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refactor(rules): Adapt rules to use the evt. filter field
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rules/README.md

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@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ As highlighted in the previous paragraph, all rules should have the event type c
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### Prefer macros over raw conditions
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Fibratus comes with a [macros](https://www.fibratus.io/#/filters/rules?id=macros) library to promote the reusability and modularization of rule conditions and lists. Before trying to spell out a raw rule condition, explore the library to check if there's already a macro you can pull into the rule. For example, detecting file accesses could be accomplished by declaring the `kevt.name = 'CreateFile' and file.operation = 'open'` expression. However, the macro library comes with the `open_file` macro that you can directly call in any rule. If you can't encounter a particular macro in the library, please consider creating it. Future detection engineers and rule writers could profit from those macros.
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Fibratus comes with a [macros](https://www.fibratus.io/#/filters/rules?id=macros) library to promote the reusability and modularization of rule conditions and lists. Before trying to spell out a raw rule condition, explore the library to check if there's already a macro you can pull into the rule. For example, detecting file accesses could be accomplished by declaring the `evt.name = 'CreateFile' and file.operation = 'open'` expression. However, the macro library comes with the `open_file` macro that you can directly call in any rule. If you can't encounter a particular macro in the library, please consider creating it. Future detection engineers and rule writers could profit from those macros.
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### Formatting styles
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rules/credentail_access_file_access_to_sam_database.yml

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name: File access to SAM database
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id: e3dace20-4962-4381-884e-40dcdde66626
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version: 1.0.3
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version: 1.0.4
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description: |
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Identifies access to the Security Account Manager on-disk database.
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labels:
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'?:\\Windows\\System32\\srtasks.exe'
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)
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min-engine-version: 2.4.0
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min-engine-version: 3.0.0

rules/credential_access_credential_access_from_backups_via_rundll32.yml

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name: Credentials access from backups via Rundll32
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id: ff43852c-486c-4870-a318-ce976d2231a5
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version: 1.0.0
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version: 1.0.1
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description: |
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Detects an attempt to obtain credentials from credential backups.
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labels:
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and
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(ps.child.args iin ('keymgr.dll') and ps.child.args iin ('KRShowKeyMgr'))
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min-engine-version: 2.0.0
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min-engine-version: 3.0.0

rules/credential_access_credential_discovery_via_vaultcmd.yml

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name: Credential discovery via VaultCmd tool
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id: 2ce607d3-5a14-4628-be8a-22bcde97dab5
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version: 1.1.0
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version: 1.1.1
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description: |
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Detects the usage of the VaultCmd tool to list Windows Credentials. VaultCmd creates,
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displays and deletes stored credentials. An adversary may abuse this to list or dump
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severity: medium
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min-engine-version: 2.0.0
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min-engine-version: 3.0.0

rules/credential_access_lsass_access_from_unsigned_executable.yml

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name: LSASS access from unsigned executable
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id: 348bf896-2201-444f-b1c9-e957a1f063bf
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version: 1.0.0
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version: 1.0.1
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description: |
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Detects attempts by an unsigned process to access the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).
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Adversaries may try to dump credential information stored in the process memory of LSASS.
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maxspan 7m
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by ps.uuid
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|load_unsigned_executable|
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|((open_process) or (open_thread)) and kevt.arg[exe] imatches '?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe'|
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|((open_process) or (open_thread)) and evt.arg[exe] imatches '?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe'|
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action:
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- name: kill
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output: >
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Unsigned executable %1.image.path attempted to access Local Security Authority Subsystem Service
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severity: high
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min-engine-version: 2.2.0
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min-engine-version: 3.0.0

rules/credential_access_lsass_handle_leak_via_seclogon.yml

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name: LSASS handle leak via Seclogon
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id: 5d55c938-875e-49e1-ae53-fa196d4445eb
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version: 1.0.0
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version: 1.0.1
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description: |
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Identifies suspicious access to LSASS process from a callstack pointing to seclogon.dll that
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may indicate an attempt to leak an LSASS handle via abusing the Secondary Logon service in
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- https://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html
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condition: >
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open_process and kevt.arg[exe] imatches '?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe' and ps.name ~= 'svchost.exe'
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open_process and evt.arg[exe] imatches '?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe' and ps.name ~= 'svchost.exe'
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and
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ps.access.mask.names in ('CREATE_PROCESS', 'DUP_HANDLE') and thread.callstack.modules imatches ('*seclogon.dll')
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severity: high
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min-engine-version: 2.4.0
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min-engine-version: 3.0.0

rules/credential_access_lsass_memory_dump_preparation_via_silent_process_exit.yml

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name: LSASS memory dump preparation via SilentProcessExit
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id: d325e426-f89a-4f7c-b655-3874dad07986
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version: 1.0.2
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version: 1.0.3
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description: |
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Adversaries may exploit the SilentProcessExit debugging technique to conduct
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LSASS memory dump via WerFault.exe (Windows Error Reporting) binary by creating
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condition: >
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modify_registry and registry.path imatches 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\lsass*'
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min-engine-version: 2.4.0
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min-engine-version: 3.0.0

rules/credential_access_lsass_memory_dump_via_minidumpwritedump.yml

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name: LSASS memory dump via MiniDumpWriteDump
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id: fd7ced77-4a95-4658-80f6-6b9d7b5e3777
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version: 1.0.0
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version: 1.0.1
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description: |
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Identifies access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process to dump the
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memory via MiniDumpWriteDump API.
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- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsass-passwords-without-mimikatz-minidumpwritedump-av-signature-bypass
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condition: >
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((open_process) or (open_thread)) and kevt.arg[exe] imatches '?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe'
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((open_process) or (open_thread)) and evt.arg[exe] imatches '?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe'
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and
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(thread.callstack.modules imatches ('*dbgcore.dll', '*comsvcs.dll') or thread.callstack.symbols imatches ('*MiniDumpWriteDump'))
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action:
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LSASS memory dump attempt by process %ps.exe via MiniDumpWriteDump
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severity: high
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min-engine-version: 2.4.0
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min-engine-version: 3.0.0

rules/credential_access_lsass_memory_dump_via_wer.yml

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name: LSASS memory dump via Windows Error Reporting
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id: 7b4a74e2-c7a7-4c1f-b2ce-0e0273c3add7
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version: 1.0.2
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version: 1.0.3
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description: |
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Adversaries may abuse Windows Error Reporting service to dump LSASS memory.
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The ALPC protocol can send a message to report an exception on LSASS and
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|spawn_process and ps.child.name iin ('WerFault.exe', 'WerFaultSecure.exe')| by ps.child.uuid
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|create_file and file.path icontains 'lsass'| by ps.uuid
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min-engine-version: 2.4.0
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min-engine-version: 3.0.0

rules/credential_access_lsass_memory_dumping.yml

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name: LSASS memory dumping via legitimate or offensive tools
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id: 335795af-246b-483e-8657-09a30c102e63
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version: 1.0.2
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version: 1.0.3
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description: |
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Detects an attempt to dump the LSAAS memory to the disk by employing legitimate
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tools such as procdump, Task Manager, Process Explorer or built-in Windows tools
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by ps.uuid
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|open_process and ps.access.mask.names in ('ALL_ACCESS', 'CREATE_PROCESS', 'VM_READ', 'DUP_HANDLE')
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and
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kevt.arg[exe] imatches '?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe'
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evt.arg[exe] imatches '?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe'
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and
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ps.exe not imatches
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(
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and subsequently write the `%2.file.path` dump file to the disk device
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severity: critical
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min-engine-version: 2.4.0
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min-engine-version: 3.0.0

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