SIMD-0075: Secp256r1 Precompile (Supersedes SIMD-0048) (#75)

0xRigel · deanmlittle · ptaffet-jump · web-flow · commit 4b1eaaff7f46 · 2024-07-11T21:43:15.000-05:00
* Update and rename 0048-native-program-for-secp256r1-sigverify.md to 0048-precompile-for-secp256r1-sigverify.md Add specification & detail Add new security considerations * linting * linting * spelling * spelling * Fixed wording and technical documentation * linting * add: author * fix: review changes * fix: typos * refactor: implementation logic argumentation * remove: SIMD-0048 * linting * linting * fix: typo * fix: typo * add: supersedes section to header * Revert "remove: SIMD-0048" This reverts commit b8dcd34. * change: old SIMD status to withdrawn * remove: Deprecated note for linting * fix: SIMD should be timeless * Revert: simd 0048 rename & add superseded-by to header * edit: supersedes field on simd 0075 * rm: superfluous/unnecessary note from design section * general improvements - revise language as per rfc2119 - move rfc design details to security considerations - add language agnostic pseudocode structs * fixes * fix: linting * reset: changes to simd-0048 * Update proposals/0075-precompile-for-secp256r1-sigverify.md Co-authored-by: Philip Taffet <123486962+ptaffet-jump@users.noreply.github.com> * add: length prefix & array padding comment * fix: missing byte of padding in line 196 * add: offset & indices checks for signature, message and publickey * fix: linting * fix: indentation * refactor: modify pseudocode and data structs to comply with SIMD 0152 * formatting * linting * formatting * resolve comments --------- Co-authored-by: aresastro <dean@bitping.com> Co-authored-by: Philip Taffet <123486962+ptaffet-jump@users.noreply.github.com>
diff --git a/proposals/0075-precompile-for-secp256r1-sigverify.md b/proposals/0075-precompile-for-secp256r1-sigverify.md
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+---
+simd: "0075"
+title: Precompile for verifying secp256r1 sig.
+authors:
+  - Orion (Bunkr)
+  - Jstnw (Bunkr)
+  - Dean (Web3 Builders Alliance)
+category: Standard
+type: Core
+status: Draft
+created: 2024-02-27
+feature: (fill in with feature tracking issues once accepted)
+supersedes: "0048"
+---
+
+## Summary
+
+Adding a precompile to support the verification of signatures generated on
+the secp256r1 curve. Analogous to the support for secp256k1 and ed25519
+signatures that already exists in form of the
+`KeccakSecp256k11111111111111111111111111111` and
+`Ed25519SigVerify111111111111111111111111111` precompiles.
+
+The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
+NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
+"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
+RFC 2119.
+
+## Motivation
+
+Solana has the opportunity to leverage the secure element of users' existing
+mobile devices to support more user-friendly self-custodial security solutions.
+The status quo of air-gapping signing with a hardware wallet currently requires
+specialty hardware and still represents a single point of failure. Multi-signature
+wallets provide enhanced security through multi-party signing, however the UX
+is cumbersome due to the need to sign transactions multiple times and manage
+multiple seed phrases. A much more ergonomic approach combining the best of
+these two solutions on generalised mobile hardware could be achieved by adding
+support for secp256r1 signatures.
+
+There are already several standardised implementations of this, such as Passkeys
+and WebAuthn. These solutions leverage Apple's Secure Enclave and Android Keystore
+to enable users to save keypairs associated to different services natively on
+the secure element of their mobile devices. To authenticate with
+those services, the user uses their biometrics to sign a message with the stored
+private key.
+
+While originally intended to solve for password-less authentication in Web2
+applications, WebAuthn and Passkeys also make an excellent candidate for on-chain
+second-factor authentication. Beyond simply securing funds, there are also many
+other potential beneficial abstractions that could make use of the simple UX
+they provide.
