Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into HEAD

Author: tlaurion

initrd/.bash_history

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ find /boot/kexec*.txt | gpg --verify /boot/kexec.sig -
 #remove invalid kexec_* signed files
 mount /dev/sda1 /boot && mount -o remount,rw /boot && rm /boot/kexec* && mount -o remount,ro /boot
 #Generate keys on OpenPGP smartcard: 
-mount-usb && gpg --home=/.gnupg/ --card-edit
+mount-usb --mode rw && gpg --home=/.gnupg/ --card-edit
 #Copy generated public key, private_subkey, trustdb and artifacts to external media for backup: 
-mount -o remount,rw /media && mkdir -p /media/gpg_keys; gpg --export-secret-keys --armor email@address.com > /media/gpg_keys/private.key && gpg --export --armor email@address.com  > /media/gpg_keys/public.key && gpg --export-ownertrust > /media/gpg_keys/otrust.txt && cp -r ./.gnupg/* /media/gpg_keys/ 2> /dev/null
+mkdir -p /media/gpg_keys; gpg --export-secret-keys --armor email@address.com > /media/gpg_keys/private.key && gpg --export --armor email@address.com  > /media/gpg_keys/public.key && gpg --export-ownertrust > /media/gpg_keys/otrust.txt && cp -r ./.gnupg/* /media/gpg_keys/ 2> /dev/null
 #Insert public key and trustdb export into reproducible rom:
 cbfs -o /media/coreboot.rom -a "heads/initrd/.gnupg/keys/public.key" -f /media/gpg_keys/public.key && cbfs -o /media/coreboot.rom -a "heads/initrd/.gnupg/keys/otrust.txt" -f /media/gpg_keys/otrust.txt
 #Flush changes to external media: 

initrd/bin/generic-init

@@ -48,14 +48,14 @@ while true; do
 	if [ "$totp_confirm" = "m" ]; then
 		# Try to select a kernel from the menu
 		mount_boot
-		kexec-select-boot -m -b /boot -c "grub.cfg"
+		DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-select-boot -m -b /boot -c "grub.cfg"
 		continue
 	fi
 
 	if [ "$totp_confirm" = "y" -o -n "$totp_confirm" ]; then
 		# Try to boot the default
 		mount_boot
-		kexec-select-boot -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" \
+		DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-select-boot -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" \
 		|| recovery "Failed default boot"
 	fi
 

initrd/bin/gui-init

@@ -150,16 +150,21 @@ generate_totp_hotp() {
 	TRACE_FUNC
 	tpm_owner_password="$1" # May be empty, will prompt if needed and empty
 	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" != "y" ] && [ -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
+		# If we don't have a TPM, but we have a HOTP USB Security dongle
+		TRACE_FUNC
 		echo "Generating new HOTP secret"
-		/bin/seal-hotpkey
+		/bin/seal-hotpkey ||
+			die "Failed to generate HOTP secret"
 	elif echo -e "Generating new TOTP secret...\n\n" && /bin/seal-totp "$BOARD_NAME" "$tpm_owner_password"; then
 		echo
 		if [ -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
+			# If we have a TPM and a HOTP USB Security dongle
 			if [ "$CONFIG_TOTP_SKIP_QRCODE" != y ]; then
 				echo "Once you have scanned the QR code, hit Enter to configure your HOTP USB Security dongle (e.g. Librem Key or Nitrokey)"
 				read
 			fi
-			/bin/seal-hotpkey
+			TRACE_FUNC
+			/bin/seal-hotpkey || die "Failed to generate HOTP secret"
 		else
 			if [ "$CONFIG_TOTP_SKIP_QRCODE" != y ]; then
 				echo "Once you have scanned the QR code, hit Enter to continue"
@@ -183,17 +188,6 @@ update_totp() {
 		TOTP="NO TPM"
 	else
 		TOTP=$(unseal-totp)
-		# On platforms using CONFIG_BOOT_EXTRA_TTYS multiple processes may try to
-		# access TPM at the same time, failing with EBUSY. The order of execution
-		# is unpredictable, so the error may appear on main console, secondary one,
-		# or neither of them if the calls are sufficiently staggered. Try up to
-		# three times (including previous one) with small delays in case of error,
-		# instead of immediately scaring users with "you've been pwned" message.
-		while [ $? -ne 0 ] && [ $tries -lt 2 ]; do
-			sleep 0.5
-			((tries++))
-			TOTP=$(unseal-totp)
-		done
 		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
 			BG_COLOR_MAIN_MENU="error"
 			if [ "$skip_to_menu" = "true" ]; then
@@ -280,7 +274,10 @@ update_hotp() {
 		HOTP='N/A'
 	fi
 
