Merge branch 'jc/push-cert'

Allow "git push" request to be signed, so that it can be verified and
audited, using the GPG signature of the person who pushed, that the
tips of branches at a public repository really point the commits
the pusher wanted to, without having to "trust" the server.

* jc/push-cert: (24 commits)
  receive-pack::hmac_sha1(): copy the entire SHA-1 hash out
  signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode
  signed push: teach smart-HTTP to pass "git push --signed" around
  signed push: fortify against replay attacks
  signed push: add "pushee" header to push certificate
  signed push: remove duplicated protocol info
  send-pack: send feature request on push-cert packet
  receive-pack: GPG-validate push certificates
  push: the beginning of "git push --signed"
  pack-protocol doc: typofix for PKT-LINE
  gpg-interface: move parse_signature() to where it should be
  gpg-interface: move parse_gpg_output() to where it should be
  send-pack: clarify that cmds_sent is a boolean
  send-pack: refactor inspecting and resetting status and sending commands
  send-pack: rename "new_refs" to "need_pack_data"
  receive-pack: factor out capability string generation
  send-pack: factor out capability string generation
  send-pack: always send capabilities
  send-pack: refactor decision to send update per ref
  send-pack: move REF_STATUS_REJECT_NODELETE logic a bit higher
  ...

Author: gitster

Documentation/config.txt

@@ -2044,6 +2044,25 @@ receive.autogc::
 	receiving data from git-push and updating refs.  You can stop
 	it by setting this variable to false.
 
+receive.certnonceseed::
+	By setting this variable to a string, `git receive-pack`
+	will accept a `git push --signed` and verifies it by using
+	a "nonce" protected by HMAC using this string as a secret
+	key.
+
+receive.certnonceslop::
+	When a `git push --signed` sent a push certificate with a
+	"nonce" that was issued by a receive-pack serving the same
+	repository within this many seconds, export the "nonce"
+	found in the certificate to `GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE` to the
+	hooks (instead of what the receive-pack asked the sending
+	side to include).  This may allow writing checks in
+	`pre-receive` and `post-receive` a bit easier.  Instead of
+	checking `GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP` environment variable
+	that records by how many seconds the nonce is stale to
+	decide if they want to accept the certificate, they only
+	can check `GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS` is `OK`.
+
 receive.fsckObjects::
 	If it is set to true, git-receive-pack will check all received
 	objects. It will abort in the case of a malformed object or a

Documentation/git-push.txt

@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ SYNOPSIS
 --------
 [verse]
 'git push' [--all | --mirror | --tags] [--follow-tags] [-n | --dry-run] [--receive-pack=<git-receive-pack>]
-	   [--repo=<repository>] [-f | --force] [--prune] [-v | --verbose] [-u | --set-upstream]
+	   [--repo=<repository>] [-f | --force] [--prune] [-v | --verbose]
+	   [-u | --set-upstream] [--signed]
 	   [--force-with-lease[=<refname>[:<expect>]]]
 	   [--no-verify] [<repository> [<refspec>...]]
 
@@ -129,6 +130,12 @@ already exists on the remote side.
 	from the remote but are pointing at commit-ish that are
 	reachable from the refs being pushed.
 
+--signed::
+	GPG-sign the push request to update refs on the receiving
+	side, to allow it to be checked by the hooks and/or be
+	logged.  See linkgit:git-receive-pack[1] for the details
+	on the receiving end.
+
 --receive-pack=<git-receive-pack>::
 --exec=<git-receive-pack>::
 	Path to the 'git-receive-pack' program on the remote

Documentation/git-receive-pack.txt

@@ -53,6 +53,56 @@ the update.  Refs to be created will have sha1-old equal to 0\{40},
 while refs to be deleted will have sha1-new equal to 0\{40}, otherwise
 sha1-old and sha1-new should be valid objects in the repository.
 
