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docs: Replace infrastructure-sovereignty.md with auditor-privacy-preserving-geolocation.md
- DELETED: infrastructure-sovereignty.md (redundant with unified identity doc) - NEW: auditor-privacy-preserving-geolocation.md - Section 2: PET comparison (TEE, FHE, MPC, DP vs ZKP) - Explains why ZKP is optimal for geolocation compliance - Multi-sensor fusion architecture - SVID geolocation claims - Evidence Bundle for auditors - Updated cross-references in README.md and AI governance doc - Builds on unified identity framework instead of duplicating
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README.md

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@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ AegisSovereignAI is designed to be framework-agnostic, serving as a secure execu
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## Technical & Auditor Resources
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* **[Auditor Guide](./docs/auditor.md)** - High-level overview of the attestation-linked evidence model covering the full AI lifecycle (Ingestion, Training, and Inference), verifiable geofencing (Reg-K), and identity binding. Includes the complete Evidence Bundle structure for regulatory reporting.
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* **[Infrastructure Sovereignty (Layer 1/2)](./docs/infrastructure-sovereignty.md)** - Technical deep-dive on **Environmental Trust**: Hardware attestation (TEE/TPM), identity binding (SPIFFE/SPIRE + Keylime), privacy-preserving geofencing (Reg-K), and data ingestion provenance.
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* **[Privacy-Preserving Geolocation (Layer 2)](./docs/auditor-privacy-preserving-geolocation.md)** - Technical deep-dive on **privacy-preserving geofencing** for Reg-K/GDPR compliance, including ZKP vs. other PETs comparison, multi-sensor fusion, and SVID geolocation claims.
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* **[Privacy-Preserving AI Governance (Layer 3)](./docs/auditor-privacy-preserving-ai-governance.md)** - Technical walkthrough of the **Four-Track Layer 3 Governance Lifecycle** (Training, System Prompt, User Prompt, Output), Batch & Purge architecture, and modular Evidence Bundle verification.
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* **[Threat Model: Unmanaged Device Security](./hybrid-cloud-poc/THREAT-MODEL-unmanaged-device.md)** - Analysis of **Infrastructure Blind Spots** on **BYOD/Unmanaged Devices**, detailing how AegisSovereignAI prevents location spoofing via hardware-rooted sensor fusion.
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* **[Unified Identity Deep-Dive](./hybrid-cloud-poc/README-arch-sovereign-unified-identity.md)** - Detailed technical architecture of the SPIRE/Keylime identity fusion model.

docs/auditor-privacy-preserving-ai-governance.md

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# Layer 3: Privacy-Preserving AI Governance (The "Audit without Disclosure" Paradox)
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> **For Technical Auditors & Architects:** This document provides a deep technical walkthrough of the **Layer 3 AI Governance** model using **privacy-preserving techniques (e.g., ZKPs)** for prompt and output verification. For Layer 1/2 foundations (Hardware Trust, Identity, Location), see **[Infrastructure Sovereignty](./infrastructure-sovereignty.md)**.
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> **For Technical Auditors & Architects:** This document provides a deep technical walkthrough of the **Layer 3 AI Governance** model using **privacy-preserving techniques (e.g., ZKPs)** for prompt and output verification. For Layer 1/2 foundations (Hardware Trust, Identity, Location), see **[Privacy-Preserving Geolocation](./auditor-privacy-preserving-geolocation.md)**.
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This document solves the **"Audit without Disclosure"** paradox: how can enterprises prove AI compliance to regulators without exposing proprietary prompts or retaining high-liability PII?
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> [!IMPORTANT]
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> **Layer 2 Prerequisites:** All Layer 3 governance assumes a verified **Sovereign Anchor** is in place. Before proceeding with content verification, auditors must confirm the workload is running on attested hardware (Layer 1) with verified identity and location (Layer 2). See **[Infrastructure Sovereignty](./infrastructure-sovereignty.md)** for Stage 1 verification.
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> **Layer 2 Prerequisites:** All Layer 3 governance assumes a verified **Sovereign Anchor** is in place. Before proceeding with content verification, auditors must confirm the workload is running on attested hardware (Layer 1) with verified identity and location (Layer 2). See **[Privacy-Preserving Geolocation](./auditor-privacy-preserving-geolocation.md)** for Stage 1 verification.
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## 1. The Problem: The Prompt & Output Paradox
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AegisSovereignAI's Layer 3 provides **cryptographic verification** across the AI governance lifecycle: **Model Training → System Prompt → User Prompt → AI Output**.
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> [!NOTE]
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> **Layer 2 Content Moved:** Data Ingestion Provenance (Track A) and Geofencing verification are Layer 2 concerns. See **[Infrastructure Sovereignty](./infrastructure-sovereignty.md)** for these primitives.
