|
| 1 | +--- |
| 2 | +title: "Encryption" |
| 3 | +--- |
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| 20 | + |
| 21 | +# Encryption |
| 22 | + |
| 23 | +Iceberg table encryption protects confidentiality and integrity of table data in an untrusted storage. The `data`, `delete`, `manifest` and `manifest list` files are encrypted and tamper-proofed before being sent to the storage backend. |
| 24 | + |
| 25 | +The `metadata.json` file does not contain data or stats, and is therefore not encrypted. |
| 26 | + |
| 27 | +Currently, encryption is supported in the Hive and REST catalogs for tables with Parquet and Avro data formats. |
| 28 | + |
| 29 | +Two parameters are required to activate encryption of a table |
| 30 | +1. Catalog property `encryption.kms-impl`, that specifies the class path for a client of a KMS ("key management service"). |
| 31 | +2. Table property `encryption.key-id`, that specifies the ID of a master key used to encrypt and decrypt the table. Master keys are stored and managed in the KMS. |
| 32 | + |
| 33 | +For more details on table encryption, see the "Appendix: Internals Overview" [subsection](#appendix-internals-overview). |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | +## Example |
| 36 | + |
| 37 | +```sh |
| 38 | +spark-sql --packages org.apache.iceberg:iceberg-spark-runtime-{{ sparkVersionMajor }}:{{ icebergVersion }}\ |
| 39 | + --conf spark.sql.extensions=org.apache.iceberg.spark.extensions.IcebergSparkSessionExtensions \ |
| 40 | + --conf spark.sql.catalog.spark_catalog=org.apache.iceberg.spark.SparkSessionCatalog \ |
| 41 | + --conf spark.sql.catalog.spark_catalog.type=hive \ |
| 42 | + --conf spark.sql.catalog.local=org.apache.iceberg.spark.SparkCatalog \ |
| 43 | + --conf spark.sql.catalog.local.type=hive \ |
| 44 | + --conf spark.sql.catalog.local.encryption.kms-impl=org.apache.iceberg.aws.AwsKeyManagementClient |
| 45 | +``` |
| 46 | + |
| 47 | +```sql |
| 48 | +CREATE TABLE local.db.table (id bigint, data string) USING iceberg |
| 49 | +TBLPROPERTIES ('encryption.key-id'='{{ master key id }}'); |
| 50 | +``` |
| 51 | + |
| 52 | +Inserted data will be automatically encrypted, |
| 53 | + |
| 54 | +```sql |
| 55 | +INSERT INTO local.db.table VALUES (1, 'a'), (2, 'b'), (3, 'c'); |
| 56 | +``` |
| 57 | + |
| 58 | +To verify encryption, the contents of data, manifest and manifest list files can be dumped in the command line with |
| 59 | + |
| 60 | +```sh |
| 61 | +hexdump -C {{ /path/to/file }} | more |
| 62 | +``` |
| 63 | + |
| 64 | +The Parquet files must start with the "PARE" magic string (PARquet Encrypted footer mode), and manifest/list files must start with "AGS1" magic string (Aes Gcm Stream version 1). |
| 65 | + |
| 66 | +Queried data will be automatically decrypted, |
| 67 | + |
| 68 | +```sql |
| 69 | +SELECT * FROM local.db.table; |
| 70 | +``` |
| 71 | + |
| 72 | +## Catalog security requirements |
| 73 | + |
| 74 | +1. Catalogs must ensure the `encryption.key-id` property is not modified or removed during table lifetime. |
| 75 | + |
| 76 | +2. To function properly, Iceberg table encryption requires the catalog implementations not to retrieve the metadata |
| 77 | +directly from metadata.json files, if these files are kept unprotected in a storage vulnerable to tampering. |
| 78 | + |
| 79 | +* Catalogs may keep the metadata in a trusted independent object store. |
| 80 | +* Catalogs may work with metadata.json files in a tamper-proof storage. |
| 81 | +* Catalogs may use checksum techniques to verify integrity of metadata.json files in a storage vulnerable to tampering |
| 82 | +(the checksums must be kept in a separate trusted storage). |
| 83 | + |
| 84 | +## Key Management Clients |
| 85 | + |
| 86 | +Currently, Iceberg has clients for the AWS, GCP and Azure KMS systems. A custom client can be built for other key management systems by implementing the `org.apache.iceberg.encryption.KeyManagementClient` interface. |
| 87 | + |
| 88 | +This interface has the following main methods, |
| 89 | + |
| 90 | +```java |
| 91 | + /** |
| 92 | + * Initialize the KMS client with given properties. |
| 93 | + * |
| 94 | + * @param properties kms client properties (taken from catalog properties) |
| 95 | + */ |
