diff --git a/config/cobra.go b/config/cobra.go
index f174906..2e496cd 100644
--- a/config/cobra.go
+++ b/config/cobra.go
@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@
 package config
 
-import "github.com/spf13/cobra"
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+)
+
+// sandboxAllowRaw holds the raw --sandbox-allow flag values before parsing.
+var sandboxAllowRaw []string
 
 // ApplyCobraFlags applies the cobra flags to the command.
 // These flags are local concern of the config package. This helper function is used
@@ -29,7 +36,26 @@ func ApplyCobraFlags(cmd *cobra.Command) {
 		globalConfig.Config.Sandbox.EnforceAlways, "Apply sandbox to all commands, not just install commands (requires --sandbox)")
 	cmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&globalConfig.SandboxProfileOverride, "sandbox-profile",
 		globalConfig.SandboxProfileOverride, "Override sandbox policy profile (built-in name or path to custom YAML)")
+	cmd.PersistentFlags().StringArrayVar(&sandboxAllowRaw, "sandbox-allow",
+		nil, "Add runtime sandbox allow rule (type=value). Types: read, write, exec, net-connect, net-bind")
 
 	// Hide the experimental proxy mode flag but keep it for backward compatibility
 	_ = cmd.PersistentFlags().MarkHidden("experimental-proxy-mode")
 }
+
+// FinalizeSandboxAllowOverrides parses the raw --sandbox-allow flag values
+// and stores the validated overrides in the global config. This must be called
+// after cobra flag parsing is complete (e.g., in PersistentPreRun).
+func FinalizeSandboxAllowOverrides() error {
+	if len(sandboxAllowRaw) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	overrides, err := parseSandboxAllowOverrides(sandboxAllowRaw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse --sandbox-allow flags: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	globalConfig.SandboxAllowOverrides = overrides
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/config/config.go b/config/config.go
index 126eced..a863ad9 100644
--- a/config/config.go
+++ b/config/config.go
@@ -134,6 +134,11 @@ type RuntimeConfig struct {
 	// This is a CLI-only flag (--sandbox-profile) and is not persisted to config.yml.
 	SandboxProfileOverride string
 
+	// SandboxAllowOverrides holds runtime sandbox allow rules from --sandbox-allow flags.
+	// These are additive rules applied on top of the resolved sandbox policy.
+	// Not persisted to config.yml.
+	SandboxAllowOverrides []SandboxAllowOverride
+
 	// Internal config values computed at runtime and must be accessed via. API
 	configDir      string
 	configFilePath string
@@ -161,6 +166,29 @@ func (r *RuntimeConfig) IsProxyModeEnabled() bool {
 	return (r.Config.ExperimentalProxyMode || r.Config.ProxyMode)
 }
 
+// SandboxAllowType represents the type of a sandbox allow override.
+type SandboxAllowType string
+
+const (
+	SandboxAllowRead       SandboxAllowType = "read"
+	SandboxAllowWrite      SandboxAllowType = "write"
+	SandboxAllowExec       SandboxAllowType = "exec"
+	SandboxAllowNetConnect SandboxAllowType = "net-connect"
+	SandboxAllowNetBind    SandboxAllowType = "net-bind"
+)
+
+// SandboxAllowOverride represents a single --sandbox-allow flag value.
+type SandboxAllowOverride struct {
+	// Type is the resource type (read, write, exec, net-connect, net-bind).
+	Type SandboxAllowType
+
+	// Value is the resolved value (absolute path, host:port, etc.).
+	Value string
+
+	// Raw is the original CLI value before resolution (for logging/warnings).
+	Raw string
+}
+
 // DefaultConfig is a fail safe contract for the runtime configuration.
 // The config package return an appropriate RuntimeConfig based on the environment and the configuration.
 func DefaultConfig() RuntimeConfig {
diff --git a/config/sandbox_allow.go b/config/sandbox_allow.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3443e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/config/sandbox_allow.go
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+package config
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/safedep/dry/log"
+)
+
+// validSandboxAllowTypes is the set of recognized --sandbox-allow type prefixes.
