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Update some documentation; version 9.0.1
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‎SLIP-39-macOS.spec‎

Lines changed: 2 additions & 2 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -50,9 +50,9 @@ coll = COLLECT(exe,
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app = BUNDLE(coll,
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name='SLIP-39.app',
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icon='images/SLIP-39.icns',
53-
version='9.0.0',
53+
version='9.0.1',
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info_plist={
55-
'CFBundleVersion':'9.0.0',
55+
'CFBundleVersion':'9.0.1',
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'CFBundlePackageType':'APPL',
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'LSApplicationCategoryType':'public.app-category.finance',
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'LSMinimumSystemVersion':'10.15.0',

‎slip39/gui/SLIP-39-PASSPHRASE.org‎

Lines changed: 13 additions & 2 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ often makes the Seed unrecoverable, because the Passphrase can be so easily lost
77

88
SLIP-39 Mnemonic Card Groups are *much* more reliable (to recover) and secure (against accidental
99
disclosure); a Passphrase is *not* recommended. Leave it empty!
10+
1011
#+END_ABSTRACT
1112

1213
* BIP-39 Passphrase
@@ -17,6 +18,15 @@ disclosure); a Passphrase is *not* recommended. Leave it empty!
1718
It is estimated that 20%+ of all Cryptocurrency has been lost, often because the BIP-39 Mnemonic is
1819
available but the Passphrase has been lost.
1920

21+
** Safely Using BIP-39 Passphrases
22+
23+
Once you Backup your BIP-39 Seed Phrase to a set of SLIP-39 Mnemonic Card Groups, you *must* also
24+
arrange to secure and recover any BIP-39 Passphrase(s). Remembre; you can have multiple
25+
Passphrases, to produce several sets of Cryptocurrency accounts from the same BIP-39 Seed Phrase.
26+
27+
Make certain that each Passphrase is made available to each intended recipient, and also in at
28+
least one additional location (eg. with someone else who will be at your funeral).
29+
2030
* SLIP-39 Passphrase
2131

2232
If you use SLIP-39 Mnemonic Card Groups, it is usually not necessary to use a Passphrase.
@@ -26,8 +36,9 @@ disclosure); a Passphrase is *not* recommended. Leave it empty!
2636

2737
** Hardware Wallet Doesn't Support Passphrase
2838

29-
The Trezor "Model T" doesn't presently support a SLIP-39 Passphrase. So, if you supply one here,
30-
you will not be able to use it when recovering your SLIP-39 Mnemonics on your Trezor "Model T".
39+
The Trezor "Model T" doesn't presently support using a Passphrase on SLIP-39 recovery. So, if
40+
you supply one here, you will not be able to use it when recovering your SLIP-39 Mnemonics on
41+
your Trezor "Model T".
3142

3243
*** Use Trezor's "Hidden Wallets" Instead
3344

‎slip39/gui/SLIP-39-PASSPHRASE.txt‎

Lines changed: 18 additions & 3 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -19,6 +19,20 @@ recommended. Leave it empty!
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lost.
2020

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22+
1.1 Safely Using BIP-39 Passphrases
23+
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
24+
25+
Once you Backup your BIP-39 Seed Phrase to a set of SLIP-39 Mnemonic
26+
Card Groups, you *must* also arrange to secure and recover any BIP-39
27+
Passphrase(s). Remembre; you can have multiple Passphrases, to
28+
produce several sets of Cryptocurrency accounts from the same BIP-39
29+
Seed Phrase.
30+
31+
Make certain that each Passphrase is made available to each intended
32+
recipient, and also in at least one additional location (eg. with
33+
someone else who will be at your funeral).
34+
35+
2236
2 SLIP-39 Passphrase
2337
====================
2438

@@ -33,9 +47,10 @@ recommended. Leave it empty!
3347
2.1 Hardware Wallet Doesn't Support Passphrase
3448
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
3549

36-
The Trezor "Model T" doesn't presently support a SLIP-39 Passphrase.
37-
So, if you supply one here, you will not be able to use it when
38-
recovering your SLIP-39 Mnemonics on your Trezor "Model T".
50+
The Trezor "Model T" doesn't presently support using a Passphrase on
51+
SLIP-39 recovery. So, if you supply one here, you will not be able to
52+
use it when recovering your SLIP-39 Mnemonics on your Trezor "Model
53+
T".
3954

