Update BIT-0006-Dissolution.md

Author: CapriciousSage

bits/BIT-0006-Dissolution.md

@@ -19,32 +19,32 @@ While the "lolocaust" has been an effective way of dealing with unwanted/dangero
 ## Specification
 
 - Addition of new governance capabilities to allow for senate members to create and vote on proposals that, should the proposal pass by a super-majority, will automatically dissolve a dTAO-subnet.
-- Dissolution process would also need to include the forced fire-sale of outstanding dtao tokens back to TAO utalising the existing pool liquidity.
+- Dissolution process would also need to include the forced fire-sale of outstanding dtao tokens back to TAO utilising the existing pool liquidity.
   -- It is vital that the dtao fire-sale all done at the same price, completed in a manner that equalises the price impact among all eligible participants.
   -- The applicable dTAO tokens in the subnet owner's wallet should be excluded from this fire-sale process ('burnt')
 - To prevent bad actors from 'rugging' the subnet during the governance window, certain activities on the subnet should be frozen once the governance proposal is submitted
-  -- These include the LP (preventing buying/selling), token issueance (miner/vali/subnet owner rewards), and miner/vali registrations).
+  -- These include the LP (preventing buying/selling), token issuance (miner/vali/subnet owner rewards), and miner/vali registrations).
 - To avoid abuse (unwarranted dissolution proposals), the governance proposer should be required to lock an amount of tao equal to the registration cost of the subnet.
-- Due to the lack of a "No with Veto" mechanic, voting results would need to accommoate three outcomes (Yes/Split Vote/No
+- Due to the lack of a "No with Veto" mechanic, voting results would need to accommodate three outcomes (Yes/Split Vote/No
   -- Yes (66% Super Majority in support): Subnet is dissolved, locked tokens returned to proposer 
   -- Split Vote (34% - 65% in support): Subnet is not dissolved, locked tokens returned to proposer
   -- No (33% or less in support): Subnet is not dissolved, locked tokens are recycled
 
 ## Rationale
 
-Subnets being used to distribute malicious or illicit material (malware, CSAM, etc) pose an exestensial risk to the entire network. It is vital that the network have a manner in which to remove these threats. Additionally, should certain subnets become abandoned, it may be necessary to remove these abandoned subnets to reduce unneccessary chain bloat/overhead.
+Subnets being used to distribute malicious or illicit material (malware, CSAM, etc) pose an existential risk to the entire network. It is vital that the network have a manner in which to remove these threats. Additionally, should certain subnets become abandoned, it may be necessary to remove these abandoned subnets to reduce unnecessary chain bloat/overhead.
 
 ## Backwards Compatibility
 
-It is unknown whether the introduction of additional capabilities to the governance module (including integrating with locking tokens when submitting a dissolution proposal) may have backwards compatiblity issues with the existing governance framework.
+It is unknown whether the introduction of additional capabilities to the governance module (including integrating with locking tokens when submitting a dissolution proposal) may have backwards compatibility issues with the existing governance framework.
 
 ## Reference Implementation (Optional)
 
-The Cosmos SDK provides a well known example of governance proposals requiring a deposit, which is then burnt in the event of a "No with Veto" outcome
+The Cosmos SDK provides a well-known example of governance proposals requiring a deposit, which is then burnt in the event of a "No with Veto" outcome
 
 ## Security Considerations
 
-The existance of a dissolution procedure is not a panacea against abuse. Senate members may have vested interests (or lack of interest in voting) that may prevent the successful dissolution of a subnet where it may be otherwise needed. However, this is always a risk in any decentralised ecosystem and relies on network participants showing wisdom in selecting which validator to delegate to.  
+The existence of a dissolution procedure is not a panacea against abuse. Senate members may have vested interests (or lack of interest in voting) that may prevent the successful dissolution of a subnet where it may be otherwise needed. However, this is always a risk in any decentralised ecosystem and relies on network participants showing wisdom in selecting which validator to delegate to.  
 
 ## Copyright