+var validSandboxAllowTypes = map[SandboxAllowType]bool{
+	SandboxAllowRead:       true,
+	SandboxAllowWrite:      true,
+	SandboxAllowExec:       true,
+	SandboxAllowNetConnect: true,
+	SandboxAllowNetBind:    true,
+}
+
+// parseSandboxAllowOverrides parses raw --sandbox-allow flag values into validated overrides.
+// Each raw value must be in the format "type=value" (e.g., "write=./.gitignore").
+func parseSandboxAllowOverrides(raw []string) ([]SandboxAllowOverride, error) {
+	overrides := make([]SandboxAllowOverride, 0, len(raw))
+
+	for _, r := range raw {
+		override, err := parseSingleOverride(r)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid --sandbox-allow %q: %w", r, err)
+		}
+
+		overrides = append(overrides, override)
+	}
+
+	return overrides, nil
+}
+
+// parseSingleOverride parses and validates a single "type=value" string.
+func parseSingleOverride(raw string) (SandboxAllowOverride, error) {
+	// Split on first '=' only to handle values containing '='
+	idx := strings.IndexByte(raw, '=')
+	if idx < 0 {
+		return SandboxAllowOverride{}, fmt.Errorf("missing '=' separator, expected format: type=value (e.g., write=./file)")
+	}
+
+	typStr := raw[:idx]
+	value := raw[idx+1:]
+
+	if typStr == "" {
+		return SandboxAllowOverride{}, fmt.Errorf("missing type before '=', expected format: type=value")
+	}
+
+	if value == "" {
+		return SandboxAllowOverride{}, fmt.Errorf("missing value after '=', expected format: type=value")
+	}
+
+	allowType := SandboxAllowType(typStr)
+
+	// Provide a helpful error for the common mistake of using "net" instead of "net-connect"/"net-bind"
+	if typStr == "net" {
+		return SandboxAllowOverride{}, fmt.Errorf("unknown type %q (use net-connect or net-bind)", typStr)
+	}
+
+	if !validSandboxAllowTypes[allowType] {
+		return SandboxAllowOverride{}, fmt.Errorf("unknown type %q, valid types: read, write, exec, net-connect, net-bind", typStr)
+	}
+
+	resolved, err := validateAndResolveValue(allowType, value)
+	if err != nil {
+		return SandboxAllowOverride{}, err
+	}
+
+	return SandboxAllowOverride{
+		Type:  allowType,
+		Value: resolved,
+		Raw:   raw,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// validateAndResolveValue validates the value for the given type and resolves paths.
+func validateAndResolveValue(typ SandboxAllowType, value string) (string, error) {
+	switch typ {
+	case SandboxAllowRead, SandboxAllowWrite:
+		return resolveFilesystemPath(value)
+	case SandboxAllowExec:
+		return resolveExecPath(value)
+	case SandboxAllowNetConnect:
+		return validateNetConnect(value)
+	case SandboxAllowNetBind:
+		return validateNetBind(value)
+	default:
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("unhandled type: %s", typ)
+	}
+}
+
+// resolveFilesystemPath resolves a filesystem path for read/write overrides.
+// Supports glob patterns. Resolves relative paths to absolute via CWD.
+func resolveFilesystemPath(value string) (string, error) {
+	if err := checkTildePath(value); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	return resolveToAbsolute(value)
+}
+
+// resolveExecPath resolves an exec path. Rejects glob patterns.
+func resolveExecPath(value string) (string, error) {
+	if err := checkTildePath(value); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	if containsGlob(value) {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("glob patterns are not allowed for exec type (specify exact path)")
+	}
+
+	return resolveToAbsolute(value)
+}
+
+// validateNetConnect validates a net-connect value (host:port format, no wildcards).
