Merge branch 'develop' into update-exchange-macro

Author: nasbench

detections/endpoint/windows_cisco_secure_endpoint_related_service_stopped.yml

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+name: Windows Cisco Secure Endpoint Related Service Stopped
+id: df74f45f-01c8-4fd6-bcb8-f6a9ea58307a
+version: 1
+date: '2024-12-09'
+author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
+status: production
+type: Anomaly
+description: The following analytic detects the suspicious termination of known services commonly targeted by ransomware before file encryption. It leverages Windows System Event Logs (EventCode 7036) to identify when critical services such as Volume Shadow Copy, backup, and antivirus services are stopped. This activity is significant because ransomware often disables these services to avoid errors and ensure successful file encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption and data loss.
+data_source:
+- Windows Event Log System 7036
+search: '`wineventlog_system` `normalized_service_binary_field` | rename param1 as display_name | rename param2 as status | search EventCode=7036 display_name IN ("Cisco AMP Orbital", "*Cisco Secure Endpoint*", "*Cisco Security Connector Monitoring*", "CiscoSAM", "CiscoAMPHeurDriver", "CiscoAMPELAMDriver", "CiscoAMPCEFWDriver", "ImmunetNetworkMonitorDriver", "ImmunetProtectDriver", "ImmunetSelfProtectDriver") status IN ("stopped", "arrêté") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode display_name normalized_service_name status dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_cisco_secure_endpoint_related_service_stopped_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints.
+known_false_positives: Administrator or troubleshooting activities may trigger this alert. Investigate the process performing this action to determine if its a legitimate activity.
+references:
+- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/
+- https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/
+- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/24/lockbit-ransomware-borrows-tricks-to-keep-up-with-revil-and-maze/
+- https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/10/lockbit-3-0-also-known-as-lockbit-black.html
+drilldown_searches:
+- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
+  search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$")
+    starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
+    values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories)
+    as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic)
+    as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+rba:
+  message: Cisco Secure Endpoint Service $display_name$ stopped on $dest$
+  risk_objects:
+  - field: dest
+    type: system
+    score: 60
+  threat_objects:
+  - field: display_name
+    type: service
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Security Solution Tampering
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1490
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/cisco_secure_endpoint_tampering/service_stop.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:System
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog

detections/endpoint/windows_cisco_secure_endpoint_stop_immunet_service_via_sfc.yml

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+name: Windows Cisco Secure Endpoint Stop Immunet Service Via Sfc
+id: 44badcb1-2e8c-4628-9537-021bbae571ad
+version: 1
+date: '2025-02-19'
+author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
+status: production
+type: Anomaly
+description: The following analytic detects the use of the `sfc.exe` utility, in order to stop the Immunet Protect service. The Sfc.exe utility is part of Cisco Secure Endpoint installation. This detection leverages telemetry from the endpoint, focusing on command-line executions involving the `-k` parameter. This activity is significant as it indicates potential tampering with defensive mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, attackers could partially blind the EDR, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.
+data_source:
+- Sysmon EventID 1
+- Windows Event Log Security 4688
+- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="sfc.exe" Processes.process="* -k*" AND NOT Processes.process_path IN ("*:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", ":\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_cisco_secure_endpoint_stop_immunet_service_via_sfc_filter`'
+how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
+known_false_positives: It is possible that this action is executed during troubleshooting activity. Activity needs to be confirmed on a case by case basis.
+references:
+- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/security/amp-endpoints/213690-amp-for-endpoint-command-line-switches.html
+drilldown_searches:
+- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+rba:
+  message: Suspicious use of `sfc.exe` stopping the Immunet Protect service on $dest$ by user $user$.
+  risk_objects:
+  - field: user
+    type: user
+    score: 56
+  - field: dest
+    type: system
+    score: 56
+  threat_objects:
+  - field: parent_process_name
+    type: parent_process_name
+  - field: process_name
+    type: process_name
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Security Solution Tampering
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.001
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/cisco_secure_endpoint_tampering/sfc_tampering.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog

