vanguard-frontier-agentic/.plugin-scanner.toml at master · VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic · GitHub

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# HOL AI Plugin Scanner configuration
# (hashgraph-online/ai-plugin-scanner-action — see .github/workflows/hol-plugin-scanner.yml)
#
# Path-scoped suppression of confirmed false positives. Secret-detection and all
# other rules stay ACTIVE on executable agent/skill/plugin code. We only exclude
# structured data, generated manifests, documentation, and test fixtures where a
# real secret is impossible or where secret-shaped strings are deliberate
# teaching/bait examples.
#
# Each entry below was confirmed against a specific code-scanning alert:
#   - catalog/**            machine-generated indexes; asset-integrity.json holds
#                           SHA256 hashes (high-entropy → false "hardcoded secret")
#   - docs/**, .claude/**   documentation & harness workflow playbooks (incl.
#                           red-team/acceptance docs that quote secret patterns)
#   - tests/**              maestro-routing fixtures, incl. credential "bait"
#                           inputs (e.g. *-gandi-key-storage-bait.json) that exist
#                           specifically to contain secret-shaped honeypot strings
#   - CHANGELOG.md          release notes
#   - .claude-plugin/plugin.json, .cursor-plugin/plugin.json
#                           generated plugin manifests (no secrets)
#   - **/metadata.json      agent/skill catalog metadata (no secrets by contract)
#   - scripts/*_data/**     generator INPUT DATA (JSON) consumed to render agents/
#                           skills; structured data, not executable code, and
#                           inherently dense with security/governance vocabulary —
#                           an application-security or live model-promotion agent's
#                           data file is ABOUT pickle/eval, hash/signature/integrity,
#                           credentials, and JIT/approval handling, which trips
#                           secret-shaped heuristics (confirmed on
#                           scripts/python_live_data/agents/10-*.json). The derived
#                           **/metadata.json is already exempt, and the generated
#                           executable AGENT.md/SKILL.md/harness files remain
#                           secret-scanned, so real secret coverage is unchanged.
#   - **/references/*.md    skill/agent reference docs that teach secret-detection
#                           patterns (sk-, Bearer, Password=, JDBC DSNs, etc.)
#   - scripts/install-codex-home.mjs
#                           spawnSync(cmd, argvArray) with no shell and no string
#                           interpolation → false "shell injection" finding
#   - plugins/**/.codex-plugin/plugin.json
#                           Note-level "interface asset/URL invalid" hints for
#                           optional fields (logo/screenshots/composerIcon/
#                           termsOfServiceURL) the manifests intentionally omit.
#                           The main bundle manifest is still secret-scanned by
#                           the listing-gate job (plugin_dir=plugins/...).
[scanner]
ignore_paths = [
  "catalog/**",
  "docs/**",
  "tests/**",
  ".claude/**",
  "CHANGELOG.md",
  "scripts/*_data/**",
  ".claude-plugin/plugin.json",
  ".cursor-plugin/plugin.json",
  "scripts/install-codex-home.mjs",
  "**/metadata.json",
  "**/references/*.md",
  "plugins/**/.codex-plugin/plugin.json",
]