Merge pull request to upgrade the HCL kernel to 6.12.36

kernel upgrade to 6.12.36

Author: hargar19

.clippy.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+check-private-items = true
+
+disallowed-macros = [
+    # The `clippy::dbg_macro` lint only works with `std::dbg!`, thus we simulate
+    # it here, see: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/issues/11303.
+    { path = "kernel::dbg", reason = "the `dbg!` macro is intended as a debugging tool", allow-invalid = true },
+]

.gitignore

@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ modules.order
 # We don't want to ignore the following even if they are dot-files
 #
 !.clang-format
+!.clippy.toml
 !.cocciconfig
 !.editorconfig
 !.get_maintainer.ignore

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -511,6 +511,7 @@ Description:	information about CPUs heterogeneity.
 
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/indirect_target_selection
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds

Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v2.rst

@@ -2954,7 +2954,7 @@ following two functions.
 	a queue (device) has been associated with the bio and
 	before submission.
 
-  wbc_account_cgroup_owner(@wbc, @page, @bytes)
+  wbc_account_cgroup_owner(@wbc, @folio, @bytes)
 	Should be called for each data segment being written out.
 	While this function doesn't care exactly when it's called
 	during the writeback session, it's the easiest and most

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -22,3 +22,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    srso
    gather_data_sampling
    reg-file-data-sampling
+   indirect-target-selection

