|
| 1 | +# Decision: Use Secrecy Crate for Sensitive Data Handling |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +## Status |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +Accepted |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +## Date |
| 8 | + |
| 9 | +2025-12-17 |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +## Context |
| 12 | + |
| 13 | +### The Problem |
| 14 | + |
| 15 | +Sensitive data (API tokens, passwords, database credentials) is currently stored as plain `String` types throughout the codebase. This creates several security and maintainability issues: |
| 16 | + |
| 17 | +1. **Accidental Exposure**: Secrets appear in full when printed with `Debug` formatting, potentially leaking through: |
| 18 | + |
| 19 | + - Debug logs during development |
| 20 | + - Error messages and stack traces |
| 21 | + - Panic outputs |
| 22 | + - Test output and CI logs |
| 23 | + |
| 24 | +2. **No Type-Level Security**: The type system doesn't distinguish between secrets and regular strings: |
| 25 | + |
| 26 | + - No compile-time guarantee that secrets are handled carefully |
| 27 | + - Easy to accidentally log or print secret values |
| 28 | + - No centralized place to add security enhancements |
| 29 | + |
| 30 | +3. **Difficult Auditing**: Hard to track secret usage: |
| 31 | + |
| 32 | + - Can't easily find all places where secrets are used |
| 33 | + - Can't grep for secret-specific types |
| 34 | + - No visibility into when/where secrets are exposed |
| 35 | + |
| 36 | +4. **Memory Security Gap**: Secrets remain in memory even after being dropped, potentially accessible through: |
| 37 | + - Memory dumps |
| 38 | + - Core dumps |
| 39 | + - Swap files |
| 40 | + - Process memory inspection |
| 41 | + |
| 42 | +### Examples of Current Problems |
| 43 | + |
| 44 | +```rust |
| 45 | +// Current problematic approach |
| 46 | +#[derive(Debug)] |
| 47 | +pub struct HetznerConfig { |
| 48 | + pub api_token: String, // Exposed in debug output! |
| 49 | +} |
| 50 | + |
| 51 | +// This accidentally logs the token |
| 52 | +tracing::debug!("Config: {:?}", config); |
| 53 | +// Output: Config: HetznerConfig { api_token: "hf_abc123..." } |
| 54 | + |
| 55 | +pub struct MysqlConfig { |
| 56 | + pub password: String, // Visible in error messages! |
| 57 | +} |
| 58 | + |
| 59 | +// Error contains password |
| 60 | +return Err(format!("Failed to connect to {:?}", config)); |
| 61 | +``` |
| 62 | + |
| 63 | +### Project Requirements |
| 64 | + |
| 65 | +1. **Identification**: Clearly identify where secrets are used in the codebase |
| 66 | +2. **Redacted Output**: Prevent accidental exposure through debug/display formatting |
| 67 | +3. **Memory Security**: Wipe secrets from memory when no longer needed |
| 68 | +4. **Maintainability**: Keep solution simple and well-documented |
| 69 | +5. **Standards Compliance**: Follow Rust ecosystem best practices |
| 70 | + |
| 71 | +## Decision |
| 72 | + |
| 73 | +**Adopt the `secrecy` crate** (https://crates.io/crates/secrecy) as the standard solution for handling sensitive data throughout the codebase. |
| 74 | + |
| 75 | +### Implementation Details |
| 76 | + |
| 77 | +**Core Type**: `Secret<T>` from the `secrecy` crate |
| 78 | + |
| 79 | +```rust |
| 80 | +// src/shared/secret.rs |
| 81 | +pub use secrecy::{ExposeSecret, Secret, SecretString}; |
| 82 | +use secrecy::SerializableSecret; |
| 83 | + |
| 84 | +// Enable serialization for String secrets (required for config files) |
| 85 | +impl SerializableSecret for String {} |
| 86 | + |
| 87 | +// Domain-specific type aliases for clarity |
| 88 | +pub type ApiToken = Secret<String>; |