detections/endpoint/windows_cisco_secure_endpoint_unblock_file_via_sfc.yml

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+name: Windows Cisco Secure Endpoint Unblock File Via Sfc
+id: 9a7a490c-5581-4c95-bab5-a21e351293ef
+version: 1
+date: '2025-02-19'
+author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
+status: production
+type: Anomaly
+description: The following analytic detects the use of the sfc.exe utility with the "-unblock" parameter, a feature within Cisco Secure Endpoint. The "-unblock" flag is used to remove system blocks imposed by the endpoint protection. This detection focuses on command-line activity that includes the "-unblock" parameter, as it may indicate an attempt to restore access to files or processes previously blocked by the security software. While this action could be legitimate in troubleshooting scenarios, malicious actors might use it to override protective measures, enabling execution of blocked malicious payloads or bypassing other security mechanisms.
+data_source:
+- Sysmon EventID 1
+- Windows Event Log Security 4688
+- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="sfc.exe" Processes.process="* -unblock *" AND NOT Processes.process_path IN ("*:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", ":\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_cisco_secure_endpoint_unblock_file_via_sfc_filter`'
+how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
+known_false_positives: It is possible that this action is executed during troubleshooting activity. Activity needs to be confirmed on a case by case basis.
+references:
+- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/security/amp-endpoints/213690-amp-for-endpoint-command-line-switches.html
+drilldown_searches:
+- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+rba:
+  message: Suspicious use of `sfc.exe` unblocking a potentially harmful file on $dest$ by user $user$
+  risk_objects:
+  - field: user
+    type: user
+    score: 56
+  - field: dest
+    type: system
+    score: 56
+  threat_objects:
+  - field: parent_process_name
+    type: parent_process_name
+  - field: process_name
+    type: process_name
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Security Solution Tampering
+  asset_type: Endpoint 
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.001
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/cisco_secure_endpoint_tampering/sfc_tampering.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog

detections/endpoint/windows_cisco_secure_endpoint_uninstall_immunet_service_via_sfc.yml

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+name: Windows Cisco Secure Endpoint Uninstall Immunet Service Via Sfc
+id: ba6e7f4d-a85e-4a14-8e7d-41f4b82e3c9a
+version: 1
+date: '2025-02-19'
+author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
+status: production
+type: Anomaly
+description: The following analytic detects the use of the sfc.exe utility with the "-u" parameter, which is part of the Cisco Secure Endpoint installation. The "-u" flag allows the uninstallation of Cisco Secure Endpoint components. This detection leverages endpoint telemetry to monitor command-line executions that include the "-u" parameter. The use of this flag is significant as it could indicate an attempt to disable or remove endpoint protection, potentially leaving the system vulnerable to further exploitation. If identified as malicious, this action may be part of a broader effort to disable security mechanisms and avoid detection.
+data_source:
+- Sysmon EventID 1
+- Windows Event Log Security 4688
+- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="sfc.exe" Processes.process="* -u*" NOT Processes.process="* -unblock *" AND NOT Processes.process_path IN ("*:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", ":\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_cisco_secure_endpoint_uninstall_immunet_service_via_sfc_filter`'
+how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
+known_false_positives: It is possible that this action is executed during troubleshooting activity. Activity needs to be confirmed on a case by case basis.
+references:
+- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/security/amp-endpoints/213690-amp-for-endpoint-command-line-switches.html
+drilldown_searches:
+- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+rba:
+  message: Suspicious use of `sfc.exe` to uninstall the Immunet Protect service on $dest$ by user $user$.
+  risk_objects:
+  - field: user
+    type: user
+    score: 56
+  - field: dest
+    type: system
+    score: 56
+  threat_objects:
+  - field: parent_process_name
+    type: parent_process_name
+  - field: process_name
+    type: process_name
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Security Solution Tampering
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.001
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/cisco_secure_endpoint_tampering/sfc_tampering.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog

stories/security_solution_tampering.yml

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+name: Security Solution Tampering
+id: c17cde5f-9f00-472b-9d4e-fceb2f47d656
+version: 1
+date: '2025-01-21'
+author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
+status: production
+description: This analytic story focuses on identifying behaviors associated with the misuse of security solution utilities, such as antivirus (AV) and endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, on endpoints. Adversaries often exploit these utilities to disable critical security services, modify configurations, or execute defense evasion actions. Such activities are typically aimed at bypassing detection mechanisms, disrupting incident response efforts, and maintaining persistence within a compromised environment. By monitoring for these suspicious behaviors, this story empowers security teams to detect, investigate, and respond to potential tampering or manipulation of endpoint defenses effectively.
+narrative: Attackers often target security solutions as part of their defense evasion strategies. By disabling or tampering with AV and EDR services, they can reduce the likelihood of detection and freely execute malicious activities. This analytic story focuses on detecting such malicious interactions with security utilities, helping organizations to identify and respond to potential threats promptly. The detections within this story leverage various data sources to monitor for suspicious activities, such as the execution of known security utility binaries with parameters that disable protections, unexpected stopping of security services, or modification of security-related registry keys. Implementing these detections enables security teams to enhance their visibility into potential tampering attempts and strengthen their overall security posture.
+references:
+- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/security/amp-endpoints/213690-amp-for-endpoint-command-line-switches.html
+- https://techdocs.broadcom.com/us/en/symantec-security-software/endpoint-security-and-management/endpoint-protection/all/appendices/windows-commands-for-the-endpoint-protection-clien-v9567615-d19e6200.html
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference?view=windowsserver2025-ps
+- https://support.kaspersky.com/keswin/11.1.1/en-US/178723.htm
+- https://ppn.snovvcrash.rocks/pentest/infrastructure/ad/av-edr-evasion/defender
+tags:
+  category:
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection