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feat(rules): LSASS handle leak via Seclogon
Identifies suspicious access to LSASS process from a callstack pointing to seclogon.dll that may indicate an attempt to leak an LSASS handle via abusing the Secondary Logon service in preparation for credential access.
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name: LSASS handle leak via Seclogon
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id: 5d55c938-875e-49e1-ae53-fa196d4445eb
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version: 1.0.0
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description: |
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Identifies suspicious access to LSASS process from a callstack pointing to seclogon.dll that
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may indicate an attempt to leak an LSASS handle via abusing the Secondary Logon service in
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preparation for credential access.
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labels:
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tactic.id: TA0006
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tactic.name: Credential Access
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tactic.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
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technique.name: OS Credential Dumping
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technique.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
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subtechnique.id: T1003.001
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subtechnique.name: LSASS Memory
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subtechnique.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
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references:
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- https://github.com/antonioCoco/MalSeclogon
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- https://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html
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condition: >
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open_process and kevt.arg[exe] imatches '?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe' and ps.name ~= 'svchost.exe'
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and
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ps.access.mask.names in ('CREATE_PROCESS', 'DUP_HANDLE') and thread.callstack.modules imatches ('*seclogon.dll')
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severity: high
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min-engine-version: 2.4.0

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