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Merge pull request #362 from DrDoofus-MD-PhD-DDS/rpip-use-latest-delegate
Use Latest Delegate
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RPIPs/RPIP-77.md

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---
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rpip: 77
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title: Set Smartnode Default to Use Latest Delegate for Minipools
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description: Update Smartnode so by default minipools use the latest protocol-approved delegate and remove supported Smartnode configuration paths for setting older delegate implementations.
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author: Dr Doofus (@DrDoofus-MD-PhD-DDS)
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discussions-to: https://dao.rocketpool.net/t/require-minipools-to-use-latest-delegate/3844
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status: Draft
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type: Protocol
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category: Core
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created: 2026-01-05
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tags: [minipools, delegate, smartnode]
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---
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## Abstract
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This proposal specifies that a future Smartnode update will by default set minipools managed via Smartnode to use the latest delegate smart contract and remove supported Smartnode configuration options for setting older delegate implementations. The intent is to ensure protocol-wide consistency among Smartnode-managed minipools, enable governance-approved minipool behavior changes, and remove technical blockers to future enforcement mechanisms (including, but not limited to, forced exits of persistently underperforming minipools).
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## Motivation
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A non-trivial number of minipools are persistently underperforming, reducing overall rETH yield and harming demand. Reduced rETH demand contributes to difficulties clearing the minipool queue and complicates the protocol’s transition to the Saturn 1 architecture, including megapools, the RPL fee switch, and alternative protocol funding mechanisms.
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While support efforts to remediate underperforming node operators are ongoing, the protocol currently lacks an enforcement mechanism because minipools may opt out of delegate upgrades. This creates a situation where governance approved protocol logic cannot be universally applied.
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## Background
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### Minipool delegate architecture
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Rocket Pool minipools are implemented using a proxy pattern. The minipool contract itself contains minimal logic and instead forwards most calls to a **delegate implementation contract** (the “delegate”).
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The delegate contract controls, among other things:
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- Minipool lifecycle and state transitions
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- Validator launch conditions
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- ETH balance distribution between node operators and rETH holders
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- Penalty and slashing logic
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- Withdrawal, exit, and finalization behavior
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- Trusted-node and governance-authorized actions
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- Bug fixes and protocol rule updates without redeploying minipools
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### `use-latest-delegate` flag
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Node operators may currently configure each minipool to either:
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- Use the delegate active at the time of creation, then upgrade to future delegates of their choosing, or
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- Use the latest delegate at all times
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### Historical rationale for opt-in delegate upgrades
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The opt-in `use-latest-delegate` model was originally designed to:
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1. Protect node operators from potentially malicious or unsafe governance upgrades.
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2. Allow minipools to converge on a long-lived (“Lindy”) delegate without mandatory churn.
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3. Provide node operators an exit path if they disagreed with protocol changes.
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This proposal revisits these assumptions in light of changes to Rocket Pool’s governance and security model.
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## Specification
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### Implementation
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- A Smartnode update SHALL set by default the use latest delegate flag to true for minipools. The exact implementation method is left to the Smartnode development team, subject to this specification.
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- The Smartnode update SHALL remove supported Smartnode configuration options for setting older delegate implementations.
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- The Smartnode update SHOULD be implemented at the earliest reasonable opportunity that does not interfere with the Saturn 1 launch.
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### Scope
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- Applies **only after** upgrading to the specified Smartnode version.
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- Does **not** retroactively modify minipools on older Smartnode versions.
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- Does **not** itself implement forced exits; it enables future governance-approved mechanisms.
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- Does **not** grant any emergency or unilateral powers to the core team or governance bodies beyond existing delegate upgrade mechanisms.
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- Does **not** prevent an older delegate from being used, it just removes the ability to change the use latest delegate option via Smartnode.
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### Delegate Update Oversight
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- Delegate updates that materially affect validator exits, reward distribution, penalties, or governance authority MUST only be implemented following pDAO vetting via vote.
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## Rationale
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Persistently underperforming minipools impose systemic costs:
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- Lower rETH yield
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- Reduced rETH demand
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- Slower queue clearance
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- Delayed or constrained Saturn 1 rollout
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- Reduced protocol revenue options (e.g., RPL fee switch, institutional incentives)
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Because the previous Smartnode behavior did not set the use latest delegate flag to yes, many Node Operators by default remain on older delegate versions, even if they would be satisfied to be on the most recent deployment. This is an unnecessary obstacle that this proposal corrects. Note that this limitation does not apply to megapools, which do not use the same delegate opt-in model.
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## Backwards Compatibility
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- Existing minipools continue operating normally until the node operator updates Smartnode.
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- No changes are applied to nodes that do not update.
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- Minipools created after updating Smartnode would automatically follow the default delegate behavior.
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- Node operators retain the ability to exit minipools prior to upgrading Smartnode, and governance processes are expected to provide sufficient notice before delegate changes that materially affect operator behavior.
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- Node operators can change delegate versions outside the scope of Smartnode UI and/or commandline interfaces.
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## Risks and Considerations
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- **Governance risk concentration:** Delegate upgrades become more powerful and require stronger review processes.
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- **Loss of opt-out:** Node operators lose the ability to permanently choose specific delegates after upgrading.
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- **Trust requirements:** Increased importance of transparent communication, audits, and governance safeguards around delegate changes.
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- **Community alignment:** Some node operators may strongly oppose the change on philosophical grounds.
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- **Imperfect enforcement**: Because this change is gated on Smartnode updates, some node operators—either due to custom setups or intentional avoidance—may remain on older Smartnode versions and continue using older delegates. This limits immediate coverage and means the proposal should be viewed as a necessary enabling step rather than a complete solution on its own.
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- **Loss of Lindy delegate stability:** Forcing delegate upgrades sacrifices the ability for minipools to remain indefinitely on a long-lived delegate implementation. While this may increase upgrade churn, it is a deliberate tradeoff in favor of enforceability and protocol-wide consistency among Smartnode-managed minipools.
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Several original justifications for opt-in delegate upgrades have been partially mitigated over time. Saturn-era governance introduces additional safeguards, including a Security Council veto, reducing the risk of malicious upgrades. Additionally, long governance lead times and explicit votes may serve as a functional replacement for individual opt-out as an exit mechanism.
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## Conclusion
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This proposal represents a philosophical shift, but one driven by observed protocol limitations rather than theory. As Rocket Pool evolves, ensuring consistent, enforceable protocol behavior may be necessary to protect rETH holders and support long-term scalability.
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## Copyright
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Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).

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