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Update phoenix_command.md
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documentation/modules/auxiliary/admin/scada/phoenix_command.md

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@@ -2,23 +2,23 @@ PhoenixContact Programmable Logic Controllers are built are using a variant of P
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Communicating using a proprietary protocol over ports TCP/1962 and TCP/41100 or TCP/20547.
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It allows a remote user to read out the PLC Type, Firmware and Build number on port TCP/1962.
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And also to read out the CPU State (Running or Stopped) AND start or stop the CPU on
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port TCP/20547 (confirmed for the PLC series ILC 15x and 17x)
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or TCP/41100 (confirmed for the ILC 39x series)
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other series may or may not work, a very big chance that they will
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port TCP/20547 (confirmed for the PLC series ILC 15x and 17x)
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or TCP/41100 (confirmed for the ILC 39x series)
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other series may or may not work, a very big chance that they will
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## Vulnerable Application
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This is a hardware zero-day vulnerability that CANNOT be patched, the only mittigation is pulling the plug (literally),
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adding a separate network in front of it (Firewall, Router, IDS, IPS, network segmentation, etc...)
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or not allowing bad people on your network
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adding a separate network in front of it (Firewall, Router, IDS, IPS, network segmentation, etc...)
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or not allowing bad people on your network .
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In general most, if not all, PLC's (computers that control engines, robots, conveyor belts, sensors, camera's, doorlocks, CRACs ...)
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have this vulnerability where, using their own tools, remote configuration and programming can be done *WITHOUT* authentication
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Investigators and underground hackers are just now creating simple tools to convert the often proprietary protocols into (simple) scripts
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have this vulnerability where, using their own tools, remote configuration and programming can be done *WITHOUT* authentication.
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Investigators and underground hackers are just now creating simple tools to convert the often proprietary protocols into (simple) scripts.
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The most important word here is proprietary. Right now the only thing stopping very bad stuff from happening.
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PhoenixContact uses an (unnamed?) low-level protocol for connection, information exchange and configuration of its PLC devices
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This script utilises that protocol for finding information and switching the PLC mode from STOP to RUN and vice versa
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PhoenixContact uses an (unnamed?) low-level protocol for connection, information exchange and configuration of its PLC devices.
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This script utilises that protocol for finding information and switching the PLC mode from STOP to RUN and vice versa
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## Verification Steps
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@@ -106,4 +106,4 @@ msf auxiliary(phoenix_command) > set ACTION START
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The module can also just read out the CPU mode and then reverse whatever it finds, RUN becomes STOP, STOP becomes RUN
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```
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msf auxiliary(phoenix_command) > set ACTION REV
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```
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```

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