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add limitations section
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using/sandbox/linux.md

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@@ -89,6 +89,16 @@ Each sandbox type handles game data storage differently:
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Because each backend stores game data in a different location, **switching between sandbox types may cause games to lose access to previously created save data**. If you switch, you will need to manually copy save data between these locations.
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## Limitations
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The current sandbox profile is designed for **compatibility** — it shares the X11 display sockets, session D-Bus, and input devices (`/dev/input`) with the host so that games work out of the box.
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On X11, this means a sandboxed game can still monitor keystrokes, capture screen contents, and send synthetic input to other windows. This is a limitation of the X11 protocol itself, which does not isolate clients from each other — any application connected to the same X display can observe and interact with every other client.
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If you run your desktop under **Wayland**, the display server enforces per-client isolation by default, so display-level protections are significantly stronger. If your desktop environment supports it, switching to a Wayland session is the simplest way to reduce this attack surface.
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Even on X11, the sandbox still provides meaningful protection: filesystem isolation (Bubblewrap redirects `$HOME` and mounts system directories read-only), optional network isolation, and environment variable filtering prevent many classes of unwanted access.
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## Troubleshooting
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If a game is broken by the sandbox, try these steps:

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