I accidentally my private key #4245
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It's a long shot, but would someone be willing to sign the latest build of my HAOS fork with the official HA key so I don't have to tell my beta testers to root ssh into their pi to hack in a new cert? I'm usually sort of careless with self-signed certificates as being basically disposable, so when I encountered permissions errors when building 16.1 in docker, I ran git clean which evidently nuked the private key that was generated. I didn't think much of it until I tried to install the rauc and it got rejected. Turns out this self signed certificate is extremely not disposable and should be guarded with my life! So https://pkg.sanctuary-systems.com/hassos/haos_rpi5-64-16.1.raucb contains a freshly generated public key, and it seems like the only way to install it on an existing installation is to root ssh into the pi and bind mount a new key on top of the read-only root filesystem, as per the first. If it were just me, I'd just do the bind mount, but I also shipped this OS to my beta testers, not all of which are software developers. I know it's a lot to ask and a bit of a security risk. I guess it would be even more to ask but less chance of making officially signed malware to build the image from source: dev...sanctuary-systems-com:operating-system:amd-6.12 but I am afraid I might have to go tell my beta testers to do the ssh thing or reinstall. At least I learned this lesson while only a hand full of people use my fork. |
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No worries, I don't see a reason why we shouldn't help you out. Rather than signing the update with the release key though, I suggest to let our GH runner (which has the production key in its secrets) to build the update file, which will be better for transparency. To do that, prepare a branch with Then I'll push this branch to our repo, check it and run a build from that branch. Your users will need to use that version as a stepping stone though, there's no way around that without signing your certificate by HA certificate authority. |
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No worries, I don't see a reason why we shouldn't help you out. Rather than signing the update with the release key though, I suggest to let our GH runner (which has the production key in its secrets) to build the update file, which will be better for transparency. To do that, prepare a branch with
cert.pem
checked in the repo (it's gitignored by default, so usegit add -f cert.pem
), as it's the easiest way to include extra cert in the keyring:operating-system/buildroot-external/scripts/rauc.sh
Line 46 in 62747cd
Then I'll push this branch to our repo, check it and run a build from that branch. You…