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added queries, tests, docs
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‎powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-502/BinaryFormatterDeserialization.qhelp

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<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC
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"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN"
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"qhelp.dtd">
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<qhelp>
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<overview>
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<p>Using BinaryFormatter to deserialize an object from untrusted input may result in security problems, such
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as denial of service or remote code execution.</p>
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</overview>
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<recommendation>
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<p>Avoid using BinaryFormatter.</p>
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</recommendation>
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<example>
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<p>In this example, a string is deserialized using a
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<code>BinaryFormatter</code>. BinaryFormatter is an easily exploited deserializer.</p>
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<sample src="examples/BinaryFormatterDeserialization.ps1" />
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</example>
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<references>
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<li>
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Mu&ntilde;oz, Alvaro and Mirosh, Oleksandr:
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<a href="https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf">JSON Attacks</a>.
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</li>
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<li>
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Microsoft:
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<a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/serialization/binaryformatter-security-guide">Deserialization risks in use of BinaryFormatter and related types</a>.
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</li>
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</references>
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</qhelp>

‎powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-502/BinaryFormatterDeserialization.ql

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/**
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* @name Use of Binary Formatter deserialization
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* @description Use of Binary Formatter is unsafe
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* @kind problem
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* @problem.severity error
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* @security-severity 8.8
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* @precision high
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* @id powershell/microsoft/public/binary-formatter-deserialization
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* @tags correctness
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* security
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* external/cwe/cwe-502
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*/
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import powershell
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import semmle.code.powershell.dataflow.DataFlow
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import semmle.code.powershell.dataflow.TaintTracking
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from DataFlow::ObjectCreationNode source, DataFlow::CallNode cn
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where
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source.getExprNode().getExpr().(CallExpr).getAnArgument().getValue().asString() = "System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary.BinaryFormatter" and
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cn.getQualifier().getALocalSource() = source and
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cn.getLowerCaseName() = "deserialize"
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select cn, "Call to BinaryFormatter.Deserialize"

‎powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-502/UnsafeDeserialization.qhelp

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<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC
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"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN"
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"qhelp.dtd">
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<qhelp>
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<overview>
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<p>Deserializing an object from untrusted input may result in security problems, such
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as denial of service or remote code execution.</p>
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</overview>
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<recommendation>
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<p>Avoid using an unsafe deserialization framework.</p>
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</recommendation>
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<example>
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<p>In this example, a string is deserialized using a
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<code>BinaryFormatter</code>. BinaryFormatter is an easily exploited deserializer.</p>
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<sample src="examples/BinaryFormatterDeserialization.ps1" />
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</example>
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<references>
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<li>
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Mu&ntilde;oz, Alvaro and Mirosh, Oleksandr:
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<a href="https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf">JSON Attacks</a>.
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</li>
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<li>
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Microsoft:
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<a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/serialization/binaryformatter-security-guide">Deserialization risks in use of BinaryFormatter and related types</a>.
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</li>
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</references>
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</qhelp>

‎powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-502/UnsafeDeserialization.ql

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/**
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* @name Unsafe deserializer
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* @description Calling an unsafe deserializer with data controlled by an attacker
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* can lead to denial of service and other security problems.
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* @kind problem
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* @problem.severity error
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* @security-severity 8.8
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* @precision high
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* @id powershell/microsoft/public/unsafe-deserialization
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* @tags correctness
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* security
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* external/cwe/cwe-502
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*/
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import powershell
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import semmle.code.powershell.dataflow.flowsources.FlowSources
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import semmle.code.powershell.dataflow.DataFlow
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import semmle.code.powershell.dataflow.TaintTracking
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module DeserializationConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
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predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof SourceNode }
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predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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exists(DataFlow::ObjectCreationNode ocn, DataFlow::CallNode cn |
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cn.getQualifier().getALocalSource() = ocn and
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ocn.getExprNode().getExpr().(CallExpr).getAnArgument().getValue().asString() = "System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary.BinaryFormatter" and
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cn.getLowerCaseName() = "deserialize" and
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cn.getAnArgument() = sink
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)
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}
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predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node nodeFrom, DataFlow::Node nodeTo){
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exists(InvokeMemberExpr ime |
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nodeTo.asExpr().getExpr() = ime and
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nodeFrom.asExpr().getExpr() = ime.getAnArgument()
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)
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}
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}
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module DeserializationFlow = TaintTracking::Global<DeserializationConfig>;
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from DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::Node sink
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where DeserializationFlow::flow(source, sink)
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select sink, "Unsafe deserializer is used. Make sure the value being deserialized comes from a trusted source."

‎powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-502/examples/BinaryFormatterDeserialization.ps1

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$untrustedBase64 = Read-Host "Enter user input"
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$formatter = New-Object System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary.BinaryFormatter
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$stream = [System.IO.MemoryStream]::new([Convert]::FromBase64String($untrustedBase64))
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$obj = $formatter.Deserialize($stream)

‎powershell/ql/test/query-tests/security/cwe-502/UnsafeDeserialization.expected

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| test.ps1:4:31:4:37 | stream | Unsafe deserializer is used. Make sure the value being deserialized comes from a trusted source. |

‎powershell/ql/test/query-tests/security/cwe-502/UnsafeDeserialization.qlref

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queries/security/cwe-502/UnsafeDeserialization.ql

‎powershell/ql/test/query-tests/security/cwe-502/test.ps1

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$untrustedBase64 = Read-Host "Enter user input"
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$formatter = New-Object System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary.BinaryFormatter
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$stream = [System.IO.MemoryStream]::new([Convert]::FromBase64String($untrustedBase64))
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$obj = $formatter.Deserialize($stream)

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