Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next

Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov:

 - Remove usermode driver (UMD) framework (Thomas Weißschuh)

 - Introduce Strongly Connected Component (SCC) in the verifier to
   detect loops and refine register liveness (Eduard Zingerman)

 - Allow 'void *' cast using bpf_rdonly_cast() and corresponding
   '__arg_untrusted' for global function parameters (Eduard Zingerman)

 - Improve precision for BPF_ADD and BPF_SUB operations in the verifier
   (Harishankar Vishwanathan)

 - Teach the verifier that constant pointer to a map cannot be NULL
   (Ihor Solodrai)

 - Introduce BPF streams for error reporting of various conditions
   detected by BPF runtime (Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi)

 - Teach the verifier to insert runtime speculation barrier (lfence on
   x86) to mitigate speculative execution instead of rejecting the
   programs (Luis Gerhorst)

 - Various improvements for 'veristat' (Mykyta Yatsenko)

 - For CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL config warn on internal verifier errors to
   improve bug detection by syzbot (Paul Chaignon)

 - Support BPF private stack on arm64 (Puranjay Mohan)

 - Introduce bpf_cgroup_read_xattr() kfunc to read xattr of cgroup's
   node (Song Liu)

 - Introduce kfuncs for read-only string opreations (Viktor Malik)

 - Implement show_fdinfo() for bpf_links (Tao Chen)

 - Reduce verifier's stack consumption (Yonghong Song)

 - Implement mprog API for cgroup-bpf programs (Yonghong Song)

* tag 'bpf-next-6.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (192 commits)
  selftests/bpf: Migrate fexit_noreturns case into tracing_failure test suite
  selftests/bpf: Add selftest for attaching tracing programs to functions in deny list
  bpf: Add log for attaching tracing programs to functions in deny list
  bpf: Show precise rejected function when attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn functions
  bpf: Fix various typos in verifier.c comments
  bpf: Add third round of bounds deduction
  selftests/bpf: Test invariants on JSLT crossing sign
  selftests/bpf: Test cross-sign 64bits range refinement
  selftests/bpf: Update reg_bound range refinement logic
  bpf: Improve bounds when s64 crosses sign boundary
  bpf: Simplify bounds refinement from s32
  selftests/bpf: Enable private stack tests for arm64
  bpf, arm64: JIT support for private stack
  bpf: Move bpf_jit_get_prog_name() to core.c
  bpf, arm64: Fix fp initialization for exception boundary
  umd: Remove usermode driver framework
  bpf/preload: Don't select USERMODE_DRIVER
  selftests/bpf: Fix test dynptr/test_dynptr_memset_xdp_chunks failure
  selftests/bpf: Fix test dynptr/test_dynptr_copy_xdp failure
  selftests/bpf: Increase xdp data size for arm64 64K page size
  ...

Author: torvalds

Documentation/bpf/bpf_devel_QA.rst

@@ -611,9 +611,10 @@ Q: I have added a new BPF instruction to the kernel, how can I integrate
 it into LLVM?
 
 A: LLVM has a ``-mcpu`` selector for the BPF back end in order to allow
-the selection of BPF instruction set extensions. By default the
-``generic`` processor target is used, which is the base instruction set
-(v1) of BPF.
+the selection of BPF instruction set extensions. Before llvm version 20,
+the ``generic`` processor target is used, which is the base instruction
+set (v1) of BPF. Since llvm 20, the default processor target has changed
+to instruction set v3.
 
 LLVM has an option to select ``-mcpu=probe`` where it will probe the host
 kernel for supported BPF instruction set extensions and selects the

Documentation/bpf/standardization/instruction-set.rst

@@ -350,9 +350,9 @@ Underflow and overflow are allowed during arithmetic operations, meaning
 the 64-bit or 32-bit value will wrap. If BPF program execution would
 result in division by zero, the destination register is instead set to zero.
 Otherwise, for ``ALU64``, if execution would result in ``LLONG_MIN``
-dividing -1, the desination register is instead set to ``LLONG_MIN``. For
-``ALU``, if execution would result in ``INT_MIN`` dividing -1, the
-desination register is instead set to ``INT_MIN``.
+divided by -1, the destination register is instead set to ``LLONG_MIN``. For
+``ALU``, if execution would result in ``INT_MIN`` divided by -1, the
+destination register is instead set to ``INT_MIN``.
 
