remove falcon data

Author: patel-bhavin

detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
   "*\\windows\\temp\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\windows\\debug\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*",
   "*\\Windows\\servicing\\*", "*\\Users\\Default\\*", "*Recycle.bin*", "*\\Windows\\Media\\*",  "\\Windows\\repair\\*",
   "*\\temp\\*" , "*\\PerfLogs\\*","*\\windows\\tasks\\*", "*:\\programdata\\*") by
-  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest
+  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.dest
   Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection

detections/endpoint/windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects the use of `reg.exe` to export Windo
 data_source:
 - Sysmon EventID 1
 - Windows Event Log Security 4688
-- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
+- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where ((`process_reg` Processes.process IN ("*save*", "*export*")) OR (`process_regedit` Processes.process IN ("*/E *", "*-E *"))) AND Processes.process IN ("*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE*", "*HKLM*") AND Processes.process IN ("*SAM*", "*System*", "*Security*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
 known_false_positives: It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.
@@ -65,8 +65,3 @@ tests:
   - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
     source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
     sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
-- name: True Positive Test - CrowdStrike
-  attack_data:
-  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/crowdstrike_falcon.log
-    source: crowdstrike
-    sourcetype: crowdstrike:events:sensor