+func validateNetConnect(value string) (string, error) {
+	host, port, err := parseHostPort(value)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid net-connect value: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if host == "*" || strings.Contains(host, "*") || strings.Contains(host, "?") {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("wildcards are not allowed for net-connect (specify exact host:port)")
+	}
+
+	if port == "*" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("port wildcard is not allowed for net-connect (specify exact host:port)")
+	}
+
+	return value, nil
+}
+
+// validateNetBind validates a net-bind value.
+// Allows localhost:* and 127.0.0.1:* as special wildcard forms.
+// Warns on non-localhost addresses.
+func validateNetBind(value string) (string, error) {
+	host, _, err := parseHostPort(value)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid net-bind value: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Reject host-side wildcards
+	if host == "*" || strings.Contains(host, "*") || strings.Contains(host, "?") {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("host wildcards are not allowed for net-bind (specify a host, e.g., localhost:3000)")
+	}
+
+	// Warn on non-localhost addresses
+	if !isLocalhostAddress(host) {
+		log.Warnf("--sandbox-allow net-bind=%s uses non-localhost address, this exposes the port to the network", value)
+	}
+
+	return value, nil
+}
+
+// parseHostPort parses a host:port string. The port may be "*" for wildcard.
+func parseHostPort(value string) (string, string, error) {
+	// Find the last ':' to split host and port (handles IPv6 in the future)
+	lastColon := strings.LastIndex(value, ":")
+	if lastColon < 0 {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("expected host:port format (e.g., example.com:443), got %q", value)
+	}
+
+	host := value[:lastColon]
+	port := value[lastColon+1:]
+
+	if host == "" {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("missing host in host:port value %q", value)
+	}
+
+	if port == "" {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("missing port in host:port value %q", value)
+	}
+
+	return host, port, nil
+}
+
+// isLocalhostAddress returns true if the host is a localhost address.
+func isLocalhostAddress(host string) bool {
+	return host == "localhost" || host == "127.0.0.1" || host == "::1"
+}
+
+// resolveToAbsolute resolves a path to an absolute path relative to CWD.
+// Glob characters are preserved. The path is cleaned via filepath.Clean().
+func resolveToAbsolute(value string) (string, error) {
+	if filepath.IsAbs(value) {
+		return filepath.Clean(value), nil
+	}
+
+	// For paths with glob characters, we need to preserve them through Clean.
+	// filepath.Clean handles ".." and "." but leaves glob chars intact.
+	cwd, err := os.Getwd()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get working directory: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(cwd, value)), nil
+}
+
+// checkTildePath returns an error if the path starts with "~" (unexpanded tilde).
+func checkTildePath(value string) error {
+	if strings.HasPrefix(value, "~") {
+		return fmt.Errorf("path %q starts with '~' which was not expanded by your shell; use an absolute path instead", value)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// containsGlob returns true if the pattern contains glob wildcards.