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> **Layer 2 Content Moved:** Data Ingestion Provenance (Track A) and Geofencing verification are Layer 2 concerns. See **[Privacy-Preserving Geolocation](./auditor-privacy-preserving-geolocation.md)** for these primitives.
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### Track A: Model Training Governance (Redaction Policy)
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> [!NOTE]
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> **Modular Verification:** The complete Evidence Bundle is verified in two stages:
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> - **Stage 1 (Layer 1/2):** "Is this a valid Aegis Sovereign Node?" See **[Infrastructure Sovereignty](./infrastructure-sovereignty.md)**
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> - **Stage 1 (Layer 1/2):** "Is this a valid Aegis Sovereign Node?" See **[Privacy-Preserving Geolocation](./auditor-privacy-preserving-geolocation.md)**
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> - **Stage 2 (This Document):** "Did this node follow the governance policy for this session?"
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When an auditor requests **Layer 3 compliance evidence**, they receive:
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---
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[Root README](../README.md) | [Auditor Guide](./auditor.md) | [Infrastructure Sovereignty (Layer 1/2)](./infrastructure-sovereignty.md) | [IETF WIMSE Draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lkspa-wimse-verifiable-geo-fence/)
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[Root README](../README.md) | [Auditor Guide](./auditor.md) | [Privacy-Preserving Geolocation (Layer 2)](./auditor-privacy-preserving-geolocation.md) | [IETF WIMSE Draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lkspa-wimse-verifiable-geo-fence/)
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# Privacy-Preserving Geolocation Verification for Auditors
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> **For Technical Auditors & Architects:** This document provides a deep-dive on **privacy-preserving geolocation verification** for regulatory compliance (e.g., Reg-K, GDPR). For the underlying hardware and identity architecture, see **[Unified Identity & Trust Framework](../hybrid-cloud-poc/README-arch-sovereign-unified-identity.md)**. For Layer 3 AI governance, see **[Privacy-Preserving AI Governance](./auditor-privacy-preserving-ai-governance.md)**.
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---
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## 1. The Problem: The Residency vs. Privacy Deadlock
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Regulators require **proof of data residency** (e.g., **Regulation K**), but traditional geofencing creates a fundamental conflict:
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| Requirement | Traditional Approach | Liability / Risk |
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|-------------|---------------------|------------------|
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| **Prove Data Residency** | Log precise GPS coordinates | Creates massive PII liability under GDPR |
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| **Comply with GDPR** | Don't store location data | Cannot prove Reg-K compliance |
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| **Prevent Location Spoofing** | Rely on IP-based geofencing | Trivially bypassed with VPNs |
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**The Deadlock:** Enterprises are forced to choose between **non-compliance with residency laws** or **privacy violation under GDPR**.
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---
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## 2. Privacy-Preserving Techniques: A Technical Comparison
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Multiple Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs) exist for protecting location data. Below is an analysis of why **Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs)** are optimal for geolocation compliance.
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| Technology | How It Works | Pros | Cons for Geolocation |
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|------------|--------------|------|----------------------|
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| **Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)** | Process location inside hardware enclaves (Intel SGX, AMD SEV) | Low overhead, real-time processing | Requires external auditor to trust the enclave; no portable proof for regulators |
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| **Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)** | Compute on encrypted coordinates without decryption | Strong mathematical guarantees | **1000x+ overhead** makes real-time geofencing impractical |
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| **Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC)** | Distribute computation across multiple parties | No single party sees full data | Network latency; operational complexity for mobile devices |
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| **Differential Privacy** | Add noise to location data | Protects individual coordinates | **Cannot prove exact boundary compliance** (noise defeats precision) |
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| **Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs)** | Prove statement about data without revealing data | Portable proof; auditor-verifiable; no data retention | Proof generation overhead (mitigated by batching) |
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### Why ZKP is Optimal for Geolocation Compliance
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1. **Portable Proof:** Unlike TEEs, ZKPs produce a proof that can be verified by any auditor without trusting specific hardware.
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2. **Exact Compliance:** Unlike Differential Privacy, ZKPs prove the coordinate is **exactly** within the boundary—no approximations.
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3. **No Retained Data:** The proof is generated device-side; raw coordinates never leave the device.
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4. **Auditor Independence:** Regulators verify the mathematical proof, not the Enterprise's attestation claims.
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5. **Batching for Performance:** While individual proof generation has overhead, session-level batching amortizes costs.
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> [!NOTE]
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> **AegisSovereignAI Hybrid Approach:** We combine **TEEs** (for secure real-time filtering) with **ZKPs** (for auditor-verifiable compliance proofs), achieving both performance and regulatory portability.
