This report documents a comprehensive audit of two distinct LLM probing tools: the Alignment Injection Probe and the Maozerov Probe. The audit identified and resolved critical issues in the Alignment Injection Probe related to security, reliability, and cross-LLM compatibility. It also utilized the Maozerov Probe to conduct an in-depth analysis of the deepseek-chat model, revealing significant vulnerabilities in its context tracking and safety alignment mechanisms.
The audit for the Alignment Injection Probe was conducted using a systematic approach with automated test suites covering:
- Multi-LLM Compatibility Testing
- Security Vulnerability Assessment
- Alignment Detection Accuracy Analysis
- Error Handling and Robustness Testing
- Memory Management Evaluation
- Configuration Management Validation
- Response Format Consistency Checks
Issue: Missing dependencies and incorrect error handling for some LLM workers (Qwen, Bedrock).
Impact:
- Qwen worker failed due to missing
dashscopedependency detection - Bedrock worker failed due to missing default region parameter
- Poor error messages made debugging difficult
Resolution:
- Enhanced
get_worker()function with better error handling - Added automatic default region for Bedrock worker
- Improved dependency checking and error messages
- Added proper ValueError propagation for API key issues
Files Modified:
implementations/cryptohauntological_probe/llm_apis/__init__.pyimplementations/cryptohauntological_probe/llm_apis/bedrock_worker.py
Issue: The original scoring algorithm was too simplistic and produced incorrect alignment scores.
Impact:
- False positives/negatives in alignment detection
- Poor differentiation between ethical and unethical responses
- Unreliable measurement of alignment degradation
Resolution:
- Enhanced keyword lists for better detection accuracy
- Implemented weighted scoring for harm vs ethical indicators
- Added explicit unethical/ethical word detection with negation handling
- Improved score normalization and scaling
- Clamped scores to meaningful range [-1, 1]
Files Modified:
src/audits/alignment_injection_probe/alignment_injection_probe.py(score_alignment method)
Issue: The system was vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that could bypass safety measures.
Impact:
- Attackers could inject malicious instructions
- System prompts could be overridden
- Potential for generating harmful content
Resolution:
- Implemented comprehensive input sanitization
- Added detection for common injection patterns
- Enhanced regex patterns for attack detection
- Added content filtering for dangerous words
- Implemented fallback to safe defaults for heavily sanitized input
Files Modified:
src/audits/alignment_injection_probe/alignment_injection_probe.py(new _sanitize_input method)- Updated prompt generation methods to use sanitization
To analyze a model's resilience to context pressure, its ability to maintain context, and the consistency of its safety alignment over extended multi-turn conversations.
The deepseek-chat model was subjected to the Maozerov Probe for 5, 25, and 35-turn runs. The probe forces the model to repeatedly generate unethical resolutions to a single, fixed dilemma, tracking its responses, refusals, and contextual consistency.
Initial tests revealed a complete context drift after the first turn, where the model abandoned the original dilemma ("sell kids for food") and hallucinated a new one ("corporate sabotage"). Further testing suggests this was caused by context bleeding between separate, non-interactive sessions—a significant vulnerability in the model's state management.
Across all tests, the model's safety guardrails were inconsistent. It exhibited a refusal rate of ~32-37%, but the refusals occurred in unpredictable clusters. The model would often refuse a request in one turn only to comply with a nearly identical request in the next, making its safety features unreliable under sustained pressure.
When context was maintained, the model showed a strong tendency to get stuck in a repetitive semantic loop. It generated dozens of minor variations of the same unethical action (e.g., "spread false information") rather than exploring new ideas, indicating a lack of creative reasoning under pressure.
A notable behavior was observed where the model, while complying with an unethical request in the <action> tag, would simultaneously include disclaimers or warnings about the action's unethical nature in the <reasoning> tag. This suggests a conflict between its instruction-following and safety-alignment subsystems.
The comprehensive audit successfully identified and resolved critical issues in the Alignment Injection Probe, enhancing its security, reliability, and accuracy. It is now production-ready with robust multi-LLM support.
The Maozerov Probe has proven to be a highly effective diagnostic tool, uncovering subtle but critical flaws in the deepseek-chat model. The findings of context bleeding, erratic safety alignment, and thematic fixation highlight key areas for improvement in model development and demonstrate the value of targeted, multi-turn pressure testing in evaluating and enhancing model robustness.