+func containsGlob(pattern string) bool {
+	return strings.Contains(pattern, "*") ||
+		strings.Contains(pattern, "?") ||
+		strings.Contains(pattern, "[")
+}
diff --git a/config/sandbox_allow_test.go b/config/sandbox_allow_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c138ed8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/config/sandbox_allow_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+package config
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestParseSandboxAllowOverrides_ValidFormats(t *testing.T) {
+	cwd, err := os.Getwd()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name          string
+		raw           string
+		expectedType  SandboxAllowType
+		expectedValue string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:          "write with relative path",
+			raw:           "write=./.gitignore",
+			expectedType:  SandboxAllowWrite,
+			expectedValue: filepath.Join(cwd, ".gitignore"),
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "write with absolute path",
+			raw:           "write=/tmp/output",
+			expectedType:  SandboxAllowWrite,
+			expectedValue: "/tmp/output",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "write with glob pattern",
+			raw:           "write=./dist/**",
+			expectedType:  SandboxAllowWrite,
+			expectedValue: filepath.Join(cwd, "dist/**"),
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "read with absolute path",
+			raw:           "read=/opt/config/registry.json",
+			expectedType:  SandboxAllowRead,
+			expectedValue: "/opt/config/registry.json",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "read with glob pattern",
+			raw:           "read=./src/**",
+			expectedType:  SandboxAllowRead,
+			expectedValue: filepath.Join(cwd, "src/**"),
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "exec with absolute path",
+			raw:           "exec=/usr/bin/curl",
+			expectedType:  SandboxAllowExec,
+			expectedValue: "/usr/bin/curl",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "net-connect with host:port",
+			raw:           "net-connect=registry.npmjs.org:443",
+			expectedType:  SandboxAllowNetConnect,
+			expectedValue: "registry.npmjs.org:443",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "net-bind with localhost",
+			raw:           "net-bind=127.0.0.1:3000",
+			expectedType:  SandboxAllowNetBind,
+			expectedValue: "127.0.0.1:3000",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "net-bind with localhost wildcard port",
+			raw:           "net-bind=localhost:*",
+			expectedType:  SandboxAllowNetBind,
+			expectedValue: "localhost:*",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "write with relative path no dot prefix",
+			raw:           "write=dist/output",
+			expectedType:  SandboxAllowWrite,
+			expectedValue: filepath.Join(cwd, "dist/output"),
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			overrides, err := parseSandboxAllowOverrides([]string{tt.raw})
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.Len(t, overrides, 1)
+
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.expectedType, overrides[0].Type)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.expectedValue, overrides[0].Value)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.raw, overrides[0].Raw)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseSandboxAllowOverrides_MultipleValues(t *testing.T) {
+	raw := []string{
+		"write=./.gitignore",
+		"exec=/usr/bin/curl",
+		"net-connect=example.com:443",
+	}
+
+	overrides, err := parseSandboxAllowOverrides(raw)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, overrides, 3)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, SandboxAllowWrite, overrides[0].Type)
+	assert.Equal(t, SandboxAllowExec, overrides[1].Type)
+	assert.Equal(t, SandboxAllowNetConnect, overrides[2].Type)
+}
+
+func TestParseSandboxAllowOverrides_EmptySlice(t *testing.T) {
+	overrides, err := parseSandboxAllowOverrides([]string{})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Empty(t, overrides)
+}
+
+func TestParseSandboxAllowOverrides_InvalidFormats(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		raw         string
+		errContains string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "missing separator",
+			raw:         "./foo",
+			errContains: "missing '=' separator",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "missing type",
+			raw:         "=./foo",
+			errContains: "missing type before '='",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "empty value",
+			raw:         "write=",
+			errContains: "missing value after '='",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "unknown type",
+			raw:         "foo=bar",
+			errContains: "unknown type",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "net shorthand rejected",
+			raw:         "net=host:443",
+			errContains: "use net-connect or net-bind",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "exec with glob pattern",
+			raw:         "exec=/usr/bin/*",
+			errContains: "glob patterns are not allowed for exec",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "net-connect with wildcard host",
