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readme.md

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@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ Security is one of the most central pillar of IAM foundations. Here are some bro
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- [Enterprise Information Security](https://infosec.mozilla.org) - Mozilla's security and access guidelines.
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- [Mitigating Cloud Vulnerabilities](https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/22/2002237484/-1/-1/0/CSI-MITIGATING-CLOUD-VULNERABILITIES_20200121.PDF) - “This document divides cloud vulnerabilities into four classes (misconfiguration, poor access control, shared tenancy vulnerabilities, and supply chain vulnerabilities)”.
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- [Mitigating Cloud Vulnerabilities](https://web.archive.org/web/20250529050934/https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/22/2002237484/-1/-1/0/CSI-MITIGATING-CLOUD-VULNERABILITIES_20200121.PDF) - “This document divides cloud vulnerabilities into four classes (misconfiguration, poor access control, shared tenancy vulnerabilities, and supply chain vulnerabilities)”.
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- [Cartography](https://github.com/lyft/cartography) - A Neo4J-based tool to map out dependencies and relationships between services and resources. Supports AWS, GCP, GSuite, Okta and GitHub.
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- [Is SMS 2FA Secure? No.](https://www.issms2fasecure.com) - Definitive research project demonstrating successful attempts at SIM swapping.
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- [Hackers Hit Twitter C.E.O. Jack Dorsey in a 'SIM Swap.' You're at Risk, Too.](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/technology/sim-swap-jack-dorsey-hack.html)
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- [Hackers Hit Twitter C.E.O. Jack Dorsey in a 'SIM Swap.' You're at Risk, Too.](https://archive.ph/AhNAI)
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- [AT&T rep handed control of his cellphone account to a hacker](https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/07/10/att_falls_for_hacker_tricks/)
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- [Using JSON Web Tokens as API Keys](https://auth0.com/blog/using-json-web-tokens-as-api-keys/) - Compared to API keys, JWTs offers granular security, homogeneous auth architecture, decentralized issuance, OAuth2 compliance, debuggability, expiration control, device management.
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- [Managing a Secure JSON Web Token Implementation](https://cursorblog.com/managing-a-secure-json-web-token-implementation/) - JWT has all sorts of flexibility that make it hard to use well.
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- [Hardcoded secrets, unverified tokens, and other common JWT mistakes](https://r2c.dev/blog/2020/hardcoded-secrets-unverified-tokens-and-other-common-jwt-mistakes/) - A good recap of all JWT pitfalls.
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- [Adding JSON Web Token API Keys to a DenyList](https://auth0.com/blog/denylist-json-web-token-api-keys/) - On token invalidation.
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- [The Case for Granular Permissions](https://cerbos.dev/blog/the-case-for-granular-permissions) - Discuss the limitations of RBAC and how ABAC (Attribute-Based Access Control) addresses them.
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- [In Search For a Perfect Access Control System](https://goteleport.com/blog/access-controls/) - The historical origins of authorization schemes. Hints at the future of sharing, trust and delegation between different teams and organizations.
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- [In Search For a Perfect Access Control System](https://web.archive.org/web/20240421203937/https://goteleport.com/blog/access-controls/) - The historical origins of authorization schemes. Hints at the future of sharing, trust and delegation between different teams and organizations.
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- [GCP's IAM syntax is better than AWS's](https://ucarion.com/iam-operation-syntax) - The minutiae of permission design in GCP improves the developer's experience.
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- [Awesome OpenID Connect](https://github.com/cerberauth/awesome-openid-connect) - A curated list of providers, services, libraries, and resources for OpenID Connect.
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- [The problem with OAuth for Authentication](http://www.thread-safe.com/2012/01/problem-with-oauth-for-authentication.html) - “The problem is that OAuth 2.0 is a Delegated Authorization protocol, and not a Authentication protocol.” 10 years after, this article is still the best explanation on [why use OpenID Connect instead of plain OAuth2](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/260519)?
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- [The problem with OAuth for Authentication](http://www.thread-safe.com/2012/01/problem-with-oauth-for-authentication.html) - “The problem is that OAuth 2.0 is a Delegated Authorization protocol, and not a Authentication protocol.” 10 years after, this article is still the best explanation on [why use OpenID Connect instead of plain OAuth2](https://web.archive.org/web/20250519085713/https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/37818/why-use-openid-connect-instead-of-plain-oauth2/260519#260519)?
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- [An Illustrated Guide to OAuth and OpenID Connect](https://developer.okta.com/blog/2019/10/21/illustrated-guide-to-oauth-and-oidc) - Explain how these standards work using simplified illustrations.
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- [OAuth 2 Simplified](https://aaronparecki.com/oauth-2-simplified/) - A reference article describing the protocol in simplified format to help developers and service providers implement it.
