Sync with 2.16.6

* maint-2.16: (31 commits)
  Git 2.16.6
  test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()`
  Git 2.15.4
  Git 2.14.6
  mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"
  mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
  mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters
  unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors
  quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh
  t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation
  quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials
  quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line
  tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting
  mingw: fix quoting of arguments
  Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories
  protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default
  path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams
  is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up
  mingw: disallow backslash characters in tree objects' file names
  path: safeguard `.git` against NTFS Alternate Streams Accesses
  ...

Author: dscho

Documentation/RelNotes/2.14.6.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+Git v2.14.6 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release addresses the security issues CVE-2019-1348,
+CVE-2019-1349, CVE-2019-1350, CVE-2019-1351, CVE-2019-1352,
+CVE-2019-1353, CVE-2019-1354, and CVE-2019-1387.
+
+Fixes since v2.14.5
+-------------------
+
+ * CVE-2019-1348:
+   The --export-marks option of git fast-import is exposed also via
+   the in-stream command feature export-marks=... and it allows
+   overwriting arbitrary paths.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1349:
+   When submodules are cloned recursively, under certain circumstances
+   Git could be fooled into using the same Git directory twice. We now
+   require the directory to be empty.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1350:
+   Incorrect quoting of command-line arguments allowed remote code
+   execution during a recursive clone in conjunction with SSH URLs.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1351:
+   While the only permitted drive letters for physical drives on
+   Windows are letters of the US-English alphabet, this restriction
+   does not apply to virtual drives assigned via subst <letter>:
+   <path>. Git mistook such paths for relative paths, allowing writing
+   outside of the worktree while cloning.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1352:
+   Git was unaware of NTFS Alternate Data Streams, allowing files
+   inside the .git/ directory to be overwritten during a clone.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1353:
+   When running Git in the Windows Subsystem for Linux (also known as
+   "WSL") while accessing a working directory on a regular Windows
+   drive, none of the NTFS protections were active.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1354:
+   Filenames on Linux/Unix can contain backslashes. On Windows,
+   backslashes are directory separators. Git did not use to refuse to
+   write out tracked files with such filenames.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1387:
+   Recursive clones are currently affected by a vulnerability that is
+   caused by too-lax validation of submodule names, allowing very
+   targeted attacks via remote code execution in recursive clones.
+
+Credit for finding these vulnerabilities goes to Microsoft Security
+Response Center, in particular to Nicolas Joly. The `fast-import`
+fixes were provided by Jeff King, the other fixes by Johannes
+Schindelin with help from Garima Singh.

Documentation/RelNotes/2.15.4.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+Git v2.15.4 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.14.6 to address
+the security issues CVE-2019-1348, CVE-2019-1349, CVE-2019-1350,
+CVE-2019-1351, CVE-2019-1352, CVE-2019-1353, CVE-2019-1354, and
+CVE-2019-1387; see the release notes for that version for details.
+
+In conjunction with a vulnerability that was fixed in v2.20.2,
+`.gitmodules` is no longer allowed to contain entries of the form
+`submodule.<name>.update=!command`.

Documentation/RelNotes/2.16.6.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+Git v2.16.6 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.14.6 and in
+v2.15.4 addressing the security issues CVE-2019-1348, CVE-2019-1349,
+CVE-2019-1350, CVE-2019-1351, CVE-2019-1352, CVE-2019-1353,
+CVE-2019-1354, and CVE-2019-1387; see the release notes for those
+versions for details.

Documentation/git-fast-import.txt

@@ -50,6 +50,21 @@ OPTIONS
 	memory used by fast-import during this run.  Showing this output
 	is currently the default, but can be disabled with --quiet.
 
+--allow-unsafe-features::
+	Many command-line options can be provided as part of the
+	fast-import stream itself by using the `feature` or `option`
+	commands. However, some of these options are unsafe (e.g.,
+	allowing fast-import to access the filesystem outside of the
+	repository). These options are disabled by default, but can be
+	allowed by providing this option on the command line.  This
+	currently impacts only the `export-marks`, `import-marks`, and
+	`import-marks-if-exists` feature commands.
++
+	Only enable this option if you trust the program generating the
+	fast-import stream! This option is enabled automatically for
+	remote-helpers that use the `import` capability, as they are
+	already trusted to run their own code.
+
 Options for Frontends
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 

Documentation/gitmodules.txt

@@ -44,9 +44,8 @@ submodule.<name>.update::
 	submodule init` to initialize the configuration variable of
 	the same name. Allowed values here are 'checkout', 'rebase',
 	'merge' or 'none'. See description of 'update' command in
-	linkgit:git-submodule[1] for their meaning. Note that the
-	'!command' form is intentionally ignored here for security
-	reasons.
+	linkgit:git-submodule[1] for their meaning. For security
+	reasons, the '!command' form is not accepted here.
 