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/indirect-target-selection.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Indirect Target Selection (ITS)
+===============================
+
+ITS is a vulnerability in some Intel CPUs that support Enhanced IBRS and were
+released before Alder Lake. ITS may allow an attacker to control the prediction
+of indirect branches and RETs located in the lower half of a cacheline.
+
+ITS is assigned CVE-2024-28956 with a CVSS score of 4.7 (Medium).
+
+Scope of Impact
+---------------
+- **eIBRS Guest/Host Isolation**: Indirect branches in KVM/kernel may still be
+  predicted with unintended target corresponding to a branch in the guest.
+
+- **Intra-Mode BTI**: In-kernel training such as through cBPF or other native
+  gadgets.
+
+- **Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)**: After an IBPB, indirect
+  branches may still be predicted with targets corresponding to direct branches
+  executed prior to the IBPB. This is fixed by the IPU 2025.1 microcode, which
+  should be available via distro updates. Alternatively microcode can be
+  obtained from Intel's github repository [#f1]_.
+
+Affected CPUs
+-------------
+Below is the list of ITS affected CPUs [#f2]_ [#f3]_:
+
+   ========================  ============  ====================  ===============
+   Common name               Family_Model  eIBRS                 Intra-mode BTI
+                                           Guest/Host Isolation
+   ========================  ============  ====================  ===============
+   SKYLAKE_X (step >= 6)     06_55H        Affected              Affected
+   ICELAKE_X                 06_6AH        Not affected          Affected
+   ICELAKE_D                 06_6CH        Not affected          Affected
+   ICELAKE_L                 06_7EH        Not affected          Affected
+   TIGERLAKE_L               06_8CH        Not affected          Affected
+   TIGERLAKE                 06_8DH        Not affected          Affected
+   KABYLAKE_L (step >= 12)   06_8EH        Affected              Affected
+   KABYLAKE (step >= 13)     06_9EH        Affected              Affected
+   COMETLAKE                 06_A5H        Affected              Affected
+   COMETLAKE_L               06_A6H        Affected              Affected
+   ROCKETLAKE                06_A7H        Not affected          Affected
+   ========================  ============  ====================  ===============
+
+- All affected CPUs enumerate Enhanced IBRS feature.
+- IBPB isolation is affected on all ITS affected CPUs, and need a microcode
+  update for mitigation.
+- None of the affected CPUs enumerate BHI_CTRL which was introduced in Golden
+  Cove (Alder Lake and Sapphire Rapids). This can help guests to determine the
+  host's affected status.
+- Intel Atom CPUs are not affected by ITS.
+
+Mitigation
+----------
+As only the indirect branches and RETs that have their last byte of instruction
+in the lower half of the cacheline are vulnerable to ITS, the basic idea behind
+the mitigation is to not allow indirect branches in the lower half.
+
+This is achieved by relying on existing retpoline support in the kernel, and in
+compilers. ITS-vulnerable retpoline sites are runtime patched to point to newly
+added ITS-safe thunks. These safe thunks consists of indirect branch in the
+second half of the cacheline. Not all retpoline sites are patched to thunks, if
+a retpoline site is evaluated to be ITS-safe, it is replaced with an inline
+indirect branch.
+
+Dynamic thunks
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+From a dynamically allocated pool of safe-thunks, each vulnerable site is
+replaced with a new thunk, such that they get a unique address. This could
+improve the branch prediction accuracy. Also, it is a defense-in-depth measure
+against aliasing.
+
+Note, for simplicity, indirect branches in eBPF programs are always replaced
+with a jump to a static thunk in __x86_indirect_its_thunk_array. If required,
+in future this can be changed to use dynamic thunks.
+
+All vulnerable RETs are replaced with a static thunk, they do not use dynamic
+thunks. This is because RETs get their prediction from RSB mostly that does not
+depend on source address. RETs that underflow RSB may benefit from dynamic
+thunks. But, RETs significantly outnumber indirect branches, and any benefit
+from a unique source address could be outweighed by the increased icache
+footprint and iTLB pressure.
+
+Retpoline
+~~~~~~~~~
+Retpoline sequence also mitigates ITS-unsafe indirect branches. For this
+reason, when retpoline is enabled, ITS mitigation only relocates the RETs to
+safe thunks. Unless user requested the RSB-stuffing mitigation.
+
+RSB Stuffing
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+RSB-stuffing via Call Depth Tracking is a mitigation for Retbleed RSB-underflow
+attacks. And it also mitigates RETs that are vulnerable to ITS.
+
+Mitigation in guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+All guests deploy ITS mitigation by default, irrespective of eIBRS enumeration
+and Family/Model of the guest. This is because eIBRS feature could be hidden
+from a guest. One exception to this is when a guest enumerates BHI_DIS_S, which
+indicates that the guest is running on an unaffected host.
+
+To prevent guests from unnecessarily deploying the mitigation on unaffected
+platforms, Intel has defined ITS_NO bit(62) in MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. When
+a guest sees this bit set, it should not enumerate the ITS bug. Note, this bit
+is not set by any hardware, but is **intended for VMMs to synthesize** it for
+guests as per the host's affected status.
+
+Mitigation options
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+The ITS mitigation can be controlled using the "indirect_target_selection"
+kernel parameter. The available options are:
+
+   ======== ===================================================================
+   on       (default)  Deploy the "Aligned branch/return thunks" mitigation.
+	    If spectre_v2 mitigation enables retpoline, aligned-thunks are only
+	    deployed for the affected RET instructions. Retpoline mitigates
+	    indirect branches.
+
+   off      Disable ITS mitigation.
+
+   vmexit   Equivalent to "=on" if the CPU is affected by guest/host isolation
+	    part of ITS. Otherwise, mitigation is not deployed. This option is
+	    useful when host userspace is not in the threat model, and only
+	    attacks from guest to host are considered.
+
+   stuff    Deploy RSB-fill mitigation when retpoline is also deployed.
+	    Otherwise, deploy the default mitigation. When retpoline mitigation
+	    is enabled, RSB-stuffing via Call-Depth-Tracking also mitigates
+	    ITS.
+
+   force    Force the ITS bug and deploy the default mitigation.
+   ======== ===================================================================
+
+Sysfs reporting
+---------------
+
+The sysfs file showing ITS mitigation status is:
+
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/indirect_target_selection
+
+Note, microcode mitigation status is not reported in this file.
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+   * - Not affected
+     - The processor is not vulnerable.
+   * - Vulnerable
+     - System is vulnerable and no mitigation has been applied.
+   * - Vulnerable, KVM: Not affected
+     - System is vulnerable to intra-mode BTI, but not affected by eIBRS
+       guest/host isolation.
+   * - Mitigation: Aligned branch/return thunks
+     - The mitigation is enabled, affected indirect branches and RETs are
+       relocated to safe thunks.
+   * - Mitigation: Retpolines, Stuffing RSB
+     - The mitigation is enabled using retpoline and RSB stuffing.
+
+References
+----------
+.. [#f1] Microcode repository - https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files
+
+.. [#f2] Affected Processors list - https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html
+
+.. [#f3] Affected Processors list (machine readable) - https://github.com/intel/Intel-affected-processor-list

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -2153,6 +2153,23 @@
 			different crypto accelerators. This option can be used
 			to achieve best performance for particular HW.
 
