Merge from 'main' to 'sycl-web' (81 commits)

  CONFLICT (content): Merge conflict in clang/tools/clang-linker-wrapper/ClangLinkerWrapper.cpp

Author: premanandrao

bolt/lib/Passes/PAuthGadgetScanner.cpp

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include "bolt/Passes/PAuthGadgetScanner.h"
 #include "bolt/Core/ParallelUtilities.h"
 #include "bolt/Passes/DataflowAnalysis.h"
+#include "bolt/Utils/CommandLineOpts.h"
 #include "llvm/ADT/STLExtras.h"
 #include "llvm/ADT/SmallSet.h"
 #include "llvm/MC/MCInst.h"
@@ -26,6 +27,11 @@ namespace llvm {
 namespace bolt {
 namespace PAuthGadgetScanner {
 
+static cl::opt<bool> AuthTrapsOnFailure(
+    "auth-traps-on-failure",
+    cl::desc("Assume authentication instructions always trap on failure"),
+    cl::cat(opts::BinaryAnalysisCategory));
+
 [[maybe_unused]] static void traceInst(const BinaryContext &BC, StringRef Label,
                                        const MCInst &MI) {
   dbgs() << "  " << Label << ": ";
@@ -82,8 +88,8 @@ class TrackedRegisters {
   TrackedRegisters(ArrayRef<MCPhysReg> RegsToTrack)
       : Registers(RegsToTrack),
         RegToIndexMapping(getMappingSize(RegsToTrack), NoIndex) {
-    for (unsigned I = 0; I < RegsToTrack.size(); ++I)
-      RegToIndexMapping[RegsToTrack[I]] = I;
+    for (auto [MappedIndex, Reg] : llvm::enumerate(RegsToTrack))
+      RegToIndexMapping[Reg] = MappedIndex;
   }
 
   ArrayRef<MCPhysReg> getRegisters() const { return Registers; }
@@ -197,9 +203,9 @@ struct SrcState {
 
     SafeToDerefRegs &= StateIn.SafeToDerefRegs;
     TrustedRegs &= StateIn.TrustedRegs;
-    for (unsigned I = 0; I < LastInstWritingReg.size(); ++I)
-      for (const MCInst *J : StateIn.LastInstWritingReg[I])
-        LastInstWritingReg[I].insert(J);
+    for (auto [ThisSet, OtherSet] :
+         llvm::zip_equal(LastInstWritingReg, StateIn.LastInstWritingReg))
+      ThisSet.insert_range(OtherSet);
     return *this;
   }
 
@@ -218,11 +224,9 @@ struct SrcState {
 static void printInstsShort(raw_ostream &OS,
                             ArrayRef<SetOfRelatedInsts> Insts) {
   OS << "Insts: ";
-  for (unsigned I = 0; I < Insts.size(); ++I) {
-    auto &Set = Insts[I];
+  for (auto [I, PtrSet] : llvm::enumerate(Insts)) {
     OS << "[" << I << "](";
-    for (const MCInst *MCInstP : Set)
-      OS << MCInstP << " ";
+    interleave(PtrSet, OS, " ");
     OS << ")";
   }
 }
@@ -364,6 +368,34 @@ class SrcSafetyAnalysis {
     return Clobbered;
   }
 
+  std::optional<MCPhysReg> getRegMadeTrustedByChecking(const MCInst &Inst,
+                                                       SrcState Cur) const {
+    // This function cannot return multiple registers. This is never the case
+    // on AArch64.
+    std::optional<MCPhysReg> RegCheckedByInst =
+        BC.MIB->getAuthCheckedReg(Inst, /*MayOverwrite=*/false);
+    if (RegCheckedByInst && Cur.SafeToDerefRegs[*RegCheckedByInst])
+      return *RegCheckedByInst;
+
+    auto It = CheckerSequenceInfo.find(&Inst);
+    if (It == CheckerSequenceInfo.end())
+      return std::nullopt;
+
+    MCPhysReg RegCheckedBySequence = It->second.first;
+    const MCInst *FirstCheckerInst = It->second.second;
+
+    // FirstCheckerInst should belong to the same basic block (see the
+    // assertion in DataflowSrcSafetyAnalysis::run()), meaning it was
+    // deterministically processed a few steps before this instruction.
+    const SrcState &StateBeforeChecker = getStateBefore(*FirstCheckerInst);
+
+    // The sequence checks the register, but it should be authenticated before.
+    if (!StateBeforeChecker.SafeToDerefRegs[RegCheckedBySequence])
+      return std::nullopt;
+
+    return RegCheckedBySequence;
+  }
+
   // Returns all registers that can be treated as if they are written by an
   // authentication instruction.
   SmallVector<MCPhysReg> getRegsMadeSafeToDeref(const MCInst &Point,
@@ -382,22 +414,43 @@ class SrcSafetyAnalysis {
     // ... an address can be updated in a safe manner, producing the result
     // which is as trusted as the input address.
     if (auto DstAndSrc = BC.MIB->analyzeAddressArithmeticsForPtrAuth(Point)) {
-      if (Cur.SafeToDerefRegs[DstAndSrc->second])
-        Regs.push_back(DstAndSrc->first);
+      auto [DstReg, SrcReg] = *DstAndSrc;
+      if (Cur.SafeToDerefRegs[SrcReg])
+        Regs.push_back(DstReg);
     }
 
+    // Make sure explicit checker sequence keeps register safe-to-dereference
+    // when the register would be clobbered according to the regular rules:
+    //
+    //    ; LR is safe to dereference here
+    //    mov   x16, x30  ; start of the sequence, LR is s-t-d right before
+    //    xpaclri         ; clobbers LR, LR is not safe anymore
+    //    cmp   x30, x16
+    //    b.eq  1f        ; end of the sequence: LR is marked as trusted
+    //    brk   0x1234
+    //  1:
+    //    ; at this point LR would be marked as trusted,
+    //    ; but not safe-to-dereference
+    //
+    // or even just
+    //
+    //    ; X1 is safe to dereference here
+    //    ldr x0, [x1, #8]!
+    //    ; X1 is trusted here, but it was clobbered due to address write-back
+    if (auto CheckedReg = getRegMadeTrustedByChecking(Point, Cur))
+      Regs.push_back(*CheckedReg);
+
     return Regs;
   }
 
   // Returns all registers made trusted by this instruction.
   SmallVector<MCPhysReg> getRegsMadeTrusted(const MCInst &Point,
                                             const SrcState &Cur) const {
+    assert(!AuthTrapsOnFailure && "Use getRegsMadeSafeToDeref instead");
     SmallVector<MCPhysReg> Regs;
 
     // An authenticated pointer can be checked, or
-    std::optional<MCPhysReg> CheckedReg =
-        BC.MIB->getAuthCheckedReg(Point, /*MayOverwrite=*/false);
-    if (CheckedReg && Cur.SafeToDerefRegs[*CheckedReg])
+    if (auto CheckedReg = getRegMadeTrustedByChecking(Point, Cur))
       Regs.push_back(*CheckedReg);
 
     // ... a pointer can be authenticated by an instruction that always checks
@@ -408,28 +461,16 @@ class SrcSafetyAnalysis {
     if (AutReg && IsChecked)
       Regs.push_back(*AutReg);
 
-    if (CheckerSequenceInfo.contains(&Point)) {
-      MCPhysReg CheckedReg;
-      const MCInst *FirstCheckerInst;
-      std::tie(CheckedReg, FirstCheckerInst) = CheckerSequenceInfo.at(&Point);
-
-      // FirstCheckerInst should belong to the same basic block (see the
-      // assertion in DataflowSrcSafetyAnalysis::run()), meaning it was
-      // deterministically processed a few steps before this instruction.
-      const SrcState &StateBeforeChecker = getStateBefore(*FirstCheckerInst);
-      if (StateBeforeChecker.SafeToDerefRegs[CheckedReg])
-        Regs.push_back(CheckedReg);
-    }
-
     // ... a safe address can be materialized, or
     if (auto NewAddrReg = BC.MIB->getMaterializedAddressRegForPtrAuth(Point))
       Regs.push_back(*NewAddrReg);
 