| 89 | +pub type Password = Secret<String>; |
| 90 | +``` |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | +**Usage Pattern**: |
| 93 | + |
| 94 | +```rust |
| 95 | +use crate::shared::{ApiToken, ExposeSecret}; |
| 96 | + |
| 97 | +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 98 | +pub struct HetznerConfig { |
| 99 | + pub api_token: ApiToken, // Automatically redacted in Debug |
| 100 | + // ... |
| 101 | +} |
| 102 | + |
| 103 | +// Creating with secret |
| 104 | +let config = HetznerConfig { |
| 105 | + api_token: Secret::new("token".to_string()), |
| 106 | +}; |
| 107 | + |
| 108 | +// Debug output is safe |
| 109 | +println!("{:?}", config); // HetznerConfig { api_token: Secret([REDACTED]) } |
| 110 | + |
| 111 | +// Explicit exposure when needed |
| 112 | +let token_str = config.api_token.expose_secret(); |
| 113 | +``` |
| 114 | + |
| 115 | +**Locations to Apply**: |
| 116 | + |
| 117 | +1. **Provider Secrets**: |
| 118 | + |
| 119 | + - `HetznerConfig.api_token` → `ApiToken` |
| 120 | + |
| 121 | +2. **Database Secrets**: |
| 122 | + |
| 123 | + - `MysqlConfig.password` → `Password` |
| 124 | + |
| 125 | +3. **API Secrets**: |
| 126 | + - `HttpApiSection.admin_token` → `ApiToken` |
| 127 | + - `HttpApiConfig.admin_token` → `ApiToken` |
| 128 | + |
| 129 | +## Rationale |
| 130 | + |
| 131 | +### Why `secrecy` Crate Over Custom Implementation? |
| 132 | + |
| 133 | +1. **Battle-Tested Security**: |
| 134 | + |
| 135 | + - Used by major Rust projects (diesel, sqlx, etc.) |
| 136 | + - Audited and maintained by security-conscious community |
| 137 | + - Implements best practices from cryptography experts |
| 138 | + |
| 139 | +2. **Memory Zeroing**: |
| 140 | + |
| 141 | + - Uses `zeroize` crate to securely wipe memory on drop |
| 142 | + - Prevents secrets from lingering in memory/swap/core dumps |
| 143 | + - Hard to implement correctly in custom solution |
| 144 | + |
| 145 | +3. **Industry Standard**: |
| 146 | + |
| 147 | + - De facto standard for secret handling in Rust |
| 148 | + - Well-documented with extensive examples |
| 149 | + - Future maintainers will recognize the pattern |
| 150 | + |
| 151 | +4. **Minimal Complexity**: |
| 152 | + |
| 153 | + - Single dependency (`secrecy` + transitive `zeroize`) |
| 154 | + - Simple API: `Secret::new()` and `expose_secret()` |
| 155 | + - Type aliases reduce boilerplate |
| 156 | + |
| 157 | +5. **Future-Proof**: |
| 158 | + - If security requirements evolve (audits, compliance), infrastructure is ready |
| 159 | + - Can easily add more advanced features if needed |
| 160 | + - No need to retrofit memory zeroing later |
| 161 | + |
| 162 | +### Why Not a Custom Type? |
| 163 | + |
| 164 | +**Pros of Custom**: |
| 165 | + |
| 166 | +- Zero dependencies |
| 167 | +- Full control |
| 168 | +- Simpler initial implementation |
| 169 | + |
| 170 | +**Cons of Custom** (Why we rejected it): |
| 171 | + |
| 172 | +- ❌ No memory zeroing (significant security gap) |
| 173 | +- ❌ Need to implement everything ourselves |
| 174 | +- ❌ Risk of security mistakes in implementation |
| 175 | +- ❌ Reinventing a well-solved problem |
| 176 | +- ❌ Future maintainers less likely to understand custom approach |
| 177 | + |
| 178 | +### Why Not a Hybrid Wrapper? |
| 179 | + |
| 180 | +A custom wrapper around `secrecy` would add: |
| 181 | + |
| 182 | +- Extra abstraction layers |
| 183 | +- More code to maintain |
| 184 | +- Learning curve for contributors |
| 185 | +- No significant benefits over direct usage |
| 186 | + |
| 187 | +The `secrecy` API is already simple and well-designed - wrapping it adds unnecessary complexity. |
