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Description
Feature or enhancement
Proposal:
Line 2132 in f695eca
res = realpath(cpath, cresolved_path); |
The program performs a buffer copy or write operation with no upper limit on the size of the copy. By analyzing the bounds of the expressions involved, it appears that certain inputs will cause a buffer overflow to occur in this case. In addition to causing program instability, techniques exist which may allow an attacker to use this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code.
Recommendation
Always control the length of buffer copy and buffer write operations. strncpy
should be used over strcpy
, snprintf
over sprintf, and in other cases 'n-variant' functions should be preferred.
int sayHello(uint32_t userId)
{
char buffer[17];
if (userId > 9999) return USER_ID_OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
// BAD: this message overflows the buffer if userId >= 1000,
// as no space for the null terminator was accounted for
sprintf(buffer, "Hello, user %d!", userId);
MessageBox(hWnd, buffer, "New Message", MB_OK);
return SUCCESS;
}
the call to sprintf
writes a message of 14 characters (including the terminating null) plus the length of the string conversion of userId
into a buffer with space for just 17 characters. While userId
is checked to occupy no more than 4 characters when converted, there is no space in the buffer for the terminating null character if userId >= 1000
. In this case, the null character overflows the buffer resulting in undefined behavior.
References
CERT C Coding Standard: STR31-C. Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator
CERT C++ Coding Standard: STR50-CPP. Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator
Has this already been discussed elsewhere?
No response given
Links to previous discussion of this feature:
No response