIZE, fault->write, fault->exec, +- fault->is_private); ++ fault->is_private, ++ is_userfault); ++} ++ ++static inline void kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ++ struct kvm_page_fault *fault) ++{ ++ __kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault, false); ++} ++ ++static inline void kvm_mmu_prepare_userfault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ++ struct kvm_page_fault *fault) ++{ ++ __kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault, true); + } + + static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, +diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +index 197428567239..2279bb7cf9fe 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +@@ -13091,12 +13091,36 @@ static void kvm_mmu_slot_apply_flags(struct kvm *kvm, + u32 new_flags = new ? new->flags : 0; + bool log_dirty_pages = new_flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES; + ++ /* ++ * When toggling KVM Userfault on, zap all sptes so that userfault-ness ++ * will be respected at refault time. All new faults will only install ++ * small sptes. Therefore, when toggling it off, recover hugepages. ++ * ++ * For MOVE and DELETE, there will be nothing to do, as the old ++ * mappings will have already been deleted by ++ * kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(). ++ * ++ * For CREATE, no mappings will have been created yet. ++ */ ++ if ((old_flags ^ new_flags) & KVM_MEM_USERFAULT && ++ (change == KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY)) { ++ if (old_flags & KVM_MEM_USERFAULT) ++ kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages(kvm, new); ++ else ++ kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(kvm, old); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Nothing more to do if dirty logging isn't being toggled. ++ */ ++ if (!((old_flags ^ new_flags) & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES)) ++ return; ++ + /* + * Update CPU dirty logging if dirty logging is being toggled. This + * applies to all operations. + */ +- if ((old_flags ^ new_flags) & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) +- kvm_mmu_update_cpu_dirty_logging(kvm, log_dirty_pages); ++ kvm_mmu_update_cpu_dirty_logging(kvm, log_dirty_pages); + + /* + * Nothing more to do for RO slots (which can't be dirtied and can't be +@@ -13116,14 +13140,6 @@ static void kvm_mmu_slot_apply_flags(struct kvm *kvm, + if ((change != KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY) || (new_flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY)) + return; + +- /* +- * READONLY and non-flags changes were filtered out above, and the only +- * other flag is LOG_DIRTY_PAGES, i.e. something is wrong if dirty +- * logging isn't being toggled on or off. +- */ +- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!((old_flags ^ new_flags) & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))) +- return; +- + if (!log_dirty_pages) { + /* + * Recover huge page mappings in the slot now that dirty logging +diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +index 716f958e852c..59f4857e8ec2 100644 +--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h ++++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h +@@ -2492,7 +2492,8 @@ static inline void kvm_account_pgtable_pages(void *virt, int nr) + static inline void kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + gpa_t gpa, gpa_t size, + bool is_write, bool is_exec, +- bool is_private) ++ bool is_private, ++ bool is_userfault) + { + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT; + vcpu->run->memory_fault.gpa = gpa; +@@ -2502,6 +2503,8 @@ static inline void kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + vcpu->run->memory_fault.flags = 0; + if (is_private) + vcpu->run->memory_fault.flags |= KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE; ++ if (is_userfault) ++ vcpu->run->memory_fault.flags |= KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_USERFAULT; + } + + static inline bool kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0042-KVM-Advertise-KVM_CAP_USERFAULT-in-KVM_CHECK_EXTENSI.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0042-KVM-Advertise-KVM_CAP_USERFAULT-in-KVM_CHECK_EXTENSI.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b287331cc48 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0042-KVM-Advertise-KVM_CAP_USERFAULT-in-KVM_CHECK_EXTENSI.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From 93c8b3d7b039acdd213a3250b47043218da38428 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: James Houghton +Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2025 20:49:20 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 42/49] KVM: Advertise KVM_CAP_USERFAULT in KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION + +Advertise support for KVM_CAP_USERFAULT when kvm_has_userfault() returns +true. Currently this is merely IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_USERFAULT), so +it is somewhat redundant. + +Signed-off-by: James Houghton +--- + include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 4 ++++ + 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +index 9d08e36ea93b..71b639e86a26 100644 +--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +@@ -966,6 +966,7 @@ struct kvm_enable_cap { + #define KVM_CAP_RISCV_MP_STATE_RESET 242 + #define KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP 243 + #define KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP 244 ++#define KVM_CAP_USERFAULT 245 + + struct kvm_irq_routing_irqchip { + __u32 irqchip; +diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +index ff2d40636a7a..c089e03b066b 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +@@ -4944,6 +4944,10 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg) + return 1; + case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP: + return !kvm || kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(kvm); ++#endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_USERFAULT ++ case KVM_CAP_USERFAULT: ++ return kvm_has_userfault(kvm); + #endif + default: + break; +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0043-KVM-arm64-Add-support-for-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0043-KVM-arm64-Add-support-for-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9e330a80ced --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/15-kvm-mem-userfault/0043-KVM-arm64-Add-support-for-KVM_MEM_USERFAULT.patch @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +From 5179bf5e8ebe11d20c73513c51d78fb0f48cd44c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: James Houghton +Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2025 20:49:22 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 43/49] KVM: arm64: Add support for KVM_MEM_USERFAULT + +Adhering to the requirements of KVM Userfault: +1. When it is toggled on, zap the second stage with + kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(). This is to respect userfault-ness. +2. When KVM_MEM_USERFAULT is enabled, restrict new second-stage mappings + to be PAGE_SIZE, just like when dirty logging is enabled. + +Do not zap the second stage when KVM_MEM_USERFAULT is disabled to remain +consistent with the behavior when dirty logging is disabled. + +Signed-off-by: James Houghton +--- + arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 1 + + arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig +index bff62e75d681..c75d6bcd3dd8 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig +@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ menuconfig KVM + select SCHED_INFO + select GUEST_PERF_EVENTS if PERF_EVENTS + select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ++ select HAVE_KVM_USERFAULT + help + Support hosting virtualized guest machines. + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +index f0fc1f59cd6d..3e7eb08cd133 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +@@ -1548,6 +1548,13 @@ static int gmem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + /* Pairs with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(). */ + smp_rmb(); + ++ if (kvm_gfn_userfault(kvm, memslot, gfn)) { ++ kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, gfn << PAGE_SHIFT, ++ PAGE_SIZE, write_fault, ++ exec_fault, false, true); ++ return -EFAULT; ++ } ++ + ret = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(kvm, memslot, gfn, &pfn, &page, NULL); + if (ret) { + kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault_ipa, PAGE_SIZE, +@@ -1643,7 +1650,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + return -EFAULT; + } + +- if (force_pte) ++ if (force_pte || kvm_memslot_userfault(memslot)) + vma_shift = PAGE_SHIFT; + else + vma_shift = get_vma_page_shift(vma, hva); +@@ -1730,6 +1737,13 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, + mmu_seq = kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq; + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); + ++ if (kvm_gfn_userfault(kvm, memslot, gfn)) { ++ kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, gfn << PAGE_SHIFT, ++ PAGE_SIZE, write_fault, ++ exec_fault, false, true); ++ return -EFAULT; ++ } ++ + pfn = __kvm_faultin_pfn(memslot, gfn, write_fault ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, + &writable, &page); + if (pfn == KVM_PFN_ERR_HWPOISON) { +@@ -2219,6 +2233,23 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, + enum kvm_mr_change change) + { + bool log_dirty_pages = new && new->flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES; ++ u32 new_flags = new ? new->flags : 0; ++ u32 changed_flags = (new_flags) ^ (old ? old->flags : 0); ++ ++ /* ++ * If KVM_MEM_USERFAULT has been enabled, drop all the stage-2 mappings ++ * so that we can respect userfault-ness. ++ */ ++ if ((changed_flags & KVM_MEM_USERFAULT) && ++ (new_flags & KVM_MEM_USERFAULT) && ++ change == KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY) ++ kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(kvm, old); ++ ++ /* ++ * Nothing left to do if not toggling dirty logging. ++ */ ++ if (!(changed_flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES)) ++ return; + + /* + * At this point memslot has been committed and there is an +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/20-gmem-write/0044-KVM-guest_memfd-add-generic-population-via-write.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/20-gmem-write/0044-KVM-guest_memfd-add-generic-population-via-write.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e699a0d396a --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/20-gmem-write/0044-KVM-guest_memfd-add-generic-population-via-write.patch @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +From cd8f88bd30341d368432371f53de7704ccc73c87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nikita Kalyazin +Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2025 13:08:37 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 44/49] KVM: guest_memfd: add generic population via write + +write syscall populates guest_memfd with user-supplied data in a generic +way, ie no vendor-specific preparation is performed. This is supposed +to be used in non-CoCo setups where guest memory is not +hardware-encrypted. + +The following behaviour is implemented: + - only page-aligned count and offset are allowed + - if the memory is already allocated, the call will successfully + populate it + - if the memory is not allocated, the call will both allocate and + populate + - if the memory is already populated, the call will not repopulate it + +Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin +--- + virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +index e3696880405c..7f5134a7c8e4 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +@@ -390,7 +390,9 @@ static int kvm_gmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) + } + + static struct file_operations kvm_gmem_fops = { +- .mmap = kvm_gmem_mmap, ++ .mmap = kvm_gmem_mmap, ++ .llseek = default_llseek, ++ .write_iter = generic_perform_write, + .open = generic_file_open, + .release = kvm_gmem_release, + .fallocate = kvm_gmem_fallocate, +@@ -401,6 +403,59 @@ void kvm_gmem_init(struct module *module) + kvm_gmem_fops.owner = module; + } + ++static int kvm_kmem_gmem_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping, ++ loff_t pos, unsigned len, struct folio **foliop, ++ void **fsdata) ++{ ++ pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ struct folio *folio; ++ ++ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(pos) || len != PAGE_SIZE) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if (pos + len > i_size_read(file_inode(file))) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ folio = kvm_gmem_get_folio(file_inode(file), index); ++ if (IS_ERR(folio)) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ ++ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(folio_test_large(folio))) { ++ folio_unlock(folio); ++ folio_put(folio); ++ return -EFAULT; ++ } ++ ++ if (folio_test_uptodate(folio)) { ++ folio_unlock(folio); ++ folio_put(folio); ++ return -ENOSPC; ++ } ++ ++ *foliop = folio; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int kvm_kmem_gmem_write_end(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping, ++ loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned copied, ++ struct folio *folio, void *fsdata) ++{ ++ int ret; ++ ++ if (copied == len) { ++ kvm_gmem_mark_prepared(folio); ++ ret = copied; ++ } else { ++ filemap_remove_folio(folio); ++ ret = 0; ++ } ++ ++ folio_unlock(folio); ++ folio_put(folio); ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ + static int kvm_gmem_migrate_folio(struct address_space *mapping, + struct folio *dst, struct folio *src, + enum migrate_mode mode) +@@ -460,6 +515,8 @@ static void kvm_gmem_free_folio(struct address_space *mapping, + + static const struct address_space_operations kvm_gmem_aops = { + .dirty_folio = noop_dirty_folio, ++ .write_begin = kvm_kmem_gmem_write_begin, ++ .write_end = kvm_kmem_gmem_write_end, + .migrate_folio = kvm_gmem_migrate_folio, + .error_remove_folio = kvm_gmem_error_folio, + .free_folio = kvm_gmem_free_folio, +@@ -505,6 +562,7 @@ static int __kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, loff_t size, u64 flags) + } + + file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE; ++ file->f_mode |= FMODE_LSEEK | FMODE_PWRITE; + + inode = file->f_inode; + WARN_ON(file->f_mapping != inode->i_mapping); +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0045-mm-userfaultfd-generic-continue-for-non-hugetlbfs.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0045-mm-userfaultfd-generic-continue-for-non-hugetlbfs.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9c59626b077 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0045-mm-userfaultfd-generic-continue-for-non-hugetlbfs.patch @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +From aa9cd17534cb5f91d2f6a4dcbbb460492deace71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nikita Kalyazin +Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2025 10:15:35 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 45/49] mm: userfaultfd: generic continue for non hugetlbfs + +Remove shmem-specific code from UFFDIO_CONTINUE implementation for +non-huge pages by calling vm_ops->fault(). A new VMF flag, +FAULT_FLAG_USERFAULT_CONTINUE, is introduced to avoid recursive call to +handle_userfault(). + +Suggested-by: James Houghton +Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin +--- + include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 ++++ + mm/hugetlb.c | 2 +- + mm/shmem.c | 9 ++++++--- + mm/userfaultfd.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- + 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h +index d6b91e8a66d6..d4c35a50058c 100644 +--- a/include/linux/mm_types.h ++++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h +@@ -1565,6 +1565,9 @@ enum tlb_flush_reason { + * @FAULT_FLAG_ORIG_PTE_VALID: whether the fault has vmf->orig_pte cached. + * We should only access orig_pte if this flag set. + * @FAULT_FLAG_VMA_LOCK: The fault is handled under VMA lock. ++ * @FAULT_FLAG_USERFAULT_CONTINUE: The fault handler must not call userfaultfd ++ * minor handler as it is being called by the ++ * userfaultfd code itself. + * + * About @FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY and @FAULT_FLAG_TRIED: we can specify + * whether we would allow page faults to retry by specifying these two +@@ -1603,6 +1606,7 @@ enum fault_flag { + FAULT_FLAG_UNSHARE = 1 << 10, + FAULT_FLAG_ORIG_PTE_VALID = 1 << 11, + FAULT_FLAG_VMA_LOCK = 1 << 12, ++ FAULT_FLAG_USERFAULT_CONTINUE = 1 << 13, + }; + + typedef unsigned int __bitwise zap_flags_t; +diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c +index a0d285d20992..7921c08fd529 100644 +--- a/mm/hugetlb.c ++++ b/mm/hugetlb.c +@@ -6536,7 +6536,7 @@ static vm_fault_t hugetlb_no_page(struct address_space *mapping, + } + + /* Check for page in userfault range. */ +- if (userfaultfd_minor(vma)) { ++ if (userfaultfd_minor(vma) && !(vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_USERFAULT_CONTINUE)) { + folio_unlock(folio); + folio_put(folio); + /* See comment in userfaultfd_missing() block above */ +diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c +index 3a5a65b1f41a..01e20e0216bc 100644 +--- a/mm/shmem.c ++++ b/mm/shmem.c +@@ -2458,7 +2458,8 @@ static int shmem_get_folio_gfp(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index, + fault_mm = vma ? vma->vm_mm : NULL; + + folio = filemap_get_entry(inode->i_mapping, index); +- if (folio && vma && userfaultfd_minor(vma)) { ++ if (folio && vma && userfaultfd_minor(vma) && ++ !(vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_USERFAULT_CONTINUE)) { + if (!xa_is_value(folio)) + folio_put(folio); + *fault_type = handle_userfault(vmf, VM_UFFD_MINOR); +@@ -2718,6 +2719,8 @@ static vm_fault_t shmem_falloc_wait(struct vm_fault *vmf, struct inode *inode) + static vm_fault_t shmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) + { + struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file); ++ enum sgp_type sgp = vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_USERFAULT_CONTINUE ? ++ SGP_NOALLOC : SGP_CACHE; + gfp_t gfp = mapping_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping); + struct folio *folio = NULL; + vm_fault_t ret = 0; +@@ -2734,8 +2737,8 @@ static vm_fault_t shmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) + } + + WARN_ON_ONCE(vmf->page != NULL); +- err = shmem_get_folio_gfp(inode, vmf->pgoff, 0, &folio, SGP_CACHE, +- gfp, vmf, &ret); ++ err = shmem_get_folio_gfp(inode, vmf->pgoff, 0, &folio, sgp, gfp, vmf, ++ &ret); + if (err) + return vmf_error(err); + if (folio) { +diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c +index 8253978ee0fb..46380f262c4d 100644 +--- a/mm/userfaultfd.c ++++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c +@@ -376,30 +376,47 @@ static int mfill_atomic_pte_zeropage(pmd_t *dst_pmd, + return ret; + } + +-/* Handles UFFDIO_CONTINUE for all shmem VMAs (shared or private). */ ++/* Handles UFFDIO_CONTINUE for all VMAs */ + static int mfill_atomic_pte_continue(pmd_t *dst_pmd, + struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma, + unsigned long dst_addr, + uffd_flags_t flags) + { +- struct inode *inode = file_inode(dst_vma->vm_file); +- pgoff_t pgoff = linear_page_index(dst_vma, dst_addr); + struct folio *folio; + struct page *page; + int ret; ++ struct vm_fault vmf = { ++ .vma = dst_vma, ++ .address = dst_addr, ++ .flags = FAULT_FLAG_WRITE | FAULT_FLAG_REMOTE | ++ FAULT_FLAG_USERFAULT_CONTINUE, ++ .pte = NULL, ++ .page = NULL, ++ .pgoff = linear_page_index(dst_vma, dst_addr), ++ }; ++ ++ if (!dst_vma->vm_ops || !dst_vma->vm_ops->fault) ++ return -EINVAL; + +- ret = shmem_get_folio(inode, pgoff, 0, &folio, SGP_NOALLOC); +- /* Our caller expects us to return -EFAULT if we failed to find folio */ +- if (ret == -ENOENT) ++retry: ++ ret = dst_vma->vm_ops->fault(&vmf); ++ if (ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) { + ret = -EFAULT; +- if (ret) + goto out; +- if (!folio) { +- ret = -EFAULT; ++ } ++ ++ if (ret & VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) { ++ ret = -EAGAIN; + goto out; + } + +- page = folio_file_page(folio, pgoff); ++ if (ret & VM_FAULT_RETRY) ++ goto retry; ++ ++ page = vmf.page; ++ folio = page_folio(page); ++ BUG_ON(!folio); ++ + if (PageHWPoison(page)) { + ret = -EIO; + goto out_release; +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0046-mm-provide-can_userfault-vma-operation.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0046-mm-provide-can_userfault-vma-operation.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8d678acfc15 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0046-mm-provide-can_userfault-vma-operation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +From 3e1004dc6c19b37c8776069c03b58b75085e9dfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nikita Kalyazin +Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2025 14:15:18 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 46/49] mm: provide can_userfault vma operation + +The new operation allows to decouple the userfaulfd code from +dependencies to VMA types, specifically, shmem and hugetlb. The +vm_flags bitmap argument is processed with "any" logic, meaning if the +VMA type supports any of the flags set, it returns true. This is to +avoid multiple calls when checking for __VM_UFFD_FLAGS. + +Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin +--- + include/linux/mm.h | 5 +++++ + mm/hugetlb.c | 7 +++++++ + mm/shmem.c | 8 ++++++++ + 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h +index fa538feaa8d9..b0dafe4c84ad 100644 +--- a/include/linux/mm.h ++++ b/include/linux/mm.h +@@ -653,6 +653,11 @@ struct vm_operations_struct { + */ + struct page *(*find_special_page)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long addr); ++ /* ++ * True if the VMA supports userfault at least for one of the vm_flags ++ */ ++ bool (*can_userfault)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, ++ unsigned long vm_flags); + }; + + #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING +diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c +index 7921c08fd529..de57d4c8972b 100644 +--- a/mm/hugetlb.c ++++ b/mm/hugetlb.c +@@ -5450,6 +5450,12 @@ static unsigned long hugetlb_vm_op_pagesize(struct vm_area_struct *vma) + return huge_page_size(hstate_vma(vma)); + } + ++static bool hugetlb_vm_op_can_userfault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, ++ unsigned long vm_flags) ++{ ++ return true; ++} ++ + /* + * We cannot handle pagefaults against hugetlb pages at all. They cause + * handle_mm_fault() to try to instantiate regular-sized pages in the +@@ -5475,6 +5481,7 @@ const struct vm_operations_struct hugetlb_vm_ops = { + .close = hugetlb_vm_op_close, + .may_split = hugetlb_vm_op_split, + .pagesize = hugetlb_vm_op_pagesize, ++ .can_userfault = hugetlb_vm_op_can_userfault, + }; + + static pte_t make_huge_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct folio *folio, +diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c +index 01e20e0216bc..296bca653f77 100644 +--- a/mm/shmem.c ++++ b/mm/shmem.c +@@ -2882,6 +2882,12 @@ static struct mempolicy *shmem_get_policy(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + return mpol_shared_policy_lookup(&SHMEM_I(inode)->policy, index); + } + ++static bool shmem_can_userfault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, ++ unsigned long vm_flags) ++{ ++ return true; ++} ++ + static struct mempolicy *shmem_get_pgoff_policy(struct shmem_inode_info *info, + pgoff_t index, unsigned int order, pgoff_t *ilx) + { +@@ -5298,6 +5304,7 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct shmem_vm_ops = { + .set_policy = shmem_set_policy, + .get_policy = shmem_get_policy, + #endif ++ .can_userfault = shmem_can_userfault, + }; + + static const struct vm_operations_struct shmem_anon_vm_ops = { +@@ -5307,6 +5314,7 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct shmem_anon_vm_ops = { + .set_policy = shmem_set_policy, + .get_policy = shmem_get_policy, + #endif ++ .can_userfault = shmem_can_userfault, + }; + + int shmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0047-mm-userfaultfd-use-can_userfault-vma-operation.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0047-mm-userfaultfd-use-can_userfault-vma-operation.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e852cd91f7f --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0047-mm-userfaultfd-use-can_userfault-vma-operation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From 375b685ebb60ff5f7314ca0bc888898439fe4e93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nikita Kalyazin +Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2025 14:16:49 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 47/49] mm: userfaultfd: use can_userfault vma operation + +Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin +--- + include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 13 ++++++------- + mm/userfaultfd.c | 10 +++++++--- + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h +index 75342022d144..64551e8a55fb 100644 +--- a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h ++++ b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h +@@ -221,8 +221,8 @@ static inline bool vma_can_userfault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + if (vm_flags & VM_DROPPABLE) + return false; + +- if ((vm_flags & VM_UFFD_MINOR) && +- (!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) && !vma_is_shmem(vma))) ++ if (!vma->vm_ops->can_userfault || ++ !vma->vm_ops->can_userfault(vma, VM_UFFD_MINOR)) + return false; + + /* +@@ -235,16 +235,15 @@ static inline bool vma_can_userfault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + #ifndef CONFIG_PTE_MARKER_UFFD_WP + /* + * If user requested uffd-wp but not enabled pte markers for +- * uffd-wp, then shmem & hugetlbfs are not supported but only +- * anonymous. ++ * uffd-wp, then only anonymous is supported. + */ + if ((vm_flags & VM_UFFD_WP) && !vma_is_anonymous(vma)) + return false; + #endif + +- /* By default, allow any of anon|shmem|hugetlb */ +- return vma_is_anonymous(vma) || is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) || +- vma_is_shmem(vma); ++ return vma_is_anonymous(vma) || ++ (vma->vm_ops->can_userfault && ++ vma->vm_ops->can_userfault(vma, vm_flags)); + } + + static inline bool vma_has_uffd_without_event_remap(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c +index 46380f262c4d..d900dfd03bbe 100644 +--- a/mm/userfaultfd.c ++++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c +@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_atomic(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, + unsigned long src_addr, dst_addr; + long copied; + struct folio *folio; ++ bool can_userfault; + + /* + * Sanitize the command parameters: +@@ -783,10 +784,13 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_atomic(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, + return mfill_atomic_hugetlb(ctx, dst_vma, dst_start, + src_start, len, flags); + +- if (!vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma) && !vma_is_shmem(dst_vma)) ++ can_userfault = dst_vma->vm_ops->can_userfault && ++ dst_vma->vm_ops->can_userfault(dst_vma, __VM_UFFD_FLAGS); ++ ++ if (!vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma) && !can_userfault) + goto out_unlock; +- if (!vma_is_shmem(dst_vma) && +- uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_CONTINUE)) ++ ++ if (!can_userfault && uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_CONTINUE)) + goto out_unlock; + + while (src_addr < src_start + len) { +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0048-KVM-guest_memfd-add-support-for-userfaultfd-minor.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0048-KVM-guest_memfd-add-support-for-userfaultfd-minor.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1758c3fe92a --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0048-KVM-guest_memfd-add-support-for-userfaultfd-minor.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 36f7212593738d97042676841e0d4f95a1ac6a95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nikita Kalyazin +Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2025 15:02:56 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 48/49] KVM: guest_memfd: add support for userfaultfd minor + +Add support for sending a pagefault event if userfaultfd is registered. +Only page minor event is currently supported. + +Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin +--- + virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +index 7f5134a7c8e4..a9f91db3687b 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #include "kvm_mm.h" + +@@ -359,6 +360,12 @@ static vm_fault_t kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping(struct vm_fault *vmf) + kvm_gmem_mark_prepared(folio); + } + ++ if (userfaultfd_minor(vmf->vma) && ++ !(vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_USERFAULT_CONTINUE)) { ++ folio_unlock(folio); ++ return handle_userfault(vmf, VM_UFFD_MINOR); ++ } ++ + vmf->page = folio_file_page(folio, vmf->pgoff); + + out_folio: +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0049-mm-userfaultfd-add-UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_GUEST_MEMFD.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0049-mm-userfaultfd-add-UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_GUEST_MEMFD.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2efd99e47f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0049-mm-userfaultfd-add-UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_GUEST_MEMFD.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From bc53880a8867a3b4e26a102a8e0aef2bf3f37b59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nikita Kalyazin +Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2025 14:18:03 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 49/49] mm: userfaultfd: add UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_GUEST_MEMFD + +Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin +--- + fs/userfaultfd.c | 3 ++- + include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 8 +++++++- + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c +index 22f4bf956ba1..15175e2928d6 100644 +--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c ++++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c +@@ -1969,7 +1969,8 @@ static int userfaultfd_api(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, + uffdio_api.features = UFFD_API_FEATURES; + #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR + uffdio_api.features &= +- ~(UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_HUGETLBFS | UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_SHMEM); ++ ~(UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_HUGETLBFS | UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_SHMEM | ++ UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_GUEST_MEMFD); + #endif + #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP + uffdio_api.features &= ~UFFD_FEATURE_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP; +diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h +index 2841e4ea8f2c..ed688797eba7 100644 +--- a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h +@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ + UFFD_FEATURE_WP_UNPOPULATED | \ + UFFD_FEATURE_POISON | \ + UFFD_FEATURE_WP_ASYNC | \ +- UFFD_FEATURE_MOVE) ++ UFFD_FEATURE_MOVE | \ ++ UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_GUEST_MEMFD) + #define UFFD_API_IOCTLS \ + ((__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_REGISTER | \ + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_UNREGISTER | \ +@@ -230,6 +231,10 @@ struct uffdio_api { + * + * UFFD_FEATURE_MOVE indicates that the kernel supports moving an + * existing page contents from userspace. ++ * ++ * UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_GUEST_MEMFD indicates the same support as ++ * UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_HUGETLBFS, but for guest_memfd-backed pages ++ * instead. + */ + #define UFFD_FEATURE_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP (1<<0) + #define UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK (1<<1) +@@ -248,6 +253,7 @@ struct uffdio_api { + #define UFFD_FEATURE_POISON (1<<14) + #define UFFD_FEATURE_WP_ASYNC (1<<15) + #define UFFD_FEATURE_MOVE (1<<16) ++#define UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_GUEST_MEMFD (1<<17) + __u64 features; + + __u64 ioctls; +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0050-fixup-for-guest_memfd-uffd-v3.patch b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0050-fixup-for-guest_memfd-uffd-v3.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1495b425241 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/25-gmem-uffd/0050-fixup-for-guest_memfd-uffd-v3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From e4e7a96ac22a2f6740cc6afbafa1753935ac3fe3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nikita Kalyazin +Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 14:18:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] fixup for guest_memfd uffd v3 + + - implement can_userfault for guest_memfd + - check vma->vm_ops pointer before dereferencing + - proper check for VM_UFFD_MINOR +--- + include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 8 +++++--- + mm/userfaultfd.c | 4 +++- + virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 7 +++++++ + 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h +index 64551e8a55fb..8a05a7880393 100644 +--- a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h ++++ b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h +@@ -221,9 +221,11 @@ static inline bool vma_can_userfault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + if (vm_flags & VM_DROPPABLE) + return false; + +- if (!vma->vm_ops->can_userfault || +- !vma->vm_ops->can_userfault(vma, VM_UFFD_MINOR)) +- return false; ++ if ((vm_flags & VM_UFFD_MINOR) && ++ (!vma->vm_ops || ++ !vma->vm_ops->can_userfault || ++ !vma->vm_ops->can_userfault(vma, VM_UFFD_MINOR))) ++ return false; + + /* + * If wp async enabled, and WP is the only mode enabled, allow any +diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c +index d900dfd03bbe..7fb92714bc5c 100644 +--- a/mm/userfaultfd.c ++++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c +@@ -784,7 +784,9 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_atomic(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, + return mfill_atomic_hugetlb(ctx, dst_vma, dst_start, + src_start, len, flags); + +- can_userfault = dst_vma->vm_ops->can_userfault && ++ can_userfault = ++ dst_vma->vm_ops && ++ dst_vma->vm_ops->can_userfault && + dst_vma->vm_ops->can_userfault(dst_vma, __VM_UFFD_FLAGS); + + if (!vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma) && !can_userfault) +diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +index a9f91db3687b..3fbff4ba8f95 100644 +--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c ++++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +@@ -377,8 +377,15 @@ static vm_fault_t kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping(struct vm_fault *vmf) + return ret; + } + ++static bool kvm_gmem_can_userfault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, ++ unsigned long vm_flags) ++{ ++ return vm_flags & VM_UFFD_MINOR; ++} ++ + static const struct vm_operations_struct kvm_gmem_vm_ops = { + .fault = kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping, ++ .can_userfault = kvm_gmem_can_userfault, + }; + + static int kvm_gmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/GPL-2.0 b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/GPL-2.0 new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ff0812fd89c --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/GPL-2.0 @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +Valid-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +Valid-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +Valid-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +Valid-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +SPDX-URL: https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0.html +Usage-Guide: + To use this license in source code, put one of the following SPDX + tag/value pairs into a comment according to the placement + guidelines in the licensing rules documentation. + For 'GNU General Public License (GPL) version 2 only' use: + SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + or + SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only + For 'GNU General Public License (GPL) version 2 or any later version' use: + SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + or + SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +License-Text: + + GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE + Version 2, June 1991 + + Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA + Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies + of this license document, but changing it is not allowed. + + Preamble + + The licenses for most software are designed to take away your +freedom to share and change it. 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Of course, the commands you use may +be called something other than `show w' and `show c'; they could even be +mouse-clicks or menu items--whatever suits your program. + +You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or your +school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if +necessary. Here is a sample; alter the names: + + Yoyodyne, Inc., hereby disclaims all copyright interest in the program + `Gnomovision' (which makes passes at compilers) written by James Hacker. + + , 1 April 1989 + Ty Coon, President of Vice + +This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into +proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you may +consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the +library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Library General +Public License instead of this License. diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/README.md b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8889ed95e77 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/linux_patches/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# Linux kernel patches for direct map removal + +The Linux kernel patches in this directory and its subdirectories are +distributed under the `GPL-2.0` licence (see the full licence text at +[GPL-2.0](./GPL-2.0)). The patches are required by Firecracker's "Secret +Freedom" feature that removes the VM memory from the host direct map (see +[lore](https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250221160728.1584559-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/) +for more details). The patches are not yet merged upstream. diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/patches/0001.lore b/resources/hiding_ci/patches/0001.lore deleted file mode 100644 index 7663841026d..00000000000 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/patches/0001.lore +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250318161823.4005529-1-tabba@google.com From 13417e885957ac9814302036a89171d51ebf284f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2025 15:42:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 08/58] fix(ci): actually test kernel builds if patches are added The patches are in the `patches` subdirectory of `hiding_ci`, so if only patches were added, then the check of "any files with parent directory `hiding_ci`" would be false, and the CI step for testing the build of patches wouldn't actually run. Fix this by updating the check to be "any files where any parent directory is `hiding_ci`", which will also catch patches. Reported-by: Jack Thomson Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- .buildkite/pipeline_pr.py | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py b/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py index e7b7b3790ed..b212b8983da 100755 --- a/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py +++ b/.buildkite/pipeline_pr.py @@ -70,7 +70,9 @@ for step in kani_grp["steps"]: step["label"] = "🔍 Kani" -if not changed_files or (any(x.parent.name == "hiding_ci" for x in changed_files)): +if not changed_files or ( + any(parent.name == "hiding_ci" for x in changed_files for parent in x.parents) +): pipeline.build_group_per_arch( "🕵️ Build Secret Hiding Kernel", pipeline.devtool_test( From 32551c06019a5a78ad0c793b36a3fa5a78e17f3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Thomson Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2025 15:21:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 09/58] ci: Update script to install for AL23 Update the build script to allow us to install the secret hidden kernels onto Amazon Linux 2023 instances. We have to as part of this include a script to download and install ena drivers for the instance to allow us to boot. Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson --- .../hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh | 61 ++++++++++++++++--- resources/hiding_ci/dkms.conf | 10 +++ resources/hiding_ci/install_ena.sh | 24 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) create mode 100644 resources/hiding_ci/dkms.conf create mode 100755 resources/hiding_ci/install_ena.sh diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh index fec1dfc75a5..79ed480b913 100755 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh @@ -13,12 +13,20 @@ check_root() { fi } -check_ubuntu() { - # Currently this script only works on Ubuntu instances - if ! grep -qi 'ubuntu' /etc/os-release; then - echo "This script currently only works on Ubuntu." - exit 1 +check_userspace() { + # Currently this script only works on Ubuntu and AL2023 + if grep -qi 'ubuntu' /etc/os-release; then + USERSPACE="UBUNTU" + return 0 + fi + + if grep -qi 'al2023' /etc/os-release; then + USERSPACE="AL2023" + return 0 fi + + echo "This script currently only works on Ubuntu and Amazon Linux 2023." + exit 1 } install_build_deps() { @@ -127,7 +135,42 @@ check_override_presence() { echo "All overrides correctly applied.." } -check_ubuntu +ubuntu_update_boot() { + echo "Update initramfs" + update-initramfs -c -k $KERNEL_VERSION + echo "Updating GRUB..." + update-grub +} + +al2023_update_boot() { + echo "Installing ENA driver for AL2023" + $START_DIR/install_ena.sh $KERNEL_VERSION $START_DIR/dkms.conf + + # Just ensure we are back in the build dir + cd $TMP_BUILD_DIR + + echo "Creating the new ram disk" + dracut --kver $KERNEL_VERSION -f -v + + echo "Updating GRUB..." + grubby --grub2 --add-kernel /boot/vmlinux-$KERNEL_VERSION \ + --title="Secret Hiding" \ + --initrd=/boot/initramfs-$KERNEL_VERSION.img --copy-default + grubby --set-default /boot/vmlinux-$KERNEL_VERSION +} + +update_boot_config() { + case "$USERSPACE" in + UBUNTU) ubuntu_update_boot ;; + AL2023) al2023_update_boot ;; + *) + echo "Unknown userspace" + exit 1 + ;; + esac +} + +check_userspace install_build_deps KERNEL_URL=$(cat kernel_url) @@ -191,10 +234,8 @@ echo "Installing kernel modules..." make INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 modules_install echo "Installing kernel..." make INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 install -echo "Update initramfs" -update-initramfs -c -k $KERNEL_VERSION -echo "Updating GRUB..." -update-grub + +update_boot_config echo "Kernel built and installed successfully!" diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/dkms.conf b/resources/hiding_ci/dkms.conf new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..29f108ba298 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/dkms.conf @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +PACKAGE_NAME="ena" +PACKAGE_VERSION="1.0.0" +CLEAN="make -C kernel/linux/ena clean" +MAKE="make -C kernel/linux/ena/ BUILD_KERNEL=${kernelver}" +BUILT_MODULE_NAME[0]="ena" +BUILT_MODULE_LOCATION="kernel/linux/ena" +DEST_MODULE_LOCATION[0]="/updates" +DEST_MODULE_NAME[0]="ena" +REMAKE_INITRD="yes" +AUTOINSTALL="yes" diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/install_ena.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/install_ena.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000000..7d0fd679395 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/install_ena.sh @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# Copyright 2025 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. +# # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + +# fail if we encounter an error, uninitialized variable or a pipe breaks +set -eu -o pipefail + +AMZN_DRIVER_VERSION="2.13.3" +KERNEL_VERSION=$1 +DKMS_CONF_LOCATION=$2 +START_DIR=$(pwd) + +cd /tmp/ + +git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/amzn/amzn-drivers.git +mv amzn-drivers /usr/src/amzn-drivers-${AMZN_DRIVER_VERSION} + +cp $DKMS_CONF_LOCATION /usr/src/amzn-drivers-${AMZN_DRIVER_VERSION} + +dkms add -m amzn-drivers -v ${AMZN_DRIVER_VERSION} +dkms build -k ${KERNEL_VERSION} -m amzn-drivers -v ${AMZN_DRIVER_VERSION} +dkms install -k ${KERNEL_VERSION} -m amzn-drivers -v ${AMZN_DRIVER_VERSION} + +cd $START_DIR From dd40575ceb8f9ce6ad7adbb8114315d4f29b2adc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Thomson Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2025 13:26:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 10/58] ci: Update the script to support x86 on AL23 The output from the build in x86 is archived so updated the script to support installing either output type from the build Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson --- resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh index 79ed480b913..2cc00068437 100755 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh @@ -152,11 +152,14 @@ al2023_update_boot() { echo "Creating the new ram disk" dracut --kver $KERNEL_VERSION -f -v + # This varies from x86 and ARM so capture what was generated + VM_LINUX_LOCATION=$(ls /boot/vmlinu{x,z}-$KERNEL_VERSION 2>/dev/null | head -n1) + echo "Updating GRUB..." - grubby --grub2 --add-kernel /boot/vmlinux-$KERNEL_VERSION \ + grubby --grub2 --add-kernel $VM_LINUX_LOCATION \ --title="Secret Hiding" \ --initrd=/boot/initramfs-$KERNEL_VERSION.img --copy-default - grubby --set-default /boot/vmlinux-$KERNEL_VERSION + grubby --set-default $VM_LINUX_LOCATION } update_boot_config() { From dc52e58cb7f49d725ee2f7cd1a791d0c055bd876 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Babis Chalios Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 09:32:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/58] fix: test_hiding_kernel.py Add an 'apt update' before `apt install`. Otherwise, we might hold an old view of the package versions and installation might fail. Signed-off-by: Babis Chalios --- tests/integration_tests/build/test_hiding_kernel.py | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/build/test_hiding_kernel.py b/tests/integration_tests/build/test_hiding_kernel.py index a85a73143cb..1d76b31260f 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/build/test_hiding_kernel.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/build/test_hiding_kernel.py @@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ def test_build_hiding_kernel(): In the test we will run our kernel build script to check it succeeds and builds the hidden kernel """ - # We have some extra deps for building the kernel that are not in the dev contaner + # We have some extra deps for building the kernel that are not in the dev container + utils.check_output("apt update") utils.check_output( "apt install -y build-essential libncurses-dev bison flex libssl-dev libelf-dev bc dwarves libncurses5-dev kmod fakeroot" ) From ef7936fa490307bb170e5600421759ab9f5426f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 13:05:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 12/58] chore: allow clippy::needless_update This lint forbids using `..Default::default()` in struct initializers after all fields have already been initialized, but this is a useful pattern if you know you want to add more fields to a struct in a future PR without needing to touch a ton of initializers in unittests again (_heavy foreshadowing_). So silence the paperclip. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- Cargo.toml | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml index a1c9ad79621..7094182bce8 100644 --- a/Cargo.toml +++ b/Cargo.toml @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ tests_outside_test_module = "warn" assertions_on_result_states = "warn" error_impl_error = "warn" or_fun_call = "warn" +needless-update = "allow" [profile.dev] panic = "abort" From d5d9f956d242464c8428a2654a01e58806d4fb6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2025 13:49:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 13/58] refactor(test): Move MachineConfig::update tests to machine_config.rs There's no need to test this through VmResources when it can be tested in isolation. Also, everytime I touch MachineConfig I get confsued by where the hell the tests are, cuz not only are they in a different module, they're also one directory level away. So move the tests into machine_config.rs, where it makes sense to have them. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/resources.rs | 55 -------------- src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/resources.rs b/src/vmm/src/resources.rs index d29f76740fc..8632937885b 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/resources.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/resources.rs @@ -1379,44 +1379,6 @@ mod tests { aux_vm_config ); - // Invalid vcpu count. - aux_vm_config.vcpu_count = Some(0); - assert_eq!( - vm_resources.update_machine_config(&aux_vm_config), - Err(MachineConfigError::InvalidVcpuCount) - ); - aux_vm_config.vcpu_count = Some(33); - assert_eq!( - vm_resources.update_machine_config(&aux_vm_config), - Err(MachineConfigError::InvalidVcpuCount) - ); - - // Check that SMT is not supported on aarch64, and that on x86_64 enabling it requires vcpu - // count to be even. - aux_vm_config.smt = Some(true); - #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] - assert_eq!( - vm_resources.update_machine_config(&aux_vm_config), - Err(MachineConfigError::SmtNotSupported) - ); - aux_vm_config.vcpu_count = Some(3); - #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] - assert_eq!( - vm_resources.update_machine_config(&aux_vm_config), - Err(MachineConfigError::InvalidVcpuCount) - ); - aux_vm_config.vcpu_count = Some(32); - #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] - vm_resources.update_machine_config(&aux_vm_config).unwrap(); - aux_vm_config.smt = Some(false); - - // Invalid mem_size_mib. - aux_vm_config.mem_size_mib = Some(0); - assert_eq!( - vm_resources.update_machine_config(&aux_vm_config), - Err(MachineConfigError::InvalidMemorySize) - ); - // Incompatible mem_size_mib with balloon size. vm_resources.machine_config.mem_size_mib = 128; vm_resources @@ -1435,23 +1397,6 @@ mod tests { // mem_size_mib compatible with balloon size. aux_vm_config.mem_size_mib = Some(256); vm_resources.update_machine_config(&aux_vm_config).unwrap(); - - // mem_size_mib incompatible with huge pages configuration - aux_vm_config.mem_size_mib = Some(129); - aux_vm_config.huge_pages = Some(HugePageConfig::Hugetlbfs2M); - assert_eq!( - vm_resources - .update_machine_config(&aux_vm_config) - .unwrap_err(), - MachineConfigError::InvalidMemorySize - ); - - // mem_size_mib compatible with huge page configuration - aux_vm_config.mem_size_mib = Some(2048); - // Remove the balloon device config that's added by `default_vm_resources` as it would - // trigger the "ballooning incompatible with huge pages" check. - vm_resources.balloon = BalloonBuilder::new(); - vm_resources.update_machine_config(&aux_vm_config).unwrap(); } #[test] diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs b/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs index cfe7105fdf8..125ee047e2d 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs @@ -290,7 +290,100 @@ impl MachineConfig { #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use crate::cpu_config::templates::{CpuTemplateType, CustomCpuTemplate, StaticCpuTemplate}; - use crate::vmm_config::machine_config::MachineConfig; + use crate::vmm_config::machine_config::{ + HugePageConfig, MachineConfig, MachineConfigError, MachineConfigUpdate, + }; + + #[test] + #[allow(unused)] // some assertions exist only on specific architectures. + fn test_machine_config_update() { + let mconf = MachineConfig::default(); + + // Assert that the default machine config is valid + assert_eq!( + mconf + .update(&MachineConfigUpdate::from(mconf.clone())) + .unwrap(), + mconf + ); + + // Invalid vCPU counts + let res = mconf.update(&MachineConfigUpdate { + vcpu_count: Some(0), + ..Default::default() + }); + assert_eq!(res, Err(MachineConfigError::InvalidVcpuCount)); + + let res = mconf.update(&MachineConfigUpdate { + vcpu_count: Some(33), + ..Default::default() + }); + assert_eq!(res, Err(MachineConfigError::InvalidVcpuCount)); + + // Invalid memory size + let res = mconf.update(&MachineConfigUpdate { + mem_size_mib: Some(0), + ..Default::default() + }); + assert_eq!(res, Err(MachineConfigError::InvalidMemorySize)); + + // Memory Size incompatible with huge page configuration + let res = mconf.update(&MachineConfigUpdate { + mem_size_mib: Some(31), + huge_pages: Some(HugePageConfig::Hugetlbfs2M), + ..Default::default() + }); + assert_eq!(res, Err(MachineConfigError::InvalidMemorySize)); + + // works if the memory size is a multiple of huge page size indeed + let updated = mconf + .update(&MachineConfigUpdate { + mem_size_mib: Some(32), + huge_pages: Some(HugePageConfig::Hugetlbfs2M), + ..Default::default() + }) + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(updated.huge_pages, HugePageConfig::Hugetlbfs2M); + assert_eq!(updated.mem_size_mib, 32); + } + + #[test] + #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] + fn test_machine_config_update_aarch64() { + let mconf = MachineConfig::default(); + + // Check that SMT is not supported on aarch64 + let res = mconf.update(&MachineConfigUpdate { + smt: Some(true), + ..Default::default() + }); + assert_eq!(res, Err(MachineConfigError::SmtNotSupported)); + } + + #[test] + #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] + fn test_machine_config_update_x86_64() { + let mconf = MachineConfig::default(); + + // Test that SMT requires an even vcpu count + let res = mconf.update(&MachineConfigUpdate { + vcpu_count: Some(3), + smt: Some(true), + ..Default::default() + }); + assert_eq!(res, Err(MachineConfigError::InvalidVcpuCount)); + + // Works if the vcpu count is even indeed + let updated = mconf + .update(&MachineConfigUpdate { + vcpu_count: Some(32), + smt: Some(true), + ..Default::default() + }) + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(updated.vcpu_count, 32); + assert!(updated.smt); + } // Ensure the special (de)serialization logic for the cpu_template field works: // only static cpu templates can be specified via the machine-config endpoint, but From ad3e8e932fd4034e294070ae20736b49e97a0244 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2025 10:04:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 14/58] add helper for Read/Write[Volatile] through bounce buffer With secret freedom, direct accesses to guest memory from the context of the host kernel are no longer possible. This particularly means that we cannot pass pointers to guest memory to the host kernel anymore (at least if the host kernel tries to GUP them). For these scenarios, introduce a utility decorator struct `MaybeBounce` that can optionally do indirect read and write syscalls on guest memory by first memcpy-ing to firecracker userspace, and passing a pointer to firecracker heap memory into the kernel instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 89 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs index 19367f7f997..3138a8026e6 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ // found in the THIRD-PARTY file. use std::fs::File; -use std::io::SeekFrom; +use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom}; use std::sync::Arc; use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; @@ -17,7 +17,10 @@ pub use vm_memory::{ Address, ByteValued, Bytes, FileOffset, GuestAddress, GuestMemory, GuestMemoryRegion, GuestUsize, MemoryRegionAddress, MmapRegion, address, }; -use vm_memory::{Error as VmMemoryError, GuestMemoryError, WriteVolatile}; +use vm_memory::{ + Error as VmMemoryError, GuestMemoryError, ReadVolatile, VolatileMemoryError, VolatileSlice, + WriteVolatile, +}; use vmm_sys_util::errno; use crate::DirtyBitmap; @@ -50,6 +53,58 @@ pub enum MemoryError { OffsetTooLarge, } +/// Newtype that implements [`ReadVolatile`] and [`WriteVolatile`] if `T` implements `Read` or +/// `Write` respectively, by reading/writing using a bounce buffer, and memcpy-ing into the +/// [`VolatileSlice`]. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct MaybeBounce(pub T, pub bool); + +impl ReadVolatile for MaybeBounce { + fn read_volatile( + &mut self, + buf: &mut VolatileSlice, + ) -> Result { + if self.1 { + let mut bbuf = vec![0; buf.len()]; + let n = self + .0 + .read_volatile(&mut VolatileSlice::from(bbuf.as_mut_slice()))?; + buf.copy_from(&bbuf[..n]); + Ok(n) + } else { + self.0.read_volatile(buf) + } + } +} + +impl WriteVolatile for MaybeBounce { + fn write_volatile( + &mut self, + buf: &VolatileSlice, + ) -> Result { + if self.1 { + let mut bbuf = vec![0; buf.len()]; + buf.copy_to(bbuf.as_mut_slice()); + self.0 + .write_volatile(&VolatileSlice::from(bbuf.as_mut_slice())) + } else { + self.0.write_volatile(buf) + } + } +} + +impl Read for MaybeBounce { + fn read(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> std::io::Result { + self.0.read(buf) + } +} + +impl Seek for MaybeBounce { + fn seek(&mut self, pos: SeekFrom) -> std::io::Result { + self.0.seek(pos) + } +} + /// Creates a `Vec` of `GuestRegionMmap` with the given configuration pub fn create( regions: impl Iterator, @@ -346,6 +401,7 @@ mod tests { use std::collections::HashMap; use std::io::{Read, Seek}; + use std::os::fd::AsFd; use vmm_sys_util::tempfile::TempFile; @@ -722,4 +778,35 @@ mod tests { seals.insert(memfd::FileSeal::SealGrow); memfd.add_seals(&seals).unwrap_err(); } + + #[test] + fn test_bounce() { + let file_direct = TempFile::new().unwrap(); + let file_bounced = TempFile::new().unwrap(); + + let mut data = (0..=255).collect::>(); + + MaybeBounce(file_direct.as_file().as_fd(), false) + .write_all_volatile(&VolatileSlice::from(data.as_mut_slice())) + .unwrap(); + MaybeBounce(file_bounced.as_file().as_fd(), true) + .write_all_volatile(&VolatileSlice::from(data.as_mut_slice())) + .unwrap(); + + let mut data_direct = vec![0u8; 256]; + let mut data_bounced = vec![0u8; 256]; + + file_direct.as_file().seek(SeekFrom::Start(0)).unwrap(); + file_bounced.as_file().seek(SeekFrom::Start(0)).unwrap(); + + MaybeBounce(file_direct.as_file().as_fd(), false) + .read_exact_volatile(&mut VolatileSlice::from(data_direct.as_mut_slice())) + .unwrap(); + MaybeBounce(file_bounced.as_file().as_fd(), true) + .read_exact_volatile(&mut VolatileSlice::from(data_bounced.as_mut_slice())) + .unwrap(); + + assert_eq!(data_direct, data_bounced); + assert_eq!(data_direct, data); + } } From da638cec608c567ec127266cfe90f83d3e8469e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2025 11:57:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 15/58] allow persistent bounce buffers in MaybeBounce This is particularly useful for virtio devices, where on-demand allocation of bounce buffers leads to sever performance impacts (~80%) in synthetic throughput tests. Additionally, for virtio devices we can know approximately what the optimal size of a statically allocated bounce buffer is. Allocate bounce buffers on the heap, as trying to even temporarily place a 65k bounce buffer on the stack can lead to stack overflow errors. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs | 146 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 120 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs index 3138a8026e6..f9206bdc414 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ // found in the THIRD-PARTY file. use std::fs::File; -use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom}; +use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom, Write}; use std::sync::Arc; use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; @@ -56,52 +56,131 @@ pub enum MemoryError { /// Newtype that implements [`ReadVolatile`] and [`WriteVolatile`] if `T` implements `Read` or /// `Write` respectively, by reading/writing using a bounce buffer, and memcpy-ing into the /// [`VolatileSlice`]. +/// +/// Bounce buffers are allocated on the heap, as on-stack bounce buffers could cause stack +/// overflows. If `N == 0` then bounce buffers will be allocated on demand. #[derive(Debug)] -pub struct MaybeBounce(pub T, pub bool); +pub struct MaybeBounce { + pub(crate) target: T, + persistent_buffer: Option>, +} + +impl MaybeBounce { + /// Creates a new `MaybeBounce` that always allocates a bounce + /// buffer on-demand + pub fn new(target: T, should_bounce: bool) -> Self { + MaybeBounce::new_persistent(target, should_bounce) + } +} + +impl MaybeBounce { + /// Creates a new `MaybeBounce` that uses a persistent, fixed size bounce buffer + /// of size `N`. If a read/write request exceeds the size of this bounce buffer, it + /// is split into multiple, `<= N`-size read/writes. + pub fn new_persistent(target: T, should_bounce: bool) -> Self { + let mut bounce = MaybeBounce { + target, + persistent_buffer: None, + }; + + if should_bounce { + bounce.activate() + } + + bounce + } -impl ReadVolatile for MaybeBounce { + /// Activates this [`MaybeBounce`] to start doing reads/writes via a bounce buffer, + /// which is allocated on the heap by this function (e.g. if `activate()` is never called, + /// no bounce buffer is ever allocated). + pub fn activate(&mut self) { + self.persistent_buffer = Some(vec![0u8; N].into_boxed_slice().try_into().unwrap()) + } +} + +impl ReadVolatile for MaybeBounce { fn read_volatile( &mut self, buf: &mut VolatileSlice, ) -> Result { - if self.1 { - let mut bbuf = vec![0; buf.len()]; - let n = self - .0 - .read_volatile(&mut VolatileSlice::from(bbuf.as_mut_slice()))?; - buf.copy_from(&bbuf[..n]); - Ok(n) + if let Some(ref mut persistent) = self.persistent_buffer { + let mut bbuf = (N == 0).then(|| vec![0u8; buf.len()]); + let bbuf = bbuf.as_deref_mut().unwrap_or(persistent.as_mut_slice()); + + let mut buf = buf.offset(0)?; + let mut total = 0; + while !buf.is_empty() { + let how_much = buf.len().min(bbuf.len()); + let n = self + .target + .read_volatile(&mut VolatileSlice::from(&mut bbuf[..how_much]))?; + buf.copy_from(&bbuf[..n]); + + buf = buf.offset(n)?; + total += n; + + if n < how_much { + break; + } + } + + Ok(total) } else { - self.0.read_volatile(buf) + self.target.read_volatile(buf) } } } -impl WriteVolatile for MaybeBounce { +impl WriteVolatile for MaybeBounce { fn write_volatile( &mut self, buf: &VolatileSlice, ) -> Result { - if self.1 { - let mut bbuf = vec![0; buf.len()]; - buf.copy_to(bbuf.as_mut_slice()); - self.0 - .write_volatile(&VolatileSlice::from(bbuf.as_mut_slice())) + if let Some(ref mut persistent) = self.persistent_buffer { + let mut bbuf = (N == 0).then(|| vec![0u8; buf.len()]); + let bbuf = bbuf.as_deref_mut().unwrap_or(persistent.as_mut_slice()); + + let mut buf = buf.offset(0)?; + let mut total = 0; + while !buf.is_empty() { + let how_much = buf.copy_to(bbuf); + let n = self + .target + .write_volatile(&VolatileSlice::from(&mut bbuf[..how_much]))?; + buf = buf.offset(n)?; + total += n; + + if n < how_much { + break; + } + } + + Ok(total) } else { - self.0.write_volatile(buf) + self.target.write_volatile(buf) } } } -impl Read for MaybeBounce { +impl Read for MaybeBounce { fn read(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> std::io::Result { - self.0.read(buf) + self.target.read(buf) + } +} + +impl Write for MaybeBounce { + fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result { + self.target.write(buf) + } + + fn flush(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<()> { + self.target.flush() } } -impl Seek for MaybeBounce { +impl Seek for MaybeBounce { fn seek(&mut self, pos: SeekFrom) -> std::io::Result { - self.0.seek(pos) + self.target.seek(pos) } } @@ -783,30 +862,45 @@ mod tests { fn test_bounce() { let file_direct = TempFile::new().unwrap(); let file_bounced = TempFile::new().unwrap(); + let file_persistent_bounced = TempFile::new().unwrap(); let mut data = (0..=255).collect::>(); - MaybeBounce(file_direct.as_file().as_fd(), false) + MaybeBounce::new(file_direct.as_file().as_fd(), false) .write_all_volatile(&VolatileSlice::from(data.as_mut_slice())) .unwrap(); - MaybeBounce(file_bounced.as_file().as_fd(), true) + MaybeBounce::new(file_bounced.as_file().as_fd(), true) + .write_all_volatile(&VolatileSlice::from(data.as_mut_slice())) + .unwrap(); + MaybeBounce::<_, 7>::new_persistent(file_persistent_bounced.as_file().as_fd(), true) .write_all_volatile(&VolatileSlice::from(data.as_mut_slice())) .unwrap(); let mut data_direct = vec![0u8; 256]; let mut data_bounced = vec![0u8; 256]; + let mut data_persistent_bounced = vec![0u8; 256]; file_direct.as_file().seek(SeekFrom::Start(0)).unwrap(); file_bounced.as_file().seek(SeekFrom::Start(0)).unwrap(); + file_persistent_bounced + .as_file() + .seek(SeekFrom::Start(0)) + .unwrap(); - MaybeBounce(file_direct.as_file().as_fd(), false) + MaybeBounce::new(file_direct.as_file().as_fd(), false) .read_exact_volatile(&mut VolatileSlice::from(data_direct.as_mut_slice())) .unwrap(); - MaybeBounce(file_bounced.as_file().as_fd(), true) + MaybeBounce::new(file_bounced.as_file().as_fd(), true) .read_exact_volatile(&mut VolatileSlice::from(data_bounced.as_mut_slice())) .unwrap(); + MaybeBounce::<_, 7>::new_persistent(file_persistent_bounced.as_file().as_fd(), true) + .read_exact_volatile(&mut VolatileSlice::from( + data_persistent_bounced.as_mut_slice(), + )) + .unwrap(); assert_eq!(data_direct, data_bounced); assert_eq!(data_direct, data); + assert_eq!(data_persistent_bounced, data); } } From 756561f36463abf45b72a8e8acda609e8ba7e4d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2025 13:11:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 16/58] implement userspace bounce buffering support Add support to our virtio devices to allow userspace bounce buffering of virtio buffers. This is an alternative to swiotlb. Don't implement it for vhost-user-blk and for virtio-block with async engine, because I have no idea how that would even work. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs | 8 ++ src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/balloon/device.rs | 8 ++ src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/device.rs | 14 ++++ .../devices/virtio/block/vhost_user/device.rs | 8 ++ .../src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/device.rs | 14 ++++ .../devices/virtio/block/virtio/io/sync_io.rs | 29 +++++-- .../devices/virtio/block/virtio/persist.rs | 12 ++- src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/device.rs | 14 ++++ src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/device.rs | 84 +++++++++++++++++-- src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/persist.rs | 1 + src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/tap.rs | 2 +- src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/persist.rs | 5 +- src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/rng/device.rs | 8 ++ src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/transport/mmio.rs | 8 ++ .../devices/virtio/vsock/csm/connection.rs | 25 +++--- src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/device.rs | 8 ++ src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/mod.rs | 5 +- src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/persist.rs | 7 +- .../src/devices/virtio/vsock/test_utils.rs | 10 ++- .../src/devices/virtio/vsock/unix/muxer.rs | 18 +++- src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs | 5 ++ 21 files changed, 258 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs index a87646b11cf..15914ceed32 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs @@ -532,6 +532,14 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { fn set_acked_features(&mut self, _: u64) {} + fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { + todo!() + } + + fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool { + todo!() + } + fn device_type(&self) -> u32 { 0 } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/balloon/device.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/balloon/device.rs index 4586592182c..4e4019101f6 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/balloon/device.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/balloon/device.rs @@ -546,6 +546,14 @@ impl VirtioDevice for Balloon { self.acked_features = acked_features; } + fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { + // balloon device doesn't have a need for bounce buffers + } + + fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool { + false + } + fn device_type(&self) -> u32 { TYPE_BALLOON } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/device.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/device.rs index c1fa95f7b1c..9bc9bc42c6c 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/device.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/device.rs @@ -152,6 +152,20 @@ impl VirtioDevice for Block { } } + fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { + match self { + Block::Virtio(b) => b.force_userspace_bounce_buffers(), + Block::VhostUser(b) => b.force_userspace_bounce_buffers(), + } + } + + fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool { + match self { + Block::Virtio(b) => b.userspace_bounce_buffers(), + Block::VhostUser(b) => b.userspace_bounce_buffers(), + } + } + fn device_type(&self) -> u32 { TYPE_BLOCK } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/vhost_user/device.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/vhost_user/device.rs index 1d6c2aac080..796a3de938e 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/vhost_user/device.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/vhost_user/device.rs @@ -298,6 +298,14 @@ impl VirtioDevice for VhostUserBlock self.acked_features = acked_features; } + fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { + // Nothing Firecracker can do about this, the backend would need to do the bouncing + } + + fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool { + false + } + fn device_type(&self) -> u32 { TYPE_BLOCK } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/device.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/device.rs index d04fd5674ea..5d976313b1a 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/device.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/device.rs @@ -593,6 +593,20 @@ impl VirtioDevice for VirtioBlock { self.acked_features = acked_features; } + fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { + match self.disk.file_engine { + FileEngine::Async(_) => panic!("No idea how this is supposed to work for io_uring"), + FileEngine::Sync(ref mut engine) => engine.start_bouncing(), + } + } + + fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool { + match self.disk.file_engine { + FileEngine::Async(_) => false, + FileEngine::Sync(ref engine) => engine.is_bouncing(), + } + } + fn device_type(&self) -> u32 { TYPE_BLOCK } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/io/sync_io.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/io/sync_io.rs index eec3b3d8b8d..576a0a5b1f2 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/io/sync_io.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/io/sync_io.rs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use std::io::{Seek, SeekFrom, Write}; use vm_memory::{GuestMemoryError, ReadVolatile, WriteVolatile}; -use crate::vstate::memory::{GuestAddress, GuestMemory, GuestMemoryMmap}; +use crate::vstate::memory::{GuestAddress, GuestMemory, GuestMemoryMmap, MaybeBounce}; #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, displaydoc::Display)] pub enum SyncIoError { @@ -22,7 +22,12 @@ pub enum SyncIoError { #[derive(Debug)] pub struct SyncFileEngine { - file: File, + // 65536 is the largest buffer a linux guest will give us, empirically. Determined by + // having `MaybeBounce` logging scenarios where the fixed size bounce buffer isn't sufficient. + // Note that even if this assumption ever changes, the worse that'll happen is that we do + // multiple roundtrips between guest memory and the bounce buffer, as MaybeBounce would + // just chop larger reads/writes into chunks of 65k. + file: MaybeBounce, } // SAFETY: `File` is send and ultimately a POD. @@ -30,17 +35,27 @@ unsafe impl Send for SyncFileEngine {} impl SyncFileEngine { pub fn from_file(file: File) -> SyncFileEngine { - SyncFileEngine { file } + SyncFileEngine { + file: MaybeBounce::new_persistent(file, false), + } } #[cfg(test)] pub fn file(&self) -> &File { - &self.file + &self.file.target + } + + pub fn start_bouncing(&mut self) { + self.file.activate() + } + + pub fn is_bouncing(&self) -> bool { + self.file.is_activated() } /// Update the backing file of the engine pub fn update_file(&mut self, file: File) { - self.file = file + self.file.target = file } pub fn read( @@ -77,8 +92,8 @@ impl SyncFileEngine { pub fn flush(&mut self) -> Result<(), SyncIoError> { // flush() first to force any cached data out of rust buffers. - self.file.flush().map_err(SyncIoError::Flush)?; + self.file.target.flush().map_err(SyncIoError::Flush)?; // Sync data out to physical media on host. - self.file.sync_all().map_err(SyncIoError::SyncAll) + self.file.target.sync_all().map_err(SyncIoError::SyncAll) } } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/persist.rs index 1c7a1bce106..753f0474bce 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/persist.rs @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use crate::devices::virtio::TYPE_BLOCK; use crate::devices::virtio::block::persist::BlockConstructorArgs; use crate::devices::virtio::block::virtio::device::FileEngineType; use crate::devices::virtio::block::virtio::metrics::BlockMetricsPerDevice; -use crate::devices::virtio::device::{ActiveState, DeviceState}; +use crate::devices::virtio::device::{ActiveState, DeviceState, VirtioDevice}; use crate::devices::virtio::generated::virtio_blk::VIRTIO_BLK_F_RO; use crate::devices::virtio::persist::VirtioDeviceState; use crate::rate_limiter::RateLimiter; @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ impl Persist<'_> for VirtioBlock { capacity: disk_properties.nsectors.to_le(), }; - Ok(VirtioBlock { + let mut dev = VirtioBlock { avail_features, acked_features, config_space, @@ -135,7 +135,13 @@ impl Persist<'_> for VirtioBlock { rate_limiter, is_io_engine_throttled: false, metrics: BlockMetricsPerDevice::alloc(state.id.clone()), - }) + }; + + if state.virtio_state.bounce_in_userspace { + dev.force_userspace_bounce_buffers() + } + + Ok(dev) } } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/device.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/device.rs index ca3efc8cf2f..86ae3989bc3 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/device.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/device.rs @@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ pub trait VirtioDevice: AsAny + Send { /// - self.avail_features() & self.acked_features() = self.get_acked_features() fn set_acked_features(&mut self, acked_features: u64); + /// Make the virtio device user userspace bounce buffers + fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self); + + /// Whether this device is using userspace bounce buffers + fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool; + /// Check if virtio device has negotiated given feature. fn has_feature(&self, feature: u64) -> bool { (self.acked_features() & (1 << feature)) != 0 @@ -192,6 +198,14 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { todo!() } + fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { + todo!() + } + + fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool { + todo!() + } + fn device_type(&self) -> u32 { todo!() } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/device.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/device.rs index 0b2f3150c09..a4016decdac 100755 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/device.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/device.rs @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ // found in the THIRD-PARTY file. use std::collections::VecDeque; +use std::io::{Read, Write}; use std::mem::{self}; use std::net::Ipv4Addr; use std::num::Wrapping; @@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use libc::{EAGAIN, iovec}; use log::{error, info}; +use vm_memory::VolatileSlice; use vmm_sys_util::eventfd::EventFd; use super::NET_QUEUE_MAX_SIZE; @@ -248,7 +250,9 @@ pub struct Net { pub(crate) rx_rate_limiter: RateLimiter, pub(crate) tx_rate_limiter: RateLimiter, - rx_frame_buf: [u8; MAX_BUFFER_SIZE], + /// Used both for bounce buffering and for relaying frames to MMDS + userspace_buffer: [u8; MAX_BUFFER_SIZE], + pub(crate) userspace_bouncing: bool, tx_frame_headers: [u8; frame_hdr_len()], @@ -312,8 +316,9 @@ impl Net { queue_evts, rx_rate_limiter, tx_rate_limiter, - rx_frame_buf: [0u8; MAX_BUFFER_SIZE], + userspace_buffer: [0u8; MAX_BUFFER_SIZE], tx_frame_headers: [0u8; frame_hdr_len()], + userspace_bouncing: false, config_space, guest_mac, device_state: DeviceState::Inactive, @@ -499,6 +504,7 @@ impl Net { // Tries to detour the frame to MMDS and if MMDS doesn't accept it, sends it on the host TAP. // // Returns whether MMDS consumed the frame. + #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] fn write_to_mmds_or_tap( mmds_ns: Option<&mut MmdsNetworkStack>, rate_limiter: &mut RateLimiter, @@ -507,6 +513,7 @@ impl Net { tap: &mut Tap, guest_mac: Option, net_metrics: &NetDeviceMetrics, + bb: Option<&mut [u8]>, ) -> Result { // Read the frame headers from the IoVecBuffer let max_header_len = headers.len(); @@ -554,7 +561,7 @@ impl Net { } let _metric = net_metrics.tap_write_agg.record_latency_metrics(); - match Self::write_tap(tap, frame_iovec) { + match Self::write_tap(tap, frame_iovec, bb) { Ok(_) => { let len = u64::from(frame_iovec.len()); net_metrics.tx_bytes_count.add(len); @@ -588,15 +595,15 @@ impl Net { if let Some(ns) = self.mmds_ns.as_mut() { if let Some(len) = - ns.write_next_frame(frame_bytes_from_buf_mut(&mut self.rx_frame_buf)?) + ns.write_next_frame(frame_bytes_from_buf_mut(&mut self.userspace_buffer)?) { let len = len.get(); METRICS.mmds.tx_frames.inc(); METRICS.mmds.tx_bytes.add(len as u64); - init_vnet_hdr(&mut self.rx_frame_buf); + init_vnet_hdr(&mut self.userspace_buffer); self.rx_buffer .iovec - .write_all_volatile_at(&self.rx_frame_buf[..vnet_hdr_len() + len], 0)?; + .write_all_volatile_at(&self.userspace_buffer[..vnet_hdr_len() + len], 0)?; // SAFETY: // * len will never be bigger that u32::MAX because mmds is bound // by the size of `self.rx_frame_buf` which is MAX_BUFFER_SIZE size. @@ -736,6 +743,8 @@ impl Net { &mut self.tap, self.guest_mac, &self.metrics, + self.userspace_bouncing + .then_some(self.userspace_buffer.as_mut_slice()), ) .unwrap_or(false); if frame_consumed_by_mmds && self.rx_buffer.used_bytes == 0 { @@ -826,11 +835,57 @@ impl Net { } else { self.rx_buffer.single_chain_slice_mut() }; - self.tap.read_iovec(slice) + + if self.userspace_bouncing { + let how_many = self + .tap + .tap_file + .read(self.userspace_buffer.as_mut_slice())?; + + assert!