Update uscl_publications.bib

Author: tungnguyenkstnk58

_bibliography/uscl_publications.bib

@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ @inproceedings{Dong_ACC2026
 	title = {Fundamental limitations of sensitivity metrics for anomaly impact analysis in LTI systems},
 	booktitle = {American Control Conference (Accepted)},
 	abstract={This study establishes a connection between the output-to-output gain (OOG), a sensitivity metric quantifying the impact of stealthy attacks, and a novel input-to-input gain (IIG) introduced to evaluate fault sensitivity under disturbances, and investigates their fundamental performance limitations arising from the transmission zeros of the underlying dynamical system. Inspired by the OOG, which characterizes the maximum performance loss caused by stealthy attacks, the IIG is proposed as a new measure of robust fault sensitivity, and is defined as the maximum energy of undetectable faults for a given disturbance intensity. Then, using right (for OOG) and left (for IIG) co-prime factorizations, both metrics are expressed as the H-inf norm of a ratio of the numerator factors. This unified representation facilitates a systematic analysis of their fundamental limitations. Subsequently, by utilizing the Poisson integral relation, theoretical bounds for the IIG and OOG are derived, explicitly characterizing their fundamental limitations imposed by system \mbox{non-minimum} phase (NMP) zeros. Finally, a numerical example is employed to validate the results.},
-	published={0},
+	published={1},
 	year={2026},
 	arxiv={2509.11194},
 	tag={10005}
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ @article{Nguyen_TAC2026
 	journal = {IEEE Trans. Automatic Control (Accepted)},
 	title = {Scalable and Optimal Security Allocation in Networks against Stealthy Injection Attacks},
 	abstract={This paper addresses the security allocation problem in a networked control system under stealthy injection attacks. The networked system is comprised of interconnected subsystems which are represented by nodes in a digraph. An adversary compromises the system by injecting false data into several nodes with the aim of maximally disrupting the performance of the network while remaining stealthy to a defender. To minimize the impact of such stealthy attacks, the defender, with limited knowledge about attack policies and attack resources, allocates several sensors on nodes to impose the stealthiness constraint governing the attack policy. We provide an optimal security allocation algorithm to minimize the expected attack impact on the entire network. Furthermore, under a suitable local control design, the proposed security allocation algorithm can be executed in a scalable way. Finally, the obtained results are validated through several numerical examples.},
-	published={0},
+	published={1},
 	year={2026},
 	doi={10.1109/TAC.2025.3639126},
   	arxiv={2411.15319},