4055

4156
2.1.1 Use Trezor's "Hidden Wallets" Instead

‎slip39/gui/SLIP-39-SD.org‎

Lines changed: 40 additions & 38 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -14,34 +14,30 @@ BIP-39 Mnemonic using SLIP-39.
1414
| Pro | Fixed | Hex data may be supplied for the Seed |
1515
#+END_ABSTRACT
1616

17-
* Random
17+
* BIP-39
1818

19-
A high-quality 128-bit random seed value is probably adequate, and the 20-word SLIP-39 (and
20-
12-word BIP-39) Mnemonics are much more practical than those produced for 256-bit seeds.
19+
Backup an existing 12- or 24-word BIP-39 Seed Phrase Mnemonic. Or, select Create to produce a new
20+
BIP-39 Mnemonic. Save your BIP-39 Seed Phrase as a set of SLIP-39 Mnemonic Card Groups.
2121

22-
2^128 is aproximately 10^38. There are about 10^57 atoms in our solar system, and about 10^19
23-
atoms in a particle of dust.
24-
25-
Therefore, the odds of 2 people picking the *same* high-quality random 128-bit Seed (1 in 10^38),
26-
is about the same as 2 people randomly selecting the same particle of *dust* out of the mass of
27-
our entire solar system!
22+
Later, select Recover to input your SLIP-39 Mnemonics, and recover your BIP-39 Seed Phrase.
2823

29-
So, 128-bit seeds are probably fine for most practical levels of account security...
24+
You can then securely destroy your BIP-39 Mnemonic card(s) (or, keep a copy in some *extremely*
25+
secure location), and use the SLIP-39 Mnemonic cards as your distributed backup in case of its
26+
loss.
3027

31-
** The Birthday Paradox
28+
** SLIP-39 vs. BIP-39 Seed
3229

33-
However, due to the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack][Birthday Attack]], the probability of two parties out of /a large number
34-
creating Seeds/ having a Seed *collision* (accidentally selecting the same Seed value) is
35-
somewhat greater.
30+
The Seed is computed *differently* on the hardware wallet (eg. a Ledger or Trezor), when
31+
importing using BIP-39 vs. SLIP-39!
3632

37-
If every human and all their devices created a few billion Seeds (about 10^13), the probability
38-
of an /accidental/ collision falls to about 1 in 10^12 -- about 1 in a billion. Unlikely, but
39-
something like this has happened for IPv4 addresses, so who knows.
33+
So, in order for us to compute and show you the correct Cryptocurrency wallet(s), you must
34+
indicate whether you're importing using the SLIP-39 Mnemonics directly (ie. on a Trezor "Model
35+
T"), *or* if you're recovering the BIP-39 Mnemonic, and using that on the hardware wallet (ie. on
36+
a Ledger, or some other non-SLIP-39 hardware wallet).
4037

41-
So, if a 1 in a billion chance of someone eventually stumbling upon your wallet is too great a
42-
risk, choose a 256-bit random Seed where this Birthday Paradox probability falls to 1 in 10^32 --
43-
approximately the chance of 2 people on earth picking the same virus-sized particle in our solar
44-
system.
38+
If you recover your Seed Entropy from a BIP-39 Mnemonic, we'll /assume/ you intend to *use* the
39+
BIP-39 Mnemonic on your hardware wallet, and we'll check "Recovering from BIP-39 on my Hardware
40+
Wallet".
4541

4642
* SLIP-39
4743

@@ -61,26 +57,32 @@ BIP-39 Mnemonic using SLIP-39.
6157
the new SLIP-39 Groups can be used to recover your Seed. Obviously, cards from the old and new
6258
SLIP-39 Mnemonics can't be "mixed" together to recover the Seed.
6359

64-
* BIP-39
60+
* Random
6561

66-
Create a new BIP-39 Mnemonic, or convert an existing 12- or 24-word BIP-39 Mnemonic into a 128- or
67-
256-bit Seed.
62+
A high-quality 128-bit random seed value is probably adequate, and the 20-word SLIP-39 (and
63+
12-word BIP-39) Mnemonics are much more practical than those produced for 256-bit seeds.
6864

69-
This allows you to "back up" your BIP-39 Seed Entropy to a set of SLIP-39 Mnemonic Card Groups.
70-
You can then securely destroy your BIP-39 Mnemonic card(s) (or, keep a copy in some *extremely*
71-
secure location), and use the SLIP-39 Mnemonic cards as your distributed backup in case of its
72-
loss.
65+
2^128 is aproximately 10^38. There are about 10^57 atoms in our solar system, and about 10^19
66+
atoms in a particle of dust.
7367