-	if [[ "$CONFIG_TPM" = n && "$HOTP" = "Invalid code" ]]; then
+	if [[ "$HOTP" = "Invalid code" ]]; then
+		#Do not propose to generate a new secret if there is no /boot/kexec_hotp_counter
+		# tpm unseal succeeded: so the sealed secret is correct: we should propose to reset TPM if not already
+		#  Here: the OS was most probably reinstalled since TPM can still unseal the secret
 		whiptail_error --title "ERROR: HOTP Validation Failed!" \
 			--menu "ERROR: $CONFIG_BRAND_NAME couldn't validate the HOTP code.\n\nIf you just reflashed your BIOS, you should generate a new TOTP/HOTP secret.\n\nIf you have not just reflashed your BIOS, THIS COULD INDICATE TAMPERING!\n\nHow would you like to proceed?" 0 80 4 \
 			'g' ' Generate new TOTP/HOTP secret' \
@@ -553,21 +550,29 @@ reset_tpm() {
 			mount -o rw,remount /boot
 			#TODO: this is really problematic, we should really remove the primary handle hash
 
-			INFO "Removing rollback and primary handle hash under /boot"
+			INFO "Removing rollback and primary handle hashes under /boot"
+
+			DEBUG "Removing /boot/kexec_rollback.txt and /boot/kexec_primhdl_hash.txt"
 			rm -f /boot/kexec_rollback.txt
 			rm -f /boot/kexec_primhdl_hash.txt
 
 			# create Heads TPM counter before any others
 			check_tpm_counter /boot/kexec_rollback.txt "" "$tpm_owner_password" ||
 				die "Unable to find/create tpm counter"
-			counter="$TPM_COUNTER"
 
-			increment_tpm_counter $counter >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+			TRACE_FUNC
+
+			TPM_COUNTER=$(cut -d: -f1 </tmp/counter)
+			DEBUG "TPM_COUNTER: $TPM_COUNTER"
+			#TPM_COUNTER can be empty
+
+			DO_WITH_DEBUG increment_tpm_counter $TPM_COUNTER>/dev/null 2>&1 ||
 				die "Unable to increment tpm counter"
 
-			sha256sum /tmp/counter-$counter >/boot/kexec_rollback.txt ||
+			DO_WITH_DEBUG sha256sum /tmp/counter-$TPM_COUNTER >/boot/kexec_rollback.txt ||
 				die "Unable to create rollback file"
 
+			TRACE_FUNC
 			# As a countermeasure for existing primary handle hash, we will now force sign /boot without it
 			if (whiptail --title 'TPM Reset Successfully' \
 				--yesno "Would you like to update the checksums and sign all of the files in /boot?\n\nYou will need your GPG key to continue and this will modify your disk.\n\nOtherwise the system will reboot immediately." 0 80); then
@@ -576,7 +581,8 @@ reset_tpm() {
 						--msgbox "Failed to update checksums / sign default config" 0 80
 				fi
 			else
-				die "TPM reset successful, but user chose not to update checksums"
+				warn "TPM reset successful, but user chose not to update+sign /boot checksums. Rebooting"
+				reboot
 			fi
 			mount -o ro,remount /boot
 
@@ -593,7 +599,7 @@ select_os_boot_option() {
 	TRACE_FUNC
 	mount_boot
 	if verify_global_hashes; then
-		kexec-select-boot -m -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g
+		DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-select-boot -m -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g
 	fi
 }
 