 If execution would result in modulo by zero, for ``ALU64`` the value of
 the destination register is unchanged whereas for ``ALU`` the upper

arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h

@@ -325,4 +325,9 @@
 #define A64_MRS_SP_EL0(Rt) \
 	aarch64_insn_gen_mrs(Rt, AARCH64_INSN_SYSREG_SP_EL0)
 
+/* Barriers */
+#define A64_SB aarch64_insn_get_sb_value()
+#define A64_DSB_NSH (aarch64_insn_get_dsb_base_value() | 0x7 << 8)
+#define A64_ISB aarch64_insn_get_isb_value()
+
 #endif /* _BPF_JIT_H */

arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #define TMP_REG_2 (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 1)
 #define TCCNT_PTR (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 2)
 #define TMP_REG_3 (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 3)
+#define PRIVATE_SP (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 4)
 #define ARENA_VM_START (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 5)
 
 #define check_imm(bits, imm) do {				\
@@ -68,6 +69,8 @@ static const int bpf2a64[] = {
 	[TCCNT_PTR] = A64_R(26),
 	/* temporary register for blinding constants */
 	[BPF_REG_AX] = A64_R(9),
+	/* callee saved register for private stack pointer */
+	[PRIVATE_SP] = A64_R(27),
 	/* callee saved register for kern_vm_start address */
 	[ARENA_VM_START] = A64_R(28),
 };
@@ -86,6 +89,7 @@ struct jit_ctx {
 	u64 user_vm_start;
 	u64 arena_vm_start;
 	bool fp_used;
+	bool priv_sp_used;
 	bool write;
 };
 
@@ -98,6 +102,10 @@ struct bpf_plt {
 #define PLT_TARGET_SIZE   sizeof_field(struct bpf_plt, target)
 #define PLT_TARGET_OFFSET offsetof(struct bpf_plt, target)
 
+/* Memory size/value to protect private stack overflow/underflow */
+#define PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ    16
+#define PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL   0xEB9F12345678eb9fULL
+
 static inline void emit(const u32 insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx->image != NULL && ctx->write)
@@ -387,8 +395,11 @@ static void find_used_callee_regs(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
 	if (reg_used & 8)
 		ctx->used_callee_reg[i++] = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_9];
 
-	if (reg_used & 16)
+	if (reg_used & 16) {
 		ctx->used_callee_reg[i++] = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_FP];
+		if (ctx->priv_sp_used)
+			ctx->used_callee_reg[i++] = bpf2a64[PRIVATE_SP];
+	}
 
 	if (ctx->arena_vm_start)
 		ctx->used_callee_reg[i++] = bpf2a64[ARENA_VM_START];
@@ -412,6 +423,7 @@ static void push_callee_regs(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
 		emit(A64_PUSH(A64_R(23), A64_R(24), A64_SP), ctx);
 		emit(A64_PUSH(A64_R(25), A64_R(26), A64_SP), ctx);
 		emit(A64_PUSH(A64_R(27), A64_R(28), A64_SP), ctx);
+		ctx->fp_used = true;
 	} else {
 		find_used_callee_regs(ctx);
 		for (i = 0; i + 1 < ctx->nr_used_callee_reg; i += 2) {
@@ -461,6 +473,19 @@ static void pop_callee_regs(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
 	}
 }
 
+static void emit_percpu_ptr(const u8 dst_reg, void __percpu *ptr,
+			    struct jit_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	const u8 tmp = bpf2a64[TMP_REG_1];
+
+	emit_a64_mov_i64(dst_reg, (__force const u64)ptr, ctx);
+	if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN))
+		emit(A64_MRS_TPIDR_EL2(tmp), ctx);
+	else
+		emit(A64_MRS_TPIDR_EL1(tmp), ctx);
+	emit(A64_ADD(1, dst_reg, dst_reg, tmp), ctx);
+}
+
 #define BTI_INSNS (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL) ? 1 : 0)
 #define PAC_INSNS (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL) ? 1 : 0)
 
@@ -476,6 +501,8 @@ static int build_prologue(struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool ebpf_from_cbpf)
 	const bool is_main_prog = !bpf_is_subprog(prog);
 	const u8 fp = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_FP];
 	const u8 arena_vm_base = bpf2a64[ARENA_VM_START];
+	const u8 priv_sp = bpf2a64[PRIVATE_SP];
+	void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr;
 	const int idx0 = ctx->idx;
 	int cur_offset;
 
@@ -551,15 +578,23 @@ static int build_prologue(struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool ebpf_from_cbpf)
 		emit(A64_SUB_I(1, A64_SP, A64_FP, 96), ctx);
 	}
 
-	if (ctx->fp_used)
-		/* Set up BPF prog stack base register */
-		emit(A64_MOV(1, fp, A64_SP), ctx);
-
 	/* Stack must be multiples of 16B */
 	ctx->stack_size = round_up(prog->aux->stack_depth, 16);
 