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- [OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect (in plain English)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=996OiexHze0) - Starts with an historical context on how these standards came to be, clears up the innacuracies in the vocabulary, then details the protocols and its pitfalls to make it less intimidating.
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- [Everything You Need to Know About OAuth (2.0)](https://gravitational.com/blog/everything-you-need-to-know-about-oauth/) - A good overview with a practical case study on how Teleport, an open-source remote access tool, allows users to log in through GitHub SSO.
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- [OAuth in one picture](https://mobile.twitter.com/kamranahmedse/status/1276994010423361540) - A nice summary card.
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- [How to Implement a Secure Central Authentication Service in Six Steps](https://shopify.engineering/implement-secure-central-authentication-service-six-steps) - Got multiple legacy systems to merge with their own login methods and accounts? Here is how to merge all that mess by the way of OIDC.
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- [What's the Difference Between OAuth, OpenID Connect, and SAML?](https://www.okta.com/identity-101/whats-the-difference-between-oauth-openid-connect-and-saml/) - Identity is hard. Another take on the different protocol is always welcome to help makes sense of it all.
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- [How SAML 2.0 Authentication Works](https://gravitational.com/blog/how-saml-authentication-works/) - Overview of the how and why of SSO and SAML.
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- [How SAML 2.0 Authentication Works](https://web.archive.org/web/20240421215604/https://goteleport.com/blog/how-saml-authentication-works/) - Overview of the how and why of SSO and SAML.
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- [Web Single Sign-On, the SAML 2.0 perspective](https://blog.theodo.com/2019/06/web-single-sign-on-the-saml-2-0-perspective/) - Another naive explanation of SAML workflow in the context of corporate SSO implementation.
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- [The Laws of Identity](https://www.identityblog.com/stories/2005/05/13/TheLawsOfIdentity.pdf) - Is this paper aims at identity metasystem, its laws still provides great insights at smaller scale, especially the first law: to always allow user control and ask for consent to earn trust.
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- [How Uber Got Lost](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/23/business/how-uber-got-lost.html) - “To limit "friction" Uber allowed riders to sign up without requiring them to provide identity beyond an email — easily faked — or a phone number. (…) Vehicles were stolen and burned; drivers were assaulted, robbed and occasionally murdered. The company stuck with the low-friction sign-up system, even as violence increased.”
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- [How Uber Got Lost](https://archive.ph/hvjKl) - “To limit "friction" Uber allowed riders to sign up without requiring them to provide identity beyond an email — easily faked — or a phone number. (…) Vehicles were stolen and burned; drivers were assaulted, robbed and occasionally murdered. The company stuck with the low-friction sign-up system, even as violence increased.”
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- [A Comparison of Personal Name Matching: Techniques and Practical Issues](http://users.cecs.anu.edu.au/~Peter.Christen/publications/tr-cs-06-02.pdf) - Customer name matching has lots of application, from account deduplication to fraud monitoring.
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- [Paper we love: Privacy](https://github.com/papers-we-love/papers-we-love/tree/master/privacy) - A collection of scientific studies of schemes providing privacy by design.
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- [IRMA Authentication](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20144240) - Open-source app and protocol that offers privacy-friendly attribute based authentication and signing using [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya's Idemix](https://privacybydesign.foundation/publications/).
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- [Have I been Pwned?](https://haveibeenpwned.com) - Data breach index.
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- [Automated security testing for Software Developers](https://fahrplan.events.ccc.de/camp/2019/Fahrplan/system/event_attachments/attachments/000/003/798/original/security_cccamp.pdf) - Most privacy breaches were allowed by known vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies. Here is how to detect them by the way of CI/CD.
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As a central repository of user data, the IAM stack stakeholders have to prevent any leakage of business and customer data. To allow for internal analytics, anonymization is required.
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- [The False Allure of Hashing for Anonymization](https://gravitational.com/blog/hashing-for-anonymization/) - Hashing is not sufficient for anonymization no. But still it is good enough for pseudonymization (which is allowed by the GDPR).
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- [The False Allure of Hashing for Anonymization](https://goteleport.com/blog/hashing-for-anonymization/) - Hashing is not sufficient for anonymization no. But still it is good enough for pseudonymization (which is allowed by the GDPR).
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- [Four cents to deanonymize: Companies reverse hashed email addresses](https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/04/09/four-cents-to-deanonymize-companies-reverse-hashed-email-addresses/) - “Hashed email addresses can be easily reversed and linked to an individual”.