+	indirect_target_selection= [X86,Intel] Mitigation control for Indirect
+			Target Selection(ITS) bug in Intel CPUs. Updated
+			microcode is also required for a fix in IBPB.
+
+			on:     Enable mitigation (default).
+			off:    Disable mitigation.
+			force:	Force the ITS bug and deploy default
+				mitigation.
+			vmexit: Only deploy mitigation if CPU is affected by
+				guest/host isolation part of ITS.
+			stuff:	Deploy RSB-fill mitigation when retpoline is
+				also deployed. Otherwise, deploy the default
+				mitigation.
+
+			For details see:
+			Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/indirect-target-selection.rst
+
 	init=		[KNL]
 			Format: <full_path>
 			Run specified binary instead of /sbin/init as init
@@ -3032,6 +3049,8 @@
 			* max_sec_lba48: Set or clear transfer size limit to
 			  65535 sectors.
 
+			* external: Mark port as external (hotplug-capable).
+
 			* [no]lpm: Enable or disable link power management.
 
 			* [no]setxfer: Indicate if transfer speed mode setting
@@ -3512,6 +3531,7 @@
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: if nokaslr then kpti=0 [ARM64]
 					       gather_data_sampling=off [X86]
+					       indirect_target_selection=off [X86]
 					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 					       mds=off [X86]
@@ -6245,6 +6265,8 @@
 
 			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
 			against user space to user space task attacks.
+			Selecting specific mitigation does not force enable
+			user mitigations.
 
 			Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
 			the user space protections.

Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst

@@ -212,6 +212,17 @@ pid>/``).
 This value defaults to 0.
 
 
+core_sort_vma
+=============
+
+The default coredump writes VMAs in address order. By setting
+``core_sort_vma`` to 1, VMAs will be written from smallest size
+to largest size. This is known to break at least elfutils, but
+can be handy when dealing with very large (and truncated)
+coredumps where the more useful debugging details are included
+in the smaller VMAs.
+
+
 core_uses_pid
 =============
 

Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst

@@ -285,6 +285,12 @@ Before jumping into the kernel, the following conditions must be met:
 
     - SCR_EL3.FGTEn (bit 27) must be initialised to 0b1.
 
+  For CPUs with the Fine Grained Traps 2 (FEAT_FGT2) extension present:
+
+  - If EL3 is present and the kernel is entered at EL2:
+
+    - SCR_EL3.FGTEn2 (bit 59) must be initialised to 0b1.
+
   For CPUs with support for HCRX_EL2 (FEAT_HCX) present:
 
   - If EL3 is present and the kernel is entered at EL2:
@@ -379,6 +385,22 @@ Before jumping into the kernel, the following conditions must be met:
 
     - SMCR_EL2.EZT0 (bit 30) must be initialised to 0b1.
 
+  For CPUs with the Performance Monitors Extension (FEAT_PMUv3p9):
+
+ - If EL3 is present:
+
+    - MDCR_EL3.EnPM2 (bit 7) must be initialised to 0b1.
+
+ - If the kernel is entered at EL1 and EL2 is present:
+
+    - HDFGRTR2_EL2.nPMICNTR_EL0 (bit 2) must be initialised to 0b1.
+    - HDFGRTR2_EL2.nPMICFILTR_EL0 (bit 3) must be initialised to 0b1.
+    - HDFGRTR2_EL2.nPMUACR_EL1 (bit 4) must be initialised to 0b1.
+
+    - HDFGWTR2_EL2.nPMICNTR_EL0 (bit 2) must be initialised to 0b1.
+    - HDFGWTR2_EL2.nPMICFILTR_EL0 (bit 3) must be initialised to 0b1.
+    - HDFGWTR2_EL2.nPMUACR_EL1 (bit 4) must be initialised to 0b1.
+
   For CPUs with Memory Copy and Memory Set instructions (FEAT_MOPS):
 
   - If the kernel is entered at EL1 and EL2 is present: