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| 1 | +# Incident Response Plan (IRP) |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +Status: Draft |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +Purpose |
| 6 | +------- |
| 7 | +This Incident Response Plan (IRP) defines the steps the project maintainer(s) will follow when handling security incidents related to the `oauth2` gem. It is written for a small project with a single primary maintainer and is intended to be practical, concise, and actionable. |
| 8 | + |
| 9 | +Scope |
| 10 | +----- |
| 11 | +Applies to security incidents that affect the `oauth2` codebase, releases (gems), CI/CD infrastructure related to building and publishing the gem, repository credentials, or any compromise of project infrastructure that could impact users. |
| 12 | + |
| 13 | +Key assumptions |
| 14 | +- This project is maintained primarily by a single maintainer. |
| 15 | +- Public vulnerability disclosure is handled via Tidelift (see `SECURITY.md`). |
| 16 | +- The maintainer will act as incident commander unless otherwise delegated. |
| 17 | + |
| 18 | +Contact & Roles |
| 19 | +--------------- |
| 20 | +- Incident Commander: Primary maintainer (repo owner). Responsible for coordinating triage, remediation, and communications. |
| 21 | +- Secondary Contact: (optional) A trusted collaborator or organization contact if available. |
| 22 | + |
| 23 | +If you are an external reporter |
| 24 | +- Do not publicly disclose details of an active vulnerability before coordination via Tidelift. |
| 25 | +- See `SECURITY.md` for Tidelift disclosure instructions. If the reporter has questions and cannot use Tidelift, they may open a direct encrypted report as described in `SECURITY.md` (if available) or email the maintainer contact listed in the repository. |
| 26 | + |
| 27 | +Incident Handling Workflow (high level) |
| 28 | +--------------------------------------- |
| 29 | +1. Identification & Reporting |
| 30 | + - Reports may arrive via Tidelift, issue tracker, direct email, or third-party advisories. |
| 31 | + - Immediately acknowledge receipt (within 24-72 hours) via the reporting channel. |
| 32 | + |
| 33 | +2. Triage & Initial Assessment (first 72 hours) |
| 34 | + - Confirm the report is not duplicative and gather: reproducer, affected versions, attack surface, exploitability, and CVSS-like severity estimate. |
| 35 | + - Verify the issue against the codebase and reproduce locally if possible. |
| 36 | + - Determine scope: which versions are affected, whether the issue is in code paths executed in common setups, and whether a workaround exists. |
| 37 | + |
| 38 | +3. Containment & Mitigation |
| 39 | + - If a simple mitigation or workaround (configuration change, safe default, or recommended upgrade) exists, document it clearly in the issue/Tidelift advisory. |
| 40 | + - If immediate removal of a release is required (rare), consult Tidelift for coordinated takedown and notify package hosts if applicable. |
| 41 | + |
| 42 | +4. Remediation & Patch |
| 43 | + - Prepare a fix in a branch with tests and changelog entries. Prefer minimal, well-tested changes. |
| 44 | + - Include tests that reproduce the faulty behavior and demonstrate the fix. |
| 45 | + - Hardening: add fuzz tests, input validation, or additional checks as appropriate. |
| 46 | + |
| 47 | +5. Release & Disclosure |
| 48 | + - Coordinate disclosure through Tidelift per `SECURITY.md` timelines. Aim for a coordinated disclosure and patch release to minimize risk to users. |
| 49 | + - Publish a patch release (increment gem version) and an advisory via Tidelift. |
| 50 | + - Update `CHANGELOG.md` and repository release notes with non-sensitive details. |
| 51 | + |
| 52 | +6. Post-Incident |
| 53 | + - Produce a short postmortem: timeline, root cause, actions taken, and follow-ups. |
| 54 | + - Add/adjust tests and CI checks to prevent regressions. |
| 55 | + - If credentials or infrastructure were compromised, rotate secrets and audit access. |
| 56 | + |
| 57 | +Severity classification (guidance) |
| 58 | +--------------------------------- |
