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lines changed Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change @@ -121,8 +121,20 @@ considered weak.
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### Persistent volume creation
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- As noted in the [ PodSecurityPolicy] ( /docs/concepts/security/pod-security-policy/#volumes-and-file-systems )
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- documentation, access to create PersistentVolumes can allow for escalation of access to the underlying host.
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+ If someone - or some application - is allowed to create arbitrary PersistentVolumes, that access
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+ includes the creation of ` hostPath ` volumes, which then means that a Pod would get access
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+ to the underlying host filesystem(s) on the associated node. Granting that ability is a security risk.
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+ There are many ways a container with unrestricted access to the host filesystem can escalate privileges, including
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+ reading data from other containers, and abusing the credentials of system services, such as Kubelet.
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+ You should only allow access to create PersistentVolume objects for:
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+
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+ - users (cluster operators) that need this access for their work, and who you trust,
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+ - the Kubernetes control plane components which creates PersistentVolumes based on PersistentVolumeClaims
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+ that are configured for automatic provisioning.
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+ This is usually setup by the Kubernetes provider or by the operator when installing a CSI driver.
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+
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Where access to persistent storage is required trusted administrators should create
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PersistentVolumes, and constrained users should use PersistentVolumeClaims to access that storage.
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