| 96 | + void initialize(Map<String, String> properties); |
| 97 | + |
| 98 | + /** |
| 99 | + * Wrap a secret key, using a wrapping/master key which is stored in KMS and referenced by an ID. |
| 100 | + * Wrapping means encryption of the secret key with the master key, and adding optional |
| 101 | + * KMS-specific metadata that allows the KMS to decrypt the secret key in an unwrapping call. |
| 102 | + * |
| 103 | + * @param key a secret key being wrapped |
| 104 | + * @param wrappingKeyId a key ID that represents a wrapping key stored in KMS |
| 105 | + * @return wrapped key material |
| 106 | + */ |
| 107 | + ByteBuffer wrapKey(ByteBuffer key, String wrappingKeyId); |
| 108 | + |
| 109 | + /** |
| 110 | + * Unwrap a secret key, using a wrapping/master key which is stored in KMS and referenced by an |
| 111 | + * ID. |
| 112 | + * |
| 113 | + * @param wrappedKey wrapped key material (encrypted key and optional KMS metadata, returned by |
| 114 | + * the wrapKey method) |
| 115 | + * @param wrappingKeyId a key ID that represents a wrapping key stored in KMS |
| 116 | + * @return raw key bytes |
| 117 | + */ |
| 118 | + ByteBuffer unwrapKey(ByteBuffer wrappedKey, String wrappingKeyId); |
| 119 | +``` |
| 120 | + |
| 121 | +## Appendix: Internals Overview |
| 122 | + |
| 123 | +The standard Iceberg encryption manager generates an encryption key and a unique file ID ("AAD prefix") |
| 124 | +for each data and delete file. The generation is performed in the worker nodes, by using a secure random |
| 125 | +number generator. For Parquet data files, these parameters are passed to the native Parquet Modular |
| 126 | +Encryption [mechanism](https://parquet.apache.org/docs/file-format/data-pages/encryption). For Avro data files, |
| 127 | +these parameters are passed to the AES GCM Stream encryption [mechanism](../../format/gcm-stream-spec.md). |
| 128 | + |
| 129 | +The parent manifest file stores the encryption key and AAD prefix for each data and delete file in the |
| 130 | +`key_metadata` [field](../../format/spec.md#data-file-fields). For Avro data tables, the data file length |
| 131 | +is also added to the `key_metadata`. |
| 132 | +The manifest file is encrypted by the AES GCM Stream encryption mechanism, using an encryption key and an |
| 133 | +AAD prefix generated by the standard encryption manager. The generation is performed in the driver nodes, |
| 134 | +by using a secure random number generator. |
| 135 | + |
| 136 | +The parent manifest list file stores the encryption key, AAD prefix and file length for each manifest file |
| 137 | +in the `key_metadata` [field](../../format/spec.md#manifest-lists). The manifest list file is encrypted by |
| 138 | +the AES GCM Stream encryption mechanism, |
| 139 | +using an encryption key and an AAD prefix generated by the standard encryption manager. |
| 140 | + |
| 141 | +The manifest list encryption key, AAD prefix and file length are packed in a key metadata object. This object |
| 142 | +is serialized and encrypted with a "key encryption key" (KEK), using the KEK creation timestamp as the AES |
| 143 | +GCM AAD. A KEK and its unique KEK_ID are generated by using a secure random number generator. For each |
| 144 | +snapshot, the KEK_ID of the encryption key that encrypts the manifest list key metadata is kept in the |
| 145 | +`key-id` field in the table metadata snapshot [structure](../../format/spec.md#snapshots). The encrypted |
| 146 | +manifest list key metadata is kept in the `encryption-keys` list in the table metadata |
| 147 | +[structure](../../format/spec.md#table-metadata-fields). |
| 148 | + |
| 149 | +The KEK is encrypted by the table master key via the KMS client. The result is kept in the `encryption-keys` |
| 150 | +list in the table metadata structure. The KEK is re-used for a period allowed by the NIST SP 800-57 |
| 151 | +specification. Then, it is rotated - a new KEK and KEK_ID are generated for encryption of new manifest list |
| 152 | +key metadata objects. The new KEK is encrypted by the table master key and stored in the `encryption-keys` |
| 153 | +list in the table metadata structure. The previous KEKs are retained for the existing table snapshots. |
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