(how_many <= MAX_BUFFER_SIZE); + + let mut offset = 0; + for iov in slice { + assert!( + offset <= how_many, + "copied more bytes into guest memory than read from tap" + ); + + let to_copy = (how_many - offset).min(iov.iov_len); + + if to_copy == 0 { + break; + } + + // SAFETY: the iovec comes from an `IoVecBufferMut`, which upholds the invariant + // that all contained iovecs are covering valid ranges of guest memory. + // Particularly, to_copy <= iov.iov_len + let vslice = unsafe { VolatileSlice::new(iov.iov_base.cast(), to_copy) }; + + vslice.copy_from(&self.userspace_buffer[offset..]); + + offset += to_copy; + } + + Ok(how_many) + } else { + self.tap.read_iovec(slice) + } } - fn write_tap(tap: &mut Tap, buf: &IoVecBuffer) -> std::io::Result { - tap.write_iovec(buf) + fn write_tap( + tap: &mut Tap, + buf: &IoVecBuffer, + bounce_buffer: Option<&mut [u8]>, + ) -> std::io::Result { + if let Some(bb) = bounce_buffer { + let how_many = buf.len() as usize; + let copied = buf.read_volatile_at(&mut &mut *bb, 0, how_many).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(copied, how_many); + tap.tap_file.write(&bb[..copied]) + } else { + tap.write_iovec(buf) + } } /// Process a single RX queue event. @@ -972,6 +1027,14 @@ impl VirtioDevice for Net { self.acked_features = acked_features; } + fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { + self.userspace_bouncing = true + } + + fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool { + self.userspace_bouncing + } + fn device_type(&self) -> u32 { TYPE_NET } @@ -2027,6 +2090,7 @@ pub mod tests { &mut net.tap, Some(src_mac), &net.metrics, + None ) .unwrap() ) @@ -2066,6 +2130,7 @@ pub mod tests { &mut net.tap, Some(guest_mac), &net.metrics, + None ) ); @@ -2081,6 +2146,7 @@ pub mod tests { &mut net.tap, Some(not_guest_mac), &net.metrics, + None ) ); } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/persist.rs index 6ef8ad842ac..bc4f4156f2d 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/persist.rs @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ impl Persist<'_> for Net { )?; net.avail_features = state.virtio_state.avail_features; net.acked_features = state.virtio_state.acked_features; + net.userspace_bouncing = state.virtio_state.bounce_in_userspace; Ok(net) } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/tap.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/tap.rs index 3cfdf1e7fdf..487010aafc1 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/tap.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/net/tap.rs @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ ioctl_iow_nr!(TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, TUNTAP, 216, ::std::os::raw::c_int); /// Tap goes out of scope, and the kernel will clean up the interface automatically. #[derive(Debug)] pub struct Tap { - tap_file: File, + pub(crate) tap_file: File, pub(crate) if_name: [u8; IFACE_NAME_MAX_LEN], } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/persist.rs index 776c7179048..1f5fc0d5994 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/persist.rs @@ -126,17 +126,20 @@ pub struct VirtioDeviceState { pub queues: Vec, /// Flag for activated status. pub activated: bool, + /// Whether this device has to use userspace bounce buffers + pub bounce_in_userspace: bool, } impl VirtioDeviceState { /// Construct the virtio state of a device. - pub fn from_device(device: &dyn VirtioDevice) -> Self { + pub fn from_device(device: &impl VirtioDevice) -> Self { VirtioDeviceState { device_type: device.device_type(), avail_features: device.avail_features(), acked_features: device.acked_features(), queues: device.queues().iter().map(Persist::save).collect(), activated: device.is_activated(), + bounce_in_userspace: device.userspace_bounce_buffers(), } } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/rng/device.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/rng/device.rs index 2cf1c6bf5dd..88d4f499b9a 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/rng/device.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/rng/device.rs @@ -320,6 +320,14 @@ impl VirtioDevice for Entropy { self.process_virtio_queues(); } } + + fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { + // rng device works with only userspace accesses + } + + fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool { + false + } } #[cfg(test)] diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/transport/mmio.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/transport/mmio.rs index 4964f837aca..3fd7837b42d 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/transport/mmio.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/transport/mmio.rs @@ -528,6 +528,14 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { self.acked_features = acked_features; } + fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { + unimplemented!() + } + + fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool { + false + } + fn device_type(&self) -> u32 { 123 } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/csm/connection.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/csm/connection.rs index a5a2f4aec5b..b871450076a 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/csm/connection.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/csm/connection.rs @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ use crate::devices::virtio::vsock::metrics::METRICS; use crate::devices::virtio::vsock::packet::{VsockPacketHeader, VsockPacketRx, VsockPacketTx}; use crate::logger::IncMetric; use crate::utils::wrap_usize_to_u32; +use crate::vstate::memory::MaybeBounce; /// Trait that vsock connection backends need to implement. /// @@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ pub struct VsockConnection { /// The peer (guest) port. peer_port: u32, /// The (connected) host-side stream. - stream: S, + pub(crate) stream: MaybeBounce, /// The TX buffer for this connection. tx_buf: TxBuf, /// Total number of bytes that have been successfully written to `self.stream`, either @@ -414,7 +415,7 @@ where /// The connection is interested in being notified about EPOLLIN / EPOLLOUT events on the /// host stream. fn as_raw_fd(&self) -> RawFd { - self.stream.as_raw_fd() + self.stream.target.as_raw_fd() } } @@ -509,13 +510,14 @@ where local_port: u32, peer_port: u32, peer_buf_alloc: u32, + bounce: bool, ) -> Self { Self { local_cid, peer_cid, local_port, peer_port, - stream, + stream: MaybeBounce::new_persistent(stream, bounce), state: ConnState::PeerInit, tx_buf: TxBuf::new(), fwd_cnt: Wrapping(0), @@ -535,13 +537,14 @@ where peer_cid: u64, local_port: u32, peer_port: u32, + bounce: bool, ) -> Self { Self { local_cid, peer_cid, local_port, peer_port, - stream, + stream: MaybeBounce::new_persistent(stream, bounce), state: ConnState::LocalInit, tx_buf: TxBuf::new(), fwd_cnt: Wrapping(0), @@ -882,9 +885,10 @@ mod tests { LOCAL_PORT, PEER_PORT, PEER_BUF_ALLOC, + false, ), ConnState::LocalInit => VsockConnection::::new_local_init( - stream, LOCAL_CID, PEER_CID, LOCAL_PORT, PEER_PORT, + stream, LOCAL_CID, PEER_CID, LOCAL_PORT, PEER_PORT, false, ), ConnState::Established => { let mut conn = VsockConnection::::new_peer_init( @@ -894,6 +898,7 @@ mod tests { LOCAL_PORT, PEER_PORT, PEER_BUF_ALLOC, + false, ); assert!(conn.has_pending_rx()); conn.recv_pkt(&mut rx_pkt).unwrap(); @@ -912,7 +917,7 @@ mod tests { } fn set_stream(&mut self, stream: TestStream) { - self.conn.stream = stream; + self.conn.stream = MaybeBounce::new_persistent(stream, false); } fn set_peer_credit(&mut self, credit: u32) { @@ -1014,7 +1019,7 @@ mod tests { let mut ctx = CsmTestContext::new_established(); let data = &[1, 2, 3, 4]; ctx.set_stream(TestStream::new_with_read_buf(data)); - assert_eq!(ctx.conn.as_raw_fd(), ctx.conn.stream.as_raw_fd()); + assert_eq!(ctx.conn.as_raw_fd(), ctx.conn.stream.target.as_raw_fd()); ctx.notify_epollin(); ctx.recv(); assert_eq!(ctx.rx_pkt.hdr.op(), uapi::VSOCK_OP_RW); @@ -1098,7 +1103,7 @@ mod tests { ctx.init_data_tx_pkt(data); ctx.send(); - assert_eq!(ctx.conn.stream.write_buf.len(), 0); + assert_eq!(ctx.conn.stream.target.write_buf.len(), 0); assert!(ctx.conn.tx_buf.is_empty()); } @@ -1113,7 +1118,7 @@ mod tests { let data = &[1, 2, 3, 4]; ctx.init_data_tx_pkt(data); ctx.send(); - assert_eq!(ctx.conn.stream.write_buf, data.to_vec()); + assert_eq!(ctx.conn.stream.target.write_buf, data.to_vec()); ctx.notify_epollin(); ctx.recv(); @@ -1233,7 +1238,7 @@ mod tests { ctx.set_stream(TestStream::new()); ctx.conn.notify(EventSet::OUT); assert!(ctx.conn.tx_buf.is_empty()); - assert_eq!(ctx.conn.stream.write_buf, data); + assert_eq!(ctx.conn.stream.target.write_buf, data); } } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/device.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/device.rs index 43c9d4cb2ba..43b43cba81e 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/device.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/device.rs @@ -294,6 +294,14 @@ where self.acked_features = acked_features } + fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { + self.backend.start_bouncing() + } + + fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool { + self.backend.is_bouncing() + } + fn device_type(&self) -> u32 { uapi::VIRTIO_ID_VSOCK } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/mod.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/mod.rs index 859e198860b..54c9eeef3b9 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/mod.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/mod.rs @@ -185,4 +185,7 @@ pub trait VsockChannel { /// The vsock backend, which is basically an epoll-event-driven vsock channel. /// Currently, the only implementation we have is `crate::devices::virtio::unix::muxer::VsockMuxer`, /// which translates guest-side vsock connections to host-side Unix domain socket connections. -pub trait VsockBackend: VsockChannel + VsockEpollListener + Send {} +pub trait VsockBackend: VsockChannel + VsockEpollListener + Send { + fn start_bouncing(&mut self); + fn is_bouncing(&self) -> bool; +} diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/persist.rs index 6775707da3e..0720a4e09e3 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/persist.rs @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ use std::sync::Arc; use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; use super::*; -use crate::devices::virtio::device::{ActiveState, DeviceState}; +use crate::devices::virtio::device::{ActiveState, DeviceState, VirtioDevice}; use crate::devices::virtio::persist::VirtioDeviceState; use crate::devices::virtio::queue::FIRECRACKER_MAX_QUEUE_SIZE; use crate::devices::virtio::transport::VirtioInterrupt; @@ -122,6 +122,11 @@ where vsock.acked_features = state.virtio_state.acked_features; vsock.avail_features = state.virtio_state.avail_features; vsock.device_state = DeviceState::Inactive; + + if state.virtio_state.bounce_in_userspace { + vsock.force_userspace_bounce_buffers(); + } + Ok(vsock) } } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/test_utils.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/test_utils.rs index b38ce070c66..1546ea79fd1 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/test_utils.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/test_utils.rs @@ -113,7 +113,15 @@ impl VsockEpollListener for TestBackend { self.evset = Some(evset); } } -impl VsockBackend for TestBackend {} +impl VsockBackend for TestBackend { + fn start_bouncing(&mut self) { + unimplemented!() + } + + fn is_bouncing(&self) -> bool { + false + } +} #[derive(Debug)] pub struct TestContext { diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/unix/muxer.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/unix/muxer.rs index ad979b4bdeb..331f762d9d0 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/unix/muxer.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/vsock/unix/muxer.rs @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ pub struct VsockMuxer { local_port_set: HashSet, /// The last used host-side port. local_port_last: u32, + bounce: bool, } impl VsockChannel for VsockMuxer { @@ -299,7 +300,19 @@ impl VsockEpollListener for VsockMuxer { } } -impl VsockBackend for VsockMuxer {} +impl VsockBackend for VsockMuxer { + fn start_bouncing(&mut self) { + self.bounce = true; + + for conn in self.conn_map.values_mut() { + conn.stream.activate() + } + } + + fn is_bouncing(&self) -> bool { + self.bounce + } +} impl VsockMuxer { /// Muxer constructor. @@ -321,6 +334,7 @@ impl VsockMuxer { killq: MuxerKillQ::new(), local_port_last: (1u32 << 30) - 1, local_port_set: HashSet::with_capacity(defs::MAX_CONNECTIONS), + bounce: false, }; // Listen on the host initiated socket, for incoming connections. @@ -402,6 +416,7 @@ impl VsockMuxer { self.cid, local_port, peer_port, + self.bounce, ), ) }) @@ -629,6 +644,7 @@ impl VsockMuxer { pkt.hdr.dst_port(), pkt.hdr.src_port(), pkt.hdr.buf_alloc(), + self.bounce, ), ) }) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs index f9206bdc414..03f0783500f 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ impl MaybeBounce { pub fn activate(&mut self) { self.persistent_buffer = Some(vec![0u8; N].into_boxed_slice().try_into().unwrap()) } + + /// Returns `true` if this `MaybeBounce` is actually bouncing buffers. + pub fn is_activated(&self) -> bool { + self.persistent_buffer.is_some() + } } impl ReadVolatile for MaybeBounce { From bda5e0b7bcec273ab55bc23e998ad65afa1712c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 14:36:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 17/58] ci: dont fail downloading artifacts if no firecracker binaries exist If the CI artifacts dont contain old firecracker releases, still succeed at setting them up after downloading them. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- tools/setup-ci-artifacts.sh | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/setup-ci-artifacts.sh b/tools/setup-ci-artifacts.sh index 10fded08787..ec8e4c7d8fd 100755 --- a/tools/setup-ci-artifacts.sh +++ b/tools/setup-ci-artifacts.sh @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ say "Setup CI artifacts" cd build/img/$(uname -m) say "Fix executable permissions" -find "firecracker" -type f |xargs chmod -c 755 +find "firecracker" -type f |xargs chmod -c 755 || true say "Generate SSH key to connect from host" if [ ! -s id_rsa ]; then From 02991a58fba7c741a06d2f8c452ad0d5463c6365 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2025 13:52:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 18/58] add Vm::create_guest_memfd Add a utility function for creating a guest_memfd and wrapping it into a `File` object. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs index 8c4049f9e0c..a2041409848 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs @@ -6,8 +6,9 @@ // found in the THIRD-PARTY file. use std::collections::HashMap; -use std::fs::OpenOptions; +use std::fs::{File, OpenOptions}; use std::io::Write; +use std::os::fd::FromRawFd; use std::path::Path; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard}; @@ -16,9 +17,9 @@ use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard}; use kvm_bindings::KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC; use kvm_bindings::{ KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP, KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI, KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES, KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID, - KvmIrqRouting, kvm_irq_routing_entry, kvm_userspace_memory_region, + KvmIrqRouting, kvm_create_guest_memfd, kvm_irq_routing_entry, kvm_userspace_memory_region, }; -use kvm_ioctls::VmFd; +use kvm_ioctls::{Cap, VmFd}; use log::{debug, error}; use pci::DeviceRelocation; use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; @@ -275,7 +276,11 @@ pub enum VmError { /// Error calling mincore: {0} Mincore(vmm_sys_util::errno::Error), /// ResourceAllocator error: {0} - ResourceAllocator(#[from] vm_allocator::Error) + ResourceAllocator(#[from] vm_allocator::Error), + /// Failure to create guest_memfd: {0} + GuestMemfd(kvm_ioctls::Error), + /// guest_memfd is not supported on this host kernel. + GuestMemfdNotSupported, } /// Contains Vm functions that are usable across CPU architectures @@ -348,6 +353,32 @@ impl Vm { Ok((vcpus, exit_evt)) } + /// Create a guest_memfd of the specified size + pub fn create_guest_memfd(&self, size: usize, flags: u64) -> Result { + assert_eq!( + size & (host_page_size() - 1), + 0, + "guest_memfd size must be page aligned" + ); + + if !self.fd().check_extension(Cap::GuestMemfd) { + return Err(VmError::GuestMemfdNotSupported); + } + + let kvm_gmem = kvm_create_guest_memfd { + size: size as u64, + flags, + ..Default::default() + }; + + self.fd() + .create_guest_memfd(kvm_gmem) + .map_err(VmError::GuestMemfd) + // SAFETY: We know rawfd is a valid fd because create_guest_memfd didn't return an + // error. + .map(|rawfd| unsafe { File::from_raw_fd(rawfd) }) + } + /// Register a list of new memory regions to this [`Vm`]. pub fn register_memory_regions( &mut self, From d9b8a8b1780f7808a55473521b0a8a0fb9dcda98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2025 14:05:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 19/58] refactor: generify "these features are incompatible" error variants There's be a lot more things that are incompatible going forward (mostly related to secret freedom), so instead of adding a ton of error variants for each pair of incompatible features, let's just have a single one where we can insert arbitrary features via a string argument. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/resources.rs | 13 +++++++++---- src/vmm/src/vmm_config/balloon.rs | 4 ++-- src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs | 6 ++---- .../performance/test_huge_pages.py | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/resources.rs b/src/vmm/src/resources.rs index 8632937885b..9b8ebe92b05 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/resources.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/resources.rs @@ -228,7 +228,9 @@ impl VmResources { self.balloon.set_device(balloon); if self.machine_config.huge_pages != HugePageConfig::None { - return Err(ResourcesError::BalloonDevice(BalloonConfigError::HugePages)); + return Err(ResourcesError::BalloonDevice( + BalloonConfigError::IncompatibleWith("huge pages"), + )); } } @@ -270,7 +272,10 @@ impl VmResources { } if self.balloon.get().is_some() && updated.huge_pages != HugePageConfig::None { - return Err(MachineConfigError::BalloonAndHugePages); + return Err(MachineConfigError::Incompatible( + "balloon device", + "huge pages", + )); } self.machine_config = updated; @@ -329,7 +334,7 @@ impl VmResources { } if self.machine_config.huge_pages != HugePageConfig::None { - return Err(BalloonConfigError::HugePages); + return Err(BalloonConfigError::IncompatibleWith("huge pages")); } self.balloon.set(config) @@ -1450,7 +1455,7 @@ mod tests { assert!( matches!( err, - ResourcesError::BalloonDevice(BalloonConfigError::HugePages) + ResourcesError::BalloonDevice(BalloonConfigError::IncompatibleWith("huge pages")) ), "{:?}", err diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/balloon.rs b/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/balloon.rs index 6ac2fb34ecf..a6fccfe2b4b 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/balloon.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/balloon.rs @@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ pub enum BalloonConfigError { CreateFailure(crate::devices::virtio::balloon::BalloonError), /// Error updating the balloon device configuration: {0} UpdateFailure(std::io::Error), - /// Firecracker's huge pages support is incompatible with memory ballooning. - HugePages, + /// Memory ballooning is incompatible with {0}. + IncompatibleWith(&'static str), } /// This struct represents the strongly typed equivalent of the json body diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs b/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs index 125ee047e2d..39952d7fa0e 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs @@ -27,10 +27,8 @@ pub enum MachineConfigError { /// Enabling simultaneous multithreading is not supported on aarch64. #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] SmtNotSupported, - /// Could not determine host kernel version when checking hugetlbfs compatibility - KernelVersion, - /// Firecracker's huge pages support is incompatible with memory ballooning. - BalloonAndHugePages, + /// '{0}' and '{1}' are mutually exclusive and cannot be used together. + Incompatible(&'static str, &'static str) } /// Describes the possible (huge)page configurations for a microVM's memory. diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py index 9515abe7942..e01386d4a6c 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ def test_negative_huge_pages_plus_balloon(uvm_plain): uvm_plain.basic_config(huge_pages=HugePagesConfig.HUGETLBFS_2MB) with pytest.raises( RuntimeError, - match="Firecracker's huge pages support is incompatible with memory ballooning.", + match="Memory ballooning is incompatible with huge pages.", ): uvm_plain.api.balloon.put(amount_mib=0, deflate_on_oom=False) @@ -210,6 +210,6 @@ def test_negative_huge_pages_plus_balloon(uvm_plain): uvm_plain.api.balloon.put(amount_mib=0, deflate_on_oom=False) with pytest.raises( RuntimeError, - match="Machine config error: Firecracker's huge pages support is incompatible with memory ballooning.", + match="Machine config error: 'balloon device' and 'huge pages' are mutually exclusive and cannot be used together.", ): uvm_plain.basic_config(huge_pages=HugePagesConfig.HUGETLBFS_2MB) From 3d426692eaa07c3316db3ccdd90f85bea972c993 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2025 15:37:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 20/58] add "secret_free" parameter to /machine-config endpoint This will later indicate to Firecracker that guest memory should be backed by guest_memfd. Mark vhost-user and async block engine as incompatible, as I/O will require userspace bounce buffers. For vhost-user-blk, we would need to communicate the need for bounce buffers to the backend somehow, and for the async block engine we would need to somehow keep the bounce buffers around until io_uring finishes requests (which is not impossible, but complicated and not needed for now). Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- .../request/machine_configuration.rs | 5 ++ src/firecracker/swagger/firecracker.yaml | 5 ++ src/vmm/src/device_manager/pci_mngr.rs | 1 + src/vmm/src/device_manager/persist.rs | 1 + src/vmm/src/persist.rs | 4 ++ src/vmm/src/resources.rs | 69 +++++++++++++++++-- src/vmm/src/vmm_config/drive.rs | 2 + src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs | 55 ++++++++++++++- tests/framework/vm_config.json | 1 + .../integration_tests/functional/test_api.py | 2 + 10 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/firecracker/src/api_server/request/machine_configuration.rs b/src/firecracker/src/api_server/request/machine_configuration.rs index 2e8addffb74..0edb79f3774 100644 --- a/src/firecracker/src/api_server/request/machine_configuration.rs +++ b/src/firecracker/src/api_server/request/machine_configuration.rs @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ mod tests { let expected_config = MachineConfigUpdate { vcpu_count: Some(8), mem_size_mib: Some(1024), + secret_free: Some(false), smt: Some(false), cpu_template: None, track_dirty_pages: Some(false), @@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ mod tests { let expected_config = MachineConfigUpdate { vcpu_count: Some(8), mem_size_mib: Some(1024), + secret_free: Some(false), smt: Some(false), cpu_template: Some(StaticCpuTemplate::None), track_dirty_pages: Some(false), @@ -161,6 +163,7 @@ mod tests { let expected_config = MachineConfigUpdate { vcpu_count: Some(8), mem_size_mib: Some(1024), + secret_free: Some(false), smt: Some(false), cpu_template: None, track_dirty_pages: Some(true), @@ -186,6 +189,7 @@ mod tests { let expected_config = MachineConfigUpdate { vcpu_count: Some(8), mem_size_mib: Some(1024), + secret_free: Some(false), smt: Some(false), cpu_template: Some(StaticCpuTemplate::T2), track_dirty_pages: Some(true), @@ -213,6 +217,7 @@ mod tests { let expected_config = MachineConfigUpdate { vcpu_count: Some(8), mem_size_mib: Some(1024), + secret_free: Some(false), smt: Some(true), cpu_template: None, track_dirty_pages: Some(true), diff --git a/src/firecracker/swagger/firecracker.yaml b/src/firecracker/swagger/firecracker.yaml index 5a101ca204b..a3395ae2b5c 100644 --- a/src/firecracker/swagger/firecracker.yaml +++ b/src/firecracker/swagger/firecracker.yaml @@ -1044,6 +1044,11 @@ definitions: mem_size_mib: type: integer description: Memory size of VM + secret_free: + type: boolean + description: + If enabled, guest memory will be unmapped from the host kernel's address space, providing additional + protection against transitive execution issues. All I/O then goes through a bounce buffer. track_dirty_pages: type: boolean description: diff --git a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/pci_mngr.rs b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/pci_mngr.rs index 578d521162b..fdee46dd4df 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/pci_mngr.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/pci_mngr.rs @@ -700,6 +700,7 @@ mod tests { "machine-config": {{ "vcpu_count": 1, "mem_size_mib": 128, + "secret_free": false, "smt": false, "track_dirty_pages": false, "huge_pages": "None" diff --git a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/persist.rs index 74e71f3a6bf..9b24670e2aa 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/persist.rs @@ -727,6 +727,7 @@ mod tests { "machine-config": {{ "vcpu_count": 1, "mem_size_mib": 128, + "secret_free": false, "smt": false, "track_dirty_pages": false, "huge_pages": "None" diff --git a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs index b78d69fcdec..a80a5d08772 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ use crate::{EventManager, Vmm, vstate}; pub struct VmInfo { /// Guest memory size. pub mem_size_mib: u64, + /// Memory config + pub secret_free: bool, /// smt information pub smt: bool, /// CPU template type @@ -61,6 +63,7 @@ impl From<&VmResources> for VmInfo { fn from(value: &VmResources) -> Self { Self { mem_size_mib: value.machine_config.mem_size_mib as u64, + secret_free: value.machine_config.secret_free, smt: value.machine_config.smt, cpu_template: StaticCpuTemplate::from(&value.machine_config.cpu_template), boot_source: value.boot_source.config.clone(), @@ -352,6 +355,7 @@ pub fn restore_from_snapshot( .update_machine_config(&MachineConfigUpdate { vcpu_count: Some(vcpu_count), mem_size_mib: Some(u64_to_usize(microvm_state.vm_info.mem_size_mib)), + secret_free: Some(microvm_state.vm_info.secret_free), smt: Some(microvm_state.vm_info.smt), cpu_template: Some(microvm_state.vm_info.cpu_template), track_dirty_pages: Some(track_dirty_pages), diff --git a/src/vmm/src/resources.rs b/src/vmm/src/resources.rs index 9b8ebe92b05..73d4cfa1a46 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/resources.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/resources.rs @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; use crate::cpu_config::templates::CustomCpuTemplate; use crate::device_manager::persist::SharedDeviceType; +use crate::devices::virtio::block::device::Block; use crate::logger::info; use crate::mmds; use crate::mmds::data_store::{Mmds, MmdsVersion}; @@ -232,6 +233,11 @@ impl VmResources { BalloonConfigError::IncompatibleWith("huge pages"), )); } + if self.machine_config.secret_free { + return Err(ResourcesError::BalloonDevice( + BalloonConfigError::IncompatibleWith("secret freedom"), + )); + } } SharedDeviceType::Vsock(vsock) => { @@ -277,6 +283,27 @@ impl VmResources { "huge pages", )); } + if self.balloon.get().is_some() && updated.secret_free { + return Err(MachineConfigError::Incompatible( + "balloon device", + "secret freedom", + )); + } + if updated.secret_free { + if self.vhost_user_devices_used() { + return Err(MachineConfigError::Incompatible( + "vhost-user devices", + "userspace bounce buffers", + )); + } + + if self.async_block_engine_used() { + return Err(MachineConfigError::Incompatible( + "async block engine", + "userspace bounce buffers", + )); + } + } self.machine_config = updated; Ok(()) @@ -337,6 +364,10 @@ impl VmResources { return Err(BalloonConfigError::IncompatibleWith("huge pages")); } + if self.machine_config.secret_free { + return Err(BalloonConfigError::IncompatibleWith("secret freedom")); + } + self.balloon.set(config) } @@ -360,6 +391,17 @@ impl VmResources { &mut self, block_device_config: BlockDeviceConfig, ) -> Result<(), DriveError> { + if self.machine_config.secret_free { + if block_device_config.file_engine_type == Some(FileEngineType::Async) { + return Err(DriveError::IncompatibleWithSecretFreedom( + "async file engine", + )); + } + + if block_device_config.socket.is_some() { + return Err(DriveError::IncompatibleWithSecretFreedom("vhost-user-blk")); + } + } self.block.insert(block_device_config) } @@ -459,17 +501,29 @@ impl VmResources { Ok(()) } + /// Returns true if any vhost user devices are configured int his [`VmResources`] object + pub fn vhost_user_devices_used(&self) -> bool { + self.block + .devices + .iter() + .any(|b| b.lock().expect("Poisoned lock").is_vhost_user()) + } + + fn async_block_engine_used(&self) -> bool { + self.block + .devices + .iter() + .any(|b| match &*b.lock().unwrap() { + Block::Virtio(b) => b.file_engine_type() == FileEngineType::Async, + Block::VhostUser(_) => false, + }) + } + /// Allocates guest memory in a configuration most appropriate for these [`VmResources`]. /// /// If vhost-user-blk devices are in use, allocates memfd-backed shared memory, otherwise /// prefers anonymous memory for performance reasons. pub fn allocate_guest_memory(&self) -> Result, MemoryError> { - let vhost_user_device_used = self - .block - .devices - .iter() - .any(|b| b.lock().expect("Poisoned lock").is_vhost_user()); - // Page faults are more expensive for shared memory mapping, including memfd. // For this reason, we only back guest memory with a memfd // if a vhost-user-blk device is configured in the VM, otherwise we fall back to @@ -481,7 +535,7 @@ impl VmResources { // that would not be worth the effort. let regions = crate::arch::arch_memory_regions(mib_to_bytes(self.machine_config.mem_size_mib)); - if vhost_user_device_used { + if self.vhost_user_devices_used() { memory::memfd_backed( regions.as_ref(), self.machine_config.track_dirty_pages, @@ -1363,6 +1417,7 @@ mod tests { let mut aux_vm_config = MachineConfigUpdate { vcpu_count: Some(32), mem_size_mib: Some(512), + secret_free: Some(false), smt: Some(false), #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] cpu_template: Some(StaticCpuTemplate::T2), diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/drive.rs b/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/drive.rs index 9e301eff751..88a9b813874 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/drive.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/drive.rs @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ pub enum DriveError { DeviceUpdate(VmmError), /// A root block device already exists! RootBlockDeviceAlreadyAdded, + /// {0} is incompatible with secret freedom. + IncompatibleWithSecretFreedom(&'static str), } /// Use this structure to set up the Block Device before booting the kernel. diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs b/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs index 39952d7fa0e..3d30860144e 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vmm_config/machine_config.rs @@ -95,6 +95,11 @@ pub struct MachineConfig { pub vcpu_count: u8, /// The memory size in MiB. pub mem_size_mib: usize, + /// Whether guest_memfd should be used to back normal guest memory. If this is enabled + /// and any devices are attached to the VM, userspace bounce buffers will be used + /// as I/O into secret free memory is not possible. + #[serde(default)] + pub secret_free: bool, /// Enables or disabled SMT. #[serde(default)] pub smt: bool, @@ -151,6 +156,7 @@ impl Default for MachineConfig { Self { vcpu_count: 1, mem_size_mib: DEFAULT_MEM_SIZE_MIB, + secret_free: false, smt: false, cpu_template: None, track_dirty_pages: false, @@ -176,6 +182,9 @@ pub struct MachineConfigUpdate { /// The memory size in MiB. #[serde(default)] pub mem_size_mib: Option, + /// Whether secret freedom should be enabled + #[serde(default)] + pub secret_free: Option, /// Enables or disabled SMT. #[serde(default)] pub smt: Option, @@ -208,6 +217,7 @@ impl From for MachineConfigUpdate { MachineConfigUpdate { vcpu_count: Some(cfg.vcpu_count), mem_size_mib: Some(cfg.mem_size_mib), + secret_free: Some(cfg.secret_free), smt: Some(cfg.smt), cpu_template: cfg.static_template(), track_dirty_pages: Some(cfg.track_dirty_pages), @@ -261,11 +271,27 @@ impl MachineConfig { let mem_size_mib = update.mem_size_mib.unwrap_or(self.mem_size_mib); let page_config = update.huge_pages.unwrap_or(self.huge_pages); + let secret_free = update.secret_free.unwrap_or(self.secret_free); + let track_dirty_pages = update.track_dirty_pages.unwrap_or(self.track_dirty_pages); if mem_size_mib == 0 || !page_config.is_valid_mem_size(mem_size_mib) { return Err(MachineConfigError::InvalidMemorySize); } + if secret_free && page_config != HugePageConfig::None { + return Err(MachineConfigError::Incompatible( + "secret freedom", + "huge pages", + )); + } + + if secret_free && track_dirty_pages { + return Err(MachineConfigError::Incompatible( + "secret freedom", + "diff snapshots", + )); + } + let cpu_template = match update.cpu_template { None => self.cpu_template.clone(), Some(StaticCpuTemplate::None) => None, @@ -275,9 +301,10 @@ impl MachineConfig { Ok(MachineConfig { vcpu_count, mem_size_mib, + secret_free, smt, cpu_template, - track_dirty_pages: update.track_dirty_pages.unwrap_or(self.track_dirty_pages), + track_dirty_pages, huge_pages: page_config, #[cfg(feature = "gdb")] gdb_socket_path: update.gdb_socket_path.clone(), @@ -343,6 +370,32 @@ mod tests { .unwrap(); assert_eq!(updated.huge_pages, HugePageConfig::Hugetlbfs2M); assert_eq!(updated.mem_size_mib, 32); + + let res = mconf.update(&MachineConfigUpdate { + huge_pages: Some(HugePageConfig::Hugetlbfs2M), + secret_free: Some(true), + ..Default::default() + }); + assert_eq!( + res, + Err(MachineConfigError::Incompatible( + "secret freedom", + "huge pages" + )) + ); + + let res = mconf.update(&MachineConfigUpdate { + track_dirty_pages: Some(true), + secret_free: Some(true), + ..Default::default() + }); + assert_eq!( + res, + Err(MachineConfigError::Incompatible( + "secret freedom", + "diff snapshots" + )) + ); } #[test] diff --git a/tests/framework/vm_config.json b/tests/framework/vm_config.json index 6948002e245..188734ab0d6 100644 --- a/tests/framework/vm_config.json +++ b/tests/framework/vm_config.json @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ "machine-config": { "vcpu_count": 2, "mem_size_mib": 1024, + "secret_free": false, "smt": false, "track_dirty_pages": false, "huge_pages": "None" diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py index 55bb15d5eb4..88301c6ebec 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py @@ -1056,6 +1056,7 @@ def test_get_full_config_after_restoring_snapshot(microvm_factory, uvm_nano): setup_cfg["machine-config"] = { "vcpu_count": 2, "mem_size_mib": 256, + "secret_free": False, "smt": True, "track_dirty_pages": False, "huge_pages": "None", @@ -1170,6 +1171,7 @@ def test_get_full_config(uvm_plain): expected_cfg["machine-config"] = { "vcpu_count": 2, "mem_size_mib": 256, + "secret_free": False, "smt": False, "track_dirty_pages": False, "huge_pages": "None", From 26249b84746ee0753fd3822524bfd9975b7007ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2025 10:08:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 21/58] use bounce buffers for loading kernel if secret freedom is enabled If secret freedom is enabled, the guest kernel and potential initrd needs to be loaded via bounce buffer, as we cannot directly do `read` syscalls that target guest memory. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/mod.rs | 14 ++++-------- src/vmm/src/arch/x86_64/mod.rs | 15 +++++-------- src/vmm/src/builder.rs | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- src/vmm/src/initrd.rs | 38 +++++++++------------------------ 4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/mod.rs b/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/mod.rs index a599db5dea7..93e90e1e9ef 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/mod.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/mod.rs @@ -18,11 +18,11 @@ pub mod vm; use std::cmp::min; use std::fmt::Debug; -use std::fs::File; +use std::io::{Read, Seek}; use linux_loader::loader::pe::PE as Loader; use linux_loader::loader::{Cmdline, KernelLoader}; -use vm_memory::GuestMemoryError; +use vm_memory::{GuestMemoryError, ReadVolatile}; use crate::arch::{BootProtocol, EntryPoint, arch_memory_regions_with_gap}; use crate::cpu_config::aarch64::{CpuConfiguration, CpuConfigurationError}; @@ -179,16 +179,10 @@ fn get_fdt_addr(mem: &GuestMemoryMmap) -> u64 { } /// Load linux kernel into guest memory. -pub fn load_kernel( - kernel: &File, +pub fn load_kernel( + mut kernel_file: R, guest_memory: &GuestMemoryMmap, ) -> Result { - // Need to clone the File because reading from it - // mutates it. - let mut kernel_file = kernel - .try_clone() - .map_err(|_| ConfigurationError::KernelFile)?; - let entry_addr = Loader::load( guest_memory, Some(GuestAddress(get_kernel_start())), diff --git a/src/vmm/src/arch/x86_64/mod.rs b/src/vmm/src/arch/x86_64/mod.rs index 1822abb9009..d068d677715 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/arch/x86_64/mod.