     // ... an address can be updated in a safe manner, producing the result
     // which is as trusted as the input address.
     if (auto DstAndSrc = BC.MIB->analyzeAddressArithmeticsForPtrAuth(Point)) {
-      if (Cur.TrustedRegs[DstAndSrc->second])
-        Regs.push_back(DstAndSrc->first);
+      auto [DstReg, SrcReg] = *DstAndSrc;
+      if (Cur.TrustedRegs[SrcReg])
+        Regs.push_back(DstReg);
     }
 
     return Regs;
@@ -463,28 +504,11 @@ class SrcSafetyAnalysis {
     BitVector Clobbered = getClobberedRegs(Point);
     SmallVector<MCPhysReg> NewSafeToDerefRegs =
         getRegsMadeSafeToDeref(Point, Cur);
-    SmallVector<MCPhysReg> NewTrustedRegs = getRegsMadeTrusted(Point, Cur);
-
-    // Ideally, being trusted is a strictly stronger property than being
-    // safe-to-dereference. To simplify the computation of Next state, enforce
-    // this for NewSafeToDerefRegs and NewTrustedRegs. Additionally, this
-    // fixes the properly for "cumulative" register states in tricky cases
-    // like the following:
-    //
-    //    ; LR is safe to dereference here
-    //    mov   x16, x30  ; start of the sequence, LR is s-t-d right before
-    //    xpaclri         ; clobbers LR, LR is not safe anymore
-    //    cmp   x30, x16
-    //    b.eq  1f        ; end of the sequence: LR is marked as trusted
-    //    brk   0x1234
-    //  1:
-    //    ; at this point LR would be marked as trusted,
-    //    ; but not safe-to-dereference
-    //
-    for (auto TrustedReg : NewTrustedRegs) {
-      if (!is_contained(NewSafeToDerefRegs, TrustedReg))
-        NewSafeToDerefRegs.push_back(TrustedReg);
-    }
+    // If authentication instructions trap on failure, safe-to-dereference
+    // registers are always trusted.
+    SmallVector<MCPhysReg> NewTrustedRegs =
+        AuthTrapsOnFailure ? NewSafeToDerefRegs
+                           : getRegsMadeTrusted(Point, Cur);
 
     // Then, compute the state after this instruction is executed.
     SrcState Next = Cur;
@@ -521,6 +545,11 @@ class SrcSafetyAnalysis {
       dbgs() << ")\n";
     });
 
+    // Being trusted is a strictly stronger property than being
+    // safe-to-dereference.
+    assert(!Next.TrustedRegs.test(Next.SafeToDerefRegs) &&
+           "SafeToDerefRegs should contain all TrustedRegs");
+
     return Next;
   }
 
@@ -836,9 +865,9 @@ struct DstState {
       return (*this = StateIn);
 
     CannotEscapeUnchecked &= StateIn.CannotEscapeUnchecked;
-    for (unsigned I = 0; I < FirstInstLeakingReg.size(); ++I)
-      for (const MCInst *J : StateIn.FirstInstLeakingReg[I])
-        FirstInstLeakingReg[I].insert(J);
+    for (auto [ThisSet, OtherSet] :
+         llvm::zip_equal(FirstInstLeakingReg, StateIn.FirstInstLeakingReg))
+      ThisSet.insert_range(OtherSet);
     return *this;
   }
 
@@ -1004,8 +1033,7 @@ class DstSafetyAnalysis {
 
     // ... an address can be updated in a safe manner, or
     if (auto DstAndSrc = BC.MIB->analyzeAddressArithmeticsForPtrAuth(Inst)) {
-      MCPhysReg DstReg, SrcReg;
-      std::tie(DstReg, SrcReg) = *DstAndSrc;
+      auto [DstReg, SrcReg] = *DstAndSrc;
       // Note that *all* registers containing the derived values must be safe,
       // both source and destination ones. No temporaries are supported at now.
       if (Cur.CannotEscapeUnchecked[SrcReg] &&
@@ -1045,7 +1073,7 @@ class DstSafetyAnalysis {
     // If this instruction terminates the program immediately, no
     // authentication oracles are possible past this point.
     if (BC.MIB->isTrap(Point)) {
-      LLVM_DEBUG({ traceInst(BC, "Trap instruction found", Point); });
+      LLVM_DEBUG(traceInst(BC, "Trap instruction found", Point));
       DstState Next(NumRegs, RegsToTrackInstsFor.getNumTrackedRegisters());
       Next.CannotEscapeUnchecked.set();
       return Next;
@@ -1130,6 +1158,11 @@ class DataflowDstSafetyAnalysis
   }
 
   void run() override {
+    // As long as DstSafetyAnalysis is only computed to detect authentication
+    // oracles, it is a waste of time to compute it when authentication
+    // instructions are known to always trap on failure.
+    assert(!AuthTrapsOnFailure &&
+           "DstSafetyAnalysis is useless with faulting auth");
     for (BinaryBasicBlock &BB : Func) {
       if (auto CheckerInfo = BC.MIB->getAuthCheckedReg(BB)) {
         LLVM_DEBUG({
@@ -1215,7 +1248,7 @@ class CFGUnawareDstSafetyAnalysis : public DstSafetyAnalysis,
       // starting to analyze Inst.
       if (BC.MIB->isCall(Inst) || BC.MIB->isBranch(Inst) ||
           BC.MIB->isReturn(Inst)) {
-        LLVM_DEBUG({ traceInst(BC, "Control flow instruction", Inst); });
+        LLVM_DEBUG(traceInst(BC, "Control flow instruction", Inst));
         S = createUnsafeState();
       }
 