 submodule.<name>.branch::
 	A remote branch name for tracking updates in the upstream submodule.

builtin/clone.c

@@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ static int checkout(int submodule_progress)
 
 	if (!err && (option_recurse_submodules.nr > 0)) {
 		struct argv_array args = ARGV_ARRAY_INIT;
-		argv_array_pushl(&args, "submodule", "update", "--init", "--recursive", NULL);
+		argv_array_pushl(&args, "submodule", "update", "--require-init", "--recursive", NULL);
 
 		if (option_shallow_submodules == 1)
 			argv_array_push(&args, "--depth=1");

builtin/submodule--helper.c

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include "revision.h"
 #include "diffcore.h"
 #include "diff.h"
+#include "dir.h"
 
 #define OPT_QUIET (1 << 0)
 #define OPT_CACHED (1 << 1)
@@ -1191,6 +1192,7 @@ static int module_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
 	char *p, *path = NULL, *sm_gitdir;
 	struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct string_list reference = STRING_LIST_INIT_NODUP;
+	int require_init = 0;
 	char *sm_alternate = NULL, *error_strategy = NULL;
 
 	struct option module_clone_options[] = {
@@ -1215,6 +1217,8 @@ static int module_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
 		OPT__QUIET(&quiet, "Suppress output for cloning a submodule"),
 		OPT_BOOL(0, "progress", &progress,
 			   N_("force cloning progress")),
+		OPT_BOOL(0, "require-init", &require_init,
+			   N_("disallow cloning into non-empty directory")),
 		OPT_END()
 	};
 
@@ -1242,6 +1246,10 @@ static int module_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
 	} else
 		path = xstrdup(path);
 
+	if (validate_submodule_git_dir(sm_gitdir, name) < 0)
+		die(_("refusing to create/use '%s' in another submodule's "
+			"git dir"), sm_gitdir);
+
 	if (!file_exists(sm_gitdir)) {
 		if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(sm_gitdir) < 0)
 			die(_("could not create directory '%s'"), sm_gitdir);
@@ -1253,6 +1261,8 @@ static int module_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
 			die(_("clone of '%s' into submodule path '%s' failed"),
 			    url, path);
 	} else {
+		if (require_init && !access(path, X_OK) && !is_empty_dir(path))
+			die(_("directory not empty: '%s'"), path);
 		if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(path) < 0)
 			die(_("could not create directory '%s'"), path);
 		strbuf_addf(&sb, "%s/index", sm_gitdir);
@@ -1301,6 +1311,7 @@ struct submodule_update_clone {
 	int quiet;
 	int recommend_shallow;
 	struct string_list references;
+	unsigned require_init;
 	const char *depth;
 	const char *recursive_prefix;
 	const char *prefix;
@@ -1316,7 +1327,7 @@ struct submodule_update_clone {
 	int failed_clones_nr, failed_clones_alloc;
 };
 #define SUBMODULE_UPDATE_CLONE_INIT {0, MODULE_LIST_INIT, 0, \
-	SUBMODULE_UPDATE_STRATEGY_INIT, 0, 0, -1, STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP, \
+	SUBMODULE_UPDATE_STRATEGY_INIT, 0, 0, -1, STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP, 0, \
 	NULL, NULL, NULL, \
 	STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP, 0, NULL, 0, 0}
 
@@ -1435,6 +1446,8 @@ static int prepare_to_clone_next_submodule(const struct cache_entry *ce,
 		argv_array_pushl(&child->args, "--prefix", suc->prefix, NULL);
 	if (suc->recommend_shallow && sub->recommend_shallow == 1)
 		argv_array_push(&child->args, "--depth=1");
+	if (suc->require_init)
+		argv_array_push(&child->args, "--require-init");
 	argv_array_pushl(&child->args, "--path", sub->path, NULL);
 	argv_array_pushl(&child->args, "--name", sub->name, NULL);
 	argv_array_pushl(&child->args, "--url", url, NULL);
@@ -1586,6 +1599,8 @@ static int update_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
 		OPT__QUIET(&suc.quiet, N_("don't print cloning progress")),
 		OPT_BOOL(0, "progress", &suc.progress,
 			    N_("force cloning progress")),
+		OPT_BOOL(0, "require-init", &suc.require_init,
+			   N_("disallow cloning into non-empty directory")),
 		OPT_END()
 	};
 

compat/mingw.c

@@ -333,6 +333,12 @@ int mingw_mkdir(const char *path, int mode)
 {
 	int ret;
 	wchar_t wpath[MAX_PATH];
+
+	if (!is_valid_win32_path(path)) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	if (xutftowcs_path(wpath, path) < 0)
 		return -1;
 	ret = _wmkdir(wpath);
@@ -345,13 +351,18 @@ int mingw_open (const char *filename, int oflags, ...)
 {
 	va_list args;
 	unsigned mode;
-	int fd;
+	int fd, create = (oflags & (O_CREAT | O_EXCL)) == (O_CREAT | O_EXCL);
 	wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH];
 
 	va_start(args, oflags);
 	mode = va_arg(args, int);
 	va_end(args);
 