+	if (ctx->fp_used) {
+		if (ctx->priv_sp_used) {
+			/* Set up private stack pointer */
+			priv_stack_ptr = prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr + PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ;
+			emit_percpu_ptr(priv_sp, priv_stack_ptr, ctx);
+			emit(A64_ADD_I(1, fp, priv_sp, ctx->stack_size), ctx);
+		} else {
+			/* Set up BPF prog stack base register */
+			emit(A64_MOV(1, fp, A64_SP), ctx);
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* Set up function call stack */
-	if (ctx->stack_size)
+	if (ctx->stack_size && !ctx->priv_sp_used)
 		emit(A64_SUB_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx);
 
 	if (ctx->arena_vm_start)
@@ -623,7 +658,7 @@ static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
 	emit(A64_STR64I(tcc, ptr, 0), ctx);
 
 	/* restore SP */
-	if (ctx->stack_size)
+	if (ctx->stack_size && !ctx->priv_sp_used)
 		emit(A64_ADD_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx);
 
 	pop_callee_regs(ctx);
@@ -991,7 +1026,7 @@ static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool was_classic)
 	const u8 ptr = bpf2a64[TCCNT_PTR];
 
 	/* We're done with BPF stack */
-	if (ctx->stack_size)
+	if (ctx->stack_size && !ctx->priv_sp_used)
 		emit(A64_ADD_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx);
 
 	pop_callee_regs(ctx);
@@ -1120,6 +1155,7 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx,
 	const u8 tmp2 = bpf2a64[TMP_REG_2];
 	const u8 fp = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_FP];
 	const u8 arena_vm_base = bpf2a64[ARENA_VM_START];
+	const u8 priv_sp = bpf2a64[PRIVATE_SP];
 	const s16 off = insn->off;
 	const s32 imm = insn->imm;
 	const int i = insn - ctx->prog->insnsi;
@@ -1564,7 +1600,7 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx,
 			src = tmp2;
 		}
 		if (src == fp) {
-			src_adj = A64_SP;
+			src_adj = ctx->priv_sp_used ? priv_sp : A64_SP;
 			off_adj = off + ctx->stack_size;
 		} else {
 			src_adj = src;
@@ -1630,17 +1666,14 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx,
 			return ret;
 		break;
 
-	/* speculation barrier */
+	/* speculation barrier against v1 and v4 */
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
-		/*
-		 * Nothing required here.
-		 *
-		 * In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation of
-		 * Speculative Store Bypass as controlled via the ssbd kernel
-		 * parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it works
-		 * for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any
-		 * additional instructions.
-		 */
+		if (alternative_has_cap_likely(ARM64_HAS_SB)) {
+			emit(A64_SB, ctx);
+		} else {
+			emit(A64_DSB_NSH, ctx);
+			emit(A64_ISB, ctx);
+		}
 		break;
 
 	/* ST: *(size *)(dst + off) = imm */
@@ -1657,7 +1690,7 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx,
 			dst = tmp2;
 		}
 		if (dst == fp) {
-			dst_adj = A64_SP;
+			dst_adj = ctx->priv_sp_used ? priv_sp : A64_SP;
 			off_adj = off + ctx->stack_size;
 		} else {
 			dst_adj = dst;
@@ -1719,7 +1752,7 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx,
 			dst = tmp2;
 		}
 		if (dst == fp) {
-			dst_adj = A64_SP;
+			dst_adj = ctx->priv_sp_used ? priv_sp : A64_SP;
 			off_adj = off + ctx->stack_size;
 		} else {
 			dst_adj = dst;
@@ -1862,6 +1895,39 @@ static inline void bpf_flush_icache(void *start, void *end)
 	flush_icache_range((unsigned long)start, (unsigned long)end);
 }
 