@@ -606,11 +612,13 @@ attempt_default_boot() {
 	fi
 	DEFAULT_FILE=$(find /boot/kexec_default.*.txt 2>/dev/null | head -1)
 	if [ -r "$DEFAULT_FILE" ]; then
-		kexec-select-boot -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g ||
+		TRACE_FUNC
+		DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-select-boot -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g ||
 			recovery "Failed default boot"
 	elif (whiptail_warning --title 'No Default Boot Option Configured' \
 		--yesno "There is no default boot option configured yet.\nWould you like to load a menu of boot options?\nOtherwise you will return to the main menu." 0 80); then
-		kexec-select-boot -m -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g
+		TRACE_FUNC
+		DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-select-boot -m -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g
 	fi
 }
 

initrd/bin/gui-init-basic

@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ select_os_boot_option()
 {
   TRACE_FUNC
   mount_boot
-  kexec-select-boot -m -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g -i
+  DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-select-boot -m -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g -i
 }
 
 attempt_default_boot()
@@ -174,11 +174,11 @@ attempt_default_boot()
   if [ "$CONFIG_BASIC_NO_AUTOMATIC_DEFAULT" != "y" ]; then
     basic-autoboot.sh
   elif [ -r "$DEFAULT_FILE" ]; then
-    kexec-select-boot -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g -i -s \
+    DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-select-boot -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g -i -s \
     || recovery "Failed default boot"
   elif (whiptail_warning --title 'No Default Boot Option Configured' \
         --yesno "There is no default boot option configured yet.\nWould you like to load a menu of boot options?\nOtherwise you will return to the main menu." 0 80) then
-    kexec-select-boot -m -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g -i
+    DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-select-boot -m -b /boot -c "grub.cfg" -g -i
   fi
 }
 

initrd/bin/kexec-save-default

@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ TRACE_FUNC
 
 while getopts "b:d:p:i:" arg; do
 	case $arg in
-	b) bootdir="$OPTARG" ;;
-	d) paramsdev="$OPTARG" ;;
-	p) paramsdir="$OPTARG" ;;
-	i) index="$OPTARG" ;;
+		b) bootdir="$OPTARG" ;;
+		d) paramsdev="$OPTARG" ;;
+		p) paramsdir="$OPTARG" ;;
+		i) index="$OPTARG" ;;
 	esac
 done
 
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
 	fi
 fi
 if [ "$CONFIG_BASIC" != "y" ]; then
-	kexec-sign-config -p $paramsdir $extparam ||
+	DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-sign-config -p $paramsdir $extparam ||
 		die "Failed to sign default config"
 fi
 # switch back to ro mode

initrd/bin/kexec-save-key

@@ -77,10 +77,11 @@ kexec-seal-key $paramsdir ||
 if [ "$skip_sign" != "y" ]; then
 	extparam=
 	if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
+		DEBUG "kexec-save-key: CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK is not set, will sign with -r"
 		extparam=-r
 	fi
 	# sign and auto-roll config counter
-	kexec-sign-config -p $paramsdir $extparam ||
+	DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-sign-config -p $paramsdir $extparam ||
 		die "Failed to sign updated config"
 fi
 

initrd/bin/kexec-seal-key

@@ -63,57 +63,70 @@ fi
 
 DEBUG "$(pcrs)"
 
-
+# First, collect all the LUKS devices that need to be tested
 luks_drk_passphrase_valid=0
-for dev in $key_devices	; do
-	attempts=0
-	while [ $attempts -lt 3 ]; do
-		if [ "$luks_drk_passphrase_valid" == "0" ]; then
-			# Ask for the passphrase only once
-			read -s -p "Enter LUKS Disk Recovery Key (DRK) passphrase that can unlock $key_devices: " disk_recovery_key_passphrase
-			#Using he provided passphrase as the DRK "keyfile" for unattended operations
-			echo -n "$disk_recovery_key_passphrase" >"$DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE"
-			echo
-		fi
+attempts=0
 