+			raw:         "net-connect=*:443",
+			errContains: "wildcards are not allowed for net-connect",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "net-connect with glob host",
+			raw:         "net-connect=*.example.com:443",
+			errContains: "wildcards are not allowed for net-connect",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "net-connect with wildcard port",
+			raw:         "net-connect=example.com:*",
+			errContains: "port wildcard is not allowed for net-connect",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "net-bind with host wildcard",
+			raw:         "net-bind=*:3000",
+			errContains: "host wildcards are not allowed for net-bind",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "net-bind with full wildcard",
+			raw:         "net-bind=*:*",
+			errContains: "host wildcards are not allowed for net-bind",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "net-connect missing port",
+			raw:         "net-connect=example.com",
+			errContains: "expected host:port format",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "net-bind missing port",
+			raw:         "net-bind=localhost",
+			errContains: "expected host:port format",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "tilde path for write",
+			raw:         "write=~/file",
+			errContains: "starts with '~'",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "tilde path for read",
+			raw:         "read=~/.config/foo",
+			errContains: "starts with '~'",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "tilde path for exec",
+			raw:         "exec=~/bin/tool",
+			errContains: "starts with '~'",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			_, err := parseSandboxAllowOverrides([]string{tt.raw})
+			require.Error(t, err)
+			assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.errContains)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseSandboxAllowOverrides_ValueWithEquals(t *testing.T) {
+	// Values can contain '=' characters — the parser splits on the first '=' only
+	overrides, err := parseSandboxAllowOverrides([]string{"write=./path=with=equals.txt"})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, overrides, 1)
+
+	cwd, err := os.Getwd()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, SandboxAllowWrite, overrides[0].Type)
+	assert.Equal(t, filepath.Join(cwd, "path=with=equals.txt"), overrides[0].Value)
+}
+
+func TestParseSandboxAllowOverrides_PathCleaning(t *testing.T) {
+	cwd, err := os.Getwd()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Paths with ".." are cleaned via filepath.Clean
+	overrides, err := parseSandboxAllowOverrides([]string{"write=./foo/../bar"})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, overrides, 1)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, filepath.Join(cwd, "bar"), overrides[0].Value)
+}
+
+func TestParseSandboxAllowOverrides_NetBindNonLocalhost(t *testing.T) {
+	// Non-localhost should succeed (with a warning logged, which we can't easily assert here)
+	overrides, err := parseSandboxAllowOverrides([]string{"net-bind=0.0.0.0:3000"})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, overrides, 1)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, SandboxAllowNetBind, overrides[0].Type)
+	assert.Equal(t, "0.0.0.0:3000", overrides[0].Value)
+}
+
+func TestParseSandboxAllowOverrides_FirstErrorStops(t *testing.T) {
+	// If the first value is invalid, the second is not parsed
+	_, err := parseSandboxAllowOverrides([]string{"write=./ok", "bad"})
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "missing '=' separator")
+}
diff --git a/docs/sandbox.md b/docs/sandbox.md
index 0094384..f77d8be 100644
--- a/docs/sandbox.md
+++ b/docs/sandbox.md
@@ -54,6 +54,34 @@ Run sandbox with custom policy file:
 pmg --sandbox --sandbox-profile=/path/to/custom-policy.yml npm install express
 ```
 
+### Runtime Allow Overrides
+
+Use `--sandbox-allow` to make one-off exceptions without creating a custom profile. This is useful when a command needs access that the default profile blocks.
+
+```bash
+# Allow writing to a specific file
+pmg --sandbox-allow write=./.gitignore npx create-next-app@latest
+
+# Allow executing a binary blocked by the profile
+pmg --sandbox-allow exec=$(which curl) npm install some-package
+
+# Allow outbound connection to a private registry
+pmg --sandbox-allow net-connect=npm.internal.corp:443 npm install @corp/private-pkg
+
+# Allow a dev server to bind to a local port
+pmg --sandbox-allow net-bind=127.0.0.1:3000 npx some-dev-tool
+
+# Multiple overrides
+pmg \
+  --sandbox-allow write=./.gitignore \
+  --sandbox-allow exec=$(which curl) \
+  npm install some-package
+```
+
+Supported types: `read`, `write`, `exec`, `net-connect`, `net-bind`.
+
+Overrides are additive (append to allow lists), non-persistent (apply to current invocation only), and logged in the event log for auditing. They cannot bypass explicit deny rules in the profile or mandatory security protections (`.env`, `.ssh`, `.aws`, `.git/hooks`, etc.).