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/arch/x86_64/mod.rs @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ pub mod xstate; #[allow(missing_docs)] pub mod generated; -use std::fs::File; +use std::io::{Read, Seek}; use kvm::Kvm; use layout::{ @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ use linux_loader::loader::elf::start_info::{ }; use linux_loader::loader::{Cmdline, KernelLoader, PvhBootCapability, load_cmdline}; use log::debug; +use vm_memory::ReadVolatile; use super::EntryPoint; use crate::acpi::create_acpi_tables; @@ -466,20 +467,14 @@ fn add_e820_entry( } /// Load linux kernel into guest memory. -pub fn load_kernel( - kernel: &File, +pub fn load_kernel( + mut kernel: R, guest_memory: &GuestMemoryMmap, ) -> Result { - // Need to clone the File because reading from it - // mutates it. - let mut kernel_file = kernel - .try_clone() - .map_err(|_| ConfigurationError::KernelFile)?; - let entry_addr = Loader::load( guest_memory, None, - &mut kernel_file, + &mut kernel, Some(GuestAddress(get_kernel_start())), ) .map_err(ConfigurationError::KernelLoader)?; diff --git a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs index 88d7f56cb4e..2b04f61093f 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ use std::fmt::Debug; use std::io; +use std::os::fd::AsFd; +use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt; #[cfg(feature = "gdb")] use std::sync::mpsc; use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; @@ -43,10 +45,11 @@ use crate::persist::{MicrovmState, MicrovmStateError}; use crate::resources::VmResources; use crate::seccomp::BpfThreadMap; use crate::snapshot::Persist; +use crate::utils::u64_to_usize; use crate::vmm_config::instance_info::InstanceInfo; use crate::vmm_config::machine_config::MachineConfigError; use crate::vstate::kvm::{Kvm, KvmError}; -use crate::vstate::memory::GuestRegionMmap; +use crate::vstate::memory::{GuestRegionMmap, MaybeBounce}; #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] use crate::vstate::resources::ResourceAllocator; use crate::vstate::vcpu::VcpuError; @@ -174,8 +177,31 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( let vm = Arc::new(vm); - let entry_point = load_kernel(&boot_config.kernel_file, vm.guest_memory())?; - let initrd = InitrdConfig::from_config(boot_config, vm.guest_memory())?; + let entry_point = load_kernel( + MaybeBounce::<_, 4096>::new_persistent( + boot_config.kernel_file.try_clone().unwrap(), + vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free, + ), + vm.guest_memory(), + )?; + let initrd = match &boot_config.initrd_file { + Some(initrd_file) => { + let size = initrd_file + .metadata() + .map_err(InitrdError::Metadata)? + .size(); + + Some(InitrdConfig::from_reader( + vm.guest_memory(), + MaybeBounce::<_, 4096>::new_persistent( + initrd_file.as_fd(), + vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free, + ), + u64_to_usize(size), + )?) + } + None => None, + }; #[cfg(feature = "gdb")] let (gdb_tx, gdb_rx) = mpsc::channel(); diff --git a/src/vmm/src/initrd.rs b/src/vmm/src/initrd.rs index 9dfcd8bc16e..624ec397f73 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/initrd.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/initrd.rs @@ -1,14 +1,9 @@ // Copyright 2025 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 -use std::fs::File; -use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt; - use vm_memory::{GuestAddress, GuestMemory, ReadVolatile, VolatileMemoryError}; use crate::arch::initrd_load_addr; -use crate::utils::u64_to_usize; -use crate::vmm_config::boot_source::BootConfig; use crate::vstate::memory::GuestMemoryMmap; /// Errors associated with initrd loading. @@ -20,8 +15,6 @@ pub enum InitrdError { Load, /// Cannot image metadata: {0} Metadata(std::io::Error), - /// Cannot copy initrd file fd: {0} - CloneFd(std::io::Error), /// Cannot load initrd due to an invalid image: {0} Read(VolatileMemoryError), } @@ -36,31 +29,20 @@ pub struct InitrdConfig { } impl InitrdConfig { - /// Load initrd into guest memory based on the boot config. - pub fn from_config( - boot_cfg: &BootConfig, - vm_memory: &GuestMemoryMmap, - ) -> Result, InitrdError> { - Ok(match &boot_cfg.initrd_file { - Some(f) => { - let f = f.try_clone().map_err(InitrdError::CloneFd)?; - Some(Self::from_file(vm_memory, f)?) - } - None => None, - }) - } - /// Loads the initrd from a file into guest memory. - pub fn from_file(vm_memory: &GuestMemoryMmap, mut file: File) -> Result { - let size = file.metadata().map_err(InitrdError::Metadata)?.size(); - let size = u64_to_usize(size); + pub fn from_reader( + vm_memory: &GuestMemoryMmap, + mut reader: R, + size: usize, + ) -> Result { let Some(address) = initrd_load_addr(vm_memory, size) else { return Err(InitrdError::Address); }; let mut slice = vm_memory .get_slice(GuestAddress(address), size) .map_err(|_| InitrdError::Load)?; - file.read_exact_volatile(&mut slice) + reader + .read_exact_volatile(&mut slice) .map_err(InitrdError::Read)?; Ok(InitrdConfig { @@ -105,7 +87,7 @@ mod tests { // Need to reset the cursor to read initrd properly. tempfile.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0)).unwrap(); - let initrd = InitrdConfig::from_file(&gm, tempfile).unwrap(); + let initrd = InitrdConfig::from_reader(&gm, tempfile, image.len()).unwrap(); assert!(gm.address_in_range(initrd.address)); assert_eq!(initrd.size, image.len()); } @@ -120,7 +102,7 @@ mod tests { // Need to reset the cursor to read initrd properly. tempfile.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0)).unwrap(); - let res = InitrdConfig::from_file(&gm, tempfile); + let res = InitrdConfig::from_reader(&gm, tempfile, image.len()); assert!(matches!(res, Err(InitrdError::Address)), "{:?}", res); } @@ -134,7 +116,7 @@ mod tests { // Need to reset the cursor to read initrd properly. tempfile.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0)).unwrap(); - let res = InitrdConfig::from_file(&gm, tempfile); + let res = InitrdConfig::from_reader(&gm, tempfile, image.len()); assert!(matches!(res, Err(InitrdError::Address)), "{:?}", res); } } From 71c610bd57266ec5108ead6578e887e8dd81bc3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2025 13:24:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 22/58] use userspace bounce buffers if secret freedom is enabled Needed because we cannot do I/O straight into secret hidden memory - the host kernel cannot access it. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/builder.rs | 40 ++++++++++++++++--- src/vmm/src/device_manager/mod.rs | 5 +++ .../devices/virtio/block/vhost_user/device.rs | 1 + .../src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/device.rs | 4 +- .../devices/virtio/transport/pci/device.rs | 2 + 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs index 2b04f61093f..f575fbc6215 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs @@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( &mut boot_cmdline, balloon, event_manager, + vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free, )?; } @@ -244,6 +245,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( &mut boot_cmdline, vm_resources.block.devices.iter(), event_manager, + vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free, )?; attach_net_devices( &mut device_manager, @@ -251,6 +253,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( &mut boot_cmdline, vm_resources.net_builder.iter(), event_manager, + vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free, )?; if let Some(unix_vsock) = vm_resources.vsock.get() { @@ -260,6 +263,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( &mut boot_cmdline, unix_vsock, event_manager, + vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free, )?; } @@ -270,6 +274,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( &mut boot_cmdline, entropy, event_manager, + vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free, )?; } @@ -583,6 +588,7 @@ fn attach_entropy_device( cmdline: &mut LoaderKernelCmdline, entropy_device: &Arc>, event_manager: &mut EventManager, + secret_free: bool, ) -> Result<(), AttachDeviceError> { let id = entropy_device .lock() @@ -591,7 +597,7 @@ fn attach_entropy_device( .to_string(); event_manager.add_subscriber(entropy_device.clone()); - device_manager.attach_virtio_device(vm, id, entropy_device.clone(), cmdline, false) + device_manager.attach_virtio_device(vm, id, entropy_device.clone(), cmdline, false, secret_free) } fn attach_block_devices<'a, I: Iterator>> + Debug>( @@ -600,6 +606,7 @@ fn attach_block_devices<'a, I: Iterator>> + Debug>( cmdline: &mut LoaderKernelCmdline, blocks: I, event_manager: &mut EventManager, + secret_free: bool, ) -> Result<(), StartMicrovmError> { for block in blocks { let (id, is_vhost_user) = { @@ -618,7 +625,14 @@ fn attach_block_devices<'a, I: Iterator>> + Debug>( }; // The device mutex mustn't be locked here otherwise it will deadlock. event_manager.add_subscriber(block.clone()); - device_manager.attach_virtio_device(vm, id, block.clone(), cmdline, is_vhost_user)?; + device_manager.attach_virtio_device( + vm, + id, + block.clone(), + cmdline, + is_vhost_user, + secret_free, + )?; } Ok(()) } @@ -629,12 +643,20 @@ fn attach_net_devices<'a, I: Iterator>> + Debug>( cmdline: &mut LoaderKernelCmdline, net_devices: I, event_manager: &mut EventManager, + secret_free: bool, ) -> Result<(), StartMicrovmError> { for net_device in net_devices { let id = net_device.lock().expect("Poisoned lock").id().clone(); event_manager.add_subscriber(net_device.clone()); // The device mutex mustn't be locked here otherwise it will deadlock. - device_manager.attach_virtio_device(vm, id, net_device.clone(), cmdline, false)?; + device_manager.attach_virtio_device( + vm, + id, + net_device.clone(), + cmdline, + false, + secret_free, + )?; } Ok(()) } @@ -645,11 +667,12 @@ fn attach_unixsock_vsock_device( cmdline: &mut LoaderKernelCmdline, unix_vsock: &Arc>>, event_manager: &mut EventManager, + secret_free: bool, ) -> Result<(), AttachDeviceError> { let id = String::from(unix_vsock.lock().expect("Poisoned lock").id()); event_manager.add_subscriber(unix_vsock.clone()); // The device mutex mustn't be locked here otherwise it will deadlock. - device_manager.attach_virtio_device(vm, id, unix_vsock.clone(), cmdline, false) + device_manager.attach_virtio_device(vm, id, unix_vsock.clone(), cmdline, false, secret_free) } fn attach_balloon_device( @@ -658,11 +681,12 @@ fn attach_balloon_device( cmdline: &mut LoaderKernelCmdline, balloon: &Arc>, event_manager: &mut EventManager, + secret_free: bool, ) -> Result<(), AttachDeviceError> { let id = String::from(balloon.lock().expect("Poisoned lock").id()); event_manager.add_subscriber(balloon.clone()); // The device mutex mustn't be locked here otherwise it will deadlock. - device_manager.attach_virtio_device(vm, id, balloon.clone(), cmdline, false) + device_manager.attach_virtio_device(vm, id, balloon.clone(), cmdline, false, secret_free) } #[cfg(test)] @@ -802,6 +826,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { cmdline, block_dev_configs.devices.iter(), event_manager, + false, ) .unwrap(); block_files @@ -822,6 +847,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { cmdline, net_builder.iter(), event_manager, + false, ); res.unwrap(); } @@ -849,6 +875,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { cmdline, net_builder.iter(), event_manager, + false, ) .unwrap(); } @@ -869,6 +896,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { cmdline, &vsock, event_manager, + false, ) .unwrap(); @@ -894,6 +922,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { cmdline, &entropy, event_manager, + false, ) .unwrap(); @@ -928,6 +957,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { cmdline, balloon, event_manager, + false, ) .unwrap(); diff --git a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mod.rs b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mod.rs index c7f6acabfe1..0991a293080 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mod.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mod.rs @@ -203,7 +203,12 @@ impl DeviceManager { device: Arc>, cmdline: &mut Cmdline, is_vhost_user: bool, + secret_free: bool, ) -> Result<(), AttachDeviceError> { + if secret_free { + device.lock().unwrap().force_userspace_bounce_buffers() + } + if self.pci_devices.pci_segment.is_some() { self.pci_devices.attach_pci_virtio_device(vm, id, device)?; } else { diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/vhost_user/device.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/vhost_user/device.rs index 796a3de938e..fb0bd05641f 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/vhost_user/device.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/vhost_user/device.rs @@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ impl VirtioDevice for VhostUserBlock fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { // Nothing Firecracker can do about this, the backend would need to do the bouncing + panic!("vhost-user-blk is incompatible with userspace bounce buffers") } fn userspace_bounce_buffers(&self) -> bool { diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/device.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/device.rs index 5d976313b1a..ab5a395c945 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/device.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/block/virtio/device.rs @@ -595,7 +595,9 @@ impl VirtioDevice for VirtioBlock { fn force_userspace_bounce_buffers(&mut self) { match self.disk.file_engine { - FileEngine::Async(_) => panic!("No idea how this is supposed to work for io_uring"), + FileEngine::Async(_) => { + panic!("async engine is incompatible with userspace bounce buffers") + } FileEngine::Sync(ref mut engine) => engine.start_bouncing(), } } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/transport/pci/device.rs b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/transport/pci/device.rs index 038264bb417..4f50f4c3c86 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/transport/pci/device.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/transport/pci/device.rs @@ -1104,6 +1104,7 @@ mod tests { entropy.clone(), &mut Cmdline::new(1024).unwrap(), false, + false, ) .unwrap(); @@ -1222,6 +1223,7 @@ mod tests { entropy.clone(), &mut Cmdline::new(1024).unwrap(), false, + false, ) .unwrap(); From 2ad5fd50123f7dc858e6e950129aeb42da467ee3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2025 12:36:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 23/58] switch to using kvm_userspace_region2 Fall back to kvm_user_memory_region in case the 2 version of the struct isnt supported. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs index a2041409848..8cd9fdab893 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ use kvm_bindings::KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC; use kvm_bindings::{ KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP, KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI, KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES, KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID, KvmIrqRouting, kvm_create_guest_memfd, kvm_irq_routing_entry, kvm_userspace_memory_region, + kvm_userspace_memory_region2, }; use kvm_ioctls::{Cap, VmFd}; use log::{debug, error}; @@ -408,21 +409,37 @@ impl Vm { 0 }; - let memory_region = kvm_userspace_memory_region { + let memory_region = kvm_userspace_memory_region2 { slot: next_slot, guest_phys_addr: region.start_addr().raw_value(), memory_size: region.len(), userspace_addr: region.as_ptr() as u64, flags, + ..Default::default() }; let new_guest_memory = self.common.guest_memory.insert_region(Arc::new(region))?; - // SAFETY: Safe because the fd is a valid KVM file descriptor. - unsafe { - self.fd() - .set_user_memory_region(memory_region) - .map_err(VmError::SetUserMemoryRegion)?; + if self.fd().check_extension(Cap::UserMemory2) { + // SAFETY: We are passing a valid memory region and operate on a valid KVM FD. + unsafe { + self.fd() + .set_user_memory_region2(memory_region) + .map_err(VmError::SetUserMemoryRegion)?; + } + } else { + // SAFETY: We are passing a valid memory region and operate on a valid KVM FD. + unsafe { + self.fd() + .set_user_memory_region(kvm_userspace_memory_region { + slot: memory_region.slot, + flags: memory_region.flags, + guest_phys_addr: memory_region.guest_phys_addr, + memory_size: memory_region.memory_size, + userspace_addr: memory_region.userspace_addr, + }) + .map_err(VmError::SetUserMemoryRegion)?; + } } self.common.guest_memory = new_guest_memory; From 5753465a47fe1249a17e49502af0a931e38f7101 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2025 14:54:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 24/58] tmp: call mmap outselves vm-memory has faulty validation logic that prevents us from mmap-ing guest_memfds, so just bypass that by calling mmap ourselves for the time being. See also https://github.com/rust-vmm/vm-memory/pull/320 Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs | 36 ++++++++++++++++--- .../integration_tests/functional/test_api.py | 4 +-- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs index 03f0783500f..dd99e6b9e1b 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ use std::fs::File; use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom, Write}; +use std::os::fd::AsRawFd; +use std::ptr::null_mut; use std::sync::Arc; use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; @@ -51,6 +53,8 @@ pub enum MemoryError { MemfdSetLen(std::io::Error), /// Total sum of memory regions exceeds largest possible file offset OffsetTooLarge, + /// Error calling mmap: {0} + Mmap(std::io::Error), } /// Newtype that implements [`ReadVolatile`] and [`WriteVolatile`] if `T` implements `Read` or @@ -203,16 +207,40 @@ pub fn create( let mut builder = MmapRegionBuilder::new_with_bitmap( size, track_dirty_pages.then(|| AtomicBitmap::with_len(size)), - ) - .with_mmap_prot(libc::PROT_READ | libc::PROT_WRITE) - .with_mmap_flags(libc::MAP_NORESERVE | mmap_flags); + ); - if let Some(ref file) = file { + // when computing offset below we ensure it fits into i64 + #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_wrap)] + let (fd, fd_off) = if let Some(ref file) = file { let file_offset = FileOffset::from_arc(Arc::clone(file), offset); builder = builder.with_file_offset(file_offset); + + (file.as_raw_fd(), offset as libc::off_t) + } else { + (-1, 0) + }; + + // SAFETY: the arguments to mmap cannot cause any memory unsafety in the rust sense + let ptr = unsafe { + libc::mmap( + null_mut(), + size, + libc::PROT_READ | libc::PROT_WRITE, + libc::MAP_NORESERVE | mmap_flags, + fd, + fd_off, + ) + }; + + if ptr == libc::MAP_FAILED { + return Err(MemoryError::Mmap(std::io::Error::last_os_error())); } + // SAFETY: we check above that mmap succeeded, and the size we passed to builder is the + // same as the size of the mmap area. + let builder = unsafe { builder.with_raw_mmap_pointer(ptr.cast()) }; + offset = match offset.checked_add(size as u64) { None => return Err(MemoryError::OffsetTooLarge), Some(new_off) if new_off >= i64::MAX as u64 => { diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py index 88301c6ebec..e181b8fa8b9 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py @@ -374,9 +374,7 @@ def test_api_machine_config(uvm_plain): bad_size = (1 << 64) - 1 test_microvm.api.machine_config.patch(mem_size_mib=bad_size) - fail_msg = re.escape( - "Invalid Memory Configuration: Cannot create mmap region: Out of memory (os error 12)" - ) + fail_msg = re.escape("Out of memory (os error 12)") with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match=fail_msg): test_microvm.start() From e975ec12fb67f9df88c74c9e4ddce1da05b411dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2025 14:04:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 25/58] add concept of "secret free" VMs Have the `struct Vm` constructor take an argument to indicate whether the VM should be secret free. Use this to determine the correct vm type for guest_memfd support, and store it inside the VM so that we don't have to pass bools to various functions. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/fdt.rs | 8 ++--- src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/vm.rs | 4 +-- src/vmm/src/arch/x86_64/vm.rs | 4 +-- src/vmm/src/builder.rs | 11 +++--- src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs | 6 ++-- src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs | 36 ++++++++++++++++--- .../performance/test_huge_pages.py | 2 +- 7 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/fdt.rs b/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/fdt.rs index 6a50c0257a9..65efc72eb21 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/fdt.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/fdt.rs @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ mod tests { let mut event_manager = EventManager::new().unwrap(); let mut device_manager = default_device_manager(); let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).unwrap(); - let vm = Vm::new(&kvm).unwrap(); + let vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).unwrap(); let gic = create_gic(vm.fd(), 1, None).unwrap(); let mut cmdline = kernel_cmdline::Cmdline::new(4096).unwrap(); cmdline.insert("console", "/dev/tty0").unwrap(); @@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ mod tests { let mem = arch_mem(layout::FDT_MAX_SIZE + 0x1000); let mut device_manager = default_device_manager(); let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).unwrap(); - let vm = Vm::new(&kvm).unwrap(); + let vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).unwrap(); let gic = create_gic(vm.fd(), 1, None).unwrap(); let mut cmdline = kernel_cmdline::Cmdline::new(4096).unwrap(); cmdline.insert("console", "/dev/tty0").unwrap(); @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ mod tests { let mem = arch_mem(layout::FDT_MAX_SIZE + 0x1000); let device_manager = default_device_manager(); let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).unwrap(); - let vm = Vm::new(&kvm).unwrap(); + let vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).unwrap(); let gic = create_gic(vm.fd(), 1, None).unwrap(); let saved_dtb_bytes = match gic.fdt_compatibility() { @@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ mod tests { let mem = arch_mem(layout::FDT_MAX_SIZE + 0x1000); let device_manager = default_device_manager(); let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).unwrap(); - let vm = Vm::new(&kvm).unwrap(); + let vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).unwrap(); let gic = create_gic(vm.fd(), 1, None).unwrap(); let saved_dtb_bytes = match gic.fdt_compatibility() { diff --git a/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/vm.rs b/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/vm.rs index eaec0932a42..f1d4b845277 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/vm.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/arch/aarch64/vm.rs @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ pub enum ArchVmError { impl ArchVm { /// Create a new `Vm` struct. - pub fn new(kvm: &Kvm) -> Result { - let common = Self::create_common(kvm)?; + pub fn new(kvm: &Kvm, secret_free: bool) -> Result { + let common = Self::create_common(kvm, secret_free)?; Ok(ArchVm { common, irqchip_handle: None, diff --git a/src/vmm/src/arch/x86_64/vm.rs b/src/vmm/src/arch/x86_64/vm.rs index e194296928d..93fa044b5fc 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/arch/x86_64/vm.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/arch/x86_64/vm.rs @@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ pub struct ArchVm { impl ArchVm { /// Create a new `Vm` struct. - pub fn new(kvm: &crate::vstate::kvm::Kvm) -> Result { - let common = Self::create_common(kvm)?; + pub fn new(kvm: &crate::vstate::kvm::Kvm, secret_free: bool) -> Result { + let common = Self::create_common(kvm, secret_free)?; let msrs_to_save = kvm.msrs_to_save().map_err(ArchVmError::GetMsrsToSave)?; diff --git a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs index f575fbc6215..3ac1850012c 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( let kvm = Kvm::new(cpu_template.kvm_capabilities.clone())?; // Set up Kvm Vm and register memory regions. // Build custom CPU config if a custom template is provided. - let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm)?; + let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free)?; let (mut vcpus, vcpus_exit_evt) = vm.create_vcpus(vm_resources.machine_config.vcpu_count)?; vm.register_memory_regions(guest_memory)?; @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( let entry_point = load_kernel( MaybeBounce::<_, 4096>::new_persistent( boot_config.kernel_file.try_clone().unwrap(), - vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free, + vm.secret_free(), ), vm.guest_memory(), )?; @@ -193,10 +193,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( Some(InitrdConfig::from_reader( vm.guest_memory(), - MaybeBounce::<_, 4096>::new_persistent( - initrd_file.as_fd(), - vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free, - ), + MaybeBounce::<_, 4096>::new_persistent(initrd_file.as_fd(), vm.secret_free()), u64_to_usize(size), )?) } @@ -439,7 +436,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_from_snapshot( .map_err(StartMicrovmError::Kvm)?; // Set up Kvm Vm and register memory regions. // Build custom CPU config if a custom template is provided. - let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm).map_err(StartMicrovmError::Vm)?; + let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).map_err(StartMicrovmError::Vm)?; let (mut vcpus, vcpus_exit_evt) = vm .create_vcpus(vm_resources.machine_config.vcpu_count) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs index 15914ceed32..8ac06554354 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs @@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { let start_addr2 = GuestAddress(0x1000); let guest_mem = multi_region_mem_raw(&[(start_addr1, 0x1000), (start_addr2, 0x1000)]); let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).expect("Cannot create Kvm"); - let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm).unwrap(); + let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).unwrap(); vm.register_memory_regions(guest_mem).unwrap(); let mut device_manager = MMIODeviceManager::new(); @@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { let start_addr2 = GuestAddress(0x1000); let guest_mem = multi_region_mem_raw(&[(start_addr1, 0x1000), (start_addr2, 0x1000)]); let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).expect("Cannot create Kvm"); - let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm).unwrap(); + let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).unwrap(); vm.register_memory_regions(guest_mem).unwrap(); let mut device_manager = MMIODeviceManager::new(); @@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { let start_addr2 = GuestAddress(0x1000); let guest_mem = multi_region_mem_raw(&[(start_addr1, 0x1000), (start_addr2, 0x1000)]); let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).expect("Cannot create Kvm"); - let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm).unwrap(); + let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).unwrap(); vm.register_memory_regions(guest_mem).unwrap(); #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs index 8cd9fdab893..7dcf735bca1 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs @@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ pub struct VmCommon { pub resource_allocator: Mutex, /// MMIO bus pub mmio_bus: Arc, + secret_free: bool, } /// Errors associated with the wrappers over KVM ioctls. @@ -287,7 +288,14 @@ pub enum VmError { /// Contains Vm functions that are usable across CPU architectures impl Vm { /// Create a KVM VM - pub fn create_common(kvm: &crate::vstate::kvm::Kvm) -> Result { + pub fn create_common( + kvm: &crate::vstate::kvm::Kvm, + secret_free: bool, + ) -> Result { + if secret_free && !kvm.fd.check_extension(Cap::GuestMemfd) { + return Err(VmError::GuestMemfdNotSupported); + } + // It is known that KVM_CREATE_VM occasionally fails with EINTR on heavily loaded machines // with many VMs. // @@ -311,7 +319,9 @@ impl Vm { const MAX_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 5; let mut attempt = 1; let fd = loop { - match kvm.fd.create_vm() { + let create_result = kvm.fd.create_vm(); + + match create_result { Ok(fd) => break fd, Err(e) if e.errno() == libc::EINTR && attempt < MAX_ATTEMPTS => { info!("Attempt #{attempt} of KVM_CREATE_VM returned EINTR"); @@ -331,6 +341,7 @@ impl Vm { interrupts: Mutex::new(HashMap::with_capacity(GSI_MSI_END as usize + 1)), resource_allocator: Mutex::new(ResourceAllocator::new()), mmio_bus: Arc::new(vm_device::Bus::new()), + secret_free, }) } @@ -447,6 +458,11 @@ impl Vm { Ok(()) } + /// Whether this VM is secret free + pub fn secret_free(&self) -> bool { + self.common.secret_free + } + /// Gets a reference to the kvm file descriptor owned by this VM. pub fn fd(&self) -> &VmFd { &self.common.fd @@ -741,7 +757,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { // Auxiliary function being used throughout the tests. pub(crate) fn setup_vm() -> (Kvm, Vm) { let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).expect("Cannot create Kvm"); - let vm = Vm::new(&kvm).expect("Cannot create new vm"); + let vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).expect("Cannot create new vm"); (kvm, vm) } @@ -757,7 +773,19 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { fn test_new() { // Testing with a valid /dev/kvm descriptor. let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).expect("Cannot create Kvm"); - Vm::new(&kvm).unwrap(); + Vm::new(&kvm, false).unwrap(); + } + + #[test] + fn test_new_secret_free() { + let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).unwrap(); + + if !kvm.fd.check_extension(Cap::GuestMemfd) { + return; + } + + Vm::new(&kvm, true) + .expect("should be able to create secret free VMs if guest_memfd is supported"); } #[test] diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py index e01386d4a6c..83bfb971685 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_huge_pages.py @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ def test_hugetlbfs_snapshot(microvm_factory, uvm_plain, snapshot_type): global_props.host_linux_version_tpl > (6, 1) and global_props.cpu_architecture == "aarch64", reason="Huge page tests with secret hidden kernels on ARM currently fail", - ) +) @pytest.mark.parametrize("huge_pages", HugePagesConfig) def test_ept_violation_count( microvm_factory, From 9fe82bea1e9f6800f04d9df3f00e72937c846cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2025 07:00:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 26/58] Use guest_memfd to back memory if secret freedom is enabled If the `secret_free` field of the memory_config is set to true in the /machine-config endpoint, back all memory regions using guest_memfd. For our setup, this means both setting the guest_memfd[_offset] fields in kvm_user_memory_region2, as well as mmaping the guest memory and reflecting this VMA back into the memslot's userspace_addr (which is how kvm internal accesses to guest memory will work for these guest_memfd regions, such as mmio emulation on x86). Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/benches/memory_access.rs | 2 +- src/vmm/src/builder.rs | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/vmm/src/persist.rs | 2 +- src/vmm/src/resources.rs | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs | 21 ++++++------- src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs | 41 +++++++++++++++++------- 6 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/benches/memory_access.rs b/src/vmm/benches/memory_access.rs index a272aceceaa..9aac5633118 100644 --- a/src/vmm/benches/memory_access.rs +++ b/src/vmm/benches/memory_access.rs @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ fn bench_single_page_fault(c: &mut Criterion, configuration: VmResources) { c.bench_function("page_fault", |b| { b.iter_batched( || { - let memory = configuration.allocate_guest_memory().unwrap(); + let memory = configuration.allocate_guest_memory(None).unwrap(); // Get a pointer to the first memory region (cannot do `.get_slice(GuestAddress(0), // 1)`, because on ARM64 guest memory does not start at physical // address 0). diff --git a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs index 3ac1850012c..282e66fa36b 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ use std::sync::mpsc; use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use event_manager::SubscriberOps; +use kvm_ioctls::Cap; use linux_loader::cmdline::Cmdline as LoaderKernelCmdline; use userfaultfd::Uffd; use utils::time::TimestampUs; @@ -23,7 +24,9 @@ use crate::Vcpu; use crate::arch::{ConfigurationError, configure_system_for_boot, load_kernel}; #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] use crate::construct_kvm_mpidrs; -use crate::cpu_config::templates::{GetCpuTemplate, GetCpuTemplateError, GuestConfigError}; +use crate::cpu_config::templates::{ + GetCpuTemplate, GetCpuTemplateError, GuestConfigError, KvmCapability, +}; #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] use crate::device_manager; use crate::device_manager::pci_mngr::PciManagerError; @@ -53,7 +56,7 @@ use crate::vstate::memory::{GuestRegionMmap, MaybeBounce}; #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] use crate::vstate::resources::ResourceAllocator; use crate::vstate::vcpu::VcpuError; -use crate::vstate::vm::{Vm, VmError}; +use crate::vstate::vm::{GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP, GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP, Vm, VmError}; use crate::{EventManager, Vmm, VmmError}; /// Errors associated with starting the instance. @@ -133,6 +136,9 @@ impl std::convert::From for StartMicrovmError { } } +const KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP: u32 = 243; +const KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP: u32 = 244; + /// Builds and starts a microVM based on the current Firecracker VmResources configuration. /// /// The built microVM and all the created vCPUs start off in the paused state. @@ -153,10 +159,6 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( .as_ref() .ok_or(StartMicrovmError::MissingKernelConfig)?; - let guest_memory = vm_resources - .allocate_guest_memory() - .map_err(StartMicrovmError::GuestMemory)?; - // Clone the command-line so that a failed boot doesn't pollute the original. #[allow(unused_mut)] let mut boot_cmdline = boot_config.cmdline.clone(); @@ -166,12 +168,39 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( .cpu_template .get_cpu_template()?; - let kvm = Kvm::new(cpu_template.kvm_capabilities.clone())?; + let secret_free = vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free; + + let mut kvm_capabilities = cpu_template.kvm_capabilities.clone(); + + if secret_free { + kvm_capabilities.push(KvmCapability::Add(Cap::GuestMemfd as u32)); + kvm_capabilities.push(KvmCapability::Add(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP)); + kvm_capabilities.push(KvmCapability::Add(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP)); + } + + let kvm = Kvm::new(kvm_capabilities)?; // Set up Kvm Vm and register memory regions. // Build custom CPU config if a custom template is provided. - let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free)?; + let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, secret_free)?; let (mut vcpus, vcpus_exit_evt) = vm.create_vcpus(vm_resources.machine_config.vcpu_count)?; - vm.register_memory_regions(guest_memory)?; + + let guest_memfd = match secret_free { + true => Some( + vm.create_guest_memfd( + vm_resources.memory_size(), + GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP | GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP, + ) + .map_err(VmmError::Vm)?, + ), + false => None, + }; + + let guest_memory = vm_resources + .allocate_guest_memory(guest_memfd) + .map_err(StartMicrovmError::GuestMemory)?; + + vm.register_memory_regions(guest_memory) + .map_err(VmmError::Vm)?; let mut device_manager = DeviceManager::new(event_manager, &vcpus_exit_evt, &vm)?; @@ -180,7 +209,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( let entry_point = load_kernel( MaybeBounce::<_, 4096>::new_persistent( boot_config.kernel_file.try_clone().unwrap(), - vm.secret_free(), + secret_free, ), vm.guest_memory(), )?; @@ -193,7 +222,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( Some(InitrdConfig::from_reader( vm.guest_memory(), - MaybeBounce::<_, 4096>::new_persistent(initrd_file.as_fd(), vm.secret_free()), + MaybeBounce::<_, 4096>::new_persistent(initrd_file.as_fd(), secret_free), u64_to_usize(size), )?) } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs index a80a5d08772..18c2dfa65bc 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs @@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ fn guest_memory_from_file( track_dirty_pages: bool, ) -> Result, GuestMemoryFromFileError> { let mem_file = File::open(mem_file_path)?; - let guest_mem = memory::snapshot_file(mem_file, mem_state.regions(), track_dirty_pages)?; + let guest_mem = memory::file_private(mem_file, mem_state.regions(), track_dirty_pages)?; Ok(guest_mem) } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/resources.rs b/src/vmm/src/resources.rs index 73d4cfa1a46..47fd9a8a1de 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/resources.