fix: loosen checkDockerHost to accept any unix:// socket; fix misleading test name (#1912)

* Initial plan

* feat: detect workflow-scope DinD (DOCKER_HOST) and fail fast

Add checkDockerHost() to src/cli.ts that inspects DOCKER_HOST on startup.
If it points at a non-default socket (e.g. tcp://localhost:2375 for a DinD
sidecar), AWF exits immediately with a clear error explaining why it is
incompatible and pointing at the new docs section.

Also add a "Workflow-Scope DinD Incompatibility" section to docs/usage.md
documenting the root cause, the error message users will see, and the
--enable-dind workaround for agents that genuinely need Docker access.

Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/github/gh-aw-firewall/sessions/d99ee10d-b3d6-4811-a197-9eb8bb15da2a

* Initial plan

* fix: address review comments on checkDockerHost

Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/github/gh-aw-firewall/sessions/7d2aff0b-b99e-40da-bbfe-7a0f983e1784

---------

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Landon Cox <landon.cox@microsoft.com>

Author: Copilot

docs/usage.md

@@ -789,6 +789,43 @@ sudo awf --allow-domains echo.websocket.events "wscat -c wss://echo.websocket.ev
 sudo awf --allow-domains github.com "npm install -g wscat && wscat -c wss://echo.websocket.events"
 ```
 
+### Workflow-Scope DinD Incompatibility
+
+Setting `DOCKER_HOST` to an external TCP daemon (e.g. a DinD service container) at
+**workflow scope** is incompatible with AWF and will be rejected at startup with an
+error like:
+
+```
+❌ DOCKER_HOST is set to an external daemon (tcp://localhost:2375). AWF requires the
+local Docker daemon (default socket). Workflow-scope DinD is incompatible with AWF's
+network isolation model.
+```
+
+**Why it is incompatible:**
+
+AWF manages its own Docker network (`172.30.0.0/24`) and iptables NAT rules that must
+run on the host runner's network namespace.  When `DOCKER_HOST` points at a DinD TCP
+daemon, `docker compose` routes all container creation through that daemon's isolated
+network namespace, which breaks:
+
+- AWF's fixed subnet routing (the subnet is inside the DinD namespace, unreachable from the runner)
+- The iptables DNAT rules configured by `awf-iptables-init` (they run in the wrong namespace)
+- Port-binding expectations used for container-to-container communication
+
+**Workaround:**
+
+If the agent command itself needs to run Docker, use `--enable-dind` to mount the host
+Docker socket into the agent container rather than configuring DinD at workflow scope:
+
+```bash
+# ✓ Use --enable-dind to allow docker commands inside the agent
+sudo awf --enable-dind --allow-domains registry-1.docker.io -- docker run hello-world
+```
+
+> **⚠️ Security warning:** `--enable-dind` allows the agent to bypass firewall
+> restrictions by spawning containers that are not subject to the firewall's network
+> rules.  Only enable it for trusted workloads that genuinely need Docker access.
+
 ## IP-Based Access
 
 Direct IP access (without domain names) is blocked:

src/cli.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { Command } from 'commander';
-import { parseEnvironmentVariables, parseDomains, parseDomainsFile, escapeShellArg, joinShellArgs, parseVolumeMounts, isValidIPv4, isValidIPv6, parseDnsServers, parseDnsOverHttps, validateAgentImage, isAgentImagePreset, AGENT_IMAGE_PRESETS, processAgentImageOption, processLocalhostKeyword, validateSkipPullWithBuildLocal, validateAllowHostPorts, validateAllowHostServicePorts, applyHostServicePortsConfig, parseMemoryLimit, validateFormat, validateApiProxyConfig, buildRateLimitConfig, validateRateLimitFlags, hasRateLimitOptions, collectRulesetFile, validateApiTargetInAllowedDomains, DEFAULT_OPENAI_API_TARGET, DEFAULT_ANTHROPIC_API_TARGET, DEFAULT_COPILOT_API_TARGET, DEFAULT_GEMINI_API_TARGET, emitApiProxyTargetWarnings, emitCliProxyStatusLogs, warnClassicPATWithCopilotModel, formatItem, program, parseAgentTimeout, applyAgentTimeout, handlePredownloadAction, resolveApiTargetsToAllowedDomains, extractGhesDomainsFromEngineApiTarget, extractGhecDomainsFromServerUrl } from './cli';
+import { parseEnvironmentVariables, parseDomains, parseDomainsFile, escapeShellArg, joinShellArgs, parseVolumeMounts, isValidIPv4, isValidIPv6, parseDnsServers, parseDnsOverHttps, validateAgentImage, isAgentImagePreset, AGENT_IMAGE_PRESETS, processAgentImageOption, processLocalhostKeyword, validateSkipPullWithBuildLocal, validateAllowHostPorts, validateAllowHostServicePorts, applyHostServicePortsConfig, parseMemoryLimit, validateFormat, validateApiProxyConfig, buildRateLimitConfig, validateRateLimitFlags, hasRateLimitOptions, collectRulesetFile, validateApiTargetInAllowedDomains, DEFAULT_OPENAI_API_TARGET, DEFAULT_ANTHROPIC_API_TARGET, DEFAULT_COPILOT_API_TARGET, DEFAULT_GEMINI_API_TARGET, emitApiProxyTargetWarnings, emitCliProxyStatusLogs, warnClassicPATWithCopilotModel, formatItem, program, parseAgentTimeout, applyAgentTimeout, handlePredownloadAction, resolveApiTargetsToAllowedDomains, extractGhesDomainsFromEngineApiTarget, extractGhecDomainsFromServerUrl, checkDockerHost } from './cli';