+
+Although WebAuthn supports the following curves:
+
+- P-256
+- P-384
+- P-521
+- ed25519
+
+P-256 is the only one supported by both Android & MacOS/iOS (MacOS/iOS being the
+more restrictive of the two), hence the goal being to implement secp256r1 signature
+verification
+
+General Documentation:
+
+[WebAuthn](https://webauthn.io/)
+
+[Passkeys](https://fidoalliance.org/passkeys/)
+
+**Note: P-256 / secp256r1 / prime256v1 are used interchangably in this document
+as they represent the same elliptic curve. The choice of nomenclature depends on
+what RFC or SEC document is being referenced.**
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+We have discussed the following alternatives:
+
+1.) Realising signature verification with a syscall similar
+to `secp256k1_recover()` instead of a precompile. This would ease
+integration for developers, since no instruction introspection would be
+required when utilizing the syscall. This is still a valid consideration.
+
+2.) Realising signature verification through and on-chain sBPF implemenation. On
+a local validator a single signature verification consumes ≈42M compute units.
+A possibility would be to split the verification into multiple transactions.
+This would most probably require off-chain infrastructure to crank the process
+or carry higher transaction fees for the end user. (similar to the current elusiv
+protocol private transfer)
+We feel this alternative directly contradicts and impinges on the main upside of
+passkeys, which is the incredible UX and ease of use to the end user.
+
+3.) Allowing for high-S signatures was considered, however the pitfalls
+of signature malleability are too great to leave open to implementation.
+
+4.) Allowing for uncompressed keys was considered, however as we are already
+taking an opinionated stance on signature malleability, it makes sense to
+also take an opinionated stance on public key encoding.
+
+## New Terminology
+
+None
+
+## Detailed Design
+
+The precompile's purpose is to verify signatures using ECDSA-256.
+(denoted in [RFC6460](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6460.txt) as
+ECDSA using the NIST P-256 curve and the SHA-256 hashing algorithm)
+
+Apart from the RFC mandated implementation the precompile must additionally take
+an opinionated stance on signature malleability.
+
+### Signature Malleability
+
+Due to X axis symmetry along the elliptic curve, for any ECDSA signature
+`(r, s)`, there also exists a valid signature `(r, n - s)`, where `n` is the
+order of the curve. This introduces "s malleability", allowing an attacker
+to produce an alternative version of `s` without invalidating the signature.
+
+The pitfalls of this in authentication systems can be particularly perilous,
+opening up certain implementations to signature replay attacks over the same
+message by simply flipping the `s` value over the curve.
+
+As the primary goal of the `secp256r1` program is secure signature validation
+for authentication purposes, the precompile must mitigate these attacks
+by enforcing the usage of `lowS` values, in which `s <= n/2`.
+
+As such, the program must immediately fail upon the detection of any
+signature that includes a `highS` value. This prevents any accidental
+succeptibility to signature malleability attacks.
+
+Note: The existing `secp256k1` precompile makes no attempt attempt to mitigate
+s malleability, as doing so would go against its primary goal of achieving
+`ecrecover` parity with EVM.
+
+### Implementation
+
+### Program
+
+ID: `Secp256r1SigVerify1111111111111111111111111`
+
+In accordance with [SIMD
+0152](https://github.com/solana-foundation/solana-improvement-documents/pull/152)
+the programs ```verify``` instruction must accept the following data:
+
+In Pseudocode:
+
+```
+struct Secp256r1SigVerifyInstruction {
+    num_signatures: uint8 LE,                  // Number of signatures to verify
+    padding: uint8 LE,                         // Single byte padding
+    offsets: Array<Secp256r1SignatureOffsets>, // Array of offset structs
+    additionalData?: Bytes,                    // Optional additional data, e.g.
+                                               // signatures included in the same
+                                               // instruction
+}
+Note: Array<Secp256r1SignatureOffsets> does not contain any length prefixes or
+padding between elements.
