ipv4: provide stronger user input validation in nl_fib_input()

Alexander reported a KMSAN splat caused by reads of uninitialized
field (tb_id_in) from user provided struct fib_result_nl

It turns out nl_fib_input() sanity tests on user input is a bit
wrong :

User can pretend nlh->nlmsg_len is big enough, but provide
at sendmsg() time a too small buffer.

Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Author: edumazet

net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c

@@ -1083,7 +1083,8 @@ static void nl_fib_input(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	net = sock_net(skb->sk);
 	nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
-	if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
+	if (skb->len < nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(*frn)) ||
+	    skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
 	    nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*frn))
 		return;