@@ -1360,7 +1393,7 @@ shouldReportUnsafeTailCall(const BinaryContext &BC, const BinaryFunction &BF,
   // such libc, ignore tail calls performed by ELF entry function.
   if (BC.StartFunctionAddress &&
       *BC.StartFunctionAddress == Inst.getFunction()->getAddress()) {
-    LLVM_DEBUG({ dbgs() << "  Skipping tail call in ELF entry function.\n"; });
+    LLVM_DEBUG(dbgs() << "  Skipping tail call in ELF entry function.\n");
     return std::nullopt;
   }
 
@@ -1434,7 +1467,7 @@ shouldReportAuthOracle(const BinaryContext &BC, const MCInstReference &Inst,
   });
 
   if (S.empty()) {
-    LLVM_DEBUG({ dbgs() << "    DstState is empty!\n"; });
+    LLVM_DEBUG(dbgs() << "    DstState is empty!\n");
     return make_generic_report(
         Inst, "Warning: no state computed for an authentication instruction "
               "(possibly unreachable)");
@@ -1461,7 +1494,7 @@ collectRegsToTrack(ArrayRef<PartialReport<MCPhysReg>> Reports) {
 void FunctionAnalysisContext::findUnsafeUses(
     SmallVector<PartialReport<MCPhysReg>> &Reports) {
   auto Analysis = SrcSafetyAnalysis::create(BF, AllocatorId, {});
-  LLVM_DEBUG({ dbgs() << "Running src register safety analysis...\n"; });
+  LLVM_DEBUG(dbgs() << "Running src register safety analysis...\n");
   Analysis->run();
   LLVM_DEBUG({
     dbgs() << "After src register safety analysis:\n";
@@ -1518,8 +1551,7 @@ void FunctionAnalysisContext::findUnsafeUses(
 
     const SrcState &S = Analysis->getStateBefore(Inst);
     if (S.empty()) {
-      LLVM_DEBUG(
-          { traceInst(BC, "Instruction has no state, skipping", Inst); });
+      LLVM_DEBUG(traceInst(BC, "Instruction has no state, skipping", Inst));
       assert(UnreachableBBReported && "Should be reported at least once");
       (void)UnreachableBBReported;
       return;
@@ -1546,8 +1578,7 @@ void FunctionAnalysisContext::augmentUnsafeUseReports(
   SmallVector<MCPhysReg> RegsToTrack = collectRegsToTrack(Reports);
   // Re-compute the analysis with register tracking.
   auto Analysis = SrcSafetyAnalysis::create(BF, AllocatorId, RegsToTrack);
-  LLVM_DEBUG(
-      { dbgs() << "\nRunning detailed src register safety analysis...\n"; });
+  LLVM_DEBUG(dbgs() << "\nRunning detailed src register safety analysis...\n");
   Analysis->run();
   LLVM_DEBUG({
     dbgs() << "After detailed src register safety analysis:\n";
@@ -1557,7 +1588,7 @@ void FunctionAnalysisContext::augmentUnsafeUseReports(
   // Augment gadget reports.
   for (auto &Report : Reports) {
     MCInstReference Location = Report.Issue->Location;
-    LLVM_DEBUG({ traceInst(BC, "Attaching clobbering info to", Location); });
+    LLVM_DEBUG(traceInst(BC, "Attaching clobbering info to", Location));
     assert(Report.RequestedDetails &&
            "Should be removed by handleSimpleReports");
     auto DetailedInfo =
@@ -1571,9 +1602,11 @@ void FunctionAnalysisContext::findUnsafeDefs(
     SmallVector<PartialReport<MCPhysReg>> &Reports) {
   if (PacRetGadgetsOnly)
     return;
+  if (AuthTrapsOnFailure)
+    return;
 
