diff --git a/content/crates.io-malicious-crates-fasterlog-and-asyncprintln.md b/content/crates.io-malicious-crates-fasterlog-and-asyncprintln.md
index f3bbfc980..fc316f0ff 100644
--- a/content/crates.io-malicious-crates-fasterlog-and-asyncprintln.md
+++ b/content/crates.io-malicious-crates-fasterlog-and-asyncprintln.md
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ team = "the crates.io team"
 team_url = "https://www.rust-lang.org/governance/teams/dev-tools#team-crates-io"
 +++
 
+**Updated September 24th, 2025 17:34:38 UTC** - Socket has also published their own [accompanying blog post][socket-blog] about the attack.
+
 ## Summary
 
 On September 24th, the crates.io team was notified by Kirill Boychenko from the [Socket Threat Research Team][socket] of two malicious crates which were actively searching file contents for Etherum private keys, Solana private keys, and arbitrary byte arrays for exfiltration.
@@ -18,7 +20,6 @@ These crates were:
 
 The malicious code was executed at runtime, when running or testing a project depending on them. Notably, they did not execute any malicious code at build time. Except for their malicious payload, these crates copied the source code, features, and documentation of legitimate crates, using a similiar name to them (a case of typosquatting[^typosquatting]).
 
-
 ## Actions taken
 
 The users in question were immediately disabled, and the crates in question were deleted[^deletion] from crates.io shortly after. We have retained copies of all logs associated with the users and the malicious crate files for further analysis.
@@ -52,3 +53,4 @@ Our thanks to Kirill Boychenko from the [Socket Threat Research Team][socket] fo
 [foundation]: https://foundation.rust-lang.org/
 [init]: https://foundation.rust-lang.org/news/2022-09-13-rust-foundation-establishes-security-team/
 [socket]: https://www.socket.dev/
+[socket-blog]: https://socket.dev/blog/two-malicious-rust-crates-impersonate-popular-logger-to-steal-wallet-keys
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