| 59 | +- High/Critical: Remote code execution, data exfiltration, or any vulnerability that can be exploited without user interaction. Immediate action and prioritized patching. |
| 60 | +- Medium: Privilege escalation, sensitive information leaks that require specific conditions. Patch in the next release cycle with advisory. |
| 61 | +- Low: Minor information leaks, UI issues, or non-exploitable bugs. Fix normally and include in the next scheduled release. |
| 62 | + |
| 63 | +Preservation of evidence |
| 64 | +------------------------ |
| 65 | +- Preserve all reporter-provided data, logs, and reproducer code in a secure location (local encrypted storage or private branch) for the investigation. |
| 66 | +- Do not publish evidence that would enable exploitation before coordinated disclosure. |
| 67 | + |
| 68 | +Communication templates |
| 69 | +----------------------- |
| 70 | +Acknowledgement (to reporter) |
| 71 | + |
| 72 | +"Thank you for reporting this issue. I've received your report and will triage it within 72 hours. If you can, please provide reproduction steps, affected versions, and any exploit PoC. I will coordinate disclosure through Tidelift per the project's security policy." |
| 73 | + |
| 74 | +Public advisory (after patch is ready) |
| 75 | + |
| 76 | +"A security advisory for oauth2 (versions X.Y.Z) has been published via Tidelift. Please upgrade to version A.B.C which patches [brief description]. See the advisory for details and recommended mitigations." |
| 77 | + |
| 78 | +Runbook: Quick steps for a maintainer to patch and release |
| 79 | +--------------------------------------------------------- |
| 80 | +1. Create a branch: `git checkout -b fix/security-brief-description` |
| 81 | +2. Reproduce the issue locally and add a regression spec in `spec/`. |
| 82 | +3. Implement the fix and run the test suite: `bundle exec rspec` (or the project's preferred test command). |
| 83 | +4. Bump version in `lib/oauth2/version.rb` following semantic versioning. |
| 84 | +5. Update `CHANGELOG.md` with an entry describing the fix (avoid exploit details). |
| 85 | +6. Commit and push the branch, open a PR, and merge after approvals. |
| 86 | +7. Build and push the gem: `gem build oauth2.gemspec && gem push pkg/...` (coordinate with Tidelift before public push if disclosure is coordinated). |
| 87 | +8. Publish a release on GitHub and ensure the Tidelift advisory is posted. |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | +Operational notes |
| 90 | +----------------- |
| 91 | +- Secrets: Use local encrypted storage for any sensitive reporter data. If repository or CI secrets may be compromised, rotate them immediately and update dependent services. |
| 92 | +- Access control: Limit who can publish gems and who has admin access to the repo. Keep an up-to-date list of collaborators in a secure place. |
| 93 | + |
| 94 | +Legal & regulatory |
| 95 | +------------------ |
| 96 | +- If the incident involves user data or has legal implications, consult legal counsel or the maintainers' employer as appropriate. The maintainer should document the timeline and all communications. |
| 97 | + |
| 98 | +Retrospective & continuous improvement |
| 99 | +------------------------------------- |
| 100 | +After an incident, perform a brief post-incident review covering: |
| 101 | +- What happened and why |
| 102 | +- What was done to contain and remediate |
| 103 | +- What tests or process changes will prevent recurrence |
| 104 | +- Assign owners and deadlines for follow-up tasks |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | +References |
| 107 | +---------- |
| 108 | +- See `SECURITY.md` for the project's official disclosure channel (Tidelift). |
| 109 | + |
| 110 | +Appendix: Example checklist for an incident |
| 111 | +------------------------------------------ |
| 112 | +- [ ] Acknowledge report to reporter (24-72 hours) |
| 113 | +- [ ] Reproduce and classify severity |
| 114 | +- [ ] Prepare and test a fix in a branch |
| 115 | +- [ ] Coordinate disclosure via Tidelift |
| 116 | +- [ ] Publish patch release and advisory |
| 117 | +- [ ] Postmortem and follow-up actions |
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