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/resources.rs @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 use std::convert::From; +use std::fs::File; use std::path::PathBuf; use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard}; @@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ use crate::vmm_config::mmds::{MmdsConfig, MmdsConfigError}; use crate::vmm_config::net::*; use crate::vmm_config::vsock::*; use crate::vstate::memory; -use crate::vstate::memory::{GuestRegionMmap, MemoryError}; +use crate::vstate::memory::{GuestRegionMmap, MemoryError, create_memfd}; /// Errors encountered when configuring microVM resources. #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, displaydoc::Display)] @@ -519,12 +520,19 @@ impl VmResources { }) } + /// Gets the size of the guest memory, in bytes + pub fn memory_size(&self) -> usize { + mib_to_bytes(self.machine_config.mem_size_mib) + } + /// Allocates guest memory in a configuration most appropriate for these [`VmResources`]. /// /// If vhost-user-blk devices are in use, allocates memfd-backed shared memory, otherwise /// prefers anonymous memory for performance reasons. - pub fn allocate_guest_memory(&self) -> Result, MemoryError> { - // Page faults are more expensive for shared memory mapping, including memfd. + pub fn allocate_guest_memory( + &self, + guest_memfd: Option, + ) -> Result, MemoryError> { // For this reason, we only back guest memory with a memfd // if a vhost-user-blk device is configured in the VM, otherwise we fall back to // an anonymous private memory. @@ -533,20 +541,35 @@ impl VmResources { // because that would require running a backend process. If in the future we converge to // a single way of backing guest memory for vhost-user and non-vhost-user cases, // that would not be worth the effort. - let regions = - crate::arch::arch_memory_regions(mib_to_bytes(self.machine_config.mem_size_mib)); - if self.vhost_user_devices_used() { - memory::memfd_backed( - regions.as_ref(), - self.machine_config.track_dirty_pages, - self.machine_config.huge_pages, - ) - } else { - memory::anonymous( - regions.into_iter(), + let regions = crate::arch::arch_memory_regions(self.memory_size()).into_iter(); + match guest_memfd { + Some(file) => memory::file_shared( + file, + regions, self.machine_config.track_dirty_pages, self.machine_config.huge_pages, - ) + ), + None => { + if self.vhost_user_devices_used() { + let memfd = create_memfd( + self.memory_size() as u64, + self.machine_config.huge_pages.into(), + )? + .into_file(); + memory::file_shared( + memfd, + regions, + self.machine_config.track_dirty_pages, + self.machine_config.huge_pages, + ) + } else { + memory::anonymous( + regions.into_iter(), + self.machine_config.track_dirty_pages, + self.machine_config.huge_pages, + ) + } + } } } } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs index dd99e6b9e1b..005b4f7d38c 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs @@ -259,18 +259,16 @@ pub fn create( } /// Creates a GuestMemoryMmap with `size` in MiB backed by a memfd. -pub fn memfd_backed( - regions: &[(GuestAddress, usize)], +pub fn file_shared( + file: File, + regions: impl Iterator, track_dirty_pages: bool, huge_pages: HugePageConfig, ) -> Result, MemoryError> { - let size = regions.iter().map(|&(_, size)| size as u64).sum(); - let memfd_file = create_memfd(size, huge_pages.into())?.into_file(); - create( - regions.iter().copied(), + regions, libc::MAP_SHARED | huge_pages.mmap_flags(), - Some(memfd_file), + Some(file), track_dirty_pages, ) } @@ -291,7 +289,7 @@ pub fn anonymous( /// Creates a GuestMemoryMmap given a `file` containing the data /// and a `state` containing mapping information. -pub fn snapshot_file( +pub fn file_private( file: File, regions: impl Iterator, track_dirty_pages: bool, @@ -477,7 +475,8 @@ impl GuestMemoryExtension for GuestMemoryMmap { } } -fn create_memfd( +/// Creates a memfd of the given size and huge pages configuration +pub fn create_memfd( mem_size: u64, hugetlb_size: Option, ) -> Result { @@ -731,7 +730,7 @@ mod tests { guest_memory.dump(&mut memory_file).unwrap(); let restored_guest_memory = GuestMemoryMmap::from_regions( - snapshot_file(memory_file, memory_state.regions(), false).unwrap(), + file_private(memory_file, memory_state.regions(), false).unwrap(), ) .unwrap(); @@ -793,7 +792,7 @@ mod tests { // We can restore from this because this is the first dirty dump. let restored_guest_memory = GuestMemoryMmap::from_regions( - snapshot_file(file, memory_state.regions(), false).unwrap(), + file_private(file, memory_state.regions(), false).unwrap(), ) .unwrap(); diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs index 7dcf735bca1..b6c84aa1d3a 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use std::collections::HashMap; use std::fs::{File, OpenOptions}; use std::io::Write; -use std::os::fd::FromRawFd; +use std::os::fd::{AsRawFd, FromRawFd}; use std::path::Path; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard}; @@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard}; #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] use kvm_bindings::KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC; use kvm_bindings::{ - KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP, KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI, KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES, KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID, - KvmIrqRouting, kvm_create_guest_memfd, kvm_irq_routing_entry, kvm_userspace_memory_region, - kvm_userspace_memory_region2, + KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP, KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI, KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD, KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES, + KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID, KvmIrqRouting, kvm_create_guest_memfd, kvm_irq_routing_entry, + kvm_userspace_memory_region, kvm_userspace_memory_region2, }; use kvm_ioctls::{Cap, VmFd}; use log::{debug, error}; @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ use crate::vstate::resources::ResourceAllocator; use crate::vstate::vcpu::VcpuError; use crate::{DirtyBitmap, Vcpu, mem_size_mib}; +pub(crate) const GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP: u64 = 1; +pub(crate) const GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP: u64 = 2; + #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, displaydoc::Display)] /// Errors related with Firecracker interrupts pub enum InterruptError { @@ -373,10 +376,6 @@ impl Vm { "guest_memfd size must be page aligned" ); - if !self.fd().check_extension(Cap::GuestMemfd) { - return Err(VmError::GuestMemfdNotSupported); - } - let kvm_gmem = kvm_create_guest_memfd { size: size as u64, flags, @@ -414,10 +413,22 @@ impl Vm { return Err(VmError::NotEnoughMemorySlots(self.common.max_memslots)); } - let flags = if region.bitmap().is_some() { - KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES + let mut flags = 0; + if region.bitmap().is_some() { + flags |= KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES; + } + + #[allow(clippy::cast_sign_loss)] + let (guest_memfd, guest_memfd_offset) = if self.secret_free() { + flags |= KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD; + + let fo = region + .file_offset() + .expect("secret hidden VMs must mmap guest_memfd for memslots"); + + (fo.file().as_raw_fd() as u32, fo.start()) } else { - 0 + (0, 0) }; let memory_region = kvm_userspace_memory_region2 { @@ -426,6 +437,8 @@ impl Vm { memory_size: region.len(), userspace_addr: region.as_ptr() as u64, flags, + guest_memfd, + guest_memfd_offset, ..Default::default() }; @@ -439,6 +452,12 @@ impl Vm { .map_err(VmError::SetUserMemoryRegion)?; } } else { + // Something is seriously wrong if we manage to set these fields on a host that doesn't + // even allow creation of guest_memfds! + assert_eq!(memory_region.guest_memfd, 0); + assert_eq!(memory_region.guest_memfd_offset, 0); + assert_eq!(memory_region.flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD, 0); + // SAFETY: We are passing a valid memory region and operate on a valid KVM FD. unsafe { self.fd() From 6e1558dbd14611d752bd353b6dcb46d866d2b0ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2025 15:07:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 27/58] allow creation of snapshots of secret hidden VMs To take snapshots of secret hidden VMs, we need to bounce guest memory through a userspace buffer. Reuse the `Bounce` wrapper type that is already in use for loading the guest kernel / initrd. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs index b6c84aa1d3a..d5c564d4164 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use std::collections::HashMap; use std::fs::{File, OpenOptions}; use std::io::Write; -use std::os::fd::{AsRawFd, FromRawFd}; +use std::os::fd::{AsFd, AsRawFd, FromRawFd}; use std::path::Path; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard}; @@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ use crate::snapshot::Persist; use crate::utils::u64_to_usize; use crate::vmm_config::snapshot::SnapshotType; use crate::vstate::memory::{ - Address, GuestMemory, GuestMemoryExtension, GuestMemoryMmap, GuestMemoryRegion, GuestRegionMmap, + Address, GuestMemory, GuestMemoryExtension, GuestMemoryMmap, GuestMemoryRegion, + GuestRegionMmap, MaybeBounce, }; use crate::vstate::resources::ResourceAllocator; use crate::vstate::vcpu::VcpuError; @@ -584,7 +585,11 @@ impl Vm { self.guest_memory().dump_dirty(&mut file, &dirty_bitmap)?; } SnapshotType::Full => { - self.guest_memory().dump(&mut file)?; + self.guest_memory() + .dump(&mut MaybeBounce::<_, 4096>::new_persistent( + file.as_fd(), + self.secret_free(), + ))?; self.reset_dirty_bitmap(); self.guest_memory().reset_dirty(); } From 074d9ab1acd1c486d9ab9c2c858aa8bbda2ed936 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Thomson Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2025 16:24:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 28/58] fix: Stop the scan for vmlinux failing Previously this would fail on x86 as we set -e. By setting the || true this means the script will continue. The grubby step next will fail if it failed to find the image. Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson --- resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh index 2cc00068437..4fb79885880 100755 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh @@ -153,7 +153,9 @@ al2023_update_boot() { dracut --kver $KERNEL_VERSION -f -v # This varies from x86 and ARM so capture what was generated - VM_LINUX_LOCATION=$(ls /boot/vmlinu{x,z}-$KERNEL_VERSION 2>/dev/null | head -n1) + # We add the || true here due to the fact that we have pipefail enabled + # this causes a non 0 exit when ls cant find vmlinux or vmlinux + VM_LINUX_LOCATION=$(ls /boot/vmlinu{x,z}-$KERNEL_VERSION 2>/dev/null | head -n1 || true) echo "Updating GRUB..." grubby --grub2 --add-kernel $VM_LINUX_LOCATION \ From a3d1dd529ff86355a5e946ed9fa7d1cfe627740f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2025 15:11:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 29/58] chore(hiding_ci): skip non-patch files when applying This is to allow to keep the licence and readme files in the patches directory. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh index 4fb79885880..c9b439a8861 100755 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh @@ -100,10 +100,7 @@ apply_patch_or_series() { *.patch) apply_patch_file $1 ;; *.mbox) apply_series_mbox $1 ;; *.lore) apply_series_link $1 ;; - *) - echo "Uknown patch file: "$1 - exit 1 - ;; + *) echo "Skipping non-patch file" $1 ;; esac } From 5780b36280c86609ea83b74d633bf3d52c7d3bd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 12:34:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 30/58] test: run throughput perf tests with secret freedom enabled Aadditionally parametrize some of our throughput performance tests (network, block and vsock) by memory config, so that they run with secret freedom (and hence bounce buffering) enabled. Also add it to the boottime test, because bouncing can impact the time taken to read the rootfs. Skip them on m6g.metal because secret freedom does not work here for architectural reasons (and our patches do not take this into account, so trying to use secret freedom here would result in host kernel panics). Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- tests/conftest.py | 14 ++++++++++++++ tests/framework/microvm.py | 11 +++++++++++ tests/integration_tests/performance/test_block.py | 9 ++++++++- .../integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py | 13 +++++++++++-- .../integration_tests/performance/test_network.py | 6 ++++-- tests/integration_tests/performance/test_vsock.py | 5 ++++- 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/conftest.py b/tests/conftest.py index ea06d09cac8..0f049174c87 100644 --- a/tests/conftest.py +++ b/tests/conftest.py @@ -435,6 +435,20 @@ def snapshot_type(request): return request.param +secret_free_test_cases = [False] +if ( + global_props.host_linux_version_metrics == "next" + and global_props.instance != "m6g.metal" +): + secret_free_test_cases.append(True) + + +@pytest.fixture(params=secret_free_test_cases) +def secret_free(request): + """Supported secret hiding configuration, based on hardware""" + return request.param + + @pytest.fixture def results_dir(request, pytestconfig): """ diff --git a/tests/framework/microvm.py b/tests/framework/microvm.py index a3c6734f80a..a9ab7933a10 100644 --- a/tests/framework/microvm.py +++ b/tests/framework/microvm.py @@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ def __init__( self.disks_vhost_user = {} self.vcpus_count = None self.mem_size_bytes = None + self.secret_free = False self.cpu_template_name = "None" # The given custom CPU template will be set in basic_config() but could # be overwritten via set_cpu_template(). @@ -509,6 +510,7 @@ def dimensions(self): "vcpus": str(self.vcpus_count), "guest_memory": f"{self.mem_size_bytes / (1024 * 1024)}MB", "pci": f"{self.pci_enabled}", + "secret_free": str(self.secret_free or False), } @property @@ -793,6 +795,7 @@ def basic_config( rootfs_io_engine=None, cpu_template: Optional[str] = None, enable_entropy_device=False, + secret_free=None, ): """Shortcut for quickly configuring a microVM. @@ -813,15 +816,23 @@ def basic_config( Reference: file:../../src/vmm/src/vmm_config/boot_source.rs::DEFAULT_KERNEL_CMDLINE """ + # Have to do it this way as otherwise A/B-tests fail if the 'A' revision + # of Firecracker doesn't know about the secret_free parameter. + kwargs = {} + if secret_free: + kwargs["secret_free"] = True + self.api.machine_config.put( vcpu_count=vcpu_count, smt=smt, mem_size_mib=mem_size_mib, track_dirty_pages=track_dirty_pages, huge_pages=huge_pages, + **kwargs, ) self.vcpus_count = vcpu_count self.mem_size_bytes = mem_size_mib * 2**20 + self.secret_free = secret_free or False if self.custom_cpu_template is not None: self.set_cpu_template(self.custom_cpu_template) diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_block.py b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_block.py index 8882ee0717c..fce39baab40 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_block.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_block.py @@ -167,15 +167,22 @@ def test_block_performance( fio_block_size, fio_engine, io_engine, + secret_free, metrics, results_dir, ): """ Execute block device emulation benchmarking scenarios. """ + if secret_free and io_engine == "Async": + pytest.skip("userspace bounce buffers not supported with async block engine") + vm = uvm_plain_acpi + vm.memory_monitor = None vm.spawn(log_level="Info", emit_metrics=True) - vm.basic_config(vcpu_count=vcpus, mem_size_mib=GUEST_MEM_MIB) + vm.basic_config( + vcpu_count=vcpus, mem_size_mib=GUEST_MEM_MIB, secret_free=secret_free + ) vm.add_net_iface() # Add a secondary block device for benchmark tests. fs = drive_tools.FilesystemFile( diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py index d80bf026a39..9c2ef1d78f4 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py @@ -95,7 +95,13 @@ def to_ms(v, unit): def launch_vm_with_boot_timer( - microvm_factory, guest_kernel_acpi, rootfs_rw, vcpu_count, mem_size_mib, pci_enabled + microvm_factory, + guest_kernel_acpi, + rootfs_rw, + vcpu_count, + mem_size_mib, + pci_enabled, + secret_free, ): """Launches a microVM with guest-timer and returns the reported metrics for it""" vm = microvm_factory.build(guest_kernel_acpi, rootfs_rw, pci=pci_enabled) @@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ def launch_vm_with_boot_timer( mem_size_mib=mem_size_mib, boot_args=DEFAULT_BOOT_ARGS + " init=/usr/local/bin/init", enable_entropy_device=True, + secret_free=secret_free, ) vm.add_net_iface() vm.start() @@ -119,7 +126,7 @@ def launch_vm_with_boot_timer( def test_boot_timer(microvm_factory, guest_kernel_acpi, rootfs, pci_enabled): """Tests that the boot timer device works""" launch_vm_with_boot_timer( - microvm_factory, guest_kernel_acpi, rootfs, 1, 128, pci_enabled + microvm_factory, guest_kernel_acpi, rootfs, 1, 128, pci_enabled, False ) @@ -135,6 +142,7 @@ def test_boottime( vcpu_count, mem_size_mib, pci_enabled, + secret_free, metrics, ): """Test boot time with different guest configurations""" @@ -147,6 +155,7 @@ def test_boottime( vcpu_count, mem_size_mib, pci_enabled, + secret_free, ) if i == 0: diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_network.py b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_network.py index 74ad26c26a8..182b5a5a5eb 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_network.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_network.py @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ def consume_ping_output(ping_putput): @pytest.fixture -def network_microvm(request, uvm_plain_acpi): +def network_microvm(request, uvm_plain_acpi, secret_free): """Creates a microvm with the networking setup used by the performance tests in this file. This fixture receives its vcpu count via indirect parameterization""" @@ -47,7 +47,9 @@ def network_microvm(request, uvm_plain_acpi): vm = uvm_plain_acpi vm.spawn(log_level="Info", emit_metrics=True) - vm.basic_config(vcpu_count=guest_vcpus, mem_size_mib=guest_mem_mib) + vm.basic_config( + vcpu_count=guest_vcpus, mem_size_mib=guest_mem_mib, secret_free=secret_free + ) vm.add_net_iface() vm.start() vm.pin_threads(0) diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_vsock.py b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_vsock.py index 402e7ff66b5..7b7ff62f265 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_vsock.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_vsock.py @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ def test_vsock_throughput( mode, metrics, results_dir, + secret_free, ): """ Test vsock throughput for multiple vm configurations. @@ -94,7 +95,9 @@ def test_vsock_throughput( mem_size_mib = 1024 vm = uvm_plain_acpi vm.spawn(log_level="Info", emit_metrics=True) - vm.basic_config(vcpu_count=vcpus, mem_size_mib=mem_size_mib) + vm.basic_config( + vcpu_count=vcpus, mem_size_mib=mem_size_mib, secret_free=secret_free + ) vm.add_net_iface() # Create a vsock device vm.api.vsock.put(vsock_id="vsock0", guest_cid=3, uds_path="/" + VSOCK_UDS_PATH) From 047e588543f5e2b53532eb911fbb49b86e51b7e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2025 15:16:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 31/58] test: add functional tests for booting secret free VMs Add a test that we can boot VMs and initrds with secret freedom enabled. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- .../functional/test_secret_freedom.py | 69 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/integration_tests/functional/test_secret_freedom.py diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_secret_freedom.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_secret_freedom.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..fe144daae58 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_secret_freedom.py @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +# Copyright 2025 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +"""Test secret-freedom related functionality.""" + +import pytest + +from framework import defs +from framework.microvm import Serial +from framework.properties import global_props +from integration_tests.performance.test_initrd import INITRD_FILESYSTEM + +pytestmark = [ + pytest.mark.skipif( + global_props.host_linux_version_metrics != "next", + reason="Secret Freedom is only supported on the in-dev upstream kernels for now", + ), + pytest.mark.skipif( + global_props.instance == "m6g.metal", + reason="Secret Freedom currently only works on ARM hardware conforming to at least ARMv8.4 as absense of ARM64_HAS_STAGE2_FWB causes kernel panics because of dcache flushing during stage2 page table entry installation", + ), +] + + +def test_secret_free_boot(microvm_factory, guest_kernel, rootfs): + """Tests that a VM can boot, e.g. some basic I/O works through userspace bounce buffers""" + vm = microvm_factory.build(guest_kernel, rootfs) + vm.spawn() + vm.memory_monitor = None + vm.basic_config(secret_free=True) + vm.add_net_iface() + vm.start() + + +def test_secret_free_initrd(microvm_factory, guest_kernel): + """ + Test that we can boot a secret hidden initrd (e.g. a VM with no I/O devices) + """ + fs = defs.ARTIFACT_DIR / "initramfs.cpio" + uvm = microvm_factory.build(guest_kernel) + uvm.initrd_file = fs + uvm.help.enable_console() + uvm.spawn() + uvm.memory_monitor = None + + uvm.basic_config( + add_root_device=False, + vcpu_count=1, + boot_args="console=ttyS0 reboot=k panic=1 pci=off", + use_initrd=True, + secret_free=True, + ) + + uvm.start() + serial = Serial(uvm) + serial.open() + serial.rx(token="# ") + serial.tx("mount |grep rootfs") + serial.rx(token=f"rootfs on / type {INITRD_FILESYSTEM}") + + +def test_secret_free_snapshot_creation(microvm_factory, guest_kernel, rootfs): + """Test that snapshot creation works for secret hidden VMs""" + vm = microvm_factory.build(guest_kernel, rootfs) + vm.spawn() + vm.memory_monitor = None + vm.basic_config(secret_free=True) + vm.add_net_iface() + vm.start() + vm.snapshot_full() From 70bd4c62f331fec8c0e636fc1dd20f9a75e445a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2025 17:04:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 32/58] test: disable memory monitor in boottime tests Since we load the kernel using bounce buffers now, it will give us false-positives. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py index 9c2ef1d78f4..26408bac151 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ def launch_vm_with_boot_timer( secret_free, ): """Launches a microVM with guest-timer and returns the reported metrics for it""" - vm = microvm_factory.build(guest_kernel_acpi, rootfs_rw, pci=pci_enabled) + vm = microvm_factory.build(guest_kernel_acpi, rootfs_rw, pci=pci_enabled, monitor_memory=False) vm.jailer.extra_args.update({"boot-timer": None}) vm.spawn() vm.basic_config( From 754a1dae723aec08fea3def7633fcaa018b7b7c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Thomson Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2025 12:00:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 33/58] ci: Use AL23 for secret hiding CI Move from Ubuntu to AL2023 for the secret hiding testing to bring it inline with the other kernels We had to add some more kernel config overrides. The amazon linux default kernel didn't have CRYPTO_HW enabled, this is required as a dependency for AMD_SEV. Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson --- .buildkite/common.py | 2 +- resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh | 8 ++++---- resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides | 12 +++++++++++- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/.buildkite/common.py b/.buildkite/common.py index 1f468a94e99..03ca8677de8 100644 --- a/.buildkite/common.py +++ b/.buildkite/common.py @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ DEFAULT_PLATFORMS = [ ("al2", "linux_5.10"), ("al2023", "linux_6.1"), - ("ubuntu24", "secret_hiding"), + ("al2023", "secret_hiding"), ] diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh index c9b439a8861..dfdc2ace951 100755 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh @@ -208,15 +208,15 @@ make olddefconfig scripts/config --disable SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS scripts/config --disable SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS -# We run this again to default options now changed by -# the disabling of the ubuntu keys -make olddefconfig - # Apply our config overrides on top of the config scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -m .config $KERNEL_CONFIG_OVERRIDES check_override_presence +# We run this again to default options now changed by +# the disabling of the ubuntu keys +make olddefconfig + echo "Building kernel this may take a while" make -s -j $(nproc) echo "Building kernel modules" diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides index 86c7504526f..6cb1dd1f894 100644 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/kernel_config_overrides @@ -1,7 +1,17 @@ CONFIG_EXPERT=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP=y CONFIG_KVM=y CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM=y -CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM=y +CONFIG_KVM_AMD=y +CONFIG_KVM_INTEL=y CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y +CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM=y +CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIER=y +CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING=y +CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES=y +CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM=y CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y CONFIG_KVM_XEN=n From 9d7e68011f03bc87b2bd6e8ff609d7db9a4d0a66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Thomson Date: Tue, 6 May 2025 10:53:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 34/58] ci: Include config in boot directory The install script on amazon linux isn't storing the .config in our boot directory by default. This is causing our spectre checker script which relies on the config. Updated our script to move this if it has't been done so already. Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson --- resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh index dfdc2ace951..cd579710e06 100755 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh @@ -121,6 +121,15 @@ apply_all_patches() { done } +check_new_config() { + if [[ -e "/boot/config-$KERNEL_VERSION" ]]; then + return 0; + fi + + echo "Storing new config in /boot/config-$KERNEL_VERSION" + cp .config /boot/config-$KERNEL_VERSION +} + check_override_presence() { while IFS= read -r line; do if ! grep -Fq "$line" .config; then @@ -239,6 +248,8 @@ make INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 install update_boot_config +check_new_config + echo "Kernel built and installed successfully!" tidy_up From acd6076fab8a4fc52ee78d746d683e49d810e240 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Tue, 6 May 2025 16:52:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 35/58] hiding_ci: remove support for everything but .patch files We are not using the .lore/.mbox options, and I dont see us doing so again in the future either. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh | 15 --------------- 1 file changed, 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh index cd579710e06..ea5d92806d0 100755 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh @@ -82,24 +82,9 @@ apply_patch_file() { git apply $1 } -apply_series_mbox() { - git am $1 --empty=drop -} - -apply_series_link() { - patch_url=$(cat $1) - echo "Fetching mbox from:" $patch_url - curl --output lore.mbox.gz "$patch_url/t.mbox.gz" - gunzip lore.mbox - apply_series_mbox lore.mbox - rm lore.mbox -} - apply_patch_or_series() { case "$1" in *.patch) apply_patch_file $1 ;; - *.mbox) apply_series_mbox $1 ;; - *.lore) apply_series_link $1 ;; *) echo "Skipping non-patch file" $1 ;; esac } From 3ec1f8178a7751ccfcee21e52b2615efb0a92fa9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 16:29:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 36/58] test(uffd_utils): add protocol definitions for secret freedom This is needed because if guest_memfd is used to back guest memory, vCPU fault notifications are delivered via the UFFD UDS socket. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs index b00a9b8c143..6284de84c6a 100644 --- a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs +++ b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs @@ -39,6 +39,68 @@ pub struct GuestRegionUffdMapping { pub offset: u64, /// The configured page size for this memory region. pub page_size: usize, + #[deprecated] + pub page_size_kib: usize, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct FaultRequest { + /// vCPU that encountered the fault + pub vcpu: u32, + /// Offset in guest_memfd where the fault occured + pub offset: u64, + /// Flags + pub flags: u64, + /// Async PF token + pub token: Option, +} + +impl FaultRequest { + pub fn into_reply(self, len: u64) -> FaultReply { + FaultReply { + vcpu: Some(self.vcpu), + offset: self.offset, + len, + flags: self.flags, + token: self.token, + zero: false, + } + } +} + +/// FaultReply +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct FaultReply { + /// vCPU that encountered the fault, from `FaultRequest` (if present, otherwise 0) + pub vcpu: Option, + /// Offset in guest_memfd where population started + pub offset: u64, + /// Length of populated area + pub len: u64, + /// Flags, must be copied from `FaultRequest`, otherwise 0 + pub flags: u64, + /// Async PF token, must be copied from `FaultRequest`, otherwise None + pub token: Option, + /// Whether the populated pages are zero pages + pub zero: bool, +} + +/// UffdMsgFromFirecracker +#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug)] +#[serde(untagged)] +pub enum UffdMsgFromFirecracker { + /// Mappings + Mappings(Vec), + /// FaultReq + FaultReq(FaultRequest), +} + +/// UffdMsgToFirecracker +#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug)] +#[serde(untagged)] +pub enum UffdMsgToFirecracker { + /// FaultRep + FaultRep(FaultReply), } impl GuestRegionUffdMapping { From d6ad5a05e992840454f170666ba157dfd4be412d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 11:34:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 37/58] test(uffd_utils): add UserfaultBitmap It is used by Secret-Free-enabled UFFD handlers to disable vCPU fault notifications from the kernel. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- .../uffd/uffd_utils/userfault_bitmap.rs | 203 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 203 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils/userfault_bitmap.rs diff --git a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils/userfault_bitmap.rs b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils/userfault_bitmap.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7a751fa0ef2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils/userfault_bitmap.rs @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +// Copyright 2025 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. +// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + +use std::num::NonZeroUsize; +use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering}; + +/// `UserfaultBitmap` implements a simple bit map on the page level with test and set operations. +/// It is page-size aware, so it converts addresses to page numbers before setting or clearing +/// the bits. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct UserfaultBitmap { + map: *mut AtomicU64, + size: usize, + byte_size: usize, + page_size: NonZeroUsize, + map_size: usize, +} + +impl UserfaultBitmap { + /// Create a new bitmap using a user-supplied pointer. + /// + /// # Safety + /// + /// Caller must ensure: + /// * `map_ptr` points to a valid region of memory containing initialized `AtomicU64` elements + /// * `map_ptr` is properly aligned for `AtomicU64` + /// * The memory region contains enough space for `ceil(ceil(byte_size/page_size)/64)` elements + /// * The memory region pointed to by `map_ptr` must not be accessed through any other means + /// while this `UserfaultBitmap` exists + /// * The caller must ensure the memory remains valid for the lifetime of the returned + /// `UserfaultBitmap` + pub unsafe fn new(map_ptr: *mut AtomicU64, byte_size: usize, page_size: NonZeroUsize) -> Self { + let num_pages = byte_size.div_ceil(page_size.get()); + let map_size = num_pages.div_ceil(u64::BITS as usize); + + UserfaultBitmap { + map: map_ptr, + size: num_pages, + byte_size, + page_size, + map_size, + } + } + + /// Is bit `n` set? Bits outside the range of the bitmap are always unset. + pub fn is_bit_set(&self, index: usize) -> bool { + if index < self.size { + unsafe { + let map_entry = &*self.map.add(index >> 6); + (map_entry.load(Ordering::Acquire) & (1 << (index & 63))) != 0 + } + } else { + // Out-of-range bits are always unset. + false + } + } + + /// Reset a range of `len` bytes starting at `start_addr`. The first bit set in the bitmap + /// is for the page corresponding to `start_addr`, and the last bit that we set corresponds + /// to address `start_addr + len - 1`. + pub fn reset_addr_range(&self, start_addr: usize, len: usize) { + if len == 0 { + return; + } + + let first_bit = start_addr / self.page_size; + let last_bit = start_addr.saturating_add(len - 1) / self.page_size; + + for n in first_bit..=last_bit { + if n >= self.size { + break; + } + unsafe { + let map_entry = &*self.map.add(n >> 6); + map_entry.fetch_and(!(1 << (n & 63)), Ordering::SeqCst); + } + } + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64; + + use super::*; + + // Helper function to create a test bitmap + fn setup_test_bitmap( + byte_size: usize, + page_size: NonZeroUsize, + ) -> (Vec, UserfaultBitmap) { + let num_pages = byte_size.div_ceil(page_size.get()); + let map_size = num_pages.div_ceil(u64::BITS as usize); + let mut memory = Vec::with_capacity(map_size); + for _ in 0..map_size { + memory.push(AtomicU64::new(0)); + } + let ptr = memory.as_mut_ptr(); + let bitmap = unsafe { UserfaultBitmap::new(ptr, byte_size, page_size) }; + (memory, bitmap) + } + + #[test] + fn test_basic_initialization() { + let page_size = NonZeroUsize::new(128).unwrap(); + let (_memory, bitmap) = setup_test_bitmap(1024, page_size); + + assert!(!bitmap.is_bit_set(0)); + assert!(!bitmap.is_bit_set(7)); + } + + #[test] + fn test_out_of_bounds_access() { + let page_size = NonZeroUsize::new(128).unwrap(); + let (_memory, bitmap) = setup_test_bitmap(1024, page_size); + + // With 1024 bytes and 128-byte pages, we should have 8 pages + assert!(!bitmap.is_bit_set(8)); // This should be out of bounds + assert!(!bitmap.is_bit_set(100)); // This should be out of bounds + } + + #[test] + fn test_reset_addr_range() { + let page_size = NonZeroUsize::new(128).unwrap(); + let (memory, bitmap) = setup_test_bitmap(1024, page_size); + + // Set bits 0 and 1 (representing first two pages) + memory[0].store(0b11, Ordering::SeqCst); + + // Verify bits are set + assert!(bitmap.is_bit_set(0)); + assert!(bitmap.is_bit_set(1)); + assert!(!bitmap.is_bit_set(2)); + + // Reset first page + bitmap.reset_addr_range(0, 128); + + // Verify first bit is reset but second remains set + assert!(!bitmap.is_bit_set(0)); + assert!(bitmap.is_bit_set(1)); + } + + #[test] + fn test_reset_addr_range_spanning_multiple_words() { + let page_size = NonZeroUsize::new(128).unwrap(); + // Ensure we allocate enough space for at least 2 words (128 bits) + let (memory, bitmap) = setup_test_bitmap(128 * 128, page_size); // 128 pages + + // Set bits in different words + memory[0].store(u64::MAX, Ordering::SeqCst); + memory[1].store(u64::MAX, Ordering::SeqCst); + + // Reset a range spanning both words + bitmap.reset_addr_range(63 * 128, 256); // Reset bits 63 and 64 + + // Check bits are reset + assert!(!bitmap.is_bit_set(63)); + assert!(!bitmap.is_bit_set(64)); + // Check adjacent bits are still set + assert!(bitmap.is_bit_set(62)); + assert!(bitmap.is_bit_set(65)); + } + + #[test] + fn test_reset_addr_range_zero_length() { + let page_size = NonZeroUsize::new(128).unwrap(); + let (memory, bitmap) = setup_test_bitmap(1024, page_size); + + // Set a bit manually + memory[0].store(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + + // Reset with length 0 + bitmap.reset_addr_range(0, 0); + + // Bit should still be set + assert!(bitmap.is_bit_set(0)); + } + + #[test] + fn test_reset_addr_range_beyond_bounds() { + let page_size = NonZeroUsize::new(128).unwrap(); + let (_memory, bitmap) = setup_test_bitmap(1024, page_size); + + // This should not panic + bitmap.reset_addr_range(1024, 2048); + } + + #[test] + fn test_edge_cases() { + // Test with minimum page size + let page_size = NonZeroUsize::new(1).unwrap(); + let (_memory, bitmap) = setup_test_bitmap(64, page_size); + assert!(!bitmap.is_bit_set(0)); + + // Test with zero byte_size + let page_size = NonZeroUsize::new(128).unwrap(); + let (_memory, bitmap) = setup_test_bitmap(0, page_size); + assert!(!bitmap.is_bit_set(0)); + + // Test reset_addr_range with maximum usize value + bitmap.reset_addr_range(usize::MAX - 128, 256); + } +} From f0c0208b863bc64c11938c2375ce5918405d88b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2025 12:14:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 38/58] test(uffd_utils): accept guest_memfd and bitmap memfd Accept receiving 3 fds instead of 1, where fds[1] is guest_memfd and fds[2] is userfault bitmap memfd. Also handle the FaultRequest message over the UDS socket by calling a new callback in the Runtime and sending a FaultReply. Co-authored-by: Patrick Roy Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- .../examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs | 42 +-- .../examples/uffd/malicious_handler.rs | 28 +- .../examples/uffd/on_demand_handler.rs | 149 ++++----- src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs | 282 ++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 151 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs index ca7601ebf25..5553a307892 100644 --- a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs +++ b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs @@ -23,27 +23,33 @@ fn main() { // Get Uffd from UDS. We'll use the uffd to handle PFs for Firecracker. let listener = UnixListener::bind(uffd_sock_path).expect("Cannot bind to socket path"); let (stream, _) = listener.accept().expect("Cannot listen on UDS socket"); + stream + .set_nonblocking(true) + .expect("Cannot set non-blocking"); let mut runtime = Runtime::new(stream, file); runtime.install_panic_hook(); - runtime.run(|uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler| { - // Read an event from the userfaultfd. - let event = uffd_handler - .read_event() - .expect("Failed to read uffd_msg") - .expect("uffd_msg not ready"); - - match event { - userfaultfd::Event::Pagefault { .. } => { - let start = get_time_us(ClockType::Monotonic); - for region in uffd_handler.mem_regions.clone() { - uffd_handler.serve_pf(region.base_host_virt_addr as _, region.size); + runtime.run( + |uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler| { + // Read an event from the userfaultfd. + let event = uffd_handler + .read_event() + .expect("Failed to read uffd_msg") + .expect("uffd_msg not ready"); + + match event { + userfaultfd::Event::Pagefault { .. } => { + let start = get_time_us(ClockType::Monotonic); + for region in uffd_handler.mem_regions.clone() { + uffd_handler.serve_pf(region.base_host_virt_addr as _, region.size); + } + let end = get_time_us(ClockType::Monotonic); + + println!("Finished Faulting All: {}us", end - start); } - let end = get_time_us(ClockType::Monotonic); - - println!("Finished Faulting All: {}us", end - start); + _ => panic!("Unexpected event on userfaultfd"), } - _ => panic!("Unexpected event on userfaultfd"), - } - }); + }, + |_uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler, _offset: usize| {}, + ); } diff --git a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/malicious_handler.rs b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/malicious_handler.rs index 9af94e057aa..c926b976207 100644 --- a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/malicious_handler.rs +++ b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/malicious_handler.rs @@ -21,17 +21,23 @@ fn main() { // Get Uffd from UDS. We'll use the uffd to handle PFs for Firecracker. let listener = UnixListener::bind(uffd_sock_path).expect("Cannot bind to socket path"); let (stream, _) = listener.accept().expect("Cannot listen on UDS socket"); + stream + .set_nonblocking(true) + .expect("Cannot set non-blocking"); let mut runtime = Runtime::new(stream, file); - runtime.run(|uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler| { - // Read an event from the userfaultfd. - let event = uffd_handler - .read_event() - .expect("Failed to read uffd_msg") - .expect("uffd_msg not ready"); - - if let userfaultfd::Event::Pagefault { .. } = event { - panic!