+	if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
+		errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
 		filename = "nul";
 
@@ -413,6 +424,11 @@ FILE *mingw_fopen (const char *filename, const char *otype)
 	int hide = needs_hiding(filename);
 	FILE *file;
 	wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH], wotype[4];
+	if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
+		int create = otype && strchr(otype, 'w');
+		errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
+		return NULL;
+	}
 	if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
 		filename = "nul";
 	if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, filename) < 0 ||
@@ -435,6 +451,11 @@ FILE *mingw_freopen (const char *filename, const char *otype, FILE *stream)
 	int hide = needs_hiding(filename);
 	FILE *file;
 	wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH], wotype[4];
+	if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
+		int create = otype && strchr(otype, 'w');
+		errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
+		return NULL;
+	}
 	if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
 		filename = "nul";
 	if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, filename) < 0 ||
@@ -883,7 +904,7 @@ static const char *quote_arg(const char *arg)
 				p++;
 				len++;
 			}
-			if (*p == '"')
+			if (*p == '"' || !*p)
 				n += count*2 + 1;
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -905,16 +926,19 @@ static const char *quote_arg(const char *arg)
 				count++;
 				*d++ = *arg++;
 			}
-			if (*arg == '"') {
+			if (*arg == '"' || !*arg) {
 				while (count-- > 0)
 					*d++ = '\\';
+				/* don't escape the surrounding end quote */
+				if (!*arg)
+					break;
 				*d++ = '\\';
 			}
 		}
 		*d++ = *arg++;
 	}
 	*d++ = '"';
-	*d++ = 0;
+	*d++ = '\0';
 	return q;
 }
 
@@ -1976,6 +2000,30 @@ pid_t waitpid(pid_t pid, int *status, int options)
 	return -1;
 }
 
+int mingw_has_dos_drive_prefix(const char *path)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Does it start with an ASCII letter (i.e. highest bit not set),
+	 * followed by a colon?
+	 */
+	if (!(0x80 & (unsigned char)*path))
+		return *path && path[1] == ':' ? 2 : 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * While drive letters must be letters of the English alphabet, it is
+	 * possible to assign virtually _any_ Unicode character via `subst` as
+	 * a drive letter to "virtual drives". Even `1`, or `ä`. Or fun stuff
+	 * like this:
+	 *
+	 *      subst ֍: %USERPROFILE%\Desktop
+	 */
+	for (i = 1; i < 4 && (0x80 & (unsigned char)path[i]); i++)
+		; /* skip first UTF-8 character */
+	return path[i] == ':' ? i + 1 : 0;
+}
+
 int mingw_skip_dos_drive_prefix(char **path)
 {
 	int ret = has_dos_drive_prefix(*path);
@@ -2117,6 +2165,50 @@ static void setup_windows_environment(void)
 		setenv("TERM", "cygwin", 1);
 }
 
+int is_valid_win32_path(const char *path)
+{
+	int preceding_space_or_period = 0, i = 0, periods = 0;
+
+	if (!protect_ntfs)
+		return 1;
+
+	skip_dos_drive_prefix((char **)&path);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		char c = *(path++);
+		switch (c) {
+		case '\0':
+		case '/': case '\\':
+			/* cannot end in ` ` or `.`, except for `.` and `..` */
+			if (preceding_space_or_period &&
+			    (i != periods || periods > 2))
+				return 0;
+			if (!c)
+				return 1;
+
+			i = periods = preceding_space_or_period = 0;
+			continue;
+		case '.':
+			periods++;
+			/* fallthru */
+		case ' ':
+			preceding_space_or_period = 1;
+			i++;
+			continue;
+		case ':': /* DOS drive prefix was already skipped */
+		case '<': case '>': case '"': case '|': case '?': case '*':
+			/* illegal character */
+			return 0;
+		default:
+			if (c > '\0' && c < '\x20')
+				/* illegal character */
+				return 0;
+		}
+		preceding_space_or_period = 0;
+		i++;
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * Disable MSVCRT command line wildcard expansion (__getmainargs called from
  * mingw startup code, see init.c in mingw runtime).