x86/bugs: Reset speculation control settings on init

[ Upstream commit 0125acd ]

Currently, x86_spec_ctrl_base is read at boot time and speculative bits
are set if Kconfig items are enabled. For example, IBRS is enabled if
CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY is configured, etc. These MSR bits are not cleared
if the mitigations are disabled.

This is a problem when kexec-ing a kernel that has the mitigation
disabled from a kernel that has the mitigation enabled. In this case,
the MSR bits are not cleared during the new kernel boot. As a result,
this might have some performance degradation that is hard to pinpoint.

This problem does not happen if the machine is (hard) rebooted because
the bit will be cleared by default.

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221128153148.1129350-1-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Author: leitao

arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h

@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
 #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT	6	   /* Disable RRSBA behavior */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S		BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT)
 
+/* A mask for bits which the kernel toggles when controlling mitigations */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK	(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD \
+							| SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S)
+
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			BIT(0)	   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
 

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -144,9 +144,17 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	 * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
 	 * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
 	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
+		/*
+		 * Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls
+		 * turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below
+		 * rediscover them based on configuration.
+		 */
+		x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
+	}
+
 	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
 	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
 	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();