net-misc/openssh: apply Qualys patch

this fix DOS and MITM vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Tortuyaux <mtortuyaux@microsoft.com>

Author: tormath1

sdk_container/src/third_party/coreos-overlay/coreos/user-patches/net-misc/openssh/qualys.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+--- a/krl.c
++++ b/krl.c
+@@ -672,6 +672,7 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
+ 			break;
+ 		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+ 			if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
++				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 				error_f("insane bitmap gap");
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+@@ -1057,6 +1058,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
+ 	}
+
+ 	if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		error_f("alloc failed");
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1839,6 +1839,14 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &d, &len)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
+ 			DBG(debug("Received SSH2_MSG_PING len %zu", len));
++			if (!ssh->state->after_authentication) {
++				DBG(debug("Won't reply to PING in preauth"));
++				break;
++			}
++			if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
++				DBG(debug("Won't reply to PING during KEX"));
++				break;
++			}
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_PONG)) != 0 ||
+ 			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, d, len)) != 0 ||
+ 			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1207,6 +1207,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
+ 	    "restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ 		if (*dcsp != NULL) {
+ 			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
++			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) {
+@@ -1216,6 +1217,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
+ 		while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ 			if (*ndcsp >= AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS) {
+ 				error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
++				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			*dcsp = xrecallocarray(*dcsp, *ndcsp, *ndcsp + 1,
+@@ -1233,6 +1235,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
+ 		}
+ 		if (*certs != NULL) {
+ 			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
++			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &v)) != 0 ||
+@@ -1244,6 +1247,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
+ 		while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ 			if (*ncerts >= AGENT_MAX_EXT_CERTS) {
+ 				error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
++				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			*certs = xrecallocarray(*certs, *ncerts, *ncerts + 1,
+@@ -1744,6 +1748,7 @@ process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e)
+ 	/* record new key/sid */
+ 	if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) {
+ 		error_f("too many session IDs recorded");
++		r = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids,
+--- a/ssh-sk-client.c
++++ b/ssh-sk-client.c
+@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ 		}
+ 		if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL) {
+ 			error_f("calloc failed");
++			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		srk->key = key;
+@@ -440,6 +441,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ 		if ((tmp = recallocarray(srks, nsrks, nsrks + 1,
+ 		    sizeof(*srks))) == NULL) {
+ 			error_f("recallocarray keys failed");
++			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		debug_f("srks[%zu]: %s %s uidlen %zu", nsrks,
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
+ 	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
+-	    xxx_conn_info) == -1)
++	    xxx_conn_info) != 0)
+ 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -692,6 +692,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+
+ 	if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ 		debug_f("server sent unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+@@ -702,6 +703,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
+ 		    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
+ 		    key->type, pktype);
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+
+@@ -721,6 +723,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ 		error_f("server replied with unknown key: %s %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "<ERROR>" : fp);
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+ 	ident = format_identity(id);
+--- a/sshsig.c
++++ b/sshsig.c
+@@ -877,6 +877,7 @@ cert_filter_principals(const char *path, u_long linenum,
+ 	}
+ 	if ((principals = sshbuf_dup_string(nprincipals)) == NULL) {
+ 		error_f("buffer error");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	/* success */