| 188 | + |
| 189 | +## Consequences |
| 190 | + |
| 191 | +### Positive |
| 192 | + |
| 193 | +✅ **Security Improvements**: |
| 194 | + |
| 195 | +- Secrets automatically redacted in debug output |
| 196 | +- Memory securely wiped on drop (via `zeroize`) |
| 197 | +- Type-safe secret handling at compile time |
| 198 | +- Industry-standard security practices |
| 199 | + |
| 200 | +✅ **Code Quality**: |
| 201 | + |
| 202 | +- Clear identification of all secret values (grep for `Secret<T>`) |
| 203 | +- Explicit `expose_secret()` calls visible in code review |
| 204 | +- Type aliases improve readability (`ApiToken` vs `String`) |
| 205 | +- Consistent pattern across codebase |
| 206 | + |
| 207 | +✅ **Maintainability**: |
| 208 | + |
| 209 | +- Standard solution recognized by Rust developers |
| 210 | +- Extensive documentation and examples available |
| 211 | +- Community support and updates |
| 212 | +- Easy to audit secret usage |
| 213 | + |
| 214 | +✅ **Minimal Overhead**: |
| 215 | + |
| 216 | +- Small dependency (single crate + zeroize) |
| 217 | +- No runtime performance impact |
| 218 | +- `no_std` compatible (if we ever need it) |
| 219 | +- Well-maintained and stable |
| 220 | + |
| 221 | +### Negative |
| 222 | + |
| 223 | +⚠️ **Learning Curve**: |
| 224 | + |
| 225 | +- Contributors need to learn `expose_secret()` pattern |
| 226 | +- Must implement `SerializableSecret` marker trait per type |
| 227 | +- Slightly more verbose than plain `String` |
| 228 | + |
| 229 | +**Mitigation**: Add examples to `AGENTS.md` and create comprehensive ADR (this document). |
| 230 | + |
| 231 | +⚠️ **Serialization Boilerplate**: |
| 232 | + |
| 233 | +- Need `impl SerializableSecret for String {}` once |
| 234 | +- Intentional friction to prevent accidental serialization |
| 235 | + |
| 236 | +**Mitigation**: Single implementation covers all `Secret<String>` uses. |
| 237 | + |
| 238 | +⚠️ **Dependency Addition**: |
| 239 | + |
| 240 | +- Adds `secrecy` (~50KB) and `zeroize` (~20KB) to dependency tree |
| 241 | + |
| 242 | +**Mitigation**: Tiny, stable dependencies with strong security track record. |
| 243 | + |
| 244 | +### Migration Impact |
| 245 | + |
| 246 | +**Affected Modules** (requires updates): |
| 247 | + |
| 248 | +- `src/domain/provider/hetzner.rs` (API token) |
| 249 | +- `src/domain/tracker/database/mysql.rs` (password) |
| 250 | +- `src/application/command_handlers/create/config/tracker/http_api_section.rs` (admin token) |
| 251 | +- `src/domain/tracker/http_api.rs` (admin token) |
| 252 | +- All tests using these types |
| 253 | + |
| 254 | +**Breaking Changes**: None (internal refactoring only) |
| 255 | + |
| 256 | +**Timeline**: Estimated 2-3 sprints for complete migration |
| 257 | + |
| 258 | +## Alternatives Considered |
| 259 | + |
| 260 | +### Alternative 1: Custom `Secret<T>` Type |
| 261 | + |
| 262 | +```rust |
| 263 | +// Custom implementation |
| 264 | +pub struct Secret<T> { |
| 265 | + inner: T, |
| 266 | +} |
| 267 | + |
| 268 | +impl<T> Debug for Secret<T> { |
| 269 | + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { |
| 270 | + write!(f, "Secret([REDACTED])") |
| 271 | + } |
| 272 | +} |
| 273 | +``` |
| 274 | + |
| 275 | +**Rejected because**: |
| 276 | + |
| 277 | +- No memory zeroing on drop (major security gap) |
| 278 | +- Would need to add `zeroize` dependency anyway |
| 279 | +- Reinventing already-solved problem |
| 280 | +- More code to maintain and audit |
| 281 | +- Less trustworthy than community-vetted solution |
| 282 | + |
| 283 | +### Alternative 2: Manual Conventions |
| 284 | + |