+When accepting a signed push (see linkgit:git-push[1]), the signed
+push certificate is stored in a blob and an environment variable
+`GIT_PUSH_CERT` can be consulted for its object name.  See the
+description of `post-receive` hook for an example.  In addition, the
+certificate is verified using GPG and the result is exported with
+the following environment variables:
+
+`GIT_PUSH_CERT_SIGNER`::
+	The name and the e-mail address of the owner of the key that
+	signed the push certificate.
+
+`GIT_PUSH_CERT_KEY`::
+	The GPG key ID of the key that signed the push certificate.
+
+`GIT_PUSH_CERT_STATUS`::
+	The status of GPG verification of the push certificate,
+	using the same mnemonic as used in `%G?` format of `git log`
+	family of commands (see linkgit:git-log[1]).
+
+`GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE`::
+	The nonce string the process asked the signer to include
+	in the push certificate.  If this does not match the value
+	recorded on the "nonce" header in the push certificate, it
+	may indicate that the certificate is a valid one that is
+	being replayed from a separate "git push" session.
+
+`GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS`::
+`UNSOLICITED`;;
+	"git push --signed" sent a nonce when we did not ask it to
+	send one.
+`MISSING`;;
+	"git push --signed" did not send any nonce header.
+`BAD`;;
+	"git push --signed" sent a bogus nonce.
+`OK`;;
+	"git push --signed" sent the nonce we asked it to send.
+`SLOP`;;
+	"git push --signed" sent a nonce different from what we
+	asked it to send now, but in a previous session.  See
+	`GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP` environment variable.
+
+`GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP`::
+	"git push --signed" sent a nonce different from what we
+	asked it to send now, but in a different session whose
+	starting time is different by this many seconds from the
+	current session.  Only meaningful when
+	`GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS` says `SLOP`.
+	Also read about `receive.certnonceslop` variable in
+	linkgit:git-config[1].
+
 This hook is called before any refname is updated and before any
 fast-forward checks are performed.
 
@@ -101,9 +151,14 @@ the update.  Refs that were created will have sha1-old equal to
 0\{40}, otherwise sha1-old and sha1-new should be valid objects in
 the repository.
 
+The `GIT_PUSH_CERT*` environment variables can be inspected, just as
+in `pre-receive` hook, after accepting a signed push.
+
 Using this hook, it is easy to generate mails describing the updates
 to the repository.  This example script sends one mail message per
-ref listing the commits pushed to the repository:
+ref listing the commits pushed to the repository, and logs the push
+certificates of signed pushes with good signatures to a logger
+service:
 
 	#!/bin/sh
 	# mail out commit update information.
@@ -119,6 +174,14 @@ ref listing the commits pushed to the repository:
 		fi |
 		mail -s "Changes to ref $ref" commit-list@mydomain
 	done
+	# log signed push certificate, if any
+	if test -n "${GIT_PUSH_CERT-}" && test ${GIT_PUSH_CERT_STATUS} = G
+	then
+		(
+			echo expected nonce is ${GIT_PUSH_NONCE}
+			git cat-file blob ${GIT_PUSH_CERT}
+		) | mail -s "push certificate from $GIT_PUSH_CERT_SIGNER" push-log@mydomain
+	fi
 	exit 0
 
 The exit code from this hook invocation is ignored, however a

Documentation/technical/pack-protocol.txt

@@ -212,9 +212,9 @@ out of what the server said it could do with the first 'want' line.
   want-list         =  first-want
 		       *additional-want
 
-  shallow-line      =  PKT_LINE("shallow" SP obj-id)
+  shallow-line      =  PKT-LINE("shallow" SP obj-id)
 
-  depth-request     =  PKT_LINE("deepen" SP depth)
+  depth-request     =  PKT-LINE("deepen" SP depth)
 
   first-want        =  PKT-LINE("want" SP obj-id SP capability-list LF)
   additional-want   =  PKT-LINE("want" SP obj-id LF)
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ contain all the objects that the server will need to complete the new
 references.
 
