Sync with 2.34.5

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]>

Author: ttaylorr

Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.6.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+Git v2.30.6 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-39253 and
+CVE-2022-39260.
+
+Fixes since v2.30.5
+-------------------
+
+ * CVE-2022-39253:
+   When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences
+   symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks
+   (or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository.
+   This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are
+   present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious
+   repository.
+
+   Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local`
+   clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that
+   have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.
+
+   Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be
+   "user" by default.
+
+ * CVE-2022-39260:
+   An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in
+   overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and
+   remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory
+   `$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists.
+
+   `git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are
+   longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject
+   inputs larger than 2GiB.
+
+Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The
+fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin.
+
+Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub.
+The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau.
+
+
+Jeff King (2):
+      shell: add basic tests
+      shell: limit size of interactive commands
+
+Kevin Backhouse (1):
+      alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline()
+
+Taylor Blau (11):
+      builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks
+      t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules
+      t/t1NNN: allow local submodules
+      t/2NNNN: allow local submodules
+      t/t3NNN: allow local submodules
+      t/t4NNN: allow local submodules
+      t/t5NNN: allow local submodules
+      t/t6NNN: allow local submodules
+      t/t7NNN: allow local submodules
+      t/t9NNN: allow local submodules
+      transport: make `protocol.file.allow` be "user" by default

Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.5.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Git v2.31.5 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges the security fix that appears in v2.30.6; see
+the release notes for that version for details.

Documentation/RelNotes/2.32.4.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Git v2.32.4 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges the security fix that appears in v2.30.6; see
+the release notes for that version for details.

Documentation/RelNotes/2.33.5.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Git v2.33.5 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges the security fix that appears in v2.30.6; see
+the release notes for that version for details.

Documentation/RelNotes/2.34.5.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Git v2.34.5 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges the security fix that appears in v2.30.6; see
+the release notes for that version for details.

Documentation/config/protocol.txt

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 protocol.allow::
 	If set, provide a user defined default policy for all protocols which
 	don't explicitly have a policy (`protocol.<name>.allow`).  By default,
-	if unset, known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file) have a
+	if unset, known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh) have a
 	default policy of `always`, known-dangerous protocols (ext) have a
-	default policy of `never`, and all other protocols have a default
-	policy of `user`.  Supported policies:
+	default policy of `never`, and all other protocols (including file)
+	have a default policy of `user`.  Supported policies:
 +
 --
 

alias.c

@@ -46,14 +46,16 @@ void list_aliases(struct string_list *list)
 
 #define SPLIT_CMDLINE_BAD_ENDING 1
 #define SPLIT_CMDLINE_UNCLOSED_QUOTE 2
+#define SPLIT_CMDLINE_ARGC_OVERFLOW 3
 static const char *split_cmdline_errors[] = {
 	N_("cmdline ends with \\"),
-	N_("unclosed quote")
+	N_("unclosed quote"),
+	N_("too many arguments"),
 };
 
 int split_cmdline(char *cmdline, const char ***argv)
 {
-	int src, dst, count = 0, size = 16;
+	size_t src, dst, count = 0, size = 16;
 	char quoted = 0;
 
 	ALLOC_ARRAY(*argv, size);
@@ -96,6 +98,11 @@ int split_cmdline(char *cmdline, const char ***argv)
 		return -SPLIT_CMDLINE_UNCLOSED_QUOTE;
 	}
 
+	if (count >= INT_MAX) {
+		FREE_AND_NULL(*argv);
+		return -SPLIT_CMDLINE_ARGC_OVERFLOW;
+	}
+
 	ALLOC_GROW(*argv, count + 1, size);
 	(*argv)[count] = NULL;
 

builtin/clone.c

@@ -310,13 +310,11 @@ static void copy_or_link_directory(struct strbuf *src, struct strbuf *dest,
 	int src_len, dest_len;
 	struct dir_iterator *iter;
 	int iter_status;
-	unsigned int flags;
 	struct strbuf realpath = STRBUF_INIT;
 
 	mkdir_if_missing(dest->buf, 0777);
 
-	flags = DIR_ITERATOR_PEDANTIC | DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS;
-	iter = dir_iterator_begin(src->buf, flags);
+	iter = dir_iterator_begin(src->buf, DIR_ITERATOR_PEDANTIC);
 
 	if (!iter)
 		die_errno(_("failed to start iterator over '%s'"), src->buf);
@@ -332,6 +330,10 @@ static void copy_or_link_directory(struct strbuf *src, struct strbuf *dest,
 		strbuf_setlen(dest, dest_len);
 		strbuf_addstr(dest, iter->relative_path);
 
+		if (S_ISLNK(iter->st.st_mode))
+			die(_("symlink '%s' exists, refusing to clone with --local"),
+			    iter->relative_path);
+
 		if (S_ISDIR(iter->st.st_mode)) {
 			mkdir_if_missing(dest->buf, 0777);
 			continue;

shell.c

@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static void cd_to_homedir(void)
 		die("could not chdir to user's home directory");
 }
 
+#define MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND (4*1024*1024)
+
 static void run_shell(void)
 {
 	int done = 0;
@@ -67,22 +69,46 @@ static void run_shell(void)
 	run_command_v_opt(help_argv, RUN_SILENT_EXEC_FAILURE);
 
 	do {
-		struct strbuf line = STRBUF_INIT;
 		const char *prog;
 		char *full_cmd;
 		char *rawargs;
+		size_t len;
 		char *split_args;
 		const char **argv;
 		int code;
 		int count;
 
 		fprintf(stderr, "git> ");
-		if (git_read_line_interactively(&line) == EOF) {
+
+		/*
+		 * Avoid using a strbuf or git_read_line_interactively() here.
+		 * We don't want to allocate arbitrary amounts of memory on
+		 * behalf of a possibly untrusted client, and we're subject to
+		 * OS limits on command length anyway.
+		 */
+		fflush(stdout);
+		rawargs = xmalloc(MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND);
+		if (!fgets(rawargs, MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND, stdin)) {
 			fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-			strbuf_release(&line);
+			free(rawargs);
 			break;
 		}
-		rawargs = strbuf_detach(&line, NULL);
+		len = strlen(rawargs);
+
+		/*
+		 * If we truncated due to our input buffer size, reject the
+		 * command. That's better than running bogus input, and
+		 * there's a good chance it's just malicious garbage anyway.
+		 */
+		if (len >= MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND - 1)
+			die("invalid command format: input too long");
+
+		if (len > 0 && rawargs[len - 1] == '\n') {
+			if (--len > 0 && rawargs[len - 1] == '\r')
+				--len;
+			rawargs[len] = '\0';
+		}
+
 		split_args = xstrdup(rawargs);
 		count = split_cmdline(split_args, &argv);
 		if (count < 0) {

t/lib-submodule-update.sh

@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ test_git_directory_exists () {
 # the submodule repo if it doesn't exist and configures the most problematic
 # settings for diff.ignoreSubmodules.
 prolog () {
+	test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
 	(test -d submodule_update_repo || create_lib_submodule_repo) &&
 	test_config_global diff.ignoreSubmodules all &&
 	test_config diff.ignoreSubmodules all