+static void priv_stack_init_guard(void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr, int alloc_size)
+{
+	int cpu, underflow_idx = (alloc_size - PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ) >> 3;
+	u64 *stack_ptr;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		stack_ptr = per_cpu_ptr(priv_stack_ptr, cpu);
+		stack_ptr[0] = PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL;
+		stack_ptr[1] = PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL;
+		stack_ptr[underflow_idx] = PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL;
+		stack_ptr[underflow_idx + 1] = PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL;
+	}
+}
+
+static void priv_stack_check_guard(void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr, int alloc_size,
+				   struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	int cpu, underflow_idx = (alloc_size - PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ) >> 3;
+	u64 *stack_ptr;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		stack_ptr = per_cpu_ptr(priv_stack_ptr, cpu);
+		if (stack_ptr[0] != PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL ||
+		    stack_ptr[1] != PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL ||
+		    stack_ptr[underflow_idx] != PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL ||
+		    stack_ptr[underflow_idx + 1] != PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL) {
+			pr_err("BPF private stack overflow/underflow detected for prog %sx\n",
+			       bpf_jit_get_prog_name(prog));
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 struct arm64_jit_data {
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header;
 	u8 *ro_image;
@@ -1874,9 +1940,11 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	int image_size, prog_size, extable_size, extable_align, extable_offset;
 	struct bpf_prog *tmp, *orig_prog = prog;
 	struct bpf_binary_header *header;
-	struct bpf_binary_header *ro_header;
+	struct bpf_binary_header *ro_header = NULL;
 	struct arm64_jit_data *jit_data;
+	void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr = NULL;
 	bool was_classic = bpf_prog_was_classic(prog);
+	int priv_stack_alloc_sz;
 	bool tmp_blinded = false;
 	bool extra_pass = false;
 	struct jit_ctx ctx;
@@ -1908,6 +1976,23 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		}
 		prog->aux->jit_data = jit_data;
 	}
+	priv_stack_ptr = prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr;
+	if (!priv_stack_ptr && prog->aux->jits_use_priv_stack) {
+		/* Allocate actual private stack size with verifier-calculated
+		 * stack size plus two memory guards to protect overflow and
+		 * underflow.
+		 */
+		priv_stack_alloc_sz = round_up(prog->aux->stack_depth, 16) +
+				      2 * PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ;
+		priv_stack_ptr = __alloc_percpu_gfp(priv_stack_alloc_sz, 16, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!priv_stack_ptr) {
+			prog = orig_prog;
+			goto out_priv_stack;
+		}
+
+		priv_stack_init_guard(priv_stack_ptr, priv_stack_alloc_sz);
+		prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr = priv_stack_ptr;
+	}
 	if (jit_data->ctx.offset) {
 		ctx = jit_data->ctx;
 		ro_image_ptr = jit_data->ro_image;
@@ -1931,6 +2016,9 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	ctx.user_vm_start = bpf_arena_get_user_vm_start(prog->aux->arena);
 	ctx.arena_vm_start = bpf_arena_get_kern_vm_start(prog->aux->arena);
 
+	if (priv_stack_ptr)
+		ctx.priv_sp_used = true;
+
 	/* Pass 1: Estimate the maximum image size.
 	 *
 	 * BPF line info needs ctx->offset[i] to be the offset of
@@ -2070,7 +2158,12 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 			ctx.offset[i] *= AARCH64_INSN_SIZE;
 		bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo(prog, ctx.offset + 1);
 out_off:
+		if (!ro_header && priv_stack_ptr) {
+			free_percpu(priv_stack_ptr);
+			prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr = NULL;
+		}
 		kvfree(ctx.offset);
+out_priv_stack:
 		kfree(jit_data);
 		prog->aux->jit_data = NULL;
 	}
@@ -2089,6 +2182,11 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	goto out_off;
 }
 
+bool bpf_jit_supports_private_stack(void)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
 bool bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call(void)
 {
 	return true;
@@ -2243,11 +2341,6 @@ static int calc_arg_aux(const struct btf_func_model *m,
 
 	/* the rest arguments are passed through stack */
 	for (; i < m->nr_args; i++) {
-		/* We can not know for sure about exact alignment needs for
-		 * struct passed on stack, so deny those
-		 */
-		if (m->arg_flags[i] & BTF_FMODEL_STRUCT_ARG)
-			return -ENOTSUPP;
 		stack_slots = (m->arg_size[i] + 7) / 8;
 		a->bstack_for_args += stack_slots * 8;
 		a->ostack_for_args = a->ostack_for_args + stack_slots * 8;
@@ -2911,6 +3004,17 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_percpu_insn(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
+bool bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4(void)
+{
+	/* In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation of Speculative
+	 * Store Bypass as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever
+	 * the mitigation is enabled, it works for all of the kernel code with
+	 * no need to provide any additional instructions. Therefore, skip
+	 * inserting nospec insns against Spectre v4.
+	 */
+	return true;
+}
+
 bool bpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(s32 imm)
 {
 	switch (imm) {
@@ -2928,6 +3032,8 @@ void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	if (prog->jited) {
 		struct arm64_jit_data *jit_data = prog->aux->jit_data;
 		struct bpf_binary_header *hdr;
+		void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr;
+		int priv_stack_alloc_sz;
 
 		/*
 		 * If we fail the final pass of JIT (from jit_subprogs),
@@ -2941,6 +3047,13 @@ void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		}
 		hdr = bpf_jit_binary_pack_hdr(prog);
 		bpf_jit_binary_pack_free(hdr, NULL);
+		priv_stack_ptr = prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr;
+		if (priv_stack_ptr) {
+			priv_stack_alloc_sz = round_up(prog->aux->stack_depth, 16) +
+					      2 * PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ;
+			priv_stack_check_guard(priv_stack_ptr, priv_stack_alloc_sz, prog);
+			free_percpu(prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr);
+		}
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(!bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off(prog));
 	}