diff --git a/detections/endpoint/macos_list_firewall_rules.yml b/detections/endpoint/macos_list_firewall_rules.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e797dd31b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/macos_list_firewall_rules.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+name: MacOS List Firewall Rules
+id: f8db6e0b-55bb-40ca-bc85-2b3700adb0f8
+version: 1
+date: '2025-09-08'
+author: Jamie Windley, Splunk
+status: production
+type: Anomaly
+description: This analytic detects attempts to enumerate or verify the configuration of the macOS application firewall. Specifically, it monitors executions of `defaults read /Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf` and `/usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getglobalstate`. These commands provide insight into firewall status, allowed applications, and explicit authorization rules. While they are legitimate administrative operations, adversaries may leverage them to identify potential attack surfaces, determine whether the firewall is active, or enumerate allowed network flows. Monitoring for these commands, particularly when executed by non-administrative users or at unusual times, can provide early indication of reconnaissance activity on macOS endpoints
+data_source:
+- osquery
+search: "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process\
+  \ values(Processes.parent_process) AS parent_process values(Processes.parent_process_exec)\
+  \ AS parent_process_exec values(Processes.parent_process_id) AS parent_process_id\
+  \ values(Processes.parent_process_name) AS parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_path)\
+  \ AS parent_process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes\
+  \ where Processes.process IN (\"*defaults read /Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf*\"\
+  \ \"*/usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getglobalstate*\") by Processes.action\
+  \ Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_name\
+  \ Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.vendor_product \n| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`\
+  \ \n| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` \n| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`\n\
+  | `macos_list_firewall_rules_filter`\n | `macos_list_firewall_rules_filter`"
+how_to_implement: Collection of process execution events from macOS endpoints is required. This can be achieved using osquery’s `es_process_events` table, EndpointSecurity framework integrations, or an EDR platform capable of recording process command lines. Ensure that captured events include at least the process path, full command line, user context, and timestamp.
+known_false_positives: These commands are frequently executed by system administrators or IT personnel during routine configuration checks, troubleshooting, or automated maintenance scripts. Security tools or monitoring agents may also query firewall status for inventory or compliance purposes. To reduce false positives, consider excluding events from known administrative accounts, trusted management systems, or scheduled maintenance jobs.
+references: []
+drilldown_searches:
+- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" AND dest = "$dest$"'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$",
+    "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time)
+    as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message)
+    as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all)
+    as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics"
+    by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+rba:
+  message: MacOS firewall rules listed
+  risk_objects:
+  - field: dest
+    type: system
+    score: 6
+  - field: user
+    type: user
+    score: 6
+  threat_objects: []
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Network Discovery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1016
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  cve: []
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/macos_net_discovery/macos_network_discovery.log
+    sourcetype: osquery:results
+    source: local_vm
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/macos_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml b/detections/endpoint/macos_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..efe2a7df3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/macos_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+name: MacOS System Network Configuration Discovery
+id: 66945806-0891-4055-952f-ea11b7bc54dd
+version: 1
+date: '2025-09-08'
+author: Jamie Windley
+status: production
+type: Anomaly
+description: This analytic detects the execution of common network configuration discovery commands on macOS systems. Specifically, it focuses on instances of `netstat -ant`, `arp -a`, and `ifconfig`. These utilities are often used for legitimate troubleshooting, but they are also frequently leveraged by adversaries during the reconnaissance phase to enumerate network interfaces, identify active connections, and discover other hosts within the same broadcast domain. Monitoring for the use of these commands, particularly when executed by unexpected users or during unusual time periods, can provide early warning of potentially malicious activity.
+data_source:
+- osquery
+search: "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process\
+  \ values(Processes.parent_process) AS parent_process values(Processes.parent_process_exec)\
+  \ AS parent_process_exec values(Processes.parent_process_id) AS parent_process_id\
+  \ values(Processes.parent_process_name) AS parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_path)\
+  \ AS parent_process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes\
+  \ where Processes.process IN (\"netstat -ant\", \"arp -a\", \"ifconfig\") by Processes.action\
+  \ Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_name\
+  \ Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.vendor_product \n| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`\
+  \ \n| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` \n| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`\n\
+  | `macos_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`\n | `macos_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`"
+how_to_implement: Collection of process execution events from macOS endpoints is required. This can be achieved using osquery’s `es_process_events` table, EndpointSecurity framework integrations, or an EDR platform capable of recording process command lines. Ensure that captured events include at least the process path, full command line, user context, and timestamp.
+known_false_positives: These commands are commonly executed by system administrators, help desk personnel, monitoring agents, and diagnostic scripts as part of routine system maintenance. Security tools and network monitoring utilities may also invoke these commands for inventory or health check purposes. To reduce false positives, consider excluding events originating from trusted management hosts, known administrative accounts, or processes executed on a predictable schedule.
+references: []
+drilldown_searches:
+- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" AND dest = "$dest$"'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$",
+    "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time)
+    as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message)
+    as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all)
+    as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics"
+    by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+rba:
+  message: MacOS system network configuration discovery command observed
+  risk_objects:
+  - field: dest
+    type: system
+    score: 6
+  - field: user
+    type: user
+    score: 6
+  threat_objects: []
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Network Discovery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1016
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  cve: []
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/macos_net_discovery/macos_network_discovery.log
+    sourcetype: osquery:results
+    source: local_vm
\ No newline at end of file