syscalls: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION for addr_limit_user_check

Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION instead of BUG_ON to provide more flexibility
on address limit failures. By default, send a SIGKILL signal to kill the
current process preventing exploitation of a bad address limit.

Make the TIF_FSCHECK flag optional so ARM can use this function.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Pratyush Anand <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Author: thgarnie

include/linux/syscalls.h

@@ -221,21 +221,25 @@ static inline int is_syscall_trace_event(struct trace_event_call *tp_event)
 	}								\
 	static inline long SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))
 
-#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK
 /*
  * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
  * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
  */
 static inline void addr_limit_user_check(void)
 {
-
+#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK
 	if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK))
 		return;
+#endif
 
-	BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
+	if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS),
+				  "Invalid address limit on user-mode return"))
+		force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
+
+#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK
 	clear_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK);
-}
 #endif
+}
 
 asmlinkage long sys32_quotactl(unsigned int cmd, const char __user *special,
 			       qid_t id, void __user *addr);