+
+struct Secp256r1SignatureOffsets {
+    signature_offset: uint16 LE,              // Offset to signature
+    signature_instruction_index: uint16 LE,   // Instruction index to signature
+    public_key_offset: uint16 LE,             // Offset to public key
+    public_key_instruction_index: uint16 LE,  // Instruction index to  public key
+    message_offset: uint16 LE,                // Offset to start of message data
+    message_length: uint16 LE,                // Size of message data
+    message_instruction_index: uint16 LE,     // Instruction index to message
+}
+```
+
+Up to 8 signatures can be verified. If any of the signatures fail to verify,
+an error must be returned.
+
+In accordance with [SIMD
+0152](https://github.com/solana-foundation/solana-improvement-documents/pull/152)
+the behavior of the program must be as follows:
+
+1. If instruction `data` is empty, return error.
+2. The first byte of `data` is the number of signatures `num_signatures`.
+3. If `num_signatures` is 0, return error.
+4. Expect (enough bytes of `data` for) `num_signatures` instances of
+   `Secp256r1SignatureOffsets`.
+5. For each signature:
+   a. Read `offsets`: an instance of `Secp256r1SignatureOffsets`
+   b. Based on the `offsets`, retrieve `signature`, `public_key`, and
+      `message` bytes. If any of the three fails, return error.
+   c. Invoke the actual `sigverify` function. If it fails, return error.
+
+To retrieve `signature`, `public_key`, and `message`:
+
+1. Get the `instruction_index`-th `instruction_data`
+   - The special value `0xFFFF` means "current instruction"
+   - If the index is invalid, return Error
+2. Return `length` bytes starting from `offset`
+   - If this exceeds the `instruction_data` length, return Error
+
+Note that fields (offsets) can overlap, for example the same public key or
+message can be referred to by multiple instances of `Secp256r1SignatureOffsets`.
+
+If the precompile `verify` function returns any error, the whole transaction
+should fail. Therefore, the type of error is irrelevant and is left as an
+implementation detail.
+
+The instruction processing logic must follow the pseudocode below:
+
+```
+/// `data` is the secp256r1 program's instruction data. `instruction_datas` is
+/// the full slice of instruction datas for all instructions in the transaction,
+/// including the secp256r1 program's instruction data.
+
+/// length_of_data is the length of `data`
+
+/// SERIALIZED_OFFSET_STRUCT_SIZE is the length of the serialized
+/// Secp256r1SignatureOffsets struct
+
+/// SERIALIZED_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH and SERIALIZED_SIGNATURE_LENGTH represent the 
+/// length of the serialized public key and signature respectively
+
+function verify() {
+  if length_of_data == 0 {
+    return Error
+  }
+  num_signatures = data[0]
+  if num_signatures == 0 && length_of_data > 1 {
+    return Error
+  }
+  if length_of_data < (num_signatures * SERIALIZED_OFFSET_STRUCT_SIZE + 2) {
+    return Error
+  }
+  all_tx_data = { data, instruction_datas }
+  data_start_position = 2
+
+  for i in 0..num_signatures {
+      offsets = (Secp256r1SignatureOffsets) 
+        all_tx_data.data[data_start_position..data_start_position + SERIALIZED_OFFSET_STRUCT_SIZE]
+      data_position += SERIALIZED_OFFSET_STRUCT_SIZE
+
+      signature = get_data_slice(all_tx_data,
+                                offsets.signature_instruction_index,
+                                offsets.signature_offset
+                                signature_length)
+      if !signature {
+        return Error
+      }
+
+      public_key = get_data_slice(all_tx_data,
+                                  offsets.public_key_instruction_index,
+                                  offsets.public_key_offset,
+                                  SERIALIZED_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH)
+      if !public_key {
+        return Error
+      }
+
+      message = get_data_slice(all_tx_data,
+                              offsets.message_instruction_index,
+                              offsets.message_offset
+                              offsets.message_length)
+      if !message {
+        return Error
+      }
+
+      // sigverify includes validating signature and public_key
+      // the additional highS check is done here
+      if signature_S == highS {
+      return Error
+      }
+      result = sigverify(signature, public_key, message)
+      if result != Success {
+        return Error
+      }
+    }
+    return Success
+}
+// This function is re-used across precompiles in accordance with SIMD-0152
+fn get_data_slice(all_tx_data, instruction_index, offset, length) {
+  // Get the right instruction_data
+  if instruction_index == 0xFFFF {
+    instruction_data = all_tx_data.data
+  } else {
+    if instruction_index >= num_instructions {
+      return Error
+    }
+    instruction_data = all_tx_data.instruction_datas[instruction_index]
+  }
+
+  start = offset
+  end = offset + length
+  if end > instruction_data_length {
+    return Error
+  }
+
+  return instruction_data[start..end]
+}    
+```
+
+Additonally the precompile's core `verify` function must be constructed in
+accordance with the structure outlined in [sdk/src/precompiles.rs](https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/blob/9ffbe2afd8ab5b972c4ad87d758866a3e1bb87fb/sdk/src/precompiles.rs).