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readme.zh.md

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- [企业信息安全](https://infosec.mozilla.org) - Mozilla 的安全和访问指南。
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- [缓解云漏洞](https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/22/2002237484/-1/-1/0/CSI-MITIGATING-CLOUD-VULNERABILITIES_20200121.PDF) - “本文档将云漏洞分为四类(配置错误、访问控制不当、共享租户漏洞和供应链漏洞)”。
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- [缓解云漏洞](https://web.archive.org/web/20250529050934/https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/22/2002237484/-1/-1/0/CSI-MITIGATING-CLOUD-VULNERABILITIES_20200121.PDF) - “本文档将云漏洞分为四类(配置错误、访问控制不当、共享租户漏洞和供应链漏洞)”。
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- [Cartography](https://github.com/lyft/cartography) - 一种基于 Neo4J 的工具,用于映射服务和资源之间的依赖关系和关系。 支持 AWS、GCP、GSuite、Okta 和 GitHub。
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- [SMS 2FA 安全吗? 不。](https://www.issms2fasecure.com) - 权威研究项目展示了 SIM 交换的成功尝试。
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- [黑客攻击 Twitter CEO 杰克·多尔西 (Jack Dorsey) 在“SIM 交换”中。 你也有危险。](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/technology/sim-swap-jack-dorsey-hack.html)
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- [黑客攻击 Twitter CEO 杰克·多尔西 (Jack Dorsey) 在“SIM 交换”中。 你也有危险。](https://archive.ph/AhNAI)
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- [美国电话电报公司代表将其手机账户的控制权交给黑客](https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/07/10/att_falls_for_hacker_tricks/)
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- [使用 JSON Web 令牌作为 API 密钥](https://auth0.com/blog/using-json-web-tokens-as-api-keys/) - 与 API 密钥相比,JWT 提供了细粒度的安全性、同质身份验证架构、去中心化发布、OAuth2 合规性、可调试性、过期控制、设备管理。
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- [管理一个安全的 JSON 网络令牌实现](https://cursorblog.com/managing-a-secure-json-web-token-implementation/) - JWT有各种各样的灵活性,使它很难用好。
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- [硬编码的密钥、未经验证的令牌和其他常见的 JWT 错误](https://r2c.dev/blog/2020/hardcoded-secrets-unverified-tokens-and-other-common-jwt-mistakes/) - 对所有 JWT 的陷阱进行了很好的总结。
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- [将 JSON 网络令牌 API 密钥添加到拒绝列表中](https://auth0.com/blog/denylist-json-web-token-api-keys/) - 在令牌失效时。
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- [细粒度权限的案例](https://cerbos.dev/blog/the-case-for-granular-permissions) - 讨论 RBAC 的局限性以及 ABAC(基于属性的访问控制)如何解决这些问题。
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- [寻找完美的访问控制系统](https://goteleport.com/blog/access-controls/) - 授权计划的历史渊源。暗示了不同团队和组织之间共享、信任和授权的未来。
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- [寻找完美的访问控制系统](https://web.archive.org/web/20240421203937/https://goteleport.com/blog/access-controls/) - 授权计划的历史渊源。暗示了不同团队和组织之间共享、信任和授权的未来。
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- [GCP IAM语法比AWS更好](https://ucarion.com/iam-operation-syntax) - GCP中许可设计的细节可改善发育器的经验。
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- [很棒的 OpenID Connect](https://github.com/cerberauth/awesome-openid-connect) - OpenID Connect 的提供商、服务、库和资源的精选列表.
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- [OAuth 身份验证的问题](http://www.thread-safe.com/2012/01/problem-with-oauth-for-authentication.html) - “问题是 OAuth 2.0 是委托授权 协议,而不是身份验证协议。” 10年后,这篇文章仍然是关于[为什么使用OpenID Connect而不是普通OAuth2](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/260519)的最好解释?
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- [OAuth 身份验证的问题](http://www.thread-safe.com/2012/01/problem-with-oauth-for-authentication.html) - “问题是 OAuth 2.0 是委托授权 协议,而不是身份验证协议。” 10年后,这篇文章仍然是关于[为什么使用OpenID Connect而不是普通OAuth2](https://web.archive.org/web/20250519085713/https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/37818/why-use-openid-connect-instead-of-plain-oauth2/260519#260519)的最好解释?
