@@ -4621,7 +4621,35 @@ <h3>Private Browsing</h3>
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</ p >
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</ section >
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+ < section class ="informative ">
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+ < h3 > Issuer Cooperation Impacts on Privacy</ h3 >
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+
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+ < p >
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+ It cannot be overstated that < a > verifiable credentials</ a > rely on a high
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+ degree of trust in < a > issuers</ a > . The degree to which a < a > holder</ a > might take
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+ advantage of possible privacy protections often depends strongly on the support
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+ an < a > issuer</ a > provides for such features. In many cases, privacy protections
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+ which make use of zero-knowledge proofs, data minimization techniques, bearer
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+ credentials, abstract claims, and protections against signature-based
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+ correlation, require the < a > issuer</ a > to actively support such capabilities and
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+ incorporate them into the < a > verifiable credentials</ a > they issue.
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+ </ p >
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+ < p >
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+ It should also be noted that, in addition to a reliance on < a > issuer</ a >
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+ participation to provide < a > verifiable credential</ a > capabilities that help
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+ preserve < a > holder</ a > and < a > subject</ a > privacy, < a > holders</ a > rely on
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+ < a > issuers</ a > to not deliberately subvert privacy protections. For example, an
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+ < a > issuer</ a > might sign < a > verifiable credentials</ a > using a signature scheme
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+ that protects against signature-based correlation. This would protect the
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+ < a > holder</ a > from being correlated by the signature value as it is shared among
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+ < a > verifiers</ a > . However, if the < a > issuer</ a > creates a unique key for each
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+ issued < a > credential</ a > , it might be possible for the < a > issuer</ a > to track
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+ < a > presentations</ a > of the < a > credential</ a > , regardless of a < a > verifier</ a > 's
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+ inability to do so.
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+ </ p >
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+ </ section >
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+
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</ section >
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< section class ="informative ">
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