+
+### Compute Cost / Efficiency
+
+Benchmarking and compute cost calculations must be done in accordance with [SIMD-0121](https://github.com/solana-foundation/solana-improvement-documents/pull/121)
+
+Additionally, comparisons to existing precompiles should be done to check for
+comperable efficiency.
+
+## Impact
+
+Would enable the on-chain usage of Passkeys and the WebAuthn Standard, and
+turn the vast majority of modern smartphones into native hardware wallets.
+
+By extension, this would also enable the creation of account abstractions and
+forms of Two-Factor Authentication around those keypairs.
+
+## Security Considerations
+
+The following security considerations must be made for the
+implementation of ECDSA over NIST P-256.
+
+### Curve
+
+The curve parameters for NIST P-256/secp256r1/prime256v1 are
+outlined in the [SEC2](https://www.secg.org/SEC2-Ver-1.0.pdf#page=21)
+document in Section 2.7.2
+
+### Point Encoding/Decoding
+
+The precompile must accept SEC1 encoded points in compressed form.
+The encoding and decoding of these is outlined in sections
+`2.3.3 Elliptic-Curve-Point-to-Octet-String Conversion`
+and `2.3.4 Octet-String-to-Elliptic-Curve-Point Conversion`
+found in [SEC1](https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf#page=16).
+
+The SEC1 encoded EC point P = (x_p, y_p) in compressed form consists
+of 33 bytes (octets). The first byte of 02_16 / 03_16 signifies a
+compressed point, as well as whether y_p is odd or even. The remaining
+32 bytes represent x_p converted into a 32 octet string.
+
+While SEC1 encoded uncompressed points could also be used,
+due to their larger size of 65 bytes, the ease of transformation
+between uncompressed and compressed points, and the vast majority
+of applications exclusively making use of compressed points, it
+seems a reasonable consideration to save 32 bytes of instruction
+data with a protocol that only accepts compressed points.
+
+### ECDSA / Signature Verification
+
+The precompile must implement the `Verifying Operation` outlined in
+[SEC1](https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf#page=52)
+in Section 4.1.4 as well as in the
+[Digital Signature Standard (DSS)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf#page=36)
+document in Section 6.4.2.
+
+A multitude of test vectors to verify correctness can
+be found in
+[RFC6979](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6979#appendix-A.2.5)
+in Section A.2.5 as well as at the
+[NIST CAVP](https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program/digital-signatures#ecdsa2vs)
+(Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program)
+
+### General
+
+As multiple other clients are being developed, it is imperative that there is
+bit-level reproducibility between the precompile implementations, especially
+with regard to cryptographic operations. Any discrepancy between implementations
+could cause a fork and or a chain halt.
+
+As such we would propose the following:
+
+- Development of a thorough test suite that includes all test vectors as well
+  as tests from the
+  [Wycheproof Project](https://github.com/google/wycheproof#project-wycheproof)
+
+- Maintaining active communication with other clients to ensure parity and to
+  support potential changes if they arise.
+
+## Backwards Compatibility
+
+Transactions using the instruction could not be used on Solana versions which don't
+implement this feature. A Feature gate should be used to enable this feature
+when the majority of the cluster is using the required version. Transactions
+that do not use this feature are not impacted.