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- [OAuth 和 OpenID Connect 图解指南](https://developer.okta.com/blog/2019/10/21/illustrated-guide-to-oauth-and-oidc) - 使用简化的插图解释这些标准的工作原理。
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- [OAuth 2 简化版](https://aaronparecki.com/oauth-2-simplified/) - 以简化格式描述协议的参考文章,以帮助开发人员和服务提供商实施它。
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- [OAuth 2.0 和 OpenID 连接(通俗易懂)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=996OiexHze0) - 首先介绍了这些标准是如何形成的历史背景,澄清了词汇中的不正确之处,然后详细介绍了协议及其陷阱,使其不那么令人生畏。
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- [关于 OAuth (2.0) 你需要知道的一切](https://gravitational.com/blog/everything-you-need-to-know-about-oauth/) - 很好的概述和实际案例研究,介绍了开源远程访问工具 Teleport 如何允许用户通过 GitHub SSO 登录。
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- [一张图看懂 OAuth](https://mobile.twitter.com/kamranahmedse/status/1276994010423361540) - 一张漂亮的总结卡。
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- [如何通过六个步骤实现安全的中央认证服务](https://shopify.engineering/implement-secure-central-authentication-service-six-steps) - 有多个遗留系统要与它们自己的登录方式和账户合并?这里是如何通过 OIDC 的方式来合并所有这些混乱的系统。
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- [OAuth、OpenID Connect 和 SAML 之间有什么区别?](https://www.okta.com/identity-101/whats-the-difference-between-oauth-openid-connect-and-saml/) - 身份是困难的。我们总是欢迎对不同协议的另一种看法,以帮助理解这一切。
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- [SAML 2.0 认证如何工作](https://gravitational.com/blog/how-saml-authentication-works/) - 概述 SSO 和 SAML 的方式和原因。
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- [SAML 2.0 认证如何工作](https://web.archive.org/web/20240421215604/https://goteleport.com/blog/how-saml-authentication-works/) - 概述 SSO 和 SAML 的方式和原因。
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- [Web 单点登录,SAML 2.0 视角](https://blog.theodo.com/2019/06/web-single-sign-on-the-saml-2-0-perspective/) - 在公司 SSO 实施的上下文中对 SAML 工作流的另一种简要解释。
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- [身份法则](https://www.identityblog.com/stories/2005/05/13/TheLawsOfIdentity.pdf) - 虽然本文的目标是身份元系统,但它的法则在较小的范围内仍然提供了很好的见解,特别是第一条法则:总是允许用户控制并征求同意以赢得信任。
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- [Uber 是如何迷路的](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/23/business/how-uber-got-lost.html) - “为了限制‘摩擦’,Uber 允许乘客在注册时无需提供电子邮件(很容易伪造)或电话号码以外的身份信息。 (...) 车辆被盗并被烧毁; 司机遭到殴打、抢劫,有时甚至被谋杀。 该公司坚持使用低摩擦注册系统,即使暴力事件有所增加。”
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- [Uber 是如何迷路的](https://archive.ph/hvjKl) - “为了限制‘摩擦’,Uber 允许乘客在注册时无需提供电子邮件(很容易伪造)或电话号码以外的身份信息。 (...) 车辆被盗并被烧毁; 司机遭到殴打、抢劫,有时甚至被谋杀。 该公司坚持使用低摩擦注册系统,即使暴力事件有所增加。”
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- [个人姓名匹配的比较:技术和实际问题](http://users.cecs.anu.edu.au/~Peter.Christen/publications/tr-cs-06-02.pdf) - 客户姓名匹配有很多应用,从重复数据删除到欺诈监控。
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- [我们喜欢的论文:隐私](https://github.com/papers-we-love/papers-we-love/tree/master/privacy) - 通过设计提供隐私的方案的科学研究集合。
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- [IRMA 认证](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20144240) - 使用 [Camenisch 和 Lysyanskaya 的 Idemix](https://privacybydesign.foundation/publications/) 提供隐私友好的基于属性的身份验证和签名的开源应用程序和协议。
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- [我被骗了吗?](https://haveibeenpwned.com) - 数据泄露指数。
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- [软件开发人员的自动化安全测试](https://fahrplan.events.ccc.de/camp/2019/Fahrplan/system/event_attachments/attachments/000/003/798/original/security_cccamp.pdf) -第三方依赖项中的已知漏洞允许大多数隐私泄露。 下面介绍如何通过 CI/CD 的方式检测它们。
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作为用户数据的中央存储库,IAM 技术栈的相关人员必须防止任何业务和客户数据的泄漏。为了允许内部分析,需要进行匿名化。
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- [哈希法用于匿名的虚假诱惑](https://gravitational.com/blog/hashing-for-anonymization/) - Hashing 不足以实现匿名化。但对于假名化(GDPR允许的)来说,它仍然足够好。
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- [哈希法用于匿名的虚假诱惑](https://goteleport.com/blog/hashing-for-anonymization/) - Hashing 不足以实现匿名化。但对于假名化(GDPR允许的)来说,它仍然足够好。
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- [四分钱去掉匿名:公司反向散列的电子邮件地址](https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/04/09/four-cents-to-deanonymize-companies-reverse-hashed-email-addresses/) - "哈希的电子邮件地址可以很容易地被逆转,并与个人联系起来"。
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