   auto Analysis = DstSafetyAnalysis::create(BF, AllocatorId, {});
-  LLVM_DEBUG({ dbgs() << "Running dst register safety analysis...\n"; });
+  LLVM_DEBUG(dbgs() << "Running dst register safety analysis...\n");
   Analysis->run();
   LLVM_DEBUG({
     dbgs() << "After dst register safety analysis:\n";
@@ -1596,8 +1629,7 @@ void FunctionAnalysisContext::augmentUnsafeDefReports(
   SmallVector<MCPhysReg> RegsToTrack = collectRegsToTrack(Reports);
   // Re-compute the analysis with register tracking.
   auto Analysis = DstSafetyAnalysis::create(BF, AllocatorId, RegsToTrack);
-  LLVM_DEBUG(
-      { dbgs() << "\nRunning detailed dst register safety analysis...\n"; });
+  LLVM_DEBUG(dbgs() << "\nRunning detailed dst register safety analysis...\n");
   Analysis->run();
   LLVM_DEBUG({
     dbgs() << "After detailed dst register safety analysis:\n";
@@ -1607,7 +1639,7 @@ void FunctionAnalysisContext::augmentUnsafeDefReports(
   // Augment gadget reports.
   for (auto &Report : Reports) {
     MCInstReference Location = Report.Issue->Location;
-    LLVM_DEBUG({ traceInst(BC, "Attaching leakage info to", Location); });
+    LLVM_DEBUG(traceInst(BC, "Attaching leakage info to", Location));
     assert(Report.RequestedDetails &&
            "Should be removed by handleSimpleReports");
     auto DetailedInfo = std::make_shared<LeakageInfo>(

bolt/test/binary-analysis/AArch64/cmdline-args.test

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ HELP-NEXT:  OPTIONS:
 HELP-EMPTY:
 HELP-NEXT:  BinaryAnalysis options:
 HELP-EMPTY:
+HELP-NEXT:   --auth-traps-on-failure - Assume authentication instructions always trap on failure
 HELP-NEXT:   --scanners=<value> - which gadget scanners to run
 HELP-NEXT:   =pacret - pac-ret: return address protection (subset of "pauth")
 HELP-NEXT:   =pauth - All Pointer Authentication scanners

bolt/test/binary-analysis/AArch64/gs-pauth-authentication-oracles.s

@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
 // RUN: %clang %cflags -march=armv8.3-a %s -o %t.exe
-// RUN: llvm-bolt-binary-analysis --scanners=pacret %t.exe 2>&1 | FileCheck -check-prefix=PACRET %s
-// RUN: llvm-bolt-binary-analysis --scanners=pauth  %t.exe 2>&1 | FileCheck %s
+// RUN: llvm-bolt-binary-analysis --scanners=pacret                        %t.exe 2>&1 | FileCheck -check-prefix=PACRET %s
+// RUN: llvm-bolt-binary-analysis --scanners=pauth --auth-traps-on-failure %t.exe 2>&1 | FileCheck -check-prefix=FPAC %s
+// RUN: llvm-bolt-binary-analysis --scanners=pauth                         %t.exe 2>&1 | FileCheck %s
 
 // The detection of compiler-generated explicit pointer checks is tested in
 // gs-pauth-address-checks.s, for that reason only test here "dummy-load" and
 // "high-bits-notbi" checkers, as the shortest examples of checkers that are
 // detected per-instruction and per-BB.
 
 // PACRET-NOT: authentication oracle found in function
+// FPAC-NOT:   authentication oracle found in function
 
         .text
 

bolt/test/binary-analysis/AArch64/gs-pauth-calls.s

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // RUN: %clang %cflags -march=armv8.3-a %s -o %t.exe
-// RUN: llvm-bolt-binary-analysis --scanners=pacret %t.exe 2>&1 | FileCheck -check-prefix=PACRET %s
-// RUN: llvm-bolt-binary-analysis --scanners=pauth %t.exe 2>&1 | FileCheck %s
+// RUN: llvm-bolt-binary-analysis --scanners=pacret                        %t.exe 2>&1 | FileCheck -check-prefix=PACRET %s
+// RUN: llvm-bolt-binary-analysis --scanners=pauth --auth-traps-on-failure %t.exe 2>&1 | FileCheck %s
+// RUN: llvm-bolt-binary-analysis --scanners=pauth                         %t.exe 2>&1 | FileCheck %s
 
 // PACRET-NOT: non-protected call found in function