Skip to content

Commit 4dcf226

Browse files
advisory-database[bot]advisory-database[bot]
committed
Publish Advisories
GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm GHSA-g2jx-37x6-6438
1 parent 6c36a46 commit 4dcf226

File tree

2 files changed

+134
-0
lines changed

2 files changed

+134
-0
lines changed

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2025/12/GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm/GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm.json‎

Lines changed: 65 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
1+
{
2+
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
3+
"id": "GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm",
4+
"modified": "2025-12-02T17:55:54Z",
5+
"published": "2025-12-02T17:55:54Z",
6+
"aliases": [
7+
"CVE-2025-13353"
8+
],
9+
"summary": "gokey allows secret recovery from a seed file without the master password",
10+
"details": "In gokey versions `<0.2.0`, a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly being derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM authentication tag of the key seed.\n\nThis issue has been fixed in gokey version `0.2.0`. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the `-s` option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version `0.2.0` gokey will generate different secrets.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the `-s` option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the `-s` option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is also not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). Specific impact includes:\n\n* keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it was expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 bytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was used \n* a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated from a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without the knowledge of the seed master password\n\n### Patches\n\nThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version `0.2.0` and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions will produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed entropy will be used now.\n\n### System secret rotation guidance\n\nIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (`0.2.0` and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems in place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is system-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\n\n#### Systems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\n\nSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by sending a unique \"magic\" link to the user's email or phone. In such cases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly generated password secret, when prompted by the system.\n\n#### Systems that require the old password/secret for rotation\n\nSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the old and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To generate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\n\n* temporarily download [gokey version `0.1.3`](https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3) for their respective operating system to recover the old password \n* use gokey version `0.2.0` or above to generate the new password \n* populate the system provided password rotation form\n\n#### Systems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\n\nSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic key as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the same time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several authorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such systems users are advised to:\n\n* generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version `0.2.0` or above \n* provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system \n* verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential \n* revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\n\n### Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was found by Théo Cusnir ([@mister_mime](https://hackerone.com/mister_mime?type=user)) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare's bug bounty program.",
11+
"severity": [
12+
{
13+
"type": "CVSS_V4",
14+
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"
15+
}
16+
],
17+
"affected": [
18+
{
19+
"package": {
20+
"ecosystem": "Go",
21+
"name": "github.com/cloudflare/gokey"
22+
},
23+
"ranges": [
24+
{
25+
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
26+
"events": [
27+
{
28+
"introduced": "0"
29+
},
30+
{
31+
"fixed": "0.2.0"
32+
}
33+
]
34+
}
35+
]
36+
}
37+
],
38+
"references": [
39+
{
40+
"type": "WEB",
41+
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/security/advisories/GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm"
42+
},
43+
{
44+
"type": "ADVISORY",
45+
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13353"
46+
},
47+
{
48+
"type": "WEB",
49+
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/commit/f261819e99ea169843bd5aa3e643d046260ff511"
50+
},
51+
{
52+
"type": "PACKAGE",
53+
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey"
54+
}
55+
],
56+
"database_specific": {
57+
"cwe_ids": [
58+
"CWE-330"
59+
],
60+
"severity": "HIGH",
61+
"github_reviewed": true,
62+
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-02T17:55:54Z",
63+
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-02T11:15:47Z"
64+
}
65+
}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2025/12/GHSA-g2jx-37x6-6438/GHSA-g2jx-37x6-6438.json‎