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---
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## 3. The AegisSovereignAI Solution: Hardware-Rooted Privacy-Preserving Geofencing
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AegisSovereignAI resolves this deadlock using a **"Coordinate-in-Polygon" ZKP circuit** combined with hardware-rooted sensor fusion.
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### The Architecture
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```
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ PRIVACY-PRESERVING GEOLOCATION FLOW │
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└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Device (BYOD/Managed) Aegis Verifier Auditor
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═══════════════════════ ══════════════ ════════
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┌──────────────────────┐
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│ Hardware Sensors │
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│ (TPM-signed GPS + │
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│ CAMARA Mobile API) │
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└──────────┬───────────┘
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┌──────────────────────┐
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│ ZKP Circuit Engine │
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│ (Coordinate-in- │
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│ Polygon Proof) │
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└──────────┬───────────┘
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│ Private: Precise GPS coordinates
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│ Public: Compliance boundary polygon
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┌──────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐
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│ ZKP Proof Generated │────────▶│ Verify ZKP Proof │
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│ (No raw GPS sent) │ │ + Hardware Quote │
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└──────────────────────┘ └──────────┬──────────┘
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┌─────────────────────┐
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│ SVID Issued with │
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│ Geolocation Claim: │
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│ • status: COMPLIANT│
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│ • region: US-EAST │──────▶ Evidence
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│ • proof: base64... │ Bundle
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└─────────────────────┘
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🔑 KEY INSIGHT: The Enterprise never sees raw GPS coordinates.
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The auditor receives a cryptographic proof of compliance.
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```
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### The ZKP Circuit
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```rust
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// Conceptual Noir Circuit for Privacy-Preserving Geofencing
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fn main(
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// PRIVATE INPUTS (Never disclosed)
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gps_latitude: Field, // User's precise latitude
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gps_longitude: Field, // User's precise longitude
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sensor_signature: [u8; 64], // TPM signature over coordinates
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// PUBLIC INPUTS (Visible to auditor)
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compliance_polygon: [Point; N], // The "Green Zone" boundary
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tpm_public_key: pub Field, // For signature verification
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proof_timestamp: pub Field // When the proof was generated
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) {
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// 1. Verify the coordinates came from genuine hardware
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assert(verify_tpm_signature(
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sensor_signature,
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hash(gps_latitude, gps_longitude, proof_timestamp),
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tpm_public_key
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));
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// 2. Verify the point is inside the compliance polygon
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assert(point_in_polygon(
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gps_latitude,
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gps_longitude,
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compliance_polygon
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));
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// OUTPUT: Proof that "genuine hardware reported a location within the boundary"
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// WITHOUT revealing the actual coordinates
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}
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```
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---
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## 4. Multi-Sensor Fusion: Defeating Spoofing Attacks
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AegisSovereignAI uses **hardware-rooted multi-sensor fusion** to prevent location spoofing. This builds on the architecture detailed in the **[Unified Identity & Trust Framework](../hybrid-cloud-poc/README-arch-sovereign-unified-identity.md)**.
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### Sensor Hierarchy
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| Sensor Type | Trust Level | Verification Method |
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|-------------|-------------|---------------------|
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| **CAMARA Mobile API** | Highest | MNO-verified SIM location via OIDC |
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| **TPM-Signed GNSS** | High | Hardware-rooted GPS signatures |
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| **App-Level GPS** | Low | Cross-validated against higher-trust sensors |
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### Attack Resistance
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| Attack Vector | Traditional Vulnerability | Aegis Defense |
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|---------------|---------------------------|---------------|
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| **VPN Spoofing** | IP-based checks fail | Hardware sensors ignore network layer |
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| **GPS Spoofing App** | App-level coordinates faked | TPM signature verification fails |
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| **Frida/API Hooking** | Runtime API interception | CAMARA API bypasses app layer entirely |
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| **Rooted/Jailbroken Device** | Full sensor control | Secure Enclave attestation detects compromise |
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> **Deep-Dive:** For complete attack analysis, see **[Threat Model: Unmanaged Device Security](../hybrid-cloud-poc/THREAT-MODEL-unmanaged-device.md)**.
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---
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## 5. The SVID Geolocation Claims
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When geolocation verification succeeds, the claims are embedded in the **SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Document (SVID)**:
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```json
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{
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"svid": "spiffe://aegis.local/workload/private-wealth-advisory",
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"claims": {
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"grc.geolocation.status": "compliant",
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"grc.geolocation.region_id": "US-EAST-1",
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"grc.geolocation.proof": "base64-zkp-proof...",
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"grc.geolocation.timestamp": "2026-01-20T14:00:00Z",
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"grc.geolocation.sensor_type": "CAMARA_MNO",
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"grc.tpm-attestation.tier": "tier-2-byod"
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},
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"attestation_quote": "base64-tpm-quote..."