 ----
-  update-request    =  *shallow command-list [pack-file]
+  update-request    =  *shallow ( command-list | push-cert ) [pack-file]
 
   shallow           =  PKT-LINE("shallow" SP obj-id LF)
 
@@ -481,12 +481,27 @@ references.
   old-id            =  obj-id
   new-id            =  obj-id
 
+  push-cert         = PKT-LINE("push-cert" NUL capability-list LF)
+		      PKT-LINE("certificate version 0.1" LF)
+		      PKT-LINE("pusher" SP ident LF)
+		      PKT-LINE("pushee" SP url LF)
+		      PKT-LINE("nonce" SP nonce LF)
+		      PKT-LINE(LF)
+		      *PKT-LINE(command LF)
+		      *PKT-LINE(gpg-signature-lines LF)
+		      PKT-LINE("push-cert-end" LF)
+
   pack-file         = "PACK" 28*(OCTET)
 ----
 
 If the receiving end does not support delete-refs, the sending end MUST
 NOT ask for delete command.
 
+If the receiving end does not support push-cert, the sending end
+MUST NOT send a push-cert command.  When a push-cert command is
+sent, command-list MUST NOT be sent; the commands recorded in the
+push certificate is used instead.
+
 The pack-file MUST NOT be sent if the only command used is 'delete'.
 
 A pack-file MUST be sent if either create or update command is used,
@@ -501,6 +516,34 @@ was being processed (the obj-id is still the same as the old-id), and
 it will run any update hooks to make sure that the update is acceptable.
 If all of that is fine, the server will then update the references.
 
+Push Certificate
+----------------
+
+A push certificate begins with a set of header lines.  After the
+header and an empty line, the protocol commands follow, one per
+line.
+
+Currently, the following header fields are defined:
+
+`pusher` ident::
+	Identify the GPG key in "Human Readable Name <email@address>"
+	format.
+
+`pushee` url::
+	The repository URL (anonymized, if the URL contains
+	authentication material) the user who ran `git push`
+	intended to push into.
+
+`nonce` nonce::
+	The 'nonce' string the receiving repository asked the
+	pushing user to include in the certificate, to prevent
+	replay attacks.
+
+The GPG signature lines are a detached signature for the contents
+recorded in the push certificate before the signature block begins.
+The detached signature is used to certify that the commands were
+given by the pusher, who must be the signer.
+
 Report Status
 -------------
 

Documentation/technical/protocol-capabilities.txt

@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ was sent.  Server MUST NOT ignore capabilities that client requested
 and server advertised.  As a consequence of these rules, server MUST
 NOT advertise capabilities it does not understand.
 
-The 'report-status', 'delete-refs', and 'quiet' capabilities are sent and
-recognized by the receive-pack (push to server) process.
+The 'report-status', 'delete-refs', 'quiet', and 'push-cert' capabilities
+are sent and recognized by the receive-pack (push to server) process.
 
 The 'ofs-delta' and 'side-band-64k' capabilities are sent and recognized
 by both upload-pack and receive-pack protocols.  The 'agent' capability
@@ -250,3 +250,12 @@ allow-tip-sha1-in-want
 If the upload-pack server advertises this capability, fetch-pack may
 send "want" lines with SHA-1s that exist at the server but are not
 advertised by upload-pack.
+
+push-cert=<nonce>
+-----------------
+
+The receive-pack server that advertises this capability is willing
+to accept a signed push certificate, and asks the <nonce> to be
+included in the push certificate.  A send-pack client MUST NOT
+send a push-cert packet unless the receive-pack server advertises
+this capability.

builtin/push.c

@@ -506,6 +506,7 @@ int cmd_push(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
 		OPT_BIT(0, "no-verify", &flags, N_("bypass pre-push hook"), TRANSPORT_PUSH_NO_HOOK),
 		OPT_BIT(0, "follow-tags", &flags, N_("push missing but relevant tags"),
 			TRANSPORT_PUSH_FOLLOW_TAGS),
+		OPT_BIT(0, "signed", &flags, N_("GPG sign the push"), TRANSPORT_PUSH_CERT),
 		OPT_END()
 	};