Lines changed: 69 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
1+
{
2+
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
3+
"id": "GHSA-g2jx-37x6-6438",
4+
"modified": "2025-12-02T17:55:44Z",
5+
"published": "2025-12-02T17:55:44Z",
6+
"aliases": [
7+
"CVE-2025-66454"
8+
],
9+
"summary": "arcade-mcp-server Has Default Hardcoded Worker Secret That Allows Full Unauthorized Access to All HTTP MCP Worker Endpoints",
10+
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe arcade-mcp HTTP server uses a hardcoded default worker secret (\"dev\") that is never validated or overridden during normal server startup. As a result, any unauthenticated attacker who knows this default key can forge valid JWTs and fully bypass the FastAPI authentication layer. This grants remote access to all worker endpoints—including tool enumeration and tool invocation—without credentials.\n\nAnyone following the official quick-start guide is vulnerable unless they manually override ARCADE_WORKER_SECRET.\n\n### Details\n\nThe documented method for launching an HTTP MCP server (python server.py http) implicitly sets the worker secret to the hardcoded default \"dev\":\n\nArcadeSettings.server_secret defaults to \"dev\"\n(libs/arcade-mcp-server/arcade_mcp_server/settings.py:129–158)\n\ncreate_arcade_mcp() passes this value directly to FastAPIWorker without validation\n(libs/arcade-mcp-server/arcade_mcp_server/worker.py:118–188)\n\nBaseWorker._set_secret() accepts this value and does not enforce rotation\n(libs/arcade-serve/arcade_serve/core/base.py:42–83)\n\nBecause the worker’s signing key is constant and publicly documented, attackers can trivially generate valid HS256 JWTs:\n\nThe FastAPI worker auth middleware (arcade_serve/fastapi/auth.py) trusts any JWT signed with the worker secret.\n\nThe core auth layer (arcade_serve/core/auth.py) does not distinguish forged tokens from legitimate ones.\n\nThe official quick-start instructions (README.md:164–190) demonstrate launching an MCP server without mentioning worker-secret rotation. Users are told how to define tool secrets in .env, but not that the worker’s authentication key must be changed.\n\nAs a result, servers deployed following the documented workflow expose all /worker/* endpoints to anyone capable of generating a simple HS256 token using the known key.\n\nThis CVE was resolved by https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp/pull/691\n\n### PoC\n\nStart the server using the official guide\nhttps://docs.arcade.dev/en/home/build-tools/create-a-mcp-server\n\nVerify that unauthenticated access is rejected (expected)\n```\ncurl -s -D - http://127.0.0.1:8000/worker/tools\n# → 403 Forbidden\n```\n\nForge a valid HS256 token using the hardcoded default secret \"dev\"\n```\nimport jwt\nprint(jwt.encode({'ver': '1', 'aud': 'worker'}, 'dev', algorithm='HS256'))\n```\n\nUse the forged token to bypass authentication\n```\ncurl -s -D - \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $(cat /tmp/forged_token.txt)\" \\\n http://127.0.0.1:8000/worker/tools\n```\n\nResult:\nThe server responds 200 OK with the full tool catalog and allows invocation of all worker tools.\n\nServer logs show a rejected request immediately followed by a successful forged request, confirming the bypass.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an authentication bypass that results in full remote access to all MCP worker endpoints:\n\nUnauthenticated attackers can enumerate tools\n\nInvoke arbitrary tools remotely\n\nAccess any data returned by tools (including secrets loaded into ToolContext)\n\nExecute actions inside internal systems if tools expose operational capabilities\n\nPerform these actions without any brute forcing or guesswork due to the known default signing key\n\nAny user who follows the official setup guide is exposed unless they manually override ARCADE_WORKER_SECRET, which is not documented.\n\nThis vulnerability effectively gives complete remote control over the MCP worker API to any attacker aware of the default key.",
11+
"severity": [
12+
{
13+
"type": "CVSS_V3",
14+
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"
15+
}
16+
],
17+
"affected": [
18+
{
19+
"package": {
20+
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
21+
"name": "arcade-mcp-server"
22+
},
23+
"ranges": [
24+
{
25+
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
26+
"events": [
27+
{
28+
"introduced": "0"
29+
},
30+
{
31+
"fixed": "1.9.1"
32+
}
33+
]
34+
}
35+
]
36+
}
37+
],
38+
"references": [
39+
{
40+
"type": "WEB",
41+
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-g2jx-37x6-6438"
42+
},
43+
{
44+
"type": "WEB",
45+
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp/pull/691"
46+
},
47+
{
48+
"type": "WEB",
49+
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp/commit/44660d18ceb220600401303df860a31ca766c817"
50+
},
51+
{
52+
"type": "WEB",
53+
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp/commit/7fb097f20fbea35e382a1b78da6fd90609c55a9e"
54+
},
55+
{
56+
"type": "PACKAGE",
57+
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp"
58+
}
59+
],
60+
"database_specific": {
61+
"cwe_ids": [
62+
"CWE-284"
63+
],
64+
"severity": "MODERATE",
65+
"github_reviewed": true,
66+
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-02T17:55:44Z",
67+
"nvd_published_at": null
68+
}
69+
}

0 commit comments

Comments
 (0)