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}
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```
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### Claim Semantics
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| Claim | Type | Example | Description |
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|-------|------|---------|-------------|
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| `grc.geolocation.status` | enum | `compliant` | ZKP-verified geofence result |
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| `grc.geolocation.region_id` | string | `US-EAST-1` | Broad compliance region (Reg-K) |
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| `grc.geolocation.proof` | base64 | `eyJ...` | The actual ZKP proof for auditor verification |
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| `grc.geolocation.sensor_type` | enum | `CAMARA_MNO` | Which sensor provided the location |
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---
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## 6. Enterprise Use Case: Private Wealth Gen-AI Advisory
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### Scenario (Use Case 1 - Enterprise Customer)
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A high-net-worth client uses the **Private Wealth Gen-AI Advisory** from their personal mobile device. The bank must prove to an EU regulator that the AI inference stayed within the EEA (**Reg-K** compliance), but cannot store raw GPS data (**GDPR** violation).
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### The Privacy-Preserving Flow
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1. **Client opens app** on personal iPhone/Android
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2. **CAMARA API** verifies device location via MNO (carrier-level, not app-level)
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3. **ZKP circuit** generates proof: "Device is within EEA boundary"
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4. **SVID issued** with `grc.geolocation.status: compliant` and `grc.geolocation.region_id: EEA`
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5. **AI inference executes** with verified geolocation claim
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6. **Evidence Bundle** includes ZKP proof for auditor
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**Result:** The bank proves Reg-K compliance without ever touching raw GPS coordinates.
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---
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## 7. The Evidence Bundle for Auditors
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When an auditor requests geolocation compliance evidence:
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```json
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{
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"bundle_type": "GEOLOCATION_COMPLIANCE",
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"audit_window": {
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"start": "2026-01-20T00:00:00Z",
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"end": "2026-01-20T23:59:59Z"
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},
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"compliance_boundary": {
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"name": "EEA_REGULATION_K",
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"polygon_hash": "sha256:abc123..."
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},
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"sessions": [
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{
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"session_id": "sess-001",
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"svid": "spiffe://aegis.local/workload/private-wealth-advisory",
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"geolocation_claim": {
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"status": "compliant",
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"region_id": "EEA",
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"sensor_type": "CAMARA_MNO",
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"zkp_proof": "base64-noir-proof..."
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},
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"timestamp": "2026-01-20T14:00:00Z"
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}
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],
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"aggregate_stats": {
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"total_sessions": 15847,
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"compliant_sessions": 15847,
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"non_compliant_sessions": 0
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},
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"signatures": {
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"aegis_geolocation_jws": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs..."
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}
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}
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```
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### Auditor Verification Workflow
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1. **Verify Boundary Definition:** Confirm the `polygon_hash` matches the official Reg-K boundary.
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2. **Verify ZKP Proofs:** For each session (or sample), verify the ZKP proof against the boundary.
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3. **Verify Hardware Attestation:** Confirm the session was on attested hardware via SVID.
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4. **Aggregate Compliance:** Confirm all sessions in the audit window are compliant.
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---
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## 8. Regulatory Mapping
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| Regulatory Need | AegisSovereignAI Implementation |
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|-----------------|--------------------------------|
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| **Reg-K (Data Residency)** | ZKP proves location within boundary without storing coordinates |
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| **GDPR Art. 5 (Data Minimization)** | No raw GPS data ever leaves the device |
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| **GDPR Art. 25 (Privacy by Design)** | Hardware-rooted ZKP is privacy-first architecture |
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| **EU AI Act (Transparency)** | Auditor receives verifiable proof, not opaque assertions |
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---
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## 9. Integration with Layer 3 AI Governance
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Geolocation verification is a **Layer 2 prerequisite** for Layer 3 AI Governance. The modular architecture:
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```
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ MODULAR EVIDENCE BUNDLE VERIFICATION │
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└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Stage 1: Environmental Trust (This Document)
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═════════════════════════════════════════════
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✓ Is this a genuine, untampered device?
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✓ Is the device within the compliance boundary?
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✓ Is the SVID bound to attested hardware?
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Stage 2: Content Trust (AI Governance)
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═══════════════════════════════════════
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✓ Did the system prompt contain required guardrails?
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✓ Were user prompts scanned for injection attacks?
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✓ Were AI outputs filtered for PII leakage?
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See: [Privacy-Preserving AI Governance](./auditor-privacy-preserving-ai-governance.md)
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```
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---
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[Root README](../README.md) | [Auditor Guide](./auditor.md) | [Unified Identity Framework](../hybrid-cloud-poc/README-arch-sovereign-unified-identity.md) | [AI Governance (Layer 3)](./auditor-privacy-preserving-ai-governance.md)

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