minor udpates to yaml

Author: patel-bhavin

detections/cloud/asl_aws_create_access_key.yml

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ tags:
   - name: user
     type: User
     role:
-    - Attacker
+    - Victim
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security

detections/cloud/asl_aws_credential_access_getpassworddata.yml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2024-12-12'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 status: production
 type: Anomaly
-description: The following analytic identifies more than 10 GetPasswordData API calls within a 5-minute window in your AWS account. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect this activity by counting the distinct instance IDs accessed. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to retrieve encrypted administrator passwords for running Windows instances, which is a critical security concern. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to administrative credentials, potentially leading to full control over the affected instances and further compromise of the AWS environment.
+description: The following analytic identifiesGetPasswordData API calls in your AWS account. It leverages  CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake to detect this activity by counting the distinct instance IDs accessed. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to retrieve encrypted administrator passwords for running Windows instances, which is a critical security concern. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to administrative credentials, potentially leading to full control over the affected instances and further compromise of the AWS environment.
 data_source: []
 search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=GetPasswordData | spath input=api.request.data | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region instanceId | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`asl_aws_credential_access_getpassworddata_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ tags:
   asset_type: AWS Account
   confidence: 70
   impact: 70
-  message: User $user$ is seen to make mulitple `GetPasswordData` API calls 
+  message: User $user$ is seen to make `GetPasswordData` API calls 
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1586
   - T1586.003

detections/cloud/asl_aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset.yml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2024-12-12'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 status: production
 type: TTP
-description: The following analytic detects the resetting of the master user password for an Amazon RDS DB instance. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where the `ModifyDBInstance` API call includes a new `masterUserPassword` parameter. This activity is significant because unauthorized password resets can grant attackers access to sensitive data stored in production databases, such as credit card information, PII, and healthcare data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, regulatory non-compliance, and significant reputational damage. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the password reset.
+description: The following analytic detects the resetting of the master user password for an Amazon RDS DB instance. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake to identify events where the `ModifyDBInstance` API call includes a new `masterUserPassword` parameter. This activity is significant because unauthorized password resets can grant attackers access to sensitive data stored in production databases, such as credit card information, PII, and healthcare data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, regulatory non-compliance, and significant reputational damage. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the password reset.
 data_source: []
 search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=ModifyDBInstance OR api.operation=ModifyDBCluster | spath input=api.request.data | search masterUserPassword=* | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region api.request.data | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`asl_aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.

detections/cloud/asl_aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2024-12-16'
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
 status: production
 type: TTP
-description: The following analytic detects the creation of AWS KMS keys with an encryption policy accessible to everyone, including external entities. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `CreateKey` or `PutKeyPolicy` events where the `kms:Encrypt` action is granted to all principals. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised account, allowing an attacker to misuse the encryption key to target other organizations. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data encryption, potentially disrupting operations and compromising sensitive information across multiple entities.
+description: The following analytic detects the creation of AWS KMS keys with an encryption policy accessible to everyone, including external entities. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake to identify `CreateKey` or `PutKeyPolicy` events where the `kms:Encrypt` action is granted to all principals. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised account, allowing an attacker to misuse the encryption key to target other organizations. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data encryption, potentially disrupting operations and compromising sensitive information across multiple entities.
 data_source: []
 search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutKeyPolicy OR api.operation=CreateKey
   | spath input=api.request.data path=policy output=policy 
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutKeyPolicy OR api.operation=Crea
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region api.request.data 
   | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`asl_aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`'
-how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
+how_to_implement: The detection is based on Cloudtrail events from Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: unknown
 references:
 - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/