| 285 | +Use comments and documentation to mark secret fields: |
| 286 | + |
| 287 | +```rust |
| 288 | +pub struct Config { |
| 289 | + /// SECRET: Never log this field |
| 290 | + pub api_token: String, |
| 291 | +} |
| 292 | +``` |
| 293 | + |
| 294 | +**Rejected because**: |
| 295 | + |
| 296 | +- No type-safety or compile-time guarantees |
| 297 | +- Easy to accidentally violate conventions |
| 298 | +- No automatic redaction of debug output |
| 299 | +- No memory security |
| 300 | +- Impossible to audit automatically |
| 301 | + |
| 302 | +### Alternative 3: `secrets` Crate |
| 303 | + |
| 304 | +Alternative crate with more advanced features (mlock, mprotect). |
| 305 | + |
| 306 | +**Rejected because**: |
| 307 | + |
| 308 | +- Requires `std` and `libc` (not `no_std` compatible) |
| 309 | +- Heavier dependency |
| 310 | +- More complexity than we currently need |
| 311 | +- `secrecy` is more widely adopted |
| 312 | + |
| 313 | +## Related Decisions |
| 314 | + |
| 315 | +- [Error Context Strategy](./error-context-strategy.md) - Errors must not expose secret values |
| 316 | +- [Actionable Error Messages](./actionable-error-messages.md) - Error messages must redact secrets |
| 317 | +- [Development Principles](../development-principles.md) - Security and observability principles |
| 318 | + |
| 319 | +## References |
| 320 | + |
| 321 | +- **Secrecy Crate**: https://docs.rs/secrecy/latest/secrecy/ |
| 322 | +- **Zeroize Crate**: https://docs.rs/zeroize/latest/zeroize/ |
| 323 | +- **Security Best Practices**: https://owasp.org/www-project-secure-coding-practices-quick-reference-guide/ |
| 324 | +- **Rust API Guidelines**: https://rust-lang.github.io/api-guidelines/ |
| 325 | +- **Related Issue**: [Secret Type Introduction Refactor Plan](../refactors/plans/secret-type-introduction.md) |
| 326 | + |
| 327 | +## Implementation Notes |
| 328 | + |
| 329 | +### Phase 1: Setup (Priority: P0) |
| 330 | + |
| 331 | +1. Add `secrecy` dependency to `Cargo.toml` |
| 332 | +2. Create `src/shared/secret.rs` module |
| 333 | +3. Export types and implement `SerializableSecret` for `String` |
| 334 | +4. Add type aliases: `ApiToken`, `Password`, `SecretString` |
| 335 | + |
| 336 | +### Phase 2: Provider Secrets (Priority: P1) |
| 337 | + |
| 338 | +1. Update `HetznerConfig.api_token` to use `ApiToken` |
| 339 | +2. Update all Hetzner-related tests |
| 340 | +3. Verify no secrets in debug output |
| 341 | + |
| 342 | +### Phase 3: Database Secrets (Priority: P2) |
| 343 | + |
| 344 | +1. Update `MysqlConfig.password` to use `Password` |
| 345 | +2. Update all MySQL-related tests |
| 346 | +3. Verify template rendering works correctly |
| 347 | + |
| 348 | +### Phase 4: API Secrets (Priority: P2) |
| 349 | + |
| 350 | +1. Update `HttpApiSection.admin_token` to use `ApiToken` |
| 351 | +2. Update `HttpApiConfig.admin_token` to use `ApiToken` |
| 352 | +3. Update all HTTP API tests |
| 353 | + |
| 354 | +### Phase 5: Documentation (Priority: P3) |
| 355 | + |
| 356 | +1. Update `AGENTS.md` with secret handling rule |
| 357 | +2. Add examples to module documentation |
| 358 | +3. Update contributing guidelines |
| 359 | + |
| 360 | +### Testing Verification |
| 361 | + |
| 362 | +For each phase, verify: |
| 363 | + |
| 364 | +- ✅ All unit tests pass |
| 365 | +- ✅ Debug output shows `[REDACTED]` instead of actual values |
| 366 | +- ✅ Serialization/deserialization works correctly |
| 367 | +- ✅ Error messages don't expose secrets |
| 368 | +- ✅ All linters pass (clippy, rustfmt, etc.) |
| 369 | + |
| 370 | +--- |
| 371 | + |
| 372 | +**Last Updated**: 2025-12-17 |
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