 import { redactSecrets } from './redact-secrets';
 import * as fs from 'fs';
 import * as path from 'path';
@@ -2810,4 +2810,46 @@ describe('cli', () => {
       expect(domains).toContain('https://custom.copilot.com');
     });
   });
+
+  describe('checkDockerHost', () => {
+    it('should return valid when DOCKER_HOST is not set', () => {
+      const result = checkDockerHost({});
+      expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should return valid when DOCKER_HOST is undefined', () => {
+      const result = checkDockerHost({ DOCKER_HOST: undefined });
+      expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should return valid for the default /var/run/docker.sock socket', () => {
+      const result = checkDockerHost({ DOCKER_HOST: 'unix:///var/run/docker.sock' });
+      expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should return valid for the /run/docker.sock socket', () => {
+      const result = checkDockerHost({ DOCKER_HOST: 'unix:///run/docker.sock' });
+      expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should return invalid for a TCP daemon (workflow-scope DinD)', () => {
+      const result = checkDockerHost({ DOCKER_HOST: 'tcp://localhost:2375' });
+      expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+      if (!result.valid) {
+        expect(result.error).toContain('tcp://localhost:2375');
+        expect(result.error).toContain('external daemon');
+        expect(result.error).toContain('network isolation model');
+      }
+    });
+
+    it('should return invalid for a TCP daemon on a non-default port', () => {
+      const result = checkDockerHost({ DOCKER_HOST: 'tcp://localhost:2376' });
+      expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('should return valid for a non-standard unix socket', () => {
+      const result = checkDockerHost({ DOCKER_HOST: 'unix:///tmp/custom-docker.sock' });
+      expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
+    });
+  });
 });

src/cli.ts

@@ -891,6 +891,49 @@ export function applyAgentTimeout(
   logger.info(`Agent timeout set to ${result.minutes} minutes`);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Checks whether DOCKER_HOST is set to an external daemon that is incompatible
+ * with AWF.
+ *
+ * AWF manages its own Docker network (`172.30.0.0/24`) and iptables rules that
+ * require direct access to the host's Docker socket.  When DOCKER_HOST points
+ * at an external TCP daemon (e.g. a DinD sidecar), Docker Compose routes all
+ * container creation through that daemon's network namespace, which breaks:
+ *  - AWF's fixed subnet routing
+ *  - The iptables DNAT rules set up by awf-iptables-init
+ *  - Port-binding expectations between containers
+ *
+ * Any `unix://` socket (including non-default paths) is accepted because it
+ * still refers to a local Docker daemon.  Only remote schemes (`tcp://`,
+ * `ssh://`, etc.) are rejected.
+ *
+ * @param env - Environment variables to inspect (defaults to process.env)
+ * @returns `{ valid: true }` when DOCKER_HOST is absent or uses a unix socket;
+ *          `{ valid: false, error: string }` for remote daemon schemes.
+ */
+export function checkDockerHost(
+  env: Record<string, string | undefined> = process.env
+): { valid: true } | { valid: false; error: string } {
+  const dockerHost = env['DOCKER_HOST'];
+
+  if (!dockerHost) {
+    return { valid: true };
+  }
+
+  if (dockerHost.startsWith('unix://')) {
+    return { valid: true };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    valid: false,
+    error:
+      `DOCKER_HOST is set to an external daemon (${dockerHost}). ` +
+      'AWF requires the local Docker daemon (default socket). ' +
+      'Workflow-scope DinD is incompatible with AWF\'s network isolation model. ' +
+      'See the "Workflow-Scope DinD Incompatibility" section in docs/usage.md for details and workarounds.',
+  };
+}
+
 /**
  * Parses and validates DNS servers from a comma-separated string
  * @param input - Comma-separated DNS server string (e.g., "8.8.8.8,1.1.1.1")
@@ -1561,6 +1604,14 @@ program
 
     logger.setLevel(logLevel);
 
+    // Fail fast when DOCKER_HOST points at an external daemon (e.g. workflow-scope DinD).
+    // AWF's network isolation depends on direct access to the local Docker socket.
+    const dockerHostCheck = checkDockerHost();
+    if (!dockerHostCheck.valid) {
+      logger.error(`❌ ${dockerHostCheck.error}`);
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+
     // Parse domains from both --allow-domains flag and --allow-domains-file
     let allowedDomains: string[] = [];