rephrase

Author: Marius Kleidl

draft-ietf-httpbis-resumable-upload.md

@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ Uploaded representation data and its metadata are untrusted input. Server operat
 
 Some servers or intermediaries provide scanning of content uploaded by clients. Any scanning mechanism that relies on receiving a complete representation in a single request message can be defeated by resumable uploads because content can be split across multiple messages. Servers or intermediaries wishing to perform content scanning SHOULD consider how resumable uploads can circumvent scanning and take appropriate measures. Possible strategies include waiting for the upload to complete before scanning the entire representation, or disabling resumable uploads.
 
-There can be a significant delay between the creation of an upload resource and its completion Policy decisions or authorization checks performed on the initial request might become outdated or invalid by the time the upload completes. To mitigate vulnerabilities arising from time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) conditions, the server SHOULD revalidate any security- or policy-relevant values derived from the initial request before finalizing the upload. This includes, for example, revalidating authentication, authorization, and quota policies associated with the upload resource.
+There can be a significant delay between the creation of an upload resource and its completion. Policy decisions or authorization checks performed on the initial request might become outdated or invalid by the time the upload completes. To mitigate vulnerabilities arising from time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) conditions, the server SHOULD validate that the user is still allowed to perform the requested action before finalizing the upload. This includes, for example, validating access privileges and quota policies associated with the upload resource.
 
 Resumable uploads are vulnerable to Slowloris-style attacks {{SLOWLORIS}}. A malicious client may create upload resources and keep them alive by regularly sending `PATCH` requests with no or small content to the upload resources. This could be abused to exhaust server resources by creating and holding open uploads indefinitely with minimal work. Servers SHOULD provide mitigations for Slowloris attacks, such as increasing the maximum number of clients the server will allow, limiting the number of uploads a single client is allowed to make, imposing restrictions on the minimum transfer speed an upload is allowed to have, and restricting the length of time an upload resource can exist.