+
 <details>
 <summary>Custom policy overrides using Policy Templates</summary>
 
@@ -256,4 +284,4 @@ bwrap --verbose [arguments...] -- npm install express
 
 - https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime
 - https://geminicli.com/docs/cli/sandbox/
-- https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap
\ No newline at end of file
+- https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap
diff --git a/internal/eventlog/eventlog.go b/internal/eventlog/eventlog.go
index b50c449..9c7166d 100644
--- a/internal/eventlog/eventlog.go
+++ b/internal/eventlog/eventlog.go
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const (
 	EventTypeDependencyResolved    EventType = "dependency_resolved"
 	EventTypeInstallInsecureBypass EventType = "install_insecure_bypass"
 	EventTypeProxyHostObserved     EventType = "proxy_host_observed"
+	EventTypeSandboxOverride       EventType = "sandbox_override"
 	EventTypeError                 EventType = "error"
 )
 
@@ -413,6 +414,22 @@ func LogProxyHostObserved(hostname, method, reason string, details map[string]in
 	}
 }
 
+// LogSandboxOverrides logs when runtime sandbox allow overrides are applied.
+func LogSandboxOverrides(sandboxProfile string, overrides []map[string]string) {
+	event := Event{
+		EventType: EventTypeSandboxOverride,
+		Message:   fmt.Sprintf("Sandbox runtime overrides applied (%d rules)", len(overrides)),
+		Details: map[string]interface{}{
+			"sandbox_profile":          sandboxProfile,
+			"sandbox_runtime_overrides": overrides,
+		},
+	}
+
+	if err := LogEvent(event); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("failed to log sandbox override event: %s", err)
+	}
+}
+
 // LogError logs an error event
 func LogError(message string, err error) {
 	event := Event{
diff --git a/main.go b/main.go
index ac1ce92..e540b8a 100644
--- a/main.go
+++ b/main.go
@@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ func main() {
 			if eventlogErr != nil {
 				ui.Fatalf("failed to initialize event logging: %v", eventlogErr)
 			}
+
+			// Parse and validate --sandbox-allow flags after all flags are resolved
+			if err := config.FinalizeSandboxAllowOverrides(); err != nil {
+				ui.Fatalf("pmg: %v", err)
+			}
 		},
 		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 			if len(args) == 0 {
diff --git a/sandbox/executor/apply.go b/sandbox/executor/apply.go
index eb1d6a5..cf3f76a 100644
--- a/sandbox/executor/apply.go
+++ b/sandbox/executor/apply.go
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ import (
 	"path/filepath"
 
 	"github.com/safedep/dry/log"
+	"github.com/safedep/dry/utils"
 	"github.com/safedep/pmg/config"
+	"github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/eventlog"
 	"github.com/safedep/pmg/sandbox"
 	"github.com/safedep/pmg/sandbox/platform"
 	"github.com/safedep/pmg/usefulerror"
@@ -114,6 +116,12 @@ func ApplySandbox(ctx context.Context, cmd *exec.Cmd, pmName string, opts ...app
 
 	log.Debugf("Loaded sandbox policy %s", policy.Name)
 
+	// Apply runtime --sandbox-allow overrides to the policy before execution
+	if len(cfg.SandboxAllowOverrides) > 0 {
+		applyRuntimeOverrides(policy, cfg.SandboxAllowOverrides)
+		logSandboxOverridesToEventLog(policy.Name, cfg.SandboxAllowOverrides)
+	}
+
 	if !policy.AppliesToPackageManager(pmName) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("sandbox policy %s does not apply to %s", policy.Name, pmName)
 	}
@@ -146,3 +154,49 @@ func ApplySandbox(ctx context.Context, cmd *exec.Cmd, pmName string, opts ...app
 
 	return result, nil
 }
+
+// applyRuntimeOverrides applies --sandbox-allow overrides to the policy.
+// Overrides are additive — they only append to allow lists, never modify deny lists.
+// Warnings are logged for conflicts with deny rules and mandatory deny patterns.
