This document outlines the core threat modeling assumptions, known attack vectors, and mitigations applied within the jPOS project. It is intended to support proactive security decisions and foster transparency with adopters and auditors.
This model focuses on the jPOS core modules and adjacent components (e.g., Q2, ISO channel layers, REST integration). It does not cover customer-specific deployments or infrastructure-level controls, which fall under the responsibility of the organization deploying jPOS.
| Threat Scenario | Description | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Unauthorized code execution | Malicious code injected via PR or dependency | CLA required, PRs require maintainer review, 2FA enforced |
| Tampered release artifacts | Artifacts modified in transit or post-build | GPG-signed releases, reproducible builds, hosted on trusted platforms |
| Dependency compromise (upstream) | Compromise in a third-party library | Minimal dependencies, monitored via mailing lists and CVE trackers |
| Credential leaks in source or CI | Secrets accidentally committed or leaked in build logs | No secrets stored in repo; CI secrets use secure GitHub Actions store |
| Misuse of sensitive APIs (e.g., HSM) | Insecure usage of cryptographic interfaces by integrators | Documentation includes secure usage patterns; integration by professionals |
| Denial of Service (DoS) attacks | Resource exhaustion via malformed ISO messages | Input validation enforced; deployers expected to use filters/firewalls |
- Modeled using STRIDE categories (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege).
- Reviewed informally every 6–12 months or after significant architectural changes.
- Threat modeling is part of our release cycle checklist.
- Feedback from users undergoing audits/pen-tests is considered.
Questions or concerns related to threat modeling? Contact us at security@jpos.org.