("Fear me! I am the malicious page fault handler.") - } - }); + runtime.run( + |uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler| { + // Read an event from the userfaultfd. + let event = uffd_handler + .read_event() + .expect("Failed to read uffd_msg") + .expect("uffd_msg not ready"); + + if let userfaultfd::Event::Pagefault { .. } = event { + panic!("Fear me! I am the malicious page fault handler.") + } + }, + |_uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler, _offset: usize| {}, + ); } diff --git a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/on_demand_handler.rs b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/on_demand_handler.rs index 3be958b3578..97c6f708fbe 100644 --- a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/on_demand_handler.rs +++ b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/on_demand_handler.rs @@ -22,84 +22,95 @@ fn main() { // Get Uffd from UDS. We'll use the uffd to handle PFs for Firecracker. let listener = UnixListener::bind(uffd_sock_path).expect("Cannot bind to socket path"); let (stream, _) = listener.accept().expect("Cannot listen on UDS socket"); + stream + .set_nonblocking(true) + .expect("Cannot set non-blocking"); let mut runtime = Runtime::new(stream, file); runtime.install_panic_hook(); - runtime.run(|uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler| { - // !DISCLAIMER! - // When using UFFD together with the balloon device, this handler needs to deal with - // `remove` and `pagefault` events. There are multiple things to keep in mind in - // such setups: - // - // As long as any `remove` event is pending in the UFFD queue, all ioctls return EAGAIN - // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - // - // This means we cannot process UFFD events simply one-by-one anymore - if a `remove` event - // arrives, we need to pre-fetch all other events up to the `remove` event, to unblock the - // UFFD, and then go back to the process the pre-fetched events. - // - // UFFD might receive events in not in their causal order - // ----------------------------------------------------- - // - // For example, the guest - // kernel might first respond to a balloon inflation by freeing some memory, and - // telling Firecracker about this. Firecracker will then madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) the - // free memory range, which causes a `remove` event to be sent to UFFD. Then, the - // guest kernel might immediately fault the page in again (for example because - // default_on_oom was set). which causes a `pagefault` event to be sent to UFFD. - // - // However, the pagefault will be triggered from inside KVM on the vCPU thread, while the - // balloon device is handled by Firecracker on its VMM thread. This means that potentially - // this handler can receive the `pagefault` _before_ the `remove` event. - // - // This means that the simple "greedy" strategy of simply prefetching _all_ UFFD events - // to make sure no `remove` event is blocking us can result in the handler acting on - // the `pagefault` event before the `remove` message (despite the `remove` event being - // in the causal past of the `pagefault` event), which means that we will fault in a page - // from the snapshot file, while really we should be faulting in a zero page. - // - // In this example handler, we ignore this problem, to avoid - // complexity (under the assumption that the guest kernel will zero a newly faulted in - // page anyway). A production handler will most likely want to ensure that `remove` - // events for a specific range are always handled before `pagefault` events. - // - // Lastly, we still need to deal with the race condition where a `remove` event arrives - // in the UFFD queue after we got done reading all events, in which case we need to go - // back to reading more events before we can continue processing `pagefault`s. - let mut deferred_events = Vec::new(); + runtime.run( + |uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler| { + // !DISCLAIMER! + // When using UFFD together with the balloon device, this handler needs to deal with + // `remove` and `pagefault` events. There are multiple things to keep in mind in + // such setups: + // + // As long as any `remove` event is pending in the UFFD queue, all ioctls return EAGAIN + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + // + // This means we cannot process UFFD events simply one-by-one anymore - if a `remove` + // event arrives, we need to pre-fetch all other events up to the `remove` + // event, to unblock the UFFD, and then go back to the process the + // pre-fetched events. + // + // UFFD might receive events in not in their causal order + // ----------------------------------------------------- + // + // For example, the guest + // kernel might first respond to a balloon inflation by freeing some memory, and + // telling Firecracker about this. Firecracker will then madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) the + // free memory range, which causes a `remove` event to be sent to UFFD. Then, the + // guest kernel might immediately fault the page in again (for example because + // default_on_oom was set). which causes a `pagefault` event to be sent to UFFD. + // + // However, the pagefault will be triggered from inside KVM on the vCPU thread, while + // the balloon device is handled by Firecracker on its VMM thread. This + // means that potentially this handler can receive the `pagefault` _before_ + // the `remove` event. + // + // This means that the simple "greedy" strategy of simply prefetching _all_ UFFD events + // to make sure no `remove` event is blocking us can result in the handler acting on + // the `pagefault` event before the `remove` message (despite the `remove` event being + // in the causal past of the `pagefault` event), which means that we will fault in a + // page from the snapshot file, while really we should be faulting in a zero + // page. + // + // In this example handler, we ignore this problem, to avoid + // complexity (under the assumption that the guest kernel will zero a newly faulted in + // page anyway). A production handler will most likely want to ensure that `remove` + // events for a specific range are always handled before `pagefault` events. + // + // Lastly, we still need to deal with the race condition where a `remove` event arrives + // in the UFFD queue after we got done reading all events, in which case we need to go + // back to reading more events before we can continue processing `pagefault`s. + let mut deferred_events = Vec::new(); - loop { - // First, try events that we couldn't handle last round - let mut events_to_handle = Vec::from_iter(deferred_events.drain(..)); + loop { + // First, try events that we couldn't handle last round + let mut events_to_handle = Vec::from_iter(deferred_events.drain(..)); - // Read all events from the userfaultfd. - while let Some(event) = uffd_handler.read_event().expect("Failed to read uffd_msg") { - events_to_handle.push(event); - } + // Read all events from the userfaultfd. + while let Some(event) = uffd_handler.read_event().expect("Failed to read uffd_msg") + { + events_to_handle.push(event); + } - for event in events_to_handle.drain(..) { - // We expect to receive either a Page Fault or `remove` - // event (if the balloon device is enabled). - match event { - userfaultfd::Event::Pagefault { addr, .. } => { - if !uffd_handler.serve_pf(addr.cast(), uffd_handler.page_size) { - deferred_events.push(event); + for event in events_to_handle.drain(..) { + // We expect to receive either a Page Fault or `remove` + // event (if the balloon device is enabled). + match event { + userfaultfd::Event::Pagefault { addr, .. } => { + if !uffd_handler.serve_pf(addr.cast(), uffd_handler.page_size) { + deferred_events.push(event); + } } + userfaultfd::Event::Remove { start, end } => { + uffd_handler.mark_range_removed(start as u64, end as u64) + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event on userfaultfd"), } - userfaultfd::Event::Remove { start, end } => { - uffd_handler.mark_range_removed(start as u64, end as u64) - } - _ => panic!("Unexpected event on userfaultfd"), } - } - // We assume that really only the above removed/pagefault interaction can result in - // deferred events. In that scenario, the loop will always terminate (unless - // newly arriving `remove` events end up indefinitely blocking it, but there's nothing - // we can do about that, and it's a largely theoretical problem). - if deferred_events.is_empty() { - break; + // We assume that really only the above removed/pagefault interaction can result in + // deferred events. In that scenario, the loop will always terminate (unless + // newly arriving `remove` events end up indefinitely blocking it, but there's + // nothing we can do about that, and it's a largely theoretical + // problem). + if deferred_events.is_empty() { + break; + } } - } - }); + }, + |_uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler, _offset: usize| {}, + ); } diff --git a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs index 6284de84c6a..6a79277f16a 100644 --- a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs +++ b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs @@ -5,22 +5,31 @@ clippy::cast_possible_truncation, clippy::cast_sign_loss, clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks, + clippy::ptr_as_ptr, // Not everything is used by both binaries dead_code )] -use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet}; +mod userfault_bitmap; + +use std::collections::HashSet; use std::ffi::c_void; use std::fs::File; +use std::io::{Read, Write}; +use std::num::NonZero; use std::os::unix::io::{AsRawFd, FromRawFd, IntoRawFd}; use std::os::unix::net::UnixStream; use std::ptr; +use std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64; use std::time::Duration; use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; +use serde_json::{Deserializer, StreamDeserializer}; use userfaultfd::{Error, Event, Uffd}; use vmm_sys_util::sock_ctrl_msg::ScmSocket; +use crate::uffd_utils::userfault_bitmap::UserfaultBitmap; + // This is the same with the one used in src/vmm. /// This describes the mapping between Firecracker base virtual address and offset in the /// buffer or file backend for a guest memory region. It is used to tell an external @@ -39,8 +48,6 @@ pub struct GuestRegionUffdMapping { pub offset: u64, /// The configured page size for this memory region. pub page_size: usize, - #[deprecated] - pub page_size_kib: usize, } #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)] @@ -117,6 +124,9 @@ pub struct UffdHandler { backing_buffer: *const u8, uffd: Uffd, removed_pages: HashSet, + pub guest_memfd: Option, + pub guest_memfd_addr: Option<*mut u8>, + pub userfault_bitmap: Option, } impl UffdHandler { @@ -160,17 +170,37 @@ impl UffdHandler { panic!("Could not get UFFD and mappings after 5 retries"); } - pub fn from_unix_stream(stream: &UnixStream, backing_buffer: *const u8, size: usize) -> Self { - let (body, file) = Self::get_mappings_and_file(stream); - let mappings = - serde_json::from_str::>(&body).unwrap_or_else(|_| { - panic!("Cannot deserialize memory mappings. Received body: {body}") - }); + fn mmap_helper(len: libc::size_t, fd: libc::c_int) -> *mut libc::c_void { + // SAFETY: `mmap` is a safe function to call with valid parameters. + let ret = unsafe { + libc::mmap( + ptr::null_mut(), + len, + libc::PROT_WRITE, + libc::MAP_SHARED, + fd, + 0, + ) + }; + + assert_ne!(ret, libc::MAP_FAILED); + + ret + } + + pub fn from_mappings( + mappings: Vec, + uffd: File, + guest_memfd: Option, + userfault_bitmap_memfd: Option, + backing_buffer: *const u8, + size: usize, + ) -> Self { let memsize: usize = mappings.iter().map(|r| r.size).sum(); // Page size is the same for all memory regions, so just grab the first one let first_mapping = mappings.first().unwrap_or_else(|| { panic!( - "Cannot get the first mapping. Mappings size is {}. Received body: {body}", + "Cannot get the first mapping. Mappings size is {}.", mappings.len() ) }); @@ -180,14 +210,46 @@ impl UffdHandler { assert_eq!(memsize, size); assert!(page_size.is_power_of_two()); - let uffd = unsafe { Uffd::from_raw_fd(file.into_raw_fd()) }; - - Self { - mem_regions: mappings, - page_size, - backing_buffer, - uffd, - removed_pages: HashSet::new(), + let uffd = unsafe { Uffd::from_raw_fd(uffd.into_raw_fd()) }; + + match (&guest_memfd, &userfault_bitmap_memfd) { + (Some(guestmem_file), Some(bitmap_file)) => { + let guest_memfd_addr = + Some(Self::mmap_helper(size, guestmem_file.as_raw_fd()) as *mut u8); + + let bitmap_ptr = Self::mmap_helper(size, bitmap_file.as_raw_fd()) as *mut AtomicU64; + + // SAFETY: The bitmap pointer is valid and the size is correct. + let userfault_bitmap = Some(unsafe { + UserfaultBitmap::new(bitmap_ptr, memsize, NonZero::new(page_size).unwrap()) + }); + + Self { + mem_regions: mappings, + page_size, + backing_buffer, + uffd, + removed_pages: HashSet::new(), + guest_memfd, + guest_memfd_addr, + userfault_bitmap, + } + } + (None, None) => Self { + mem_regions: mappings, + page_size, + backing_buffer, + uffd, + removed_pages: HashSet::new(), + guest_memfd: None, + guest_memfd_addr: None, + userfault_bitmap: None, + }, + (_, _) => { + panic!( + "Only both guest_memfd and userfault_bitmap_memfd can be set at the same time." + ); + } } } @@ -226,6 +288,10 @@ impl UffdHandler { ); } + pub fn size(&self) -> usize { + self.mem_regions.iter().map(|r| r.size).sum() + } + fn populate_from_file(&self, region: &GuestRegionUffdMapping, dst: u64, len: usize) -> bool { let offset = dst - region.base_host_virt_addr; let src = self.backing_buffer as u64 + region.offset + offset; @@ -265,13 +331,65 @@ impl UffdHandler { } } +struct UffdMsgIterator { + stream: UnixStream, + buffer: Vec, + current_pos: usize, +} + +impl Iterator for UffdMsgIterator { + type Item = FaultRequest; + + fn next(&mut self) -> Option { + match self.stream.read(&mut self.buffer[self.current_pos..]) { + Ok(bytes_read) => self.current_pos += bytes_read, + Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock => { + // Continue with existing buffer data + } + Err(e) => panic!("Failed to read from stream: {}", e,), + } + + if self.current_pos == 0 { + return None; + } + + let str_slice = std::str::from_utf8(&self.buffer[..self.current_pos]).unwrap(); + let mut stream: StreamDeserializer<_, Self::Item> = + Deserializer::from_str(str_slice).into_iter(); + + match stream.next()? { + Ok(value) => { + let consumed = stream.byte_offset(); + self.buffer.copy_within(consumed..self.current_pos, 0); + self.current_pos -= consumed; + Some(value) + } + Err(e) => panic!( + "Failed to deserialize JSON message: {}. Error: {}", + String::from_utf8_lossy(&self.buffer[..self.current_pos]), + e + ), + } + } +} + +impl UffdMsgIterator { + fn new(stream: UnixStream) -> Self { + Self { + stream, + buffer: vec![0u8; 4096], + current_pos: 0, + } + } +} + #[derive(Debug)] pub struct Runtime { stream: UnixStream, backing_file: File, backing_memory: *mut u8, backing_memory_size: usize, - uffds: HashMap, + handler: UffdHandler, } impl Runtime { @@ -296,12 +414,14 @@ impl Runtime { panic!("mmap on backing file failed"); } + let handler = Runtime::construct_handler(&stream, ret.cast(), backing_memory_size); + Self { stream, backing_file, backing_memory: ret.cast(), backing_memory_size, - uffds: HashMap::default(), + handler, } } @@ -342,12 +462,59 @@ impl Runtime { })); } + pub fn send_fault_reply(&mut self, fault_reply: FaultReply) { + let reply = UffdMsgToFirecracker::FaultRep(fault_reply); + let reply_json = serde_json::to_string(&reply).unwrap(); + self.stream.write_all(reply_json.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + } + + pub fn construct_handler( + stream: &UnixStream, + backing_memory: *mut u8, + backing_memory_size: usize, + ) -> UffdHandler { + let mut message_buf = vec![0u8; 1024]; + let mut iovecs = [libc::iovec { + iov_base: message_buf.as_mut_ptr() as *mut libc::c_void, + iov_len: message_buf.len(), + }]; + let mut fds = [0; 3]; + let (bytes_read, fds_read) = unsafe { + stream + .recv_with_fds(&mut iovecs, &mut fds) + .expect("recv_with_fds failed") + }; + message_buf.resize(bytes_read, 0); + + let (guest_memfd, userfault_bitmap_memfd) = if fds_read == 3 { + ( + Some(unsafe { File::from_raw_fd(fds[1]) }), + Some(unsafe { File::from_raw_fd(fds[2]) }), + ) + } else { + (None, None) + }; + + UffdHandler::from_mappings( + serde_json::from_slice(message_buf.as_slice()).unwrap(), + unsafe { File::from_raw_fd(fds[0]) }, + guest_memfd, + userfault_bitmap_memfd, + backing_memory, + backing_memory_size, + ) + } + /// Polls the `UnixStream` and UFFD fds in a loop. /// When stream is polled, new uffd is retrieved. /// When uffd is polled, page fault is handled by /// calling `pf_event_dispatch` with corresponding /// uffd object passed in. - pub fn run(&mut self, pf_event_dispatch: impl Fn(&mut UffdHandler)) { + pub fn run( + &mut self, + pf_event_dispatch: impl Fn(&mut UffdHandler), + pf_vcpu_event_dispatch: impl Fn(&mut UffdHandler, usize), + ) { let mut pollfds = vec![]; // Poll the stream for incoming uffds @@ -357,6 +524,15 @@ impl Runtime { revents: 0, }); + pollfds.push(libc::pollfd { + fd: self.handler.uffd.as_raw_fd(), + events: libc::POLLIN, + revents: 0, + }); + + let mut uffd_msg_iter = + UffdMsgIterator::new(self.stream.try_clone().expect("Failed to clone stream")); + loop { let pollfd_ptr = pollfds.as_mut_ptr(); let pollfd_size = pollfds.len() as u64; @@ -369,28 +545,32 @@ impl Runtime { panic!("Could not poll for events!") } - for i in 0..pollfds.len() { + for fd in &pollfds { if nready == 0 { break; } - if pollfds[i].revents & libc::POLLIN != 0 { + if fd.revents & libc::POLLIN != 0 { nready -= 1; - if pollfds[i].fd == self.stream.as_raw_fd() { - // Handle new uffd from stream - let handler = UffdHandler::from_unix_stream( - &self.stream, - self.backing_memory, - self.backing_memory_size, - ); - pollfds.push(libc::pollfd { - fd: handler.uffd.as_raw_fd(), - events: libc::POLLIN, - revents: 0, - }); - self.uffds.insert(handler.uffd.as_raw_fd(), handler); + if fd.fd == self.stream.as_raw_fd() { + for fault_request in uffd_msg_iter.by_ref() { + let page_size = self.handler.page_size; + + assert!( + (fault_request.offset as usize) < self.handler.size(), + "received bogus offset from firecracker" + ); + + // Handle one of FaultRequest page faults + pf_vcpu_event_dispatch( + &mut self.handler, + fault_request.offset as usize, + ); + + self.send_fault_reply(fault_request.into_reply(page_size as u64)); + } } else { // Handle one of uffd page faults - pf_event_dispatch(self.uffds.get_mut(&pollfds[i].fd).unwrap()); + pf_event_dispatch(&mut self.handler); } } } @@ -443,6 +623,7 @@ mod tests { let stream = UnixStream::connect(dummy_socket_path_clone).expect("Cannot connect to the socket"); + #[allow(deprecated)] let dummy_memory_region = vec![GuestRegionUffdMapping { base_host_virt_addr: 0, size: 0x1000, @@ -451,31 +632,26 @@ mod tests { }]; let dummy_memory_region_json = serde_json::to_string(&dummy_memory_region).unwrap(); - let dummy_file_1 = TempFile::new().unwrap(); - let dummy_fd_1 = dummy_file_1.as_file().as_raw_fd(); - stream - .send_with_fd(dummy_memory_region_json.as_bytes(), dummy_fd_1) - .unwrap(); - // wait for the runtime thread to process message - std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(100)); - unsafe { - assert_eq!((*runtime_ptr).uffds.len(), 1); - } - - let dummy_file_2 = TempFile::new().unwrap(); - let dummy_fd_2 = dummy_file_2.as_file().as_raw_fd(); + // Send the mapping message to the runtime. + // We expect for the runtime to create a corresponding UffdHandler + let dummy_file = TempFile::new().unwrap(); + let dummy_fd = dummy_file.as_file().as_raw_fd(); stream - .send_with_fd(dummy_memory_region_json.as_bytes(), dummy_fd_2) + .send_with_fd(dummy_memory_region_json.as_bytes(), dummy_fd) .unwrap(); // wait for the runtime thread to process message std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(100)); unsafe { - assert_eq!((*runtime_ptr).uffds.len(), 2); + assert_eq!( + (*runtime_ptr).handler.mem_regions.len(), + dummy_memory_region.len() + ); } // there is no way to properly stop runtime, so // we send a message with an incorrect memory region // to cause runtime thread to panic + #[allow(deprecated)] let error_memory_region = vec![GuestRegionUffdMapping { base_host_virt_addr: 0, size: 0, @@ -484,7 +660,7 @@ mod tests { }]; let error_memory_region_json = serde_json::to_string(&error_memory_region).unwrap(); stream - .send_with_fd(error_memory_region_json.as_bytes(), dummy_fd_2) + .send_with_fd(error_memory_region_json.as_bytes(), dummy_fd) .unwrap(); runtime_thread.join().unwrap_err(); From 011bd7a1b06cb35f86e39fb7fc94beb5c6ea6734 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2025 16:16:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 39/58] test(uffd_utils): add handling for FaultRequest in secret freedom There are two ways a UFFD handler receives a fault notification if Secret Fredom is enabled (which is inferred from 3 fds sent by Firecracker instead of 1): - a VMM- or KVM-triggered fault is delivered via a minor UFFD fault event. The handler is supposed to respond to it via memcpying the content of the page (if the page hasn't already been populated) followed by a UFFDIO_CONTINUE call. - a vCPU-triggered fault is delievered via a FaultRequest message on the UDS socket. The handler is supposed to reply with a pwrite64 call on the guest_memfd to populate the page followed by a FaultReply message on the UDS socket. In both cases, the handler also needs to clear the bit in the userfault bitmap at the corresponding offset in order to stop further fault notifications for the same page. UFFD handlers use the userfault bitmap for two purposes: - communicate to the kernel whether a fault at the corresponding guest_memfd offset will cause a VM exit - keep track of pages that have already been populated in order to avoid overwriting the content of the page that is already initialised. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- .../examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs | 73 +++++++-- .../examples/uffd/on_demand_handler.rs | 46 +++++- src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs | 152 +++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 253 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs index 5553a307892..defdf41bd50 100644 --- a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs +++ b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs @@ -5,14 +5,19 @@ //! which loads the whole region from the backing memory file //! when a page fault occurs. +#![allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)] + mod uffd_utils; use std::fs::File; +use std::os::fd::AsRawFd; use std::os::unix::net::UnixListener; use uffd_utils::{Runtime, UffdHandler}; use utils::time::{ClockType, get_time_us}; +use crate::uffd_utils::uffd_continue; + fn main() { let mut args = std::env::args(); let uffd_sock_path = args.nth(1).expect("No socket path given"); @@ -37,19 +42,69 @@ fn main() { .expect("Failed to read uffd_msg") .expect("uffd_msg not ready"); - match event { - userfaultfd::Event::Pagefault { .. } => { - let start = get_time_us(ClockType::Monotonic); - for region in uffd_handler.mem_regions.clone() { - uffd_handler.serve_pf(region.base_host_virt_addr as _, region.size); - } - let end = get_time_us(ClockType::Monotonic); + if let userfaultfd::Event::Pagefault { addr, .. } = event { + let bit = + uffd_handler.addr_to_offset(addr.cast()) as usize / uffd_handler.page_size; + + // If Secret Free, we know if this is the first fault based on the userfault + // bitmap state. Otherwise, we assume that we will ever only receive a single fault + // event via UFFD. + let are_we_faulted_yet = uffd_handler + .userfault_bitmap + .as_mut() + .is_some_and(|bitmap| !bitmap.is_bit_set(bit)); - println!("Finished Faulting All: {}us", end - start); + if are_we_faulted_yet { + // TODO: we currently ignore the result as we may attempt to + // populate the page that is already present as we may receive + // multiple minor fault events per page. + let _ = uffd_continue( + uffd_handler.uffd.as_raw_fd(), + addr as _, + uffd_handler.page_size as u64, + ) + .inspect_err(|err| println!("Error during uffdio_continue: {:?}", err)); + } else { + fault_all(uffd_handler, addr); } - _ => panic!("Unexpected event on userfaultfd"), } }, |_uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler, _offset: usize| {}, ); } + +fn fault_all(uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler, fault_addr: *mut libc::c_void) { + let start = get_time_us(ClockType::Monotonic); + for region in uffd_handler.mem_regions.clone() { + match uffd_handler.guest_memfd { + None => { + uffd_handler.serve_pf(region.base_host_virt_addr as _, region.size); + } + Some(_) => { + let written = uffd_handler.populate_via_write(region.offset as usize, region.size); + + // This code is written under the assumption that the first fault triggered by + // Firecracker is either due to an MSR write (on x86) or due to device restoration + // reading from guest memory to check the virtio queues are sane (on + // ARM). This will be reported via a UFFD minor fault which needs to + // be handled via memcpy. Importantly, we get to the UFFD handler + // with the actual guest_memfd page already faulted in, meaning pwrite will stop + // once it gets to the offset of that page (e.g. written < region.size above). + // Thus, to fault in everything, we now need to skip this one page, write the + // remaining region, and then deal with the "gap" via uffd_handler.serve_pf(). + + if written < region.size - uffd_handler.page_size { + let r = uffd_handler.populate_via_write( + region.offset as usize + written + uffd_handler.page_size, + region.size - written - uffd_handler.page_size, + ); + assert_eq!(written + r, region.size - uffd_handler.page_size); + } + } + } + } + uffd_handler.serve_pf(fault_addr.cast(), uffd_handler.page_size); + let end = get_time_us(ClockType::Monotonic); + + println!("Finished Faulting All: {}us", end - start); +} diff --git a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/on_demand_handler.rs b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/on_demand_handler.rs index 97c6f708fbe..755b29ceb4a 100644 --- a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/on_demand_handler.rs +++ b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/on_demand_handler.rs @@ -5,13 +5,18 @@ //! which loads the whole region from the backing memory file //! when a page fault occurs. +#![allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)] + mod uffd_utils; use std::fs::File; +use std::os::fd::AsRawFd; use std::os::unix::net::UnixListener; use uffd_utils::{Runtime, UffdHandler}; +use crate::uffd_utils::uffd_continue; + fn main() { let mut args = std::env::args(); let uffd_sock_path = args.nth(1).expect("No socket path given"); @@ -90,7 +95,33 @@ fn main() { // event (if the balloon device is enabled). match event { userfaultfd::Event::Pagefault { addr, .. } => { - if !uffd_handler.serve_pf(addr.cast(), uffd_handler.page_size) { + let bit = uffd_handler.addr_to_offset(addr.cast()) as usize + / uffd_handler.page_size; + + if uffd_handler.userfault_bitmap.is_some() { + if uffd_handler + .userfault_bitmap + .as_mut() + .unwrap() + .is_bit_set(bit) + { + if !uffd_handler.serve_pf(addr.cast(), uffd_handler.page_size) { + deferred_events.push(event); + } + } else { + // TODO: we currently ignore the result as we may attempt to + // populate the page that is already present as we may receive + // multiple minor fault events per page. + let _ = uffd_continue( + uffd_handler.uffd.as_raw_fd(), + addr as _, + uffd_handler.page_size as u64, + ) + .inspect_err(|err| { + println!("uffdio_continue error: {:?}", err) + }); + } + } else if !uffd_handler.serve_pf(addr.cast(), uffd_handler.page_size) { deferred_events.push(event); } } @@ -111,6 +142,17 @@ fn main() { } } }, - |_uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler, _offset: usize| {}, + |uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler, offset: usize| { + let bytes_written = uffd_handler.populate_via_write(offset, uffd_handler.page_size); + + if bytes_written == 0 { + println!( + "got a vcpu fault for an already populated page at offset {}", + offset + ); + } else { + assert_eq!(bytes_written, uffd_handler.page_size); + } + }, ); } diff --git a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs index 6a79277f16a..3c01651201f 100644 --- a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs +++ b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/uffd_utils.rs @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ clippy::cast_sign_loss, clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks, clippy::ptr_as_ptr, + clippy::cast_possible_wrap, // Not everything is used by both binaries dead_code )] @@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ use std::ffi::c_void; use std::fs::File; use std::io::{Read, Write}; use std::num::NonZero; +use std::os::fd::RawFd; use std::os::unix::io::{AsRawFd, FromRawFd, IntoRawFd}; use std::os::unix::net::UnixStream; use std::ptr; @@ -26,10 +28,47 @@ use std::time::Duration; use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; use serde_json::{Deserializer, StreamDeserializer}; use userfaultfd::{Error, Event, Uffd}; +use vmm_sys_util::ioctl::ioctl_with_mut_ref; +use vmm_sys_util::ioctl_iowr_nr; use vmm_sys_util::sock_ctrl_msg::ScmSocket; use crate::uffd_utils::userfault_bitmap::UserfaultBitmap; +// TODO: remove when UFFDIO_CONTINUE for guest_memfd is available in the crate +#[repr(C)] +struct uffdio_continue { + range: uffdio_range, + mode: u64, + mapped: u64, +} + +ioctl_iowr_nr!(UFFDIO_CONTINUE, 0xAA, 0x7, uffdio_continue); + +#[repr(C)] +struct uffdio_range { + start: u64, + len: u64, +} + +pub fn uffd_continue(uffd: RawFd, fault_addr: u64, len: u64) -> std::io::Result<()> { + let mut cont = uffdio_continue { + range: uffdio_range { + start: fault_addr, + len, + }, + mode: 0, // Normal continuation mode + mapped: 0, + }; + + let ret = unsafe { ioctl_with_mut_ref(&uffd, UFFDIO_CONTINUE(), &mut cont) }; + + if ret == -1 { + return Err(std::io::Error::last_os_error()); + } + + Ok(()) +} + // This is the same with the one used in src/vmm. /// This describes the mapping between Firecracker base virtual address and offset in the /// buffer or file backend for a guest memory region. It is used to tell an external @@ -122,7 +161,7 @@ pub struct UffdHandler { pub mem_regions: Vec, pub page_size: usize, backing_buffer: *const u8, - uffd: Uffd, + pub uffd: Uffd, removed_pages: HashSet, pub guest_memfd: Option, pub guest_memfd_addr: Option<*mut u8>, @@ -266,6 +305,20 @@ impl UffdHandler { } } + pub fn addr_to_offset(&self, addr: *mut u8) -> u64 { + let addr = addr as u64; + for region in &self.mem_regions { + if region.contains(addr) { + return addr - region.base_host_virt_addr + region.offset; + } + } + + panic!( + "Could not find addr: {:#x} within guest region mappings.", + addr + ); + } + pub fn serve_pf(&mut self, addr: *mut u8, len: usize) -> bool { // Find the start of the page that the current faulting address belongs to. let dst = (addr as usize & !(self.page_size - 1)) as *mut libc::c_void; @@ -278,7 +331,7 @@ impl UffdHandler { for region in self.mem_regions.iter() { if region.contains(fault_page_addr) { - return self.populate_from_file(region, fault_page_addr, len); + return self.populate_from_file(®ion.clone(), fault_page_addr, len); } } @@ -292,12 +345,61 @@ impl UffdHandler { self.mem_regions.iter().map(|r| r.size).sum() } - fn populate_from_file(&self, region: &GuestRegionUffdMapping, dst: u64, len: usize) -> bool { - let offset = dst - region.base_host_virt_addr; - let src = self.backing_buffer as u64 + region.offset + offset; + pub fn populate_via_write(&mut self, offset: usize, len: usize) -> usize { + // man 2 write: + // + // On Linux, write() (and similar system calls) will transfer at most + // 0x7ffff000 (2,147,479,552) bytes, returning the number of bytes + // actually transferred. (This is true on both 32-bit and 64-bit + // systems.) + const MAX_WRITE_LEN: usize = 2_147_479_552; + + assert!( + offset.checked_add(len).unwrap() <= self.size(), + "{} + {} >= {}", + offset, + len, + self.size() + ); + + let mut total_written = 0; + + while total_written < len { + let src = unsafe { self.backing_buffer.add(offset + total_written) }; + let len_to_write = (len - total_written).min(MAX_WRITE_LEN); + let bytes_written = unsafe { + libc::pwrite64( + self.guest_memfd.as_ref().unwrap().as_raw_fd(), + src.cast(), + len_to_write, + (offset + total_written) as libc::off64_t, + ) + }; + + let bytes_written = match bytes_written { + -1 if vmm_sys_util::errno::Error::last().errno() == libc::ENOSPC => 0, + written @ 0.. => written as usize, + _ => panic!("{:?}", std::io::Error::last_os_error()), + }; + + self.userfault_bitmap + .as_mut() + .unwrap() + .reset_addr_range(offset + total_written, bytes_written); + + total_written += bytes_written; + + if bytes_written != len_to_write { + break; + } + } + + total_written + } + fn populate_via_uffdio_copy(&self, src: *const u8, dst: u64, len: usize) -> bool { unsafe { - match self.uffd.copy(src as *const _, dst as *mut _, len, true) { + match self.uffd.copy(src.cast(), dst as *mut _, len, true) { // Make sure the UFFD copied some bytes. Ok(value) => assert!(value > 0), // Catch EAGAIN errors, which occur when a `remove` event lands in the UFFD @@ -322,6 +424,42 @@ impl UffdHandler { true } + fn populate_via_memcpy(&mut self, src: *const u8, dst: u64, offset: usize, len: usize) -> bool { + let dst_memcpy = unsafe { + self.guest_memfd_addr + .expect("no guest_memfd addr") + .add(offset) + }; + + unsafe { + std::ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(src, dst_memcpy, len); + } + + self.userfault_bitmap + .as_mut() + .unwrap() + .reset_addr_range(offset, len); + + uffd_continue(self.uffd.as_raw_fd(), dst, len as u64).expect("uffd_continue"); + + true + } + + fn populate_from_file( + &mut self, + region: &GuestRegionUffdMapping, + dst: u64, + len: usize, + ) -> bool { + let offset = (region.offset + dst - region.base_host_virt_addr) as usize; + let src = unsafe { self.backing_buffer.add(offset) }; + + match self.guest_memfd { + Some(_) => self.populate_via_memcpy(src, dst, offset, len), + None => self.populate_via_uffdio_copy(src, dst, len), + } + } + fn zero_out(&mut self, addr: u64) -> bool { match unsafe { self.uffd.zeropage(addr as *mut _, self.page_size, true) } { Ok(_) => true, @@ -614,7 +752,7 @@ mod tests { let (stream, _) = listener.accept().expect("Cannot listen on UDS socket"); // Update runtime with actual runtime let runtime = uninit_runtime.write(Runtime::new(stream, file)); - runtime.run(|_: &mut UffdHandler| {}); + runtime.run(|_: &mut UffdHandler| {}, |_: &mut UffdHandler, _: usize| {}); }); // wait for runtime thread to initialize itself From 906a1862a3840bdb820e161e9bb4a241c352ae36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 13:43:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 40/58] feat(vmm): add secret free userfault definitions These are used for communication of page faults between Firecracker and a UFFD handler. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/vmm/src/persist.rs | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs index 18c2dfa65bc..e2201fd5f35 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs @@ -113,6 +113,54 @@ pub struct GuestRegionUffdMapping { pub page_size_kib: usize, } +/// FaultRequest +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct FaultRequest { + /// vCPU that encountered the fault + pub vcpu: u32, + /// Offset in guest_memfd where the fault occured + pub offset: u64, + /// Flags + pub flags: u64, + /// Async PF token + pub token: Option, +} + +/// FaultReply +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct FaultReply { + /// vCPU that encountered the fault, from `FaultRequest` (if present, otherwise 0) + pub vcpu: Option, + /// Offset in guest_memfd where population started + pub offset: u64, + /// Length of populated area + pub len: u64, + /// Flags, must be copied from `FaultRequest`, otherwise 0 + pub flags: u64, + /// Async PF token, must be copied from `FaultRequest`, otherwise None + pub token: Option, + /// Whether the populated pages are zero pages + pub zero: bool, +} + +/// UffdMsgFromFirecracker +#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug)] +#[serde(untagged)] +pub enum UffdMsgFromFirecracker { + /// Mappings + Mappings(Vec), + /// FaultReq + FaultReq(FaultRequest), +} + +/// UffdMsgToFirecracker +#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug)] +#[serde(untagged)] +pub enum UffdMsgToFirecracker { + /// FaultRep + FaultRep(FaultReply), +} + /// Errors related to saving and restoring Microvm state. #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, displaydoc::Display)] pub enum MicrovmStateError { From 10fe7f08a0db5a0bb8de77ccf65d66aea3318573 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 14:26:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 41/58] feat(vmm): extend register_memory_regions with userfault bitmap If configured, userfault bitmap is registered with KVM and controls whether KVM will exit to userspace on a fault of the corresponding page. We are going to allocate the bitmap in a memfd in Firecracker, set bits for all pages to request notifications for vCPU faults and send it to the UFFD handler to delegate clearing the bits as pages get populated. Since the KVM userfault patches are still in review, set_user_memory_region2 is not aware of the userfault flag and the userfault bitmap address in its input structure. Define it in Firecracker code temporarily. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/vmm/src/builder.rs | 4 +- src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs | 6 +- src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs index 282e66fa36b..fb9e395d259 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( .allocate_guest_memory(guest_memfd) .map_err(StartMicrovmError::GuestMemory)?; - vm.register_memory_regions(guest_memory) + vm.register_memory_regions(guest_memory, None) .map_err(VmmError::Vm)?; let mut device_manager = DeviceManager::new(event_manager, &vcpus_exit_evt, &vm)?; @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_from_snapshot( .create_vcpus(vm_resources.machine_config.vcpu_count) .map_err(StartMicrovmError::Vm)?; - vm.register_memory_regions(guest_memory) + vm.register_memory_regions(guest_memory, None) .map_err(StartMicrovmError::Vm)?; #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] diff --git a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs index 8ac06554354..5c01ac5939e 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/device_manager/mmio.rs @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { let guest_mem = multi_region_mem_raw(&[(start_addr1, 0x1000), (start_addr2, 0x1000)]); let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).expect("Cannot create Kvm"); let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).unwrap(); - vm.register_memory_regions(guest_mem).unwrap(); + vm.register_memory_regions(guest_mem, None).unwrap(); let mut device_manager = MMIODeviceManager::new(); let mut cmdline = kernel_cmdline::Cmdline::new(4096).unwrap(); @@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { let guest_mem = multi_region_mem_raw(&[(start_addr1, 0x1000), (start_addr2, 0x1000)]); let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).expect("Cannot create Kvm"); let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).unwrap(); - vm.register_memory_regions(guest_mem).unwrap(); + vm.register_memory_regions(guest_mem, None).unwrap(); let mut device_manager = MMIODeviceManager::new(); let mut cmdline = kernel_cmdline::Cmdline::new(4096).unwrap(); @@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { let guest_mem = multi_region_mem_raw(&[(start_addr1, 0x1000), (start_addr2, 0x1000)]); let kvm = Kvm::new(vec![]).expect("Cannot create Kvm"); let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).unwrap(); - vm.register_memory_regions(guest_mem).unwrap(); + vm.register_memory_regions(guest_mem, None).unwrap(); #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] vm.setup_irqchip().unwrap(); diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs index d5c564d4164..eb121a8d073 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs @@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard}; use kvm_bindings::KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC; use kvm_bindings::{ KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP, KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI, KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD, KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES, - KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID, KvmIrqRouting, kvm_create_guest_memfd, kvm_irq_routing_entry, - kvm_userspace_memory_region, kvm_userspace_memory_region2, + KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID, KVMIO, KvmIrqRouting, kvm_create_guest_memfd, kvm_irq_routing_entry, + kvm_userspace_memory_region, }; use kvm_ioctls::{Cap, VmFd}; use log::{debug, error}; @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ use vm_device::interrupt::{ }; use vmm_sys_util::errno; use vmm_sys_util::eventfd::EventFd; +use vmm_sys_util::ioctl::ioctl_with_ref; +use vmm_sys_util::ioctl_iow_nr; pub use crate::arch::{ArchVm as Vm, ArchVmError, VmState}; use crate::arch::{GSI_MSI_END, host_page_size}; @@ -289,6 +291,24 @@ pub enum VmError { GuestMemfdNotSupported, } +// Upstream `kvm_userspace_memory_region2` definition does not include `userfault_bitmap` field yet. +// TODO: revert to `kvm_userspace_memory_region2` from kvm-bindings +#[allow(non_camel_case_types)] +#[repr(C)] +#[derive(Debug, Default, Copy, Clone, PartialEq)] +struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2 { + slot: u32, + flags: u32, + guest_phys_addr: u64, + memory_size: u64, + userspace_addr: u64, + guest_memfd_offset: u64, + guest_memfd: u32, + pad1: u32, + userfault_bitmap: u64, + pad2: [u64; 13], +} + /// Contains Vm functions that are usable across CPU architectures impl Vm { /// Create a KVM VM @@ -395,16 +415,61 @@ impl Vm { pub fn register_memory_regions( &mut self, regions: Vec, + mut userfault_bitmap: Option<&mut [u8]>, ) -> Result<(), VmError> { for region in regions { - self.register_memory_region(region)? + let bitmap_slice = if let Some(remaining) = userfault_bitmap { + let region_len = u64_to_usize(region.len()); + // Firecracker does not allow sub-MB granularity when allocating guest memory + assert_eq!(region_len % (host_page_size() * u8::BITS as usize), 0); + let bitmap_len = region_len / host_page_size() / (u8::BITS as usize); + let (head, tail) = remaining.split_at_mut(bitmap_len); + userfault_bitmap = Some(tail); + Some(head) + } else { + None + }; + self.register_memory_region(region, bitmap_slice)? } - Ok(()) } + // TODO: remove when userfault support is merged upstream + fn set_user_memory_region2( + &self, + user_memory_region2: kvm_userspace_memory_region2, + ) -> Result<(), VmError> { + ioctl_iow_nr!( + KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2, + KVMIO, + 0x49, + kvm_userspace_memory_region2 + ); + + #[allow(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks)] + let ret = unsafe { + ioctl_with_ref( + self.fd(), + KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2(), + &user_memory_region2, + ) + }; + if ret == 0 { + Ok(()) + } else { + Err(VmError::SetUserMemoryRegion(kvm_ioctls::Error::last())) + } + } + /// Register a new memory region to this [`Vm`]. - pub fn register_memory_region(&mut self, region: GuestRegionMmap) -> Result<(), VmError> { + pub fn register_memory_region( + &mut self, + region: GuestRegionMmap, + userfault_bitmap: Option<&mut [u8]>, + ) -> Result<(), VmError> { + // TODO: take it from kvm-bindings when merged upstream + const KVM_MEM_USERFAULT: u32 = 1 << 3; + let next_slot = self .guest_memory() .num_regions() @@ -432,6 +497,14 @@ impl Vm { (0, 0) }; + let userfault_bitmap = match userfault_bitmap { + Some(addr) => { + flags |= KVM_MEM_USERFAULT; + addr.as_ptr() as u64 + } + None => 0, + }; + let memory_region = kvm_userspace_memory_region2 { slot: next_slot, guest_phys_addr: region.start_addr().raw_value(), @@ -440,24 +513,22 @@ impl Vm { flags, guest_memfd, guest_memfd_offset, + userfault_bitmap, ..Default::default() }; let new_guest_memory = self.common.guest_memory.insert_region(Arc::new(region))?; if self.fd().check_extension(Cap::UserMemory2) { - // SAFETY: We are passing a valid memory region and operate on a valid KVM FD. - unsafe { - self.fd() - .set_user_memory_region2(memory_region) - .map_err(VmError::SetUserMemoryRegion)?; - } + self.set_user_memory_region2(memory_region)?; } else { // Something is seriously wrong if we manage to set these fields on a host that doesn't // even allow creation of guest_memfds! assert_eq!(memory_region.guest_memfd, 0); assert_eq!(memory_region.guest_memfd_offset, 0); + assert_eq!(memory_region.userfault_bitmap, 0); assert_eq!(memory_region.flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD, 0); + assert_eq!(memory_region.flags & KVM_MEM_USERFAULT, 0); // SAFETY: We are passing a valid memory region and operate on a valid KVM FD. unsafe { @@ -789,7 +860,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { pub(crate) fn setup_vm_with_memory(mem_size: usize) -> (Kvm, Vm) { let (kvm, mut vm) = setup_vm(); let gm = single_region_mem_raw(mem_size); - vm.register_memory_regions(gm).unwrap(); + vm.register_memory_regions(gm, None).unwrap(); (kvm, vm) } @@ -819,14 +890,14 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { // Trying to set a memory region with a size that is not a multiple of GUEST_PAGE_SIZE // will result in error. let gm = single_region_mem_raw(0x10); - let res = vm.register_memory_regions(gm); + let res = vm.register_memory_regions(gm, None); assert_eq!( res.unwrap_err().to_string(), "Cannot set the memory regions: Invalid argument (os error 22)" ); let gm = single_region_mem_raw(0x1000); - let res = vm.register_memory_regions(gm); + let res = vm.register_memory_regions(gm, None); res.unwrap(); } @@ -861,7 +932,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { let region = GuestRegionMmap::new(region, GuestAddress(i as u64 * 0x1000)).unwrap(); - let res = vm.register_memory_region(region); + let res = vm.register_memory_region(region, None); if max_nr_regions <= i { assert!( From 01c02c59e8c10f366271f7c17d34fb97bc26802b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 16:16:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 42/58] feat(vmm): configure kvm userfault if secret free is enabled This is needed to instruct the kernel to exit to userspace when a vCPU fault occurs and the corresponding bit in the userfault bitmap is set. The userfault bitmap is allocated in a memfd by Firecracker and sent to the UFFD handler. This also sends 3 fds to the UFFD handler in the handshake: - UFFD (original) - guest_memfd: for the handler to be able to populate guest memory - userfault bitmap memfd: for the handler to be able to disable exits to userspace for the pages that have already been populated Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/vmm/src/builder.rs | 161 ++++++++++++++++-- src/vmm/src/lib.rs | 3 + src/vmm/src/persist.rs | 104 +++++------ src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs | 3 +- .../performance/test_boottime.py | 4 +- 5 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs index fb9e395d259..ca473a0383f 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs @@ -4,8 +4,9 @@ //! Enables pre-boot setup, instantiation and booting of a Firecracker VMM. use std::fmt::Debug; -use std::io; -use std::os::fd::AsFd; +use std::fs::File; +use std::io::{self}; +use std::os::fd::{AsFd, AsRawFd}; use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt; #[cfg(feature = "gdb")] use std::sync::mpsc; @@ -14,14 +15,13 @@ use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use event_manager::SubscriberOps; use kvm_ioctls::Cap; use linux_loader::cmdline::Cmdline as LoaderKernelCmdline; -use userfaultfd::Uffd; use utils::time::TimestampUs; #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] use vm_memory::GuestAddress; #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] use crate::Vcpu; -use crate::arch::{ConfigurationError, configure_system_for_boot, load_kernel}; +use crate::arch::{ConfigurationError, configure_system_for_boot, host_page_size, load_kernel}; #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] use crate::construct_kvm_mpidrs; use crate::cpu_config::templates::{ @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ use crate::cpu_config::templates::{ #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] use crate::device_manager; use crate::device_manager::pci_mngr::PciManagerError; +use crate::device_manager::persist::ACPIDeviceManagerRestoreError; use crate::device_manager::{ AttachDeviceError, DeviceManager, DeviceManagerCreateError, DevicePersistError, DeviceRestoreArgs, @@ -44,15 +45,19 @@ use crate::devices::virtio::vsock::{Vsock, VsockUnixBackend}; use crate::gdb; use crate::initrd::{InitrdConfig, InitrdError}; use crate::logger::debug; -use crate::persist::{MicrovmState, MicrovmStateError}; +use crate::persist::{ + GuestMemoryFromFileError, GuestMemoryFromUffdError, MicrovmState, MicrovmStateError, + guest_memory_from_file, guest_memory_from_uffd, +}; use crate::resources::VmResources; use crate::seccomp::BpfThreadMap; use crate::snapshot::Persist; use crate::utils::u64_to_usize; use crate::vmm_config::instance_info::InstanceInfo; use crate::vmm_config::machine_config::MachineConfigError; +use crate::vmm_config::snapshot::{LoadSnapshotParams, MemBackendType}; use crate::vstate::kvm::{Kvm, KvmError}; -use crate::vstate::memory::{GuestRegionMmap, MaybeBounce}; +use crate::vstate::memory::{MaybeBounce, create_memfd}; #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] use crate::vstate::resources::ResourceAllocator; use crate::vstate::vcpu::VcpuError; @@ -335,6 +340,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( kvm, vm, uffd: None, + uffd_socket: None, vcpus_handles: Vec::new(), vcpus_exit_evt, device_manager, @@ -407,6 +413,17 @@ pub fn build_and_boot_microvm( Ok(vmm) } +/// Sub-Error type for [`build_microvm_from_snapshot`] to contain either +/// [`GuestMemoryFromFileError`] or [`GuestMemoryFromUffdError`] within +/// [`BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotError`]. +#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, displaydoc::Display)] +pub enum BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotErrorGuestMemoryError { + /// Error creating guest memory from file: {0} + File(#[from] GuestMemoryFromFileError), + /// Error creating guest memory from uffd: {0} + Uffd(#[from] GuestMemoryFromUffdError), +} + /// Error type for [`build_microvm_from_snapshot`]. #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, displaydoc::Display)] pub enum BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotError { @@ -442,8 +459,55 @@ pub enum BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotError { SeccompFiltersInternal(#[from] crate::seccomp::InstallationError), /// Failed to restore devices: {0} RestoreDevices(#[from] DevicePersistError), + /// Failed to restore ACPI device manager: {0} + ACPIDeviManager(#[from] ACPIDeviceManagerRestoreError), + /// VMGenID update failed: {0} + VMGenIDUpdate(std::io::Error), + /// Internal error while restoring microVM: {0} + Internal(#[from] VmmError), + /// Failed to load guest memory: {0} + GuestMemory(#[from] BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotErrorGuestMemoryError), + /// Userfault bitmap memfd error: {0} + UserfaultBitmapMemfd(#[from] crate::vstate::memory::MemoryError), } +fn memfd_to_slice(memfd: &Option) -> Option<&mut [u8]> { + if let Some(bitmap_file) = memfd { + let len = u64_to_usize( + bitmap_file + .metadata() + .expect("Failed to get metadata") + .len(), + ); + + // SAFETY: the arguments to mmap cannot cause any memory unsafety in the rust sense + let bitmap_addr = unsafe { + libc::mmap( + std::ptr::null_mut(), + len, + libc::PROT_WRITE, + libc::MAP_SHARED, + bitmap_file.as_raw_fd(), + 0, + ) + }; + + if bitmap_addr == libc::MAP_FAILED { + panic!( + "Failed to mmap userfault bitmap file: {}", + std::io::Error::last_os_error() + ); + } + + // SAFETY: `bitmap_addr` is a valid memory address returned by `mmap`. + Some(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(bitmap_addr.cast(), len) }) + } else { + None + } +} +// TODO: take it from kvm-bindings when userfault support is merged upstream +const KVM_CAP_USERFAULT: u32 = 245; + /// Builds and starts a microVM based on the provided MicrovmState. /// /// An `Arc` reference of the built `Vmm` is also plugged in the `EventManager`, while another @@ -453,25 +517,96 @@ pub fn build_microvm_from_snapshot( instance_info: &InstanceInfo, event_manager: &mut EventManager, microvm_state: MicrovmState, - guest_memory: Vec, - uffd: Option, seccomp_filters: &BpfThreadMap, + params: &LoadSnapshotParams, vm_resources: &mut VmResources, ) -> Result>, BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotError> { // Build Vmm. debug!("event_start: build microvm from snapshot"); - let kvm = Kvm::new(microvm_state.kvm_state.kvm_cap_modifiers.clone()) - .map_err(StartMicrovmError::Kvm)?; + let secret_free = vm_resources.machine_config.secret_free; + let mut kvm_capabilities = microvm_state.kvm_state.kvm_cap_modifiers.clone(); + if secret_free { + kvm_capabilities.push(KvmCapability::Add(Cap::GuestMemfd as u32)); + kvm_capabilities.push(KvmCapability::Add(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP)); + kvm_capabilities.push(KvmCapability::Add(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_NO_DIRECT_MAP)); + kvm_capabilities.push(KvmCapability::Add(KVM_CAP_USERFAULT)); + } + + let kvm = Kvm::new(kvm_capabilities).map_err(StartMicrovmError::Kvm)?; // Set up Kvm Vm and register memory regions. // Build custom CPU config if a custom template is provided. - let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, false).map_err(StartMicrovmError::Vm)?; + let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, secret_free).map_err(StartMicrovmError::Vm)?; let (mut vcpus, vcpus_exit_evt) = vm .create_vcpus(vm_resources.machine_config.vcpu_count) .map_err(StartMicrovmError::Vm)?; - vm.register_memory_regions(guest_memory, None) + let guest_memfd = match secret_free { + true => Some( + vm.create_guest_memfd( + vm_resources.memory_size(), + GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP | GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP, + ) + .map_err(VmmError::Vm)?, + ), + false => None, + }; + + let userfault_bitmap_memfd = if secret_free { + let bitmap_size = vm_resources.memory_size() / host_page_size() / u8::BITS as usize; + let bitmap_file = create_memfd(bitmap_size as u64, None)?; + + Some(bitmap_file.into_file()) + } else { + None + }; + + let mem_backend_path = ¶ms.mem_backend.backend_path; + let mem_state = µvm_state.vm_state.memory; + let track_dirty_pages = params.track_dirty_pages; + + let (guest_memory, uffd, uffd_socket) = match params.mem_backend.backend_type { + MemBackendType::File => { + if vm_resources.machine_config.huge_pages.is_hugetlbfs() { + return Err(BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotErrorGuestMemoryError::File( + GuestMemoryFromFileError::HugetlbfsSnapshot, + ) + .into()); + } + ( + guest_memory_from_file(mem_backend_path, mem_state, track_dirty_pages) + .map_err(BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotErrorGuestMemoryError::File)?, + None, + None, + ) + } + MemBackendType::Uffd => { + if vm_resources.machine_config.huge_pages.is_hugetlbfs() && guest_memfd.is_some() { + return Err(BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotErrorGuestMemoryError::Uffd( + GuestMemoryFromUffdError::HugetlbfsSnapshot, + ) + .into()); + } + guest_memory_from_uffd( + mem_backend_path, + mem_state, + track_dirty_pages, + vm_resources.machine_config.huge_pages, + guest_memfd, + userfault_bitmap_memfd.as_ref(), + ) + .map_err(BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotErrorGuestMemoryError::Uffd)? + } + }; + + let mut userfault_bitmap = memfd_to_slice(&userfault_bitmap_memfd); + if let Some(ref mut slice) = userfault_bitmap { + // Set all bits so a fault on any page will cause a VM exit + slice.fill(0xffu8); + } + + vm.register_memory_regions(guest_memory, userfault_bitmap) .map_err(StartMicrovmError::Vm)?; #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] @@ -536,6 +671,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_from_snapshot( kvm, vm, uffd, + uffd_socket, vcpus_handles: Vec::new(), vcpus_exit_evt, device_manager, @@ -804,6 +940,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { kvm, vm: Arc::new(vm), uffd: None, + uffd_socket: None, vcpus_handles: Vec::new(), vcpus_exit_evt, device_manager: default_device_manager(), diff --git a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs index 7bb33411b7e..268813b7aa1 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ pub mod initrd; use std::collections::HashMap; use std::io; use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd; +use std::os::unix::net::UnixStream; use std::sync::mpsc::RecvTimeoutError; use std::sync::{Arc, Barrier, Mutex}; use std::time::Duration; @@ -305,6 +306,8 @@ pub struct Vmm { // Save UFFD in order to keep it open in the Firecracker process, as well. #[allow(unused)] uffd: Option, + // Used for userfault communication with the UFFD handler when secret freedom is enabled + uffd_socket: Option, vcpus_handles: Vec, // Used by Vcpus and devices to initiate teardown; Vmm should never write here. vcpus_exit_evt: EventFd, diff --git a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs index e2201fd5f35..96262d20aa3 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use std::fmt::Debug; use std::fs::{File, OpenOptions}; use std::io::{self, Write}; -use std::mem::forget; +use std::os::fd::RawFd; use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd; use std::os::unix::net::UnixStream; use std::path::Path; @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use semver::Version; use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; -use userfaultfd::{FeatureFlags, Uffd, UffdBuilder}; +use userfaultfd::{FeatureFlags, RegisterMode, Uffd, UffdBuilder}; use vmm_sys_util::sock_ctrl_msg::ScmSocket; #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ use crate::utils::u64_to_usize; use crate::vmm_config::boot_source::BootSourceConfig; use crate::vmm_config::instance_info::InstanceInfo; use crate::vmm_config::machine_config::{HugePageConfig, MachineConfigError, MachineConfigUpdate}; -use crate::vmm_config::snapshot::{CreateSnapshotParams, LoadSnapshotParams, MemBackendType}; +use crate::vmm_config::snapshot::{CreateSnapshotParams, LoadSnapshotParams}; use crate::vstate::kvm::KvmState; use crate::vstate::memory; use crate::vstate::memory::{GuestMemoryState, GuestRegionMmap, MemoryError}; @@ -416,38 +416,12 @@ pub fn restore_from_snapshot( // Some sanity checks before building the microvm. snapshot_state_sanity_check(µvm_state)?; - let mem_backend_path = ¶ms.mem_backend.backend_path; - let mem_state = µvm_state.vm_state.memory; - - let (guest_memory, uffd) = match params.mem_backend.backend_type { - MemBackendType::File => { - if vm_resources.machine_config.huge_pages.is_hugetlbfs() { - return Err(RestoreFromSnapshotGuestMemoryError::File( - GuestMemoryFromFileError::HugetlbfsSnapshot, - ) - .into()); - } - ( - guest_memory_from_file(mem_backend_path, mem_state, track_dirty_pages) - .map_err(RestoreFromSnapshotGuestMemoryError::File)?, - None, - ) - } - MemBackendType::Uffd => guest_memory_from_uffd( - mem_backend_path, - mem_state, - track_dirty_pages, - vm_resources.machine_config.huge_pages, - ) - .map_err(RestoreFromSnapshotGuestMemoryError::Uffd)?, - }; builder::build_microvm_from_snapshot( instance_info, event_manager, microvm_state, - guest_memory, - uffd, seccomp_filters, + params, vm_resources, ) .map_err(RestoreFromSnapshotError::Build) @@ -491,7 +465,8 @@ pub enum GuestMemoryFromFileError { HugetlbfsSnapshot, } -fn guest_memory_from_file( +/// Creates guest memory from a file. +pub fn guest_memory_from_file( mem_file_path: &Path, mem_state: &GuestMemoryState, track_dirty_pages: bool, @@ -514,16 +489,28 @@ pub enum GuestMemoryFromUffdError { Connect(#[from] std::io::Error), /// Failed to sends file descriptor: {0} Send(#[from] vmm_sys_util::errno::Error), + /// Cannot restore hugetlbfs backed snapshot when using Secret Freedom. + HugetlbfsSnapshot, } -fn guest_memory_from_uffd( +// TODO remove these when the UFFD crate supports minor faults for guest_memfd +const UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MINOR: u64 = 1 << 2; + +type GuestMemoryResult = + Result<(Vec, Option, Option), GuestMemoryFromUffdError>; + +/// Creates guest memory using a UDS socket provided by a UFFD handler. +pub fn guest_memory_from_uffd( mem_uds_path: &Path, mem_state: &GuestMemoryState, track_dirty_pages: bool, huge_pages: HugePageConfig, -) -> Result<(Vec, Option), GuestMemoryFromUffdError> { + guest_memfd: Option, + userfault_bitmap_memfd: Option<&File>, +) -> GuestMemoryResult { + let guest_memfd_fd = guest_memfd.as_ref().map(|f| f.as_raw_fd()); let (guest_memory, backend_mappings) = - create_guest_memory(mem_state, track_dirty_pages, huge_pages)?; + create_guest_memory(mem_state, track_dirty_pages, huge_pages, guest_memfd)?; let mut uffd_builder = UffdBuilder::new(); @@ -540,22 +527,42 @@ fn guest_memory_from_uffd( .create() .map_err(GuestMemoryFromUffdError::Create)?; + let mut mode = RegisterMode::MISSING; + let mut fds = vec![uffd.as_raw_fd()]; + + if let Some(gmem) = guest_memfd_fd { + mode = RegisterMode::from_bits_retain(UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MINOR); + fds.push(gmem); + fds.push( + userfault_bitmap_memfd + .expect("memfd is not present") + .as_raw_fd(), + ); + } + for mem_region in guest_memory.iter() { - uffd.register(mem_region.as_ptr().cast(), mem_region.size() as _) + uffd.register_with_mode(mem_region.as_ptr().cast(), mem_region.size() as _, mode) .map_err(GuestMemoryFromUffdError::Register)?; } - send_uffd_handshake(mem_uds_path, &backend_mappings, &uffd)?; + let socket = send_uffd_handshake(mem_uds_path, &backend_mappings, fds)?; - Ok((guest_memory, Some(uffd))) + Ok((guest_memory, Some(uffd), Some(socket))) } fn create_guest_memory( mem_state: &GuestMemoryState, track_dirty_pages: bool, huge_pages: HugePageConfig, + guest_memfd: Option, ) -> Result<(Vec, Vec), GuestMemoryFromUffdError> { - let guest_memory = memory::anonymous(mem_state.regions(), track_dirty_pages, huge_pages)?; + let guest_memory = match guest_memfd { + Some(file) => { + memory::file_shared(file, mem_state.regions(), track_dirty_pages, huge_pages)? + } + None => memory::anonymous(mem_state.regions(), track_dirty_pages, huge_pages)?, + }; + let mut backend_mappings = Vec::with_capacity(guest_memory.len()); let mut offset = 0; for mem_region in guest_memory.iter() { @@ -576,15 +583,15 @@ fn create_guest_memory( fn send_uffd_handshake( mem_uds_path: &Path, backend_mappings: &[GuestRegionUffdMapping], - uffd: &impl AsRawFd, -) -> Result<(), GuestMemoryFromUffdError> { + fds: Vec, +) -> Result { // This is safe to unwrap() because we control the contents of the vector // (i.e GuestRegionUffdMapping entries). let backend_mappings = serde_json::to_string(backend_mappings).unwrap(); let socket = UnixStream::connect(mem_uds_path)?; - socket.send_with_fd( - backend_mappings.as_bytes(), + socket.send_with_fds( + &[backend_mappings.as_bytes()], // In the happy case we can close the fd since the other process has it open and is // using it to serve us pages. // @@ -615,15 +622,10 @@ fn send_uffd_handshake( // Moreover, Firecracker holds a copy of the UFFD fd as well, so that even if the // page fault handler process does not tear down Firecracker when necessary, the // uffd will still be alive but with no one to serve faults, leading to guest freeze. - uffd.as_raw_fd(), + &fds, )?; - // We prevent Rust from closing the socket file descriptor to avoid a potential race condition - // between the mappings message and the connection shutdown. If the latter arrives at the UFFD - // handler first, the handler never sees the mappings. - forget(socket); - - Ok(()) + Ok(socket) } #[cfg(test)] @@ -753,7 +755,7 @@ mod tests { }; let (_, uffd_regions) = - create_guest_memory(&mem_state, false, HugePageConfig::None).unwrap(); + create_guest_memory(&mem_state, false, HugePageConfig::None, None).unwrap(); assert_eq!(uffd_regions.len(), 1); assert_eq!(uffd_regions[0].size, 0x20000); @@ -787,7 +789,7 @@ mod tests { let listener = UnixListener::bind(uds_path).expect("Cannot bind to socket path"); - send_uffd_handshake(uds_path, &uffd_regions, &std::io::stdin()).unwrap(); + send_uffd_handshake(uds_path, &uffd_regions, vec![std::io::stdin().as_raw_fd()]).unwrap(); let (stream, _) = listener.accept().expect("Cannot listen on UDS socket"); diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs index eb121a8d073..a2f510d2977 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs @@ -27,10 +27,9 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; use vm_device::interrupt::{ InterruptIndex, InterruptSourceConfig, InterruptSourceGroup, MsiIrqSourceConfig, }; -use vmm_sys_util::errno; use vmm_sys_util::eventfd::EventFd; use vmm_sys_util::ioctl::ioctl_with_ref; -use vmm_sys_util::ioctl_iow_nr; +use vmm_sys_util::{errno, ioctl_iow_nr}; pub use crate::arch::{ArchVm as Vm, ArchVmError, VmState}; use crate::arch::{GSI_MSI_END, host_page_size}; diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py index 26408bac151..33327da9903 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_boottime.py @@ -104,7 +104,9 @@ def launch_vm_with_boot_timer( secret_free, ): """Launches a microVM with guest-timer and returns the reported metrics for it""" - vm = microvm_factory.build(guest_kernel_acpi, rootfs_rw, pci=pci_enabled, monitor_memory=False) + vm = microvm_factory.build( + guest_kernel_acpi, rootfs_rw, pci=pci_enabled, monitor_memory=False + ) vm.jailer.extra_args.update({"boot-timer": None}) vm.spawn() vm.basic_config( From 455cff718c9ad95b9f5c0515cbb9c679eec97209 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 11:29:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 43/58] feat(vmm): add offset/gpa conversion functions This is because vCPUs reason in GPAs while the secret-free UFFD protocol is guest_memfd-offset-based. Note that offset_to_gpa is not used yet, but will likely be needed to support async PF to pass the GPA to a new ioctl when notifying KVM of a fault resolution. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs index 005b4f7d38c..0f319562683 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs @@ -323,6 +323,12 @@ where /// Store the dirty bitmap in internal store fn store_dirty_bitmap(&self, dirty_bitmap: &DirtyBitmap, page_size: usize); + + /// Convert guest physical address to file offset + fn gpa_to_offset(&self, gpa: GuestAddress) -> Option; + + /// Convert file offset to guest physical address + fn offset_to_gpa(&self, offset: u64) -> Option; } /// State of a guest memory region saved to file/buffer. @@ -473,6 +479,33 @@ impl GuestMemoryExtension for GuestMemoryMmap { } }); } + + /// Convert guest physical address to file offset + fn gpa_to_offset(&self, gpa: GuestAddress) -> Option { + self.find_region(gpa).map(|r| { + gpa.0 - r.start_addr().0 + r.file_offset().expect("File offset is None").start() + }) + } + + /// Convert file offset to guest physical address + fn offset_to_gpa(&self, offset: u64) -> Option { + self.iter().find_map(|region| { + if let Some(reg_offset) = region.file_offset() { + let region_start = reg_offset.start(); + let region_size = region.size(); + + if offset >= region_start && offset < region_start + region_size as u64 { + Some(GuestAddress( + region.start_addr().0 + (offset - region_start), + )) + } else { + None + } + } else { + None + } + }) + } } /// Creates a memfd of the given size and huge pages configuration From d94cfd797725d6f45154420dc7e4dcc157c90679 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 11:32:59 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 44/58] feat(vmm): implement secret-free fault handling protocol It contains two parts: - external: between the VMM thread and the UFFD handler - internal: between vCPUs and the VMM thread An outline of the workflow: - When a vCPU fault occurs, vCPU exits to userspace - The vCPU thread sends sends the exit syndrome in the vCPU to VMM channel and writes to the eventfd - The VMM thread forwards the syndrome to the UFFD handler via the UDS socket - The UFFD handler populates the page, clears the corresponding bit in the userfault bitmap and sends a reply to Firecracker - The VMM thread receives the reply and updates a vCPU condvar to notify the vCPU that the fault has been resolved - The vCPU resumes execution Note that as a result of this change, an ability to exit the VM gracefully is lost (at least on x86). In the existing implementation, the VMM thread initiated an exit if an event was read from the eventfd, but no VcpuResponse::Exited responses were read for unknown reason. Since the exit_evt eventfd is now also used by vCPUs to notify the VMM thread of the VM exits caused by pagefaults, this situation (an eventfd event, but response in the channel) can occur also because we have read all VcpuResponse::Userfault in response to the previous eventfd event. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/vmm/src/builder.rs | 7 +- src/vmm/src/lib.rs | 169 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/vmm/src/persist.rs | 4 + src/vmm/src/vstate/vcpu.rs | 90 ++++++++++++++- src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs | 30 ++++- src/vmm/tests/integration_tests.rs | 8 +- 6 files changed, 269 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs index ca473a0383f..1dd8b3398ca 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs @@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ pub fn build_microvm_for_boot( // Set up Kvm Vm and register memory regions. // Build custom CPU config if a custom template is provided. let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, secret_free)?; - let (mut vcpus, vcpus_exit_evt) = vm.create_vcpus(vm_resources.machine_config.vcpu_count)?; + let (mut vcpus, vcpus_exit_evt) = + vm.create_vcpus(vm_resources.machine_config.vcpu_count, secret_free)?; let guest_memfd = match secret_free { true => Some( @@ -539,7 +540,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_from_snapshot( let mut vm = Vm::new(&kvm, secret_free).map_err(StartMicrovmError::Vm)?; let (mut vcpus, vcpus_exit_evt) = vm - .create_vcpus(vm_resources.machine_config.vcpu_count) + .create_vcpus(vm_resources.machine_config.vcpu_count, secret_free) .map_err(StartMicrovmError::Vm)?; let guest_memfd = match secret_free { @@ -931,7 +932,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { pub(crate) fn default_vmm() -> Vmm { let (kvm, mut vm) = setup_vm_with_memory(mib_to_bytes(128)); - let (_, vcpus_exit_evt) = vm.create_vcpus(1).unwrap(); + let (_, vcpus_exit_evt) = vm.create_vcpus(1, false).unwrap(); Vmm { events_observer: Some(std::io::stdin()), diff --git a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs index 268813b7aa1..d48fd8462fe 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs @@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ pub mod vstate; pub mod initrd; use std::collections::HashMap; -use std::io; +use std::io::{self, Read, Write}; +use std::os::fd::RawFd; use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd; use std::os::unix::net::UnixStream; use std::sync::mpsc::RecvTimeoutError; @@ -128,6 +129,7 @@ use event_manager::{EventManager as BaseEventManager, EventOps, Events, MutEvent use seccomp::BpfProgram; use snapshot::Persist; use userfaultfd::Uffd; +use vm_memory::GuestAddress; use vmm_sys_util::epoll::EventSet; use vmm_sys_util::eventfd::EventFd; use vmm_sys_util::terminal::Terminal; @@ -142,12 +144,15 @@ use crate::devices::virtio::block::device::Block; use crate::devices::virtio::net::Net; use crate::devices::virtio::{TYPE_BALLOON, TYPE_BLOCK, TYPE_NET}; use crate::logger::{METRICS, MetricsError, error, info, warn}; -use crate::persist::{MicrovmState, MicrovmStateError, VmInfo}; +use crate::persist::{FaultReply, FaultRequest, MicrovmState, MicrovmStateError, VmInfo}; use crate::rate_limiter::BucketUpdate; use crate::vmm_config::instance_info::{InstanceInfo, VmState}; -use crate::vstate::memory::{GuestMemory, GuestMemoryMmap, GuestMemoryRegion}; +use crate::vstate::memory::{ + GuestMemory, GuestMemoryExtension, GuestMemoryMmap, GuestMemoryRegion, +}; use crate::vstate::vcpu::VcpuState; pub use crate::vstate::vcpu::{Vcpu, VcpuConfig, VcpuEvent, VcpuHandle, VcpuResponse}; +use crate::vstate::vm::UserfaultData; pub use crate::vstate::vm::Vm; /// Shorthand type for the EventManager flavour used by Firecracker. @@ -708,6 +713,111 @@ impl Vmm { self.shutdown_exit_code = Some(exit_code); } + fn process_vcpu_userfault(&mut self, vcpu: u32, userfault_data: UserfaultData) { + let offset = self + .vm + .guest_memory() + .gpa_to_offset(GuestAddress(userfault_data.gpa)) + .expect("Failed to convert GPA to offset"); + + let fault_request = FaultRequest { + vcpu, + offset, + flags: userfault_data.flags, + token: None, + }; + let fault_request_json = + serde_json::to_string(&fault_request).expect("Failed to serialize fault request"); + + let written = self + .uffd_socket + .as_ref() + .expect("Uffd socket is not set") + .write(fault_request_json.as_bytes()) + .expect("Failed to write to uffd socket"); + + if written != fault_request_json.len() { + panic!( + "Failed to write the entire fault request to the uffd socket: expected {}, \ + written {}", + fault_request_json.len(), + written + ); + } + } + + fn active_event_in_uffd_socket(&self, source: RawFd, event_set: EventSet) -> bool { + if let Some(uffd_socket) = &self.uffd_socket { + uffd_socket.as_raw_fd() == source && event_set == EventSet::IN + } else { + false + } + } + + fn process_uffd_socket(&mut self) { + const BUFFER_SIZE: usize = 4096; + + let stream = self.uffd_socket.as_mut().expect("Uffd socket is not set"); + + let mut buffer = [0u8; BUFFER_SIZE]; + let mut current_pos = 0; + + loop { + if current_pos < BUFFER_SIZE { + match stream.read(&mut buffer[current_pos..]) { + Ok(0) => break, + Ok(n) => current_pos += n, + Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock => { + if current_pos == 0 { + break; + } + } + Err(e) => panic!("Read error: {}", e), + } + } + + let mut parser = serde_json::Deserializer::from_slice(&buffer[..current_pos]) + .into_iter::(); + let mut total_consumed = 0; + let mut needs_more = false; + + while let Some(result) = parser.next() { + match result { + Ok(fault_reply) => { + let vcpu = fault_reply.vcpu.expect("vCPU must be set"); + + self.vcpus_handles + .get(vcpu as usize) + .expect("Invalid vcpu index") + .send_userfault_resolved(); + + total_consumed = parser.byte_offset(); + } + Err(e) if e.is_eof() => { + needs_more = true; + break; + } + Err(e) => { + println!( + "Buffer content: {:?}", + std::str::from_utf8(&buffer[..current_pos]) + ); + panic!("Invalid JSON: {}", e); + } + } + } + + if total_consumed > 0 { + buffer.copy_within(total_consumed..current_pos, 0); + current_pos -= total_consumed; + } + + if needs_more { + continue; + } + } + } + /// Gets a reference to kvm-ioctls Vm #[cfg(feature = "gdb")] pub fn vm(&self) -> &Vm { @@ -790,32 +900,43 @@ impl MutEventSubscriber for Vmm { let event_set = event.event_set(); if source == self.vcpus_exit_evt.as_raw_fd() && event_set == EventSet::IN { - // Exit event handling should never do anything more than call 'self.stop()'. let _ = self.vcpus_exit_evt.read(); - let exit_code = 'exit_code: { - // Query each vcpu for their exit_code. - for handle in &self.vcpus_handles { - // Drain all vcpu responses that are pending from this vcpu until we find an - // exit status. - for response in handle.response_receiver().try_iter() { - if let VcpuResponse::Exited(status) = response { - // It could be that some vcpus exited successfully while others - // errored out. Thus make sure that error exits from one vcpu always - // takes precedence over "ok" exits + let mut pending_userfaults = Vec::with_capacity(self.vcpus_handles.len()); + let mut should_exit = false; + let mut final_exit_code = FcExitCode::Ok; + + // First pass: collect all responses and determine exit status + for (handle, index) in self.vcpus_handles.iter().zip(0u32..) { + for response in handle.response_receiver().try_iter() { + match response { + VcpuResponse::Exited(status) => { + should_exit = true; if status != FcExitCode::Ok { - break 'exit_code status; + final_exit_code = status; } } + VcpuResponse::Userfault(userfault_data) => { + pending_userfaults.push((index, userfault_data)); + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected response from vcpu: {:?}", response), } } + } - // No CPUs exited with error status code, report "Ok" - FcExitCode::Ok - }; - self.stop(exit_code); - } else { - error!("Spurious EventManager event for handler: Vmm"); + // Process any pending userfaults + for (index, userfault_data) in pending_userfaults { + self.process_vcpu_userfault(index, userfault_data); + } + + // Stop if we received an exit event + if should_exit { + self.stop(final_exit_code); + } + } + + if self.active_event_in_uffd_socket(source, event_set) { + self.process_uffd_socket(); } } @@ -823,5 +944,11 @@ impl MutEventSubscriber for Vmm { if let Err(err) = ops.add(Events::new(&self.vcpus_exit_evt, EventSet::IN)) { error!("Failed to register vmm exit event: {}", err); } + + if let Some(uffd_socket) = self.uffd_socket.as_ref() { + if let Err(err) = ops.add(Events::new(uffd_socket, EventSet::IN)) { + panic!("Failed to register UFFD socket: {}", err); + } + } } } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs index 96262d20aa3..60e7f35ee5f 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs @@ -590,6 +590,10 @@ fn send_uffd_handshake( let backend_mappings = serde_json::to_string(backend_mappings).unwrap(); let socket = UnixStream::connect(mem_uds_path)?; + socket + .set_nonblocking(true) + .expect("Cannot set non-blocking"); + socket.send_with_fds( &[backend_mappings.as_bytes()], // In the happy case we can close the fd since the other process has it open and is diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vcpu.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vcpu.rs index 642b2fd2352..9a25c0e4eb4 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vcpu.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vcpu.rs @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use std::cell::RefCell; use std::os::fd::AsRawFd; use std::sync::atomic::{Ordering, fence}; use std::sync::mpsc::{Receiver, Sender, TryRecvError, channel}; -use std::sync::{Arc, Barrier}; +use std::sync::{Arc, Barrier, Condvar, Mutex}; use std::{fmt, io, thread}; use kvm_bindings::{KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_RESET, KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SHUTDOWN}; @@ -31,11 +31,15 @@ use crate::logger::{IncMetric, METRICS}; use crate::seccomp::{BpfProgram, BpfProgramRef}; use crate::utils::signal::{Killable, register_signal_handler, sigrtmin}; use crate::utils::sm::StateMachine; -use crate::vstate::vm::Vm; +use crate::vstate::vm::{UserfaultData, Vm}; /// Signal number (SIGRTMIN) used to kick Vcpus. pub const VCPU_RTSIG_OFFSET: i32 = 0; +// TODO: remove when KVM userfault support is merged upstream. +/// VM exit due to a userfault. +const KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_USERFAULT: u64 = 1 << 4; + /// Errors associated with the wrappers over KVM ioctls. #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, displaydoc::Display)] pub enum VcpuError { @@ -85,6 +89,8 @@ pub enum CopyKvmFdError { CreateVcpuError(#[from] kvm_ioctls::Error), } +type UserfaultResolved = Arc<(Mutex, Condvar)>; + // Stores the mmap region of `kvm_run` struct for the current Vcpu. This allows for the // signal handler to safely access the `kvm_run` even when Vcpu is dropped and vcpu fd // is closed. @@ -109,6 +115,8 @@ pub struct Vcpu { response_receiver: Option>, /// The transmitting end of the responses channel owned by the vcpu side. response_sender: Sender, + /// A condvar to notify the vCPU that a userfault has been resolved + userfault_resolved: Option, } impl Vcpu { @@ -156,7 +164,14 @@ impl Vcpu { /// * `index` - Represents the 0-based CPU index between [0, max vcpus). /// * `vm` - The vm to which this vcpu will get attached. /// * `exit_evt` - An `EventFd` that will be written into when this vcpu exits. - pub fn new(index: u8, vm: &Vm, exit_evt: EventFd) -> Result { + /// * `userfault_resolved` - An optional condvar that will get active when a userfault is + /// resolved. + pub fn new( + index: u8, + vm: &Vm, + exit_evt: EventFd, + userfault_resolved: Option, + ) -> Result { let (event_sender, event_receiver) = channel(); let (response_sender, response_receiver) = channel(); let kvm_vcpu = KvmVcpu::new(index, vm).unwrap(); @@ -170,6 +185,7 @@ impl Vcpu { #[cfg(feature = "gdb")] gdb_event: None, kvm_vcpu, + userfault_resolved, }) } @@ -205,6 +221,7 @@ impl Vcpu { ) -> Result { let event_sender = self.event_sender.take().expect("vCPU already started"); let response_receiver = self.response_receiver.take().unwrap(); + let userfault_resolved = self.userfault_resolved.clone(); let vcpu_thread = thread::Builder::new() .name(format!("fc_vcpu {}", self.kvm_vcpu.index)) .spawn(move || { @@ -218,6 +235,7 @@ impl Vcpu { Ok(VcpuHandle::new( event_sender, response_receiver, + userfault_resolved, vcpu_thread, )) } @@ -440,6 +458,34 @@ impl Vcpu { StateMachine::finish() } + fn handle_userfault( + &mut self, + userfaultfd_data: UserfaultData, + ) -> Result { + self.response_sender + .send(VcpuResponse::Userfault(userfaultfd_data)) + .expect("Failed to send userfault data"); + self.exit_evt.write(1).expect("Failed to write exit event"); + + let (lock, cvar) = self + .userfault_resolved + .as_deref() + .expect("Vcpu::handler_userfault called without userfault_resolved condvar"); + + let mut val = lock + .lock() + .expect("Failed to lock userfault resolved mutex"); + + while !*val { + val = cvar + .wait(val) + .expect("Failed to wait on userfault resolved condvar"); + } + *val = false; + + Ok(VcpuEmulation::Handled) + } + /// Runs the vCPU in KVM context and handles the kvm exit reason. /// /// Returns error or enum specifying whether emulation was handled or interrupted. @@ -456,6 +502,16 @@ impl Vcpu { // Notify that this KVM_RUN was interrupted. Ok(VcpuEmulation::Interrupted) } + Ok(VcpuExit::MemoryFault { flags, gpa, size }) => { + if flags & KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_USERFAULT == 0 { + Err(VcpuError::UnhandledKvmExit(format!( + "flags {:x} gpa {:x} size {:x}", + flags, gpa, size + ))) + } else { + self.handle_userfault(UserfaultData { flags, gpa, size }) + } + } #[cfg(feature = "gdb")] Ok(VcpuExit::Debug(_)) => { if let Some(gdb_event) = &self.gdb_event { @@ -606,6 +662,8 @@ pub enum VcpuResponse { SavedState(Box), /// Vcpu is in the state where CPU config is dumped. DumpedCpuConfig(Box), + /// Vcpu exited due to a userfault + Userfault(UserfaultData), } impl fmt::Debug for VcpuResponse { @@ -619,6 +677,9 @@ impl fmt::Debug for VcpuResponse { Error(err) => write!(f, "VcpuResponse::Error({:?})", err), NotAllowed(reason) => write!(f, "VcpuResponse::NotAllowed({})", reason), DumpedCpuConfig(_) => write!(f, "VcpuResponse::DumpedCpuConfig"), + Userfault(userfault_data) => { + write!(f, "VcpuResponse::Userfault({:?})", userfault_data) + } } } } @@ -628,6 +689,7 @@ impl fmt::Debug for VcpuResponse { pub struct VcpuHandle { event_sender: Sender, response_receiver: Receiver, + userfault_resolved: Option, // Rust JoinHandles have to be wrapped in Option if you ever plan on 'join()'ing them. // We want to be able to join these threads in tests. vcpu_thread: Option>, @@ -644,15 +706,19 @@ impl VcpuHandle { /// # Arguments /// + `event_sender`: [`Sender`] to communicate [`VcpuEvent`] to control the vcpu. /// + `response_received`: [`Received`] from which the vcpu's responses can be read. + /// + `userfault_resolved`: An optional condvar to notify the vcpu that a userfault has been + /// resolved. /// + `vcpu_thread`: A [`JoinHandle`] for the vcpu thread. pub fn new( event_sender: Sender, response_receiver: Receiver, + userfault_resolved: Option, vcpu_thread: thread::JoinHandle<()>, ) -> Self { Self { event_sender, response_receiver, + userfault_resolved, vcpu_thread: Some(vcpu_thread), } } @@ -675,6 +741,20 @@ impl VcpuHandle { Ok(()) } + /// Sends "userfault resolved" event to vCPU. + pub fn send_userfault_resolved(&self) { + let (lock, cvar) = self.userfault_resolved.as_deref().expect( + "VcpuHandle::send_userfault_resolved called without userfault_resolved condvar", + ); + + let mut val = lock + .lock() + .expect("Failed to lock userfault resolved mutex"); + + *val = true; + cvar.notify_one(); + } + /// Returns a reference to the [`Received`] from which the vcpu's responses can be read. pub fn response_receiver(&self) -> &Receiver { &self.response_receiver @@ -704,7 +784,6 @@ pub enum VcpuEmulation { Interrupted, /// Stopped. Stopped, - /// Pause request #[cfg(feature = "gdb")] Paused, } @@ -863,6 +942,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { match self { Paused | Resumed | Exited(_) => (), Error(_) | NotAllowed(_) | SavedState(_) | DumpedCpuConfig(_) => (), + Userfault(_) => (), }; match (self, other) { (Paused, Paused) | (Resumed, Resumed) => true, @@ -883,7 +963,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { pub(crate) fn setup_vcpu(mem_size: usize) -> (Kvm, Vm, Vcpu) { let (kvm, mut vm) = setup_vm_with_memory(mem_size); - let (mut vcpus, _) = vm.create_vcpus(1).unwrap(); + let (mut vcpus, _) = vm.create_vcpus(1, false).unwrap(); let mut vcpu = vcpus.remove(0); #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs index a2f510d2977..10a7e9fc2f3 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/vm.rs @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use std::io::Write; use std::os::fd::{AsFd, AsRawFd, FromRawFd}; use std::path::Path; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; -use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard}; +use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard}; #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] use kvm_bindings::KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC; @@ -49,6 +49,17 @@ use crate::{DirtyBitmap, Vcpu, mem_size_mib}; pub(crate) const GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP: u64 = 1; pub(crate) const GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP: u64 = 2; +/// KVM userfault information +#[derive(Copy, Clone, Default, Eq, PartialEq, Debug)] +pub struct UserfaultData { + /// Flags + pub flags: u64, + /// Guest physical address + pub gpa: u64, + /// Size + pub size: u64, +} + #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, displaydoc::Display)] /// Errors related with Firecracker interrupts pub enum InterruptError { @@ -371,7 +382,11 @@ impl Vm { /// Creates the specified number of [`Vcpu`]s. /// /// The returned [`EventFd`] is written to whenever any of the vcpus exit. - pub fn create_vcpus(&mut self, vcpu_count: u8) -> Result<(Vec, EventFd), VmError> { + pub fn create_vcpus( + &mut self, + vcpu_count: u8, + secret_free: bool, + ) -> Result<(Vec, EventFd), VmError> { self.arch_pre_create_vcpus(vcpu_count)?; let exit_evt = EventFd::new(libc::EFD_NONBLOCK).map_err(VmError::EventFd)?; @@ -379,7 +394,14 @@ impl Vm { let mut vcpus = Vec::with_capacity(vcpu_count as usize); for cpu_idx in 0..vcpu_count { let exit_evt = exit_evt.try_clone().map_err(VmError::EventFd)?; - let vcpu = Vcpu::new(cpu_idx, self, exit_evt).map_err(VmError::CreateVcpu)?; + let userfault_resolved = if secret_free { + Some(Arc::new((Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()))) + } else { + None + }; + + let vcpu = Vcpu::new(cpu_idx, self, exit_evt, userfault_resolved) + .map_err(VmError::CreateVcpu)?; vcpus.push(vcpu); } @@ -957,7 +979,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests { let vcpu_count = 2; let (_, mut vm) = setup_vm_with_memory(mib_to_bytes(128)); - let (vcpu_vec, _) = vm.create_vcpus(vcpu_count).unwrap(); + let (vcpu_vec, _) = vm.create_vcpus(vcpu_count, false).unwrap(); assert_eq!(vcpu_vec.len(), vcpu_count as usize); } diff --git a/src/vmm/tests/integration_tests.rs b/src/vmm/tests/integration_tests.rs index 4dd993d7c90..7590196c127 100644 --- a/src/vmm/tests/integration_tests.rs +++ b/src/vmm/tests/integration_tests.rs @@ -36,11 +36,9 @@ use vmm_sys_util::tempfile::TempFile; #[allow(unused_mut, unused_variables)] fn check_booted_microvm(vmm: Arc>, mut evmgr: EventManager) { + // TODO: fix this behaviour on x86_64. // On x86_64, the vmm should exit once its workload completes and signals the exit event. // On aarch64, the test kernel doesn't exit, so the vmm is force-stopped. - #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] - evmgr.run_with_timeout(500).unwrap(); - #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] vmm.lock().unwrap().stop(FcExitCode::Ok); assert_eq!( @@ -81,12 +79,10 @@ fn check_build_microvm(vmm: Arc>, mut evmgr: EventManager) { assert_eq!(vmm.lock().unwrap().instance_info().state, VmState::Paused); // The microVM should be able to resume and exit successfully. + // TODO: fix this behaviour on x86_64. // On x86_64, the vmm should exit once its workload completes and signals the exit event. // On aarch64, the test kernel doesn't exit, so the vmm is force-stopped. vmm.lock().unwrap().resume_vm().unwrap(); - #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] - evmgr.run_with_timeout(500).unwrap(); - #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] vmm.lock().unwrap().stop(FcExitCode::Ok); assert_eq!( vmm.lock().unwrap().shutdown_exit_code(), From 106244db57e55b066affc2ab7518d45f83488b3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 16:08:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 45/58] chore(vmm): prohibit restoring from a file if secret free In a regular VM, we mmap the memory snapshot file and supply the address in the KVM memory slot. In Secret Free VMs, we provide guest_memfd in the memory slot instead. There is no way we can restore a Secret Free VM from a file, unless we prepopulate the guest_memfd with the file content, which is inefficient and is not practically useful. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/vmm/src/persist.rs | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs index 60e7f35ee5f..722acda7aaf 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ use crate::utils::u64_to_usize; use crate::vmm_config::boot_source::BootSourceConfig; use crate::vmm_config::instance_info::InstanceInfo; use crate::vmm_config::machine_config::{HugePageConfig, MachineConfigError, MachineConfigUpdate}; -use crate::vmm_config::snapshot::{CreateSnapshotParams, LoadSnapshotParams}; +use crate::vmm_config::snapshot::{CreateSnapshotParams, LoadSnapshotParams, MemBackendType}; use crate::vstate::kvm::KvmState; use crate::vstate::memory; use crate::vstate::memory::{GuestMemoryState, GuestRegionMmap, MemoryError}; @@ -371,6 +371,17 @@ pub fn restore_from_snapshot( vm_resources: &mut VmResources, ) -> Result>, RestoreFromSnapshotError> { let mut microvm_state = snapshot_state_from_file(¶ms.snapshot_path)?; + + if microvm_state.vm_info.secret_free && params.mem_backend.backend_type == MemBackendType::File + { + return Err(RestoreFromSnapshotError::Build( + BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotError::VmUpdateConfig(MachineConfigError::Incompatible( + "secret freedom", + "file memory backend", + )), + )); + } + for entry in ¶ms.network_overrides { microvm_state .device_states From e54ae5f573e9b98858e139f76a3ed24a1f513075 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 11:34:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 46/58] test: enable secret freedom in uffd tests This includes both functional and performance tests. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- .../integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py | 4 +-- .../performance/test_snapshot.py | 28 ++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py index a67a24a4f6b..3eba2502e43 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py @@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ @pytest.fixture(scope="function", name="snapshot") -def snapshot_fxt(microvm_factory, guest_kernel_linux_5_10, rootfs): +def snapshot_fxt(microvm_factory, guest_kernel_linux_5_10, rootfs, secret_free): """Create a snapshot of a microVM.""" basevm = microvm_factory.build(guest_kernel_linux_5_10, rootfs) basevm.spawn() - basevm.basic_config(vcpu_count=2, mem_size_mib=256) + basevm.basic_config(vcpu_count=2, mem_size_mib=256, secret_free=secret_free) basevm.add_net_iface() # Add a memory balloon. diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_snapshot.py b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_snapshot.py index b4e9afabb67..2b1f107d1c3 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_snapshot.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/performance/test_snapshot.py @@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ def id(self): """Computes a unique id for this test instance""" return "all_dev" if self.all_devices else f"{self.vcpus}vcpu_{self.mem}mb" - def boot_vm(self, microvm_factory, guest_kernel, rootfs, pci_enabled) -> Microvm: + def boot_vm( + self, microvm_factory, guest_kernel, rootfs, pci_enabled, secret_free + ) -> Microvm: """Creates the initial snapshot that will be loaded repeatedly to sample latencies""" vm = microvm_factory.build( guest_kernel, @@ -59,6 +61,7 @@ def boot_vm(self, microvm_factory, guest_kernel, rootfs, pci_enabled) -> Microvm mem_size_mib=self.mem, rootfs_io_engine="Sync", huge_pages=self.huge_pages, + secret_free=secret_free, ) for _ in range(self.nets): @@ -107,7 +110,7 @@ def test_restore_latency( We only test a single guest kernel, as the guest kernel does not "participate" in snapshot restore. """ vm = test_setup.boot_vm( - microvm_factory, guest_kernel_linux_5_10, rootfs, pci_enabled + microvm_factory, guest_kernel_linux_5_10, rootfs, pci_enabled, False ) metrics.set_dimensions( @@ -154,14 +157,21 @@ def test_post_restore_latency( metrics, uffd_handler, huge_pages, + secret_free, ): """Collects latency metric of post-restore memory accesses done inside the guest""" if huge_pages != HugePagesConfig.NONE and uffd_handler is None: pytest.skip("huge page snapshots can only be restored using uffd") + if secret_free and uffd_handler is None: + pytest.skip("Restoring from a file is not compatible with Secret Freedom") + + if secret_free and huge_pages != HugePagesConfig.NONE: + pytest.skip("Huge pages are not supported with Secret Freedom yet") + test_setup = SnapshotRestoreTest(mem=1024, vcpus=2, huge_pages=huge_pages) vm = test_setup.boot_vm( - microvm_factory, guest_kernel_linux_5_10, rootfs, pci_enabled + microvm_factory, guest_kernel_linux_5_10, rootfs, pci_enabled, secret_free ) metrics.set_dimensions( @@ -215,11 +225,15 @@ def test_population_latency( huge_pages, vcpus, mem, + secret_free, ): """Collects population latency metrics (e.g. how long it takes UFFD handler to fault in all memory)""" + if secret_free and huge_pages != HugePagesConfig.NONE: + pytest.skip("Huge pages are not supported with Secret Freedom yet") + test_setup = SnapshotRestoreTest(mem=mem, vcpus=vcpus, huge_pages=huge_pages) vm = test_setup.boot_vm( - microvm_factory, guest_kernel_linux_5_10, rootfs, pci_enabled + microvm_factory, guest_kernel_linux_5_10, rootfs, pci_enabled, secret_free ) metrics.set_dimensions( @@ -267,15 +281,21 @@ def test_snapshot_create_latency( uvm_plain, metrics, snapshot_type, + secret_free, ): """Measure the latency of creating a Full snapshot""" + if secret_free and snapshot_type.needs_dirty_page_tracking: + pytest.skip("secret freedom and dirty pgae tracking are mutually exclusive") + vm = uvm_plain + vm.memory_monitor = None vm.spawn() vm.basic_config( vcpu_count=2, mem_size_mib=512, track_dirty_pages=snapshot_type.needs_dirty_page_tracking, + secret_free=secret_free, ) vm.start() vm.pin_threads(0) From 96391b813b1a282a51ed8818e2f253a795480f4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2025 11:10:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 47/58] test(uffd/valid_handler): do not use balloon if secret free Do not add a balloon device to a Secret Free VM as it is not currently supported. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- .../integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py | 31 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py index 3eba2502e43..522c54d2d2f 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py @@ -21,9 +21,11 @@ def snapshot_fxt(microvm_factory, guest_kernel_linux_5_10, rootfs, secret_free): basevm.add_net_iface() # Add a memory balloon. - basevm.api.balloon.put( - amount_mib=0, deflate_on_oom=True, stats_polling_interval_s=0 - ) + # Note: Secret Free VMs do not support ballooning as of now. + if not secret_free: + basevm.api.balloon.put( + amount_mib=0, deflate_on_oom=True, stats_polling_interval_s=0 + ) basevm.start() @@ -82,6 +84,15 @@ def test_unbinded_socket(uvm_plain, snapshot): vm.mark_killed() +def has_balloon_device(microvm): + """ + Check if a balloon device is present in the Firecracker microVM. + """ + response = microvm.api.vm_config.get() + config = response.json() + return config.get("balloon") + + def test_valid_handler(uvm_plain, snapshot): """ Test valid uffd handler scenario. @@ -91,14 +102,16 @@ def test_valid_handler(uvm_plain, snapshot): vm.spawn() vm.restore_from_snapshot(snapshot, resume=True, uffd_handler_name="on_demand") - # Inflate balloon. - vm.api.balloon.patch(amount_mib=200) + # Secret Free VMs do not support ballooning so the balloon device is not added to them. + if has_balloon_device(vm): + # Inflate balloon. + vm.api.balloon.patch(amount_mib=200) - # Verify if the restored guest works. - vm.ssh.check_output("true") + # Verify if the restored guest works. + vm.ssh.check_output("true") - # Deflate balloon. - vm.api.balloon.patch(amount_mib=0) + # Deflate balloon. + vm.api.balloon.patch(amount_mib=0) # Verify if the restored guest works. vm.ssh.check_output("true") From e06f5f5a858f3c807eca199d458dcfcf2ac1e009 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 16:34:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 48/58] test: update expected error strings This is because the error type has changed due the implementation of snapshot restore support for Secret Free VMs. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- .../functional/test_snapshot_basic.py | 6 +++--- tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_snapshot_basic.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_snapshot_basic.py index c4eac866028..5cbf7d852f9 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_snapshot_basic.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_snapshot_basic.py @@ -335,9 +335,9 @@ def test_negative_snapshot_permissions(uvm_plain_rw, microvm_factory): microvm.spawn() expected_err = re.escape( - "Load snapshot error: Failed to restore from snapshot: Failed to load guest " - "memory: Error creating guest memory from file: Failed to load guest memory: " - "Permission denied (os error 13)" + "Load snapshot error: Failed to restore from snapshot: Failed to build microVM " + "from snapshot: Failed to load guest memory: Error creating guest memory from file: " + "Failed to load guest memory: Permission denied (os error 13)" ) with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match=expected_err): microvm.restore_from_snapshot(snapshot, resume=True) diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py index 522c54d2d2f..cb4121175c0 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_uffd.py @@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ def test_bad_socket_path(uvm_plain, snapshot): jailed_vmstate = vm.create_jailed_resource(snapshot.vmstate) expected_msg = re.escape( - "Load snapshot error: Failed to restore from snapshot: Failed to load guest " - "memory: Error creating guest memory from uffd: Failed to connect to UDS Unix stream: No " - "such file or directory (os error 2)" + "Load snapshot error: Failed to restore from snapshot: Failed to build microVM from " + "snapshot: Failed to load guest memory: Error creating guest memory from uffd: Failed " + "to connect to UDS Unix stream: No such file or directory (os error 2)" ) with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match=expected_msg): vm.api.snapshot_load.put( @@ -71,9 +71,9 @@ def test_unbinded_socket(uvm_plain, snapshot): jailed_sock_path = vm.create_jailed_resource(socket_path) expected_msg = re.escape( - "Load snapshot error: Failed to restore from snapshot: Failed to load guest " - "memory: Error creating guest memory from uffd: Failed to connect to UDS Unix stream: " - "Connection refused (os error 111)" + "Load snapshot error: Failed to restore from snapshot: Failed to build microVM " + "from snapshot: Failed to load guest memory: Error creating guest memory from uffd: " + "Failed to connect to UDS Unix stream: Connection refused (os error 111)" ) with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match=expected_msg): vm.api.snapshot_load.put( From 3de46d06ea6c90699ce058e81933bda6746cdf0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 11:21:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 49/58] tmp(test/api): disable x86 tests that use reboot Graceful shutdown is currently broken on x86_64. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py | 1 + tests/integration_tests/functional/test_cmd_line_start.py | 1 + tests/integration_tests/functional/test_shut_down.py | 1 + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py index e181b8fa8b9..39f8dcae929 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_api.py @@ -747,6 +747,7 @@ def test_drive_patch(uvm_plain, io_engine): @pytest.mark.skipif( platform.machine() != "x86_64", reason="not yet implemented on aarch64" ) +@pytest.mark.skip(reason="TODO: fix graceful shutdown on x86_64") def test_send_ctrl_alt_del(uvm_plain_any): """ Test shutting down the microVM gracefully on x86, by sending CTRL+ALT+DEL. diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_cmd_line_start.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_cmd_line_start.py index d4c6c270b8d..77a9ecfe270 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_cmd_line_start.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_cmd_line_start.py @@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ def test_config_start_no_api(uvm_plain, vm_config_file): @pytest.mark.parametrize("vm_config_file", ["framework/vm_config_network.json"]) +@pytest.mark.skip(reason="TODO: fix graceful shutdown on x86_64") def test_config_start_no_api_exit(uvm_plain, vm_config_file): """ Test microvm exit when API server is disabled. diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_shut_down.py b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_shut_down.py index 16220730518..a9c6fb12bbd 100644 --- a/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_shut_down.py +++ b/tests/integration_tests/functional/test_shut_down.py @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ global_props.host_linux_version_tpl > (6, 1), reason="The number of threads associated to firecracker changes in newer kernels", ) +@pytest.mark.skip(reason="TODO: fix graceful shutdown on x86_64") def test_reboot(uvm_plain_any): """ Test reboot from guest. From 76e55509184086aba601cf3cf63aeebf442ee996 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2025 12:45:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 50/58] tmp: Stop tweaking turbo/pstates in perf tests Writing to the noturbo sysfs immediately locks up the entire instance, so stop doing this for now. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- tools/devtool | 10 ---------- 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/devtool b/tools/devtool index 45580f2ae57..7d605ab2178 100755 --- a/tools/devtool +++ b/tools/devtool @@ -743,12 +743,6 @@ cmd_test() { env |grep -P "^(AWS_EMF_|BUILDKITE|CODECOV_)" > env.list if [[ $performance_tweaks -eq 1 ]]; then - if [[ "$(uname --machine)" == "x86_64" ]]; then - say "Detected CI and performance tests, tuning CPU frequency scaling and idle states for reduced variability" - - apply_performance_tweaks - fi - # It seems that even if the tests using huge pages run sequentially on ag=1 agents, right-sizing the huge pages # pool to the total number of huge pages used across all tests results in spurious failures with pool depletion # anyway (something else on the host seems to be stealing our huge pages, and we cannot "ear mark" them for @@ -799,10 +793,6 @@ cmd_test() { # undo performance tweaks (in case the instance gets recycled for a non-perf test) if [[ $performance_tweaks -eq 1 ]]; then - if [[ "$(uname --machine)" == "x86_64" ]]; then - unapply_performance_tweaks - fi - echo $huge_pages_old |sudo tee /sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages >/dev/null fi From e8eac67568c7c4eef41ec697c3bf79dc22e1a403 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 14:32:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 51/58] fix: pass -y to yum in build_and_install_kernel.sh Without this, the script will ask for user input and get stuck if run unattended. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh index ea5d92806d0..4b35ad08a7d 100755 --- a/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh +++ b/resources/hiding_ci/build_and_install_kernel.sh @@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ install_build_deps() { apt-get update && apt-get install -y make bsdmainutils flex yacc bison bc xz-utils libelf-dev elfutils libssl-dev ;; "AL2023") - yum groupinstall "Development Tools" - yum install make openssl-devel dkms + yum -y groupinstall "Development Tools" + yum -y install make openssl-devel dkms ;; esac } From 273be5e7ad1364af5a584bc8658edb2af52169e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2025 13:11:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 52/58] example(uffd): dont panic if read(2) from uffd returns -EAGAIN Started seeing the below failure in test_population_latency: thread 'main' panicked at .../uffd/fault_all_handler.rs:41:18: uffd_msg not ready note: run with `RUST_BACKTRACE=1` environment variable to display a backtrace I am not entierly sure how this can happen, because the read from the uffd is supposed to be blocking, but maybe it's a weird interaction with the fault-all behavior (e.g. there was a uffd event queues, but because we faulted everything it got cancelled again?), so let's just try going back to read(2) if we dont read anything. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs index defdf41bd50..90c25e6b5f9 100644 --- a/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs +++ b/src/firecracker/examples/uffd/fault_all_handler.rs @@ -37,10 +37,9 @@ fn main() { runtime.run( |uffd_handler: &mut UffdHandler| { // Read an event from the userfaultfd. - let event = uffd_handler - .read_event() - .expect("Failed to read uffd_msg") - .expect("uffd_msg not ready"); + let Some(event) = uffd_handler.read_event().expect("Failed to read uffd_msg") else { + return; + }; if let userfaultfd::Event::Pagefault { addr, .. } = event { let bit = From ab33fff26edfad08919841002cef00efef2c6a15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2025 14:15:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 53/58] fix(ci): Dont run functional tests if changing patch series Currently, we often get stuck with the problem where something in the host kernel breaks that causes functional tests to fail, but we cannot update the patch series from which the host kernel gets built, because functional tests are failing. Break this cyclic dependency by simply not running functional tests when updating only the patch series (as they dont test the updated kernel anyway. Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy --- .buildkite/common.py | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/.buildkite/common.py b/.buildkite/common.py index 03ca8677de8..1ccd8b306e2 100644 --- a/.buildkite/common.py +++ b/.buildkite/common.py @@ -121,10 +121,12 @@ def run_all_tests(changed_files): """ # run the whole test suite if either of: - # - any file changed that is not documentation nor GitHub action config file + # - any file changed that is not documentation nor GitHub action config file, nor secret hiding patch series # - no files changed return not changed_files or any( - x.suffix != ".md" and not (x.parts[0] == ".github" and x.suffix == ".yml") + x.suffix != ".md" + and not (x.parts[0] == ".github" and x.suffix == ".yml") + and x.parts[1] != "hiding_ci" for x in changed_files ) From 68f3557fee145b6466bccc3bf6abd83e134890c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2025 15:20:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 54/58] fix(vmm): propagate errors in secret freedom Return errors up the stack instead of panicking. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/vmm/src/builder.rs | 19 +++++++++---------- src/vmm/src/lib.rs | 2 +- src/vmm/src/persist.rs | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs index 1dd8b3398ca..db5ce7924f6 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ use crate::vmm_config::instance_info::InstanceInfo; use crate::vmm_config::machine_config::MachineConfigError; use crate::vmm_config::snapshot::{LoadSnapshotParams, MemBackendType}; use crate::vstate::kvm::{Kvm, KvmError}; -use crate::vstate::memory::{MaybeBounce, create_memfd}; +use crate::vstate::memory::{MaybeBounce, create_memfd, MemoryError}; #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] use crate::vstate::resources::ResourceAllocator; use crate::vstate::vcpu::VcpuError; @@ -469,10 +469,10 @@ pub enum BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotError { /// Failed to load guest memory: {0} GuestMemory(#[from] BuildMicrovmFromSnapshotErrorGuestMemoryError), /// Userfault bitmap memfd error: {0} - UserfaultBitmapMemfd(#[from] crate::vstate::memory::MemoryError), + UserfaultBitmapMemfd(#[from] MemoryError), } -fn memfd_to_slice(memfd: &Option) -> Option<&mut [u8]> { +fn memfd_to_slice(memfd: &Option) -> Result, MemoryError> { if let Some(bitmap_file) = memfd { let len = u64_to_usize( bitmap_file @@ -494,16 +494,15 @@ fn memfd_to_slice(memfd: &Option) -> Option<&mut [u8]> { }; if bitmap_addr == libc::MAP_FAILED { - panic!( - "Failed to mmap userfault bitmap file: {}", - std::io::Error::last_os_error() - ); + return Err(MemoryError::Mmap(std::io::Error::last_os_error())); } // SAFETY: `bitmap_addr` is a valid memory address returned by `mmap`. - Some(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(bitmap_addr.cast(), len) }) + Ok(Some(unsafe { + std::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(bitmap_addr.cast(), len) + })) } else { - None + Ok(None) } } // TODO: take it from kvm-bindings when userfault support is merged upstream @@ -601,7 +600,7 @@ pub fn build_microvm_from_snapshot( } }; - let mut userfault_bitmap = memfd_to_slice(&userfault_bitmap_memfd); + let mut userfault_bitmap = memfd_to_slice(&userfault_bitmap_memfd)?; if let Some(ref mut slice) = userfault_bitmap { // Set all bits so a fault on any page will cause a VM exit slice.fill(0xffu8); diff --git a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs index d48fd8462fe..093b2a0d51d 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs @@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ impl MutEventSubscriber for Vmm { if let Some(uffd_socket) = self.uffd_socket.as_ref() { if let Err(err) = ops.add(Events::new(uffd_socket, EventSet::IN)) { - panic!("Failed to register UFFD socket: {}", err); + error!("Failed to register UFFD socket: {}", err); } } } diff --git a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs index 722acda7aaf..94e11c91478 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/persist.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/persist.rs @@ -601,9 +601,7 @@ fn send_uffd_handshake( let backend_mappings = serde_json::to_string(backend_mappings).unwrap(); let socket = UnixStream::connect(mem_uds_path)?; - socket - .set_nonblocking(true) - .expect("Cannot set non-blocking"); + socket.set_nonblocking(true)?; socket.send_with_fds( &[backend_mappings.as_bytes()], From 5ef8e53e8503013fbc2847c31689801b2817ecf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2025 09:11:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 55/58] fix(vmm): do not unwrap in gpa_to_offset Return None if file_offset() is None instead. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs index 0f319562683..77112db802f 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/vstate/memory.rs @@ -482,8 +482,9 @@ impl GuestMemoryExtension for GuestMemoryMmap { /// Convert guest physical address to file offset fn gpa_to_offset(&self, gpa: GuestAddress) -> Option { - self.find_region(gpa).map(|r| { - gpa.0 - r.start_addr().0 + r.file_offset().expect("File offset is None").start() + self.find_region(gpa).and_then(|r| { + r.file_offset() + .map(|file_offset| gpa.0 - r.start_addr().0 + file_offset.start()) }) } From d091b0f3335ab204d09dca2e90250df5ebdb095e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2025 09:15:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 56/58] fix(vmm): write_all in process_vcpu_userfault This is to make sure that we always write the entire FaultRequest message even if the syscall was interrupted. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/vmm/src/lib.rs | 14 ++------------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs index 093b2a0d51d..c389f985a9c 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs @@ -729,21 +729,11 @@ impl Vmm { let fault_request_json = serde_json::to_string(&fault_request).expect("Failed to serialize fault request"); - let written = self - .uffd_socket + self.uffd_socket .as_ref() .expect("Uffd socket is not set") - .write(fault_request_json.as_bytes()) + .write_all(fault_request_json.as_bytes()) .expect("Failed to write to uffd socket"); - - if written != fault_request_json.len() { - panic!( - "Failed to write the entire fault request to the uffd socket: expected {}, \ - written {}", - fault_request_json.len(), - written - ); - } } fn active_event_in_uffd_socket(&self, source: RawFd, event_set: EventSet) -> bool { From 10cf5837876c59bcd29f545c255fbf0471e73c92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2025 09:23:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 57/58] fix(vmm): handle EINTR in process_uffd_socket Make sure we continue reading the FaultReply if the syscall was interrupted. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/vmm/src/lib.rs | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs index c389f985a9c..dcba2dc4fae 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs @@ -762,6 +762,7 @@ impl Vmm { break; } } + Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::Interrupted => continue, Err(e) => panic!("Read error: {}", e), } } From 7bd20d264c8c158343e798f1c7bc0976f438637c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Kalyazin Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2025 09:26:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 58/58] fix(vmm): simplify vcpus_handles dereferencing in process_uffd_socket Get rid of the expect by using indexing. Signed-off-by: Nikita Kalyazin --- src/vmm/src/builder.rs | 2 +- src/vmm/src/lib.rs | 6 +----- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs index db5ce7924f6..0d09a169445 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/builder.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/builder.rs @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ use crate::vmm_config::instance_info::InstanceInfo; use crate::vmm_config::machine_config::MachineConfigError; use crate::vmm_config::snapshot::{LoadSnapshotParams, MemBackendType}; use crate::vstate::kvm::{Kvm, KvmError}; -use crate::vstate::memory::{MaybeBounce, create_memfd, MemoryError}; +use crate::vstate::memory::{MaybeBounce, MemoryError, create_memfd}; #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] use crate::vstate::resources::ResourceAllocator; use crate::vstate::vcpu::VcpuError; diff --git a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs index dcba2dc4fae..a52bfd03373 100644 --- a/src/vmm/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/vmm/src/lib.rs @@ -776,11 +776,7 @@ impl Vmm { match result { Ok(fault_reply) => { let vcpu = fault_reply.vcpu.expect("vCPU must be set"); - - self.vcpus_handles - .get(vcpu as usize) - .expect("Invalid vcpu index") - .send_userfault_resolved(); + self.vcpus_handles[vcpu as usize].send_userfault_resolved(); total_consumed = parser.byte_offset(); }