Impact
Due to the ordering of code used to start an MCP server container, we inadvertently store secrets in the run config files which are used to restart stopped containers. This means that an attacker who has access to the home folder of the user who starts the MCP server can read secrets without needing access to the secrets store itself. This only applies to secrets which were used in containers whose run configs exist at a point in time - other secrets remaining inaccessible.
Patches
ToolHive v0.0.33
Workarounds
- Stop and delete any running MCP servers.
- Manually remove any runconfigs from
$HOME/Library/Application Support/toolhive/runconfigs/
(macOS) or $HOME/.state/toolhive/runconfigs/
(Linux)
References
N/A
Impact
Due to the ordering of code used to start an MCP server container, we inadvertently store secrets in the run config files which are used to restart stopped containers. This means that an attacker who has access to the home folder of the user who starts the MCP server can read secrets without needing access to the secrets store itself. This only applies to secrets which were used in containers whose run configs exist at a point in time - other secrets remaining inaccessible.
Patches
ToolHive v0.0.33
Workarounds
$HOME/Library/Application Support/toolhive/runconfigs/
(macOS) or$HOME/.state/toolhive/runconfigs/
(Linux)References
N/A