+func applyRuntimeOverrides(policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy, overrides []config.SandboxAllowOverride) {
+	for _, override := range overrides {
+		switch override.Type {
+		case config.SandboxAllowRead:
+			log.Infof("Sandbox override: allowing read access to %s", override.Value)
+			policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = append(policy.Filesystem.AllowRead, override.Value)
+
+		case config.SandboxAllowWrite:
+			log.Infof("Sandbox override: allowing write access to %s", override.Value)
+			policy.Filesystem.AllowWrite = append(policy.Filesystem.AllowWrite, override.Value)
+
+		case config.SandboxAllowExec:
+			log.Infof("Sandbox override: allowing execution of %s", override.Value)
+			policy.Process.AllowExec = append(policy.Process.AllowExec, override.Value)
+
+		case config.SandboxAllowNetConnect:
+			log.Infof("Sandbox override: allowing outbound connection to %s", override.Value)
+			policy.Network.AllowOutbound = append(policy.Network.AllowOutbound, override.Value)
+
+		case config.SandboxAllowNetBind:
+			log.Infof("Sandbox override: allowing network bind on %s", override.Value)
+			policy.Network.AllowBind = append(policy.Network.AllowBind, override.Value)
+
+			// Enable AllowNetworkBind so the translator emits bind rules.
+			// Without this, AllowBind entries would be ignored on some platforms.
+			policy.AllowNetworkBind = utils.PtrTo(true)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// logSandboxOverridesToEventLog records sandbox allow overrides in the audit event log.
+func logSandboxOverridesToEventLog(profileName string, overrides []config.SandboxAllowOverride) {
+	entries := make([]map[string]string, 0, len(overrides))
+	for _, o := range overrides {
+		entries = append(entries, map[string]string{
+			"type":  string(o.Type),
+			"value": o.Value,
+		})
+	}
+
+	eventlog.LogSandboxOverrides(profileName, entries)
+}
diff --git a/sandbox/executor/apply_test.go b/sandbox/executor/apply_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc350ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox/executor/apply_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+package executor
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/safedep/dry/utils"
+	"github.com/safedep/pmg/config"
+	"github.com/safedep/pmg/sandbox"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+)
+
+func TestApplyRuntimeOverrides_Read(t *testing.T) {
+	policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
+		Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
+			AllowRead: []string{"/existing"},
+		},
+	}
+
+	applyRuntimeOverrides(policy, []config.SandboxAllowOverride{
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowRead, Value: "/new/path", Raw: "read=/new/path"},
+	})
+
+	assert.Contains(t, policy.Filesystem.AllowRead, "/existing")
+	assert.Contains(t, policy.Filesystem.AllowRead, "/new/path")
+}
+
+func TestApplyRuntimeOverrides_Write(t *testing.T) {
+	policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
+		Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
+			AllowWrite: []string{"/existing"},
+		},
+	}
+
+	applyRuntimeOverrides(policy, []config.SandboxAllowOverride{
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowWrite, Value: "/new/file", Raw: "write=/new/file"},
+	})
+
+	assert.Contains(t, policy.Filesystem.AllowWrite, "/existing")
+	assert.Contains(t, policy.Filesystem.AllowWrite, "/new/file")
+}
+
+func TestApplyRuntimeOverrides_Exec(t *testing.T) {
+	policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
+		Process: sandbox.ProcessPolicy{
+			AllowExec: []string{"/usr/bin/node"},
+		},
+	}
+
+	applyRuntimeOverrides(policy, []config.SandboxAllowOverride{
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowExec, Value: "/usr/bin/curl", Raw: "exec=/usr/bin/curl"},
+	})
+
+	assert.Contains(t, policy.Process.AllowExec, "/usr/bin/node")
+	assert.Contains(t, policy.Process.AllowExec, "/usr/bin/curl")
+}
+
+func TestApplyRuntimeOverrides_NetConnect(t *testing.T) {
+	policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
+		Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{
+			AllowOutbound: []string{"registry.npmjs.org:443"},
+		},
+	}
+
+	applyRuntimeOverrides(policy, []config.SandboxAllowOverride{
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowNetConnect, Value: "example.com:443", Raw: "net-connect=example.com:443"},
+	})
+
+	assert.Contains(t, policy.Network.AllowOutbound, "registry.npmjs.org:443")
+	assert.Contains(t, policy.Network.AllowOutbound, "example.com:443")
+}
+
+func TestApplyRuntimeOverrides_NetBind(t *testing.T) {
+	policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
+		Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{
+			AllowBind: []string{},
+		},
+	}
+
+	applyRuntimeOverrides(policy, []config.SandboxAllowOverride{
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowNetBind, Value: "127.0.0.1:3000", Raw: "net-bind=127.0.0.1:3000"},
+	})
+
+	assert.Contains(t, policy.Network.AllowBind, "127.0.0.1:3000")
+	assert.NotNil(t, policy.AllowNetworkBind)
+	assert.True(t, *policy.AllowNetworkBind)
+}
+
+func TestApplyRuntimeOverrides_NetBindPreservesExistingTrue(t *testing.T) {
+	policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
+		AllowNetworkBind: utils.PtrTo(true),
+		Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{
+			AllowBind: []string{"localhost:8080"},
+		},
+	}
+
+	applyRuntimeOverrides(policy, []config.SandboxAllowOverride{
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowNetBind, Value: "127.0.0.1:3000", Raw: "net-bind=127.0.0.1:3000"},
+	})
+
+	assert.Contains(t, policy.Network.AllowBind, "localhost:8080")
+	assert.Contains(t, policy.Network.AllowBind, "127.0.0.1:3000")
+	assert.True(t, *policy.AllowNetworkBind)
+}
+
+func TestApplyRuntimeOverrides_MultipleOverrides(t *testing.T) {
+	policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
+		Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{},
+		Process:    sandbox.ProcessPolicy{},
+		Network:    sandbox.NetworkPolicy{},
+	}
+
+	overrides := []config.SandboxAllowOverride{
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowWrite, Value: "/path/a", Raw: "write=/path/a"},
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowWrite, Value: "/path/b", Raw: "write=/path/b"},
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowExec, Value: "/usr/bin/curl", Raw: "exec=/usr/bin/curl"},
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowNetConnect, Value: "example.com:443", Raw: "net-connect=example.com:443"},
+	}
+
+	applyRuntimeOverrides(policy, overrides)
+
+	assert.Len(t, policy.Filesystem.AllowWrite, 2)
+	assert.Len(t, policy.Process.AllowExec, 1)
+	assert.Len(t, policy.Network.AllowOutbound, 1)
+}
+
+func TestApplyRuntimeOverrides_EmptyOverrides(t *testing.T) {
+	policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
+		Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
+			AllowWrite: []string{"/existing"},
+		},
+	}
+
+	applyRuntimeOverrides(policy, []config.SandboxAllowOverride{})
+
+	// Policy should be unchanged
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{"/existing"}, policy.Filesystem.AllowWrite)
+}
+
+func TestApplyRuntimeOverrides_DenyListsUnmodified(t *testing.T) {
+	policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
+		Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
+			DenyWrite: []string{"/protected"},
+		},
+		Process: sandbox.ProcessPolicy{
+			DenyExec: []string{"/usr/bin/curl"},
+		},
+		Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{
+			DenyOutbound: []string{"*:*"},
+		},
+	}
+
+	overrides := []config.SandboxAllowOverride{
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowWrite, Value: "/something", Raw: "write=/something"},
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowExec, Value: "/usr/bin/wget", Raw: "exec=/usr/bin/wget"},
+		{Type: config.SandboxAllowNetConnect, Value: "example.com:443", Raw: "net-connect=example.com:443"},
+	}
+
+	applyRuntimeOverrides(policy, overrides)
+
+	// Deny lists should never be modified by overrides
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{"/protected"}, policy.Filesystem.DenyWrite)
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{"/usr/bin/curl"}, policy.Process.DenyExec)
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{"*:*"}, policy.Network.DenyOutbound)
+}
+