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| 1 | +# Threat Model (Lab Baseline) |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +This threat model is a **lab-only baseline** for the LOOP protocol. It is not a |
| 4 | +production security assessment. |
| 5 | + |
| 6 | +## System boundaries |
| 7 | +- **LOOP Node API** (lab demo): handles MaterialDNA, Offer, Match, Transfer. |
| 8 | +- **Event log**: immutable audit trail for lab events. |
| 9 | +- **Public interest registry**: optional contact data. |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +## Assets |
| 12 | +- Protocol payloads (MaterialDNA, Offer, Match, Transfer) |
| 13 | +- Event logs and timestamps |
| 14 | +- Optional contact data (interest submissions) |
| 15 | + |
| 16 | +## Threats (STRIDE-lite) |
| 17 | + |
| 18 | +| Threat | Example | Mitigation (lab) | |
| 19 | +| --- | --- | --- | |
| 20 | +| Spoofing | Fake node identity | Mutual TLS / signed requests (future), allowlist in lab | |
| 21 | +| Tampering | Offer payload modified | Schema validation, server-side logging | |
| 22 | +| Repudiation | Deny match acceptance | Immutable event log with timestamps | |
| 23 | +| Information disclosure | PII leaks | Data minimization, redact logs | |
| 24 | +| Denial of service | Flood endpoints | Rate limits, request size limits | |
| 25 | +| Elevation of privilege | Abuse admin endpoints | Auth scaffolding (future), least privilege | |
| 26 | + |
| 27 | +## Residual risk (lab stage) |
| 28 | +Risks remain due to the early TRL level and the absence of production-grade |
| 29 | +identity, key management, and audit tooling. This document should be revisited |
| 30 | +before any pilot deployments. |
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