-		DEBUG "Testing $DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE keyfile created from provided passphrase against $dev individual key slots"
-		if cryptsetup open $dev --test-passphrase --key-file "$DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-			echo "++++++ $dev: LUKS device unlocked successfully with the DRK passphrase"
-			luks_drk_passphrase_valid=1
+# Ask for the DRK passphrase first, before testing any devices
+while [ $attempts -lt 3 ] && [ $luks_drk_passphrase_valid -eq 0 ]; do
+	read -r -s -p $'\nEnter LUKS Disk Recovery Key (DRK) passphrase that can unlock '"$key_devices"': ' disk_recovery_key_passphrase
+	echo
+	echo -n "$disk_recovery_key_passphrase" >"$DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE"
+
+	# Test the passphrase against ALL devices before deciding if it's valid
+	all_devices_unlocked=1
+
+	for dev in $key_devices; do
+		DEBUG "Testing $DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE keyfile against $dev"
+		if ! cryptsetup open $dev --test-passphrase --key-file "$DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			warn "Failed to unlock LUKS device $dev with the provided passphrase."
+			all_devices_unlocked=0
 			break
 		else
-			attempts=$((attempts + 1))
-			if [ "$attempts" == "3" ] && [ "$luks_drk_passphrase_valid" == "0" ]; then
-				die "Failed to unlock LUKS device $dev with the provided passphrase. Exiting..."
-			elif [ "$attempts" != "3" ] && [ "$luks_drk_passphrase_valid" == "1" ]; then
-				#We failed unlocking with DRK passphrase another LUKS container
-				die "LUKS device $key_devices cannot all be unlocked with same passphrase. Please make $key_devices devices unlockable with the same passphrase. Exiting"
-			else
-				warn "Failed to unlock LUKS device $dev with the provided passphrase. Please try again."
-			fi
+			echo "++++++ $dev: LUKS device unlocked successfully with the DRK passphrase"
 		fi
 	done
+
+	if [ $all_devices_unlocked -eq 1 ]; then
+		luks_drk_passphrase_valid=1
+	else
+		attempts=$((attempts + 1))
+		if [ $attempts -eq 3 ]; then
+			die "Failed to unlock all LUKS devices with the provided passphrase after 3 attempts. Exiting..."
+		else
+			warn "Please try again."
+		fi
+	fi
 done
 
+# Now that all devices are verified with the DRK passphrase, proceed with DUK setup
+MIN_PASSPHRASE_LENGTH=12
 attempts=0
 while [ $attempts -lt 3 ]; do
-	read -s -p "New LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrase for booting: " key_password
+	read -r -s -p $'\nNew LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrase for booting (minimum '"$MIN_PASSPHRASE_LENGTH"' characters): ' key_password
 	echo
-	read -s -p "Repeat LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrase for booting: " key_password2
+	if [ ${#key_password} -lt $MIN_PASSPHRASE_LENGTH ]; then
+		attempts=$((attempts + 1))
+		warn "Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrase is too short. Please try again."
+		continue
+	fi
+
+	read -r -s -p $'\nRepeat LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrase for booting: ' key_password2
 	echo
 	if [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ]; then
 		attempts=$((attempts + 1))
-		if [ "$attempts" == "3" ]; then
-			die "Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrases do not match. Exiting..."
-		else
-			warn "Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrases do not match. Please try again."
-		fi
+		warn "Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrases do not match. Please try again."
 	else
 		break
 	fi
 done
 
+if [ $attempts -ge 3 ]; then
+	die "Failed to set a valid Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrase after 3 attempts. Exiting..."
+fi
+
 # Generate key file
+echo
 echo "++++++ Generating new randomized 128 bytes key file that will be sealed/unsealed by LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
 dd \
 	if=/dev/urandom \
@@ -159,7 +172,7 @@ for dev in $key_devices; do
 	# Get all the key slots that are used on $dev
 	luks_used_keyslots=($(cryptsetup luksDump "$dev" | grep -E "$regex" | sed "$sed_command"))
 	DEBUG "$dev LUKS key slots: ${luks_used_keyslots[*]}"
-	
+
 	#Find the key slot that can be unlocked with the provided passphrase
 	drk_key_slot=$(find_drk_key_slot)
 
@@ -181,8 +194,8 @@ for dev in $key_devices; do
 				# Heads expects key slot LUKSv1:7 or LUKSv2:31 to be used for TPM DUK setup.
 				#  Ask user to confirm otherwise
 				warn "LUKS key slot $keyslot is not typical ($duk_keyslot expected) for TPM Disk Unlock Key setup"
-				read -p "Are you sure you want to wipe it? [y/N] " -n 1 -r
-				echo
+				read -p $'Are you sure you want to wipe it? [y/N]\n' -n 1 -r
+				echo ""
 				# If user does not confirm, skip this slot
 				if [[ $REPLY =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
 					wipe_desired="yes"
@@ -203,7 +216,6 @@ for dev in $key_devices; do
 		fi
 	done
 
-
 	echo "++++++ $dev: Adding LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key to LUKS key slot $duk_keyslot"
 	DO_WITH_DEBUG cryptsetup luksAddKey \
 		--key-file "$DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE" \