74-
** SLIP-39 vs. BIP-39 Seed
68+
Therefore, the odds of 2 people picking the *same* high-quality random 128-bit Seed (1 in 10^38),
69+
is about the same as 2 people randomly selecting the same particle of *dust* out of the mass of
70+
our entire solar system!
7571

76-
The Seed is computed *differently* on the hardware wallet (eg. a Ledger or Trezor), when
77-
importing using BIP-39 vs. SLIP-39!
72+
So, 128-bit seeds are probably fine for most practical levels of account security...
7873

79-
So, in order for us to compute and show you the correct Cryptocurrency wallet(s), you must
80-
indicate whether you're importing using the SLIP-39 Mnemonics directly (ie. on a Trezor "Model
81-
T"), *or* if you're recovering the BIP-39 Mnemonic, and using that on the hardware wallet (ie. on
82-
a Ledger, or some other non-SLIP-39 hardware wallet).
74+
** The Birthday Paradox
75+
76+
However, due to the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack][Birthday Attack]], the probability of two parties out of /a large number
77+
creating Seeds/ having a Seed *collision* (accidentally selecting the same Seed value) is
78+
somewhat greater.
79+
80+
If every human and all their devices created a few billion Seeds (about 10^13), the probability
81+
of an /accidental/ collision falls to about 1 in 10^12 -- about 1 in a billion. Unlikely, but
82+
something like this has happened for IPv4 addresses, so who knows.
83+
84+
So, if a 1 in a billion chance of someone eventually stumbling upon your wallet is too great a
85+
risk, choose a 256-bit random Seed where this Birthday Paradox probability falls to 1 in 10^32 --
86+
approximately the chance of 2 people on earth picking the same virus-sized particle in our solar
87+
system.
8388

84-
If you recover your Seed Entropy from a BIP-39 Mnemonic, we'll /assume/ you intend to *use* the
85-
BIP-39 Mnemonic on your hardware wallet, and we'll check "Recovering from BIP-39 on my Hardware
86-
Wallet".

‎slip39/gui/SLIP-39-SD.txt‎

Lines changed: 53 additions & 51 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -10,45 +10,37 @@ your insecure/unreliable BIP-39 Mnemonic using SLIP-39.
1010
Pro Fixed Hex data may be supplied for the Seed
1111

1212

13-
1 Random
13+
1 BIP-39
1414
========
1515

16-
A high-quality 128-bit random seed value is probably adequate, and the
17-
20-word SLIP-39 (and 12-word BIP-39) Mnemonics are much more practical
18-
than those produced for 256-bit seeds.
16+
Backup an existing 12- or 24-word BIP-39 Seed Phrase Mnemonic. Or,
17+
select Create to produce a new BIP-39 Mnemonic. Save your BIP-39 Seed
18+
Phrase as a set of SLIP-39 Mnemonic Card Groups.
1919

20-
2^128 is aproximately 10^38. There are about 10^57 atoms in our solar
21-
system, and about 10^19 atoms in a particle of dust.
20+
Later, select Recover to input your SLIP-39 Mnemonics, and recover
21+
your BIP-39 Seed Phrase.
2222

23-
Therefore, the odds of 2 people picking the *same* high-quality random
24-
128-bit Seed (1 in 10^38), is about the same as 2 people randomly
25-
selecting the same particle of *dust* out of the mass of our entire
26-
solar system!
23+
You can then securely destroy your BIP-39 Mnemonic card(s) (or, keep a
24+
copy in some *extremely* secure location), and use the SLIP-39
25+
Mnemonic cards as your distributed backup in case of its loss.
2726

28-
So, 128-bit seeds are probably fine for most practical levels of
29-
account security...
3027

28+
1.1 SLIP-39 vs. BIP-39 Seed
29+
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
3130

32-
1.1 The Birthday Paradox
33-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
34-
35-
However, due to the [Birthday Attack], the probability of two parties
36-
out of /a large number creating Seeds/ having a Seed *collision*
37-
(accidentally selecting the same Seed value) is somewhat greater.
38-
39-
If every human and all their devices created a few billion Seeds
40-
(about 10^13), the probability of an /accidental/ collision falls to
41-
about 1 in 10^12 -- about 1 in a billion. Unlikely, but something
42-
like this has happened for IPv4 addresses, so who knows.
43-
44-
So, if a 1 in a billion chance of someone eventually stumbling upon
45-
your wallet is too great a risk, choose a 256-bit random Seed where
46-
this Birthday Paradox probability falls to 1 in 10^32 -- approximately
47-
the chance of 2 people on earth picking the same virus-sized particle
48-
in our solar system.
31+
The Seed is computed *differently* on the hardware wallet (eg. a
32+
Ledger or Trezor), when importing using BIP-39 vs. SLIP-39!
4933

34+
So, in order for us to compute and show you the correct Cryptocurrency
35+
wallet(s), you must indicate whether you're importing using the
36+
SLIP-39 Mnemonics directly (ie. on a Trezor "Model T"), *or* if you're
37+
recovering the BIP-39 Mnemonic, and using that on the hardware wallet
38+
(ie. on a Ledger, or some other non-SLIP-39 hardware wallet).
5039

51-
[Birthday Attack] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack>
40+
If you recover your Seed Entropy from a BIP-39 Mnemonic, we'll
41+
/assume/ you intend to *use* the BIP-39 Mnemonic on your hardware
42+
wallet, and we'll check "Recovering from BIP-39 on my Hardware
43+
Wallet".
5244

5345

5446
2 SLIP-39
@@ -77,32 +69,42 @@ your insecure/unreliable BIP-39 Mnemonic using SLIP-39.
7769
Mnemonics can't be "mixed" together to recover the Seed.
7870

7971

80-
3 BIP-39
72+
3 Random
8173
========
8274

83-
Create a new BIP-39 Mnemonic, or convert an existing 12- or 24-word
84-
BIP-39 Mnemonic into a 128- or 256-bit Seed.
75+
A high-quality 128-bit random seed value is probably adequate, and the
76+
20-word SLIP-39 (and 12-word BIP-39) Mnemonics are much more practical
77+
than those produced for 256-bit seeds.
8578

86-
This allows you to "back up" your BIP-39 Seed Entropy to a set of
87-
SLIP-39 Mnemonic Card Groups. You can then securely destroy your
88-
BIP-39 Mnemonic card(s) (or, keep a copy in some *extremely* secure
89-
location), and use the SLIP-39 Mnemonic cards as your distributed
90-
backup in case of its loss.
79+
2^128 is aproximately 10^38. There are about 10^57 atoms in our solar
80+
system, and about 10^19 atoms in a particle of dust.
9181

82+
Therefore, the odds of 2 people picking the *same* high-quality random
83+
128-bit Seed (1 in 10^38), is about the same as 2 people randomly
84+
selecting the same particle of *dust* out of the mass of our entire
85+
solar system!
9286

93-
3.1 SLIP-39 vs. BIP-39 Seed
94-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
87+
So, 128-bit seeds are probably fine for most practical levels of
88+
account security...
9589

96-
The Seed is computed *differently* on the hardware wallet (eg. a
97-
Ledger or Trezor), when importing using BIP-39 vs. SLIP-39!
9890

99-
So, in order for us to compute and show you the correct Cryptocurrency
100-
wallet(s), you must indicate whether you're importing using the
101-
SLIP-39 Mnemonics directly (ie. on a Trezor "Model T"), *or* if you're
102-
recovering the BIP-39 Mnemonic, and using that on the hardware wallet
103-
(ie. on a Ledger, or some other non-SLIP-39 hardware wallet).
91+
3.1 The Birthday Paradox
92+
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
10493

105-
If you recover your Seed Entropy from a BIP-39 Mnemonic, we'll
106-
/assume/ you intend to *use* the BIP-39 Mnemonic on your hardware
107-
wallet, and we'll check "Recovering from BIP-39 on my Hardware
108-
Wallet".
94+
However, due to the [Birthday Attack], the probability of two parties
95+
out of /a large number creating Seeds/ having a Seed *collision*
96+
(accidentally selecting the same Seed value) is somewhat greater.
97+
98+
If every human and all their devices created a few billion Seeds
99+
(about 10^13), the probability of an /accidental/ collision falls to
100+
about 1 in 10^12 -- about 1 in a billion. Unlikely, but something
101+
like this has happened for IPv4 addresses, so who knows.
102+
103+
So, if a 1 in a billion chance of someone eventually stumbling upon
104+
your wallet is too great a risk, choose a 256-bit random Seed where
105+
this Birthday Paradox probability falls to 1 in 10^32 -- approximately
106+
the chance of 2 people on earth picking the same virus-sized particle
107+
in our solar system.
108+
109+
110+
[Birthday Attack] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack>

‎slip39/version.py‎

Lines changed: 1 addition & 1 deletion
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
1-
__version_info__ = ( 9, 0, 0 )
1+
__version_info__ = ( 9, 0, 1 )
22
